

# THE EXPOSITOR

EDITED BY THE REV.

SIR W. ROBERTSON NICOLL, M.A., LL.D.

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## *THE NATURAL STRENGTH OF THE PSALMS.*<sup>1</sup>

FOR our present purpose it is enough to remember that the Book of Psalms is composed of several separate collections, edited by different hands and arranged for the Musical Service of the Second Temple. The dates of these are uncertain, but the whole Book was complete by 130 B.C. when its translation into Greek was already extant.

Nor need we trouble about the dates or authorship of single Psalms : and this for two reasons. The titles, which assign many of the Psalms to famous authors and even to particular episodes in their lives, appear to be due to the editors of the collections and are not reliable. Some do not agree with the contents of the verses to which they are prefixed ; and from a comparison of the Hebrew with the Septuagint, we find that the process of entitling Psalms previously anonymous continued to a late date and was pursued with arbitrariness. Whether any of the titles rest on a sound tradition it is impossible to say. Very few Psalms reflect history so minutely that we can be wholly sure of their date. Nor does the language always provide unmistakeable evidence. Pure Hebrew was written up to a late period ; conversely all the Aramaisms may not be due to the original writers ; some may have crept in upon the course of a long popular tradition. The conclusion of several moderns that we have no Psalms from the centuries before the Exile appears to me rash. David was too great a poet, as we see from his dirge on Saul and Jonathan, of too

<sup>1</sup> Being a Murtle Lecture delivered before the University of Aberdeen.

sensitive a heart towards the God of his people, and too closely associated with the ecstatic religious movement of his youth, to allow us to dismiss the tradition which links his name to the origins of religious Psalmody in Israel. It is improbable, also, that the epochs of the great Prophets, who delivered many of their oracles in the rhythms of poetry, did not contribute to the Psalter. But to go beyond such general inferences, and seek to prove the authorship of particular Psalms, is a precarious if not impossible task ; and that not only for the reasons given but because of the following.

Religious poetry, however personal in its origins, tends to lose many traces of these when it passes into popular use and is pressed into a national liturgy. Local and temporary features change or disappear. The feelings of the individual merge into those of the community. Additions or alterations may be made, to overtake the riper experience, the more definite doctrines or the purer tastes of later generations. Some of the early Christian hymnody grew in this way till its individual sources were overwhelmed or forgotten ; and we now hear in it the praise of the Church as a whole surging with the struggles and victories of many generations. Even our modern hymns have not escaped modification. The histories of several of these prove how at all times hymns grow, and grow—not always but frequently—from good to better.

The religious poetry of Israel suffered such changes in times when the rules of literary tradition were less severe than they are among ourselves. The Psalms bear evidence of the following. Sometimes the Divine Names were changed to suit the religious temper of a new school. Sometimes a hymn of praise to God in Nature was adapted to celebrate also His covenant mercies to His people. Sometimes two hymns of different origins, subjects and metres



were combined. And sometimes apparently the experiences or aspirations of the individual were mingled with, or absorbed in, those of the nation as a whole, till it is very difficult to know whether we should interpret certain Psalms as personal or national. This fusion was the more easy that the pious Israelite ran his own sorrows, problems and hopes into those of his people. The Israelite was Israel. His faith in God rested on her past. His piety grew out of her tribal discipline and worship; and he thought of no future for himself apart from her national ideals. The same cruel facts which baffled the destiny of the nation frustrated also his private rights—the oppressions of the innocent by the wicked—so that even in this most personal of his problems he felt himself one with her. Whether such fusion of the person and the people be original to the authors of the Psalms or due to the adaptations which I have described, we cannot separate the two. Let us cease, therefore, from the search after individual dates and authors, with whom at the best we can attain only the faintest of touches. From all such groping on hands and knees, let us stand up, and reverently look to the one essential unmistakeable Figure of the Nation as a whole: Israel the real author as she has been the age-long singer of the Psalms: “our Mother of Sorrows, our mistress in pain and in patience, at whose knees we have all learned our first prayers of penitence and confession.”<sup>1</sup>

We must, therefore, expect in the Psalms much that is national and racial. They betray the hereditary qualities of Israel; a people sprung from generations of shepherds, in whom their deserts had bred a long patience of hunger broken by fits of rancour and ferocity; untrained to speculation and incapable of sustained argument; interested in the facts of life and religion almost exclusively for their

<sup>1</sup> *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, i. 435.

practical bearing on the observer of them and his tribe ; a people to whom from time immemorial religion has been a concern more of the tribe than of the individual. First as shepherds, with the desert shepherds' dislike of fields and fear of towns, and then slowly drawn to agriculture ; they were at last concentrated with all their worship and politics upon a single city : their only altar, their highest school, their final court of appeal ; whose destruction and their long exile from her only made her the more indispensable to their faith and hope.<sup>1</sup>

These racial qualities and political experiences resound through the Psalter. We find in it the desert-born patience, disturbed, as in the cursing Psalms, by fits of rancour, into which such patience always breaks down—whether it be bred of a famine of food or of a famine of justice. We trace the Semitic mind, dull to the ultimate problems of being and knowledge, but alert, like the sentinel of the desert-camp, to the practical meaning of phenomena for the singer himself and his tribe ; taking God and His Nature for granted, but watchful and sometimes jealous of His ways with men. We see the ancient forms of religion, subordinating the individual to the nation ; and only at the last, and then with difficulty, daring to conceive for him another life with God after he sinks from their living fellowship on earth. We recognise the Semitic imagination, incapable of sustained drama or epic ; but wonderful in its lyric music and power of vivid metaphor, whether the subject be the moral experience of men or the beauty of the world. The fondest figures of the poetry are drawn from the oldest memories of Israel, their camps and marches in the wilderness ; or from their present surroundings, the pastures of the flocks and the furrows and fields of the husbandmen, embraced by the desert and looking across

<sup>1</sup> See the writer's *Jerusalem*, vol. ii. ch. xi.



the sea. But over all these landscapes rise dominant the bulwarks and towers of the City of the musical name, Jerusalem, the Temple with its ceaseless smoke of sacrifice and the lines of chanting pilgrims coming up to it over the mountains.

Yet a deeper humanity moves beneath; else the Psalter had never become the confessional of so many other races. The national forms of the feeling of the Psalms are so flexible, just by reason of their vitality, that we Western peoples have easily used them—even to particular turns of their terminology—in order to express our own struggles for liberty, our own migrations and banishments. There is, too, in the Psalms the revolt of the individual conscience against the racial tempers, the national ethics and the dogmas of the past; against, for instance, the obdurate creed that suffering proves the guilt of the sufferer; or against the idea that animal sacrifice and ritual are what God demands from men; or against that hopeless outlook beyond the grave to which Semitic religions conspired in condemning the individual. All the Psalms which treat of these subjects assert a man's rights as man with God, both in this life and in that which is to come. But whether in enthusiasm for the traditional forms or in protest against them; whether rising upon the national ideals or searching the heart of the individual or asserting his conscience; whether in the quest for God or in the fullness of His Presence; whether in the joy of life or in the fear of death; whether in the quarrel for justice or in satisfaction with God's world; whether for war or peace, doubt or faith, hate or love—the frankness, honesty and force of the Psalms are everywhere apparent: their whole-heartedness, their untamed, unstinted expression of all that was in the hearts of the men who wrote them—

Bless the Lord, O my soul,  
And all that is within me, bless His Holy Name.



For more than blessing did the souls of the Psalmists fulfil this call upon them. "I may truly name this book," says John Calvin, "the anatomy of all parts of the soul; for no one can feel a movement of the spirit which is not reflected in this mirror. All the sorrows, troubles, fears, doubts, hopes, pains, perplexities and stormy outbreaks, by which the hearts of men are tossed, have here been depicted by the Spirit to the very life." And one of our own Puritans, using the same figure, says that the Psalms are "as it were the anatomy of a man. In other portions of Scripture God speaks to us, but in the Psalms men speak to God and their own hearts." Variable as the heart, the Psalter is as hospitable to every experience, passion and purpose. Human nature is confessed with a thoroughness to which every generation of men has borne immediate testimony. And this is the secret of the Psalms' perennial strength.

Their frankness appears in many aspects. I begin with one of the darkest, the expression of Hatred and the passion for Revenge. In times of slander and persecution, the hunger for justice grew awful in the heart of the Jew, and he did not mitigate his anger before the Lord. Take these verses from Psalm cix.: with usually three, but sometimes four, and sometimes only two, stresses to the line; to my ear a natural measure for the hurried curses launched by the Psalmist at his foe, the very irregularity of the rhythm assisting the effect.

Oh God of my praise, be not dumb!  
 For the mouth of the godless is opened upon me.  
 They speak against me with a lying tongue.  
 With words of hate they environ me,  
 They fight me for nothing!  
 Evil for good they return me  
 And hate for my love.  
 Oh commission the godless to judge him,

And may Satan stand his accuser!<sup>1</sup>  
 In his trial may he come forth a felon,  
 And his prayer but add to his sin!  
 May his days be few,  
 And another receive his office!  
 Let his children be orphans,  
 And his wife a widow!  
 His children be vagabond beggars,  
 And driven out of their rookeries! . . .  
 Be none to shew him a kindness,  
 Nor any to pity his orphans.  
 Let his father's guilt be remembered,  
 Nor the sin of his mother effaced.

Or these from Psalm xxxv. 5, 6—alternately 3 and 2 stresses—

As chaff before wind let them be,  
 And His Angel to drive them.  
 Dark be their way and slippery,  
 And His Angel to hunt them.

Or these from Psalm lviii.—4 stresses to the line—

O God, break Thou their teeth in their mouth,  
 Break out the tusks of the lions, O Lord.  
 Let them melt as water run down on its tracks;  
 May He shoot His shafts at them, they perish! (?)  
 The just shall rejoice when he sees revenge:  
 His feet he shall wash in the blood of the wicked.

Or the close of Psalm cxxxvii.—

Daughter of Babylon, doomed to destruction,  
 Happy who deals thee  
 The dole thou dealedst to us!  
 Happy who seizeth and dasheth  
 On the rocks thy little ones!

This we must regard as the delirium of the conscience—a delirium produced by a famine of justice. Men are frenzied through a famine of bread. If they were not we should not believe the extremity of their hunger. The delirium is, of course, morbid, but it is genuine. And so with many other outbursts of hatred which might be quoted. They are pathological, but they are authentic: proofs

<sup>1</sup> Literally: *at his right hand*.

that we have in the Psalms the utterances of real men and not of professional worshippers acting out their thin show before God and the ages.

One other observation is necessary. In the horror with which we shrink from such frank prayers—whose feeling, let us remember at the same time, is as sincere as our recoil from it—we can read the measure of the great change which the teaching and example of Jesus have produced on the ethical instincts of mankind. He has mitigated the virulence of this disease of the human heart: He has altered the moral atmosphere.

The frankness of the Psalms is also evident in the expression which they give to Doubt. Belief was not easy to many of the Psalmists and they let us feel it. One symptom of this is the sudden defiance and revolt, with which some Psalms open, against “the everlasting No,”<sup>1</sup> emphasising by a strong initial interjection or disjunctive particle, that upon their high flight of faith they are breaking from some deep imprisonment of doubt. Thus in Psalm lxii. 1, 2—

Ah but to God be still, my soul!  
From Him is my hope.  
Ah but He my rock, my salvation!  
My height,<sup>2</sup> I shall not waver.

Or in Psalm lxxiii.—

Ah but<sup>3</sup> good to Israel is God,  
To the pure of heart!

<sup>1</sup> “The Everlasting No had said: Behold, thou art fatherless, outcast, and the universe is mine (the devil’s); to which my whole Me now made answer: *I* am not thine, but free and for ever hate thee.” *Sartor Resartus*, 156 f. Carlyle calls this protest “the most important transaction in his life . . . in a psychological point of view.”

<sup>2</sup> *High, or vantage ground.*

<sup>3</sup> 𐤁𐤏. The simpler *but* in the same connexion is the conjunction 𐤁: e.g. Psalms xciv. 22; cii. 13, 28; ciii. 17; cix. 21 (all in the Hebrew numbering). The turn of the protest is frequently on the stronger 𐤁𐤏𐤁𐤏 = But Thou!

Sometimes it is the intolerable silence of God which weighs on the Psalmist, always in contrast to man's cries to Him, as in the line quoted already from Psalm cix. or in the similar openings of lxxxiii. and xxviii.

O God of my praise, be not dumb!

O God, be not dumb!

Be not silent nor still, O God.

To thee, O my Rock, I call.

Be Thou not deaf from me!

Lest in the hush I lose Thee,

And be mated with those that sink to the pit.

Or, again, it is abandonment by men and utter solitude—a soul starved of love and the light of kind faces, as in Psalm lxxxviii.

Lover and friend hast thou put far from me,

My familiar the darkness!

As I have said elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> the two greatest lonelines of life—the loneliness of death is different—are the loneliness of temptation and of power, of the depth and of the height. Religion seeks to mitigate the rigour of the first of these by recalling to the battlefields of the heart the memories of the great spirits who have already fought and conquered there; and the Psalmists, like the Prophets, are strong to remind us that in our moral struggles God Himself shall also be found on our right hand a comrade and keeper. But the Psalter has also comfort for the less remembered loneliness of the height. When a man is led to the unshareable duty of a great decision, or called to the quest for truth, or given the charge of other lives, or lifted above his fellows in authority or vision, there springs in him a yearning to cling to, and nestle in, and be shadowed by, something bigger than himself. It is perhaps a king who says in Psalm lxi.—

When my heart is overwhelmed,

Lead me to the Rock higher than I.

<sup>1</sup> *Four Psalms*, 124 f.



The most frequent cause of doubt in Israel was the problem of the fortunate wicked, and the seeming vanity of righteousness.

But I, my feet were almost gone,  
My steps had wellnigh slipped,  
For I was envious at the arrogant,  
I saw the health of the wicked . . .  
But in vain have I cleansed my heart,  
And washed my hands in innocence !

Yet in this same psalm there is another note of frankness, which is easily missed by the reader. With great honesty the Psalmist confesses that not all of his doubt had been due to the facts of experience, but some also to his ignorance and bad temper.

For my heart was in ferment,  
I was stung in my reins,  
Yea I was brutish and knew not,  
Was a beast beside Thee !

In our doubt are we always as candid as this ? Do not let us charge all our scepticism or despair on our hard experience. Some of it may be due to our short sight and shorter temper.

But among those mingled streams of hate and the passion for vengeance, of fear and complaint and doubt—over which the Spirit of God moves as over another chaos—the darkest surge is the sense of guilt. In the Psalms we see one soul after another writhing upwards from a pain which at first it does not understand with the cry : What is this that keeps God from answering me ? We see it turning like a smitten animal from the face of its master back upon its sore till at last intelligence breaks and the soul is strengthened to bear its penalty by the sheer knowledge that this is deserved. The psychology of such psalms is interesting ; for even before the man becomes assured of pardon his cowardice goes and by con-



fession he wins a certain nobility and power of endurance :  
Psalm xxxii.

When I kept silence my bones did moulder,  
Thorough my groaning all the day ;  
For day and night Thy hand oppressed me,  
My sap was turned to summer's drought.  
My sin I confessed, and my guilt I hid not.  
I said I will own my sin to Yahweh,  
And Thou, Thou forgavest the guilt of my sin.<sup>1</sup>

This is but a longer expression of the verse in Lamentations—

Why doth a living man complain,  
A man for the punishment of his sin ?

On the subject of sin the sincerity of the Psalms is carried to a degree that disturbs and blackens their art. The cowardice of sin, the malversation or breach of trust ; the loneliness ; the shame ; the rottenness and leprosy, the equal curse on body and soul are rendered in all their ugliness. Sobs and groans, and the lamentable cries of disease borne with a bad conscience are heard, which never would have been heard had it been artfulness and not utter honesty which had been the spirit of the singers : e.g. Psalms xxxviii. 3-5, li. 3, cxxx. 3 : the first again in the long line of 4 stresses—

Nought sound in my flesh before Thy wrath,  
Nor health in my bones before my sin.  
For my crimes pass over my head,  
Like a heavy load—too heavy for me !  
Stinking, foul are my wounds for my folly.  
For my rebellion I—I—know  
And my sin is ever before me.  
If Thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquities,  
O Lord, who shall stand ?

Is it wonderful that with so unsparing a conscience the Psalter should have become the confessional of half the world ?

<sup>1</sup> The original rhythm, lines of four accents or stresses each, falls easily into English.

After these confessions of sin we may take those opposite asseverations of the singer's righteousness and integrity, which it must sometimes puzzle the Christian to find in the same Canon that contains the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican : e.g. Psalm xviii. 20.

The Lord rewards me after my righteousness,  
After the cleanness of my hands, He requites me.  
For the ways of the Lord I have kept,  
And not viciously lapsed from my God.  
So have I been perfect before Him  
And have kept me from mine iniquity.

On such passages I would remark that they are further proof that the Psalms have not been curbed or stinted in the interest of a system of theology, but have been left free to express all the movers of the spirit of man. The speaker in such Psalms is sometimes the congregation of Israel as a whole, justly sensible that in general they have been faithful to the Law under the tyranny of the heathen ; and sometimes, as in the Book of Job, the individual in revolt against the dogma that his suffering is a proof of guilt. But above all we may again read here the measure of the difference Christ has made by so revealing the infiniteness of the moral ideal and of our responsibilities towards it, that since He came and perfectly kept the Law none of us can say we have even approached its fulfilment.

I have no time to describe the free enjoyment of God's world and of the riches He has stored in it, which some of the Psalms express. The power of the open air and of the skies rests upon them ; and, with their sense of the beauty and awfulness of the universe, renders them healthy examples for our own worship. They breathe a full joy in God's gifts of birds, beasts and fishes, corn, oil and wine ; an exultation in fire and wind, frost and snow ; and even a relish of the more uncouth forms of animal life, e.g. Psalm civ. 26.

Leviathan, whom Thou hast formed to play with him.<sup>1</sup>

This fragment may serve to remind us of the liberal use which some Psalmists make of the figures of the popular mythology of their time : to illustrate that fully would require another lecture.

As we should expect from a people of highland warriors, and cragsmen, whose God was their Battle-Lord, we have such wholehearted songs of challenge and of triumph as the following : Psalm xviii. 31-34, 36, 29—

For who besides Yahweh is God,  
And who save our God is a Rock ?  
The God who girds me with strength  
And maketh my way secure,  
Who evens my feet to the hinds'  
And stands me up on my heights ;  
Who traineth my hands to war  
Till my arms bend bows of brass.  
Thou<sup>1</sup> broadenest my steps beneath me,  
That my ankles do not swerve,  
For by Thee do I scatter a troop,  
And by my God I leap over a wall.

Or the sheer strength of the antiphon in Psalm xxiv.  
7-10—

Lift up, O gates, your heads ;  
And be lifted, ye doors everlasting,  
That the King of Glory may enter !  
Who then is the King of Glory ?  
Yahweh the mighty, the hero,  
Yahweh the hero of war.  
Lift up, O gates, your heads,  
And be lifted, ye doors everlasting !  
Who then is He, the King of Glory ?  
Yahweh of Hosts, He King of Glory.

These then, but imperfectly rendered, are features of the Psalter, some of which may have been taken by the Christian heart for offences or scandals, whereas all are marks of the force and genuineness of the Psalms, of

<sup>1</sup> The most probable rendering : cf. Job xli. 5 and the Babylonian mythology on which that passage is based.

their honest and natural humanity. Consider the bearing of this upon their religious testimony. Thomas Carlyle used to say of his father that he did not know any man whose "spiritual faculties had such a stamp of natural strength." This is the proof and the charm of the Psalter. As spiritual witnesses the Psalms have "the stamp of natural strength." Genuine in their humanity they cannot fail when they come to us with their messages from God. Honest in their telling of earthly things, they are the more to be trusted when they bring us the heavenly.

For all the drifts and motions which we have been considering, stained as they are by the earthiness of the basin and channels in which they move, are only tides : surges deriving their force and their direction from above. If that derivation be correct, which identifies *El*, the common Semitic name for God, with the preposition meaning *to*, as though God were the Great Towards, the desire and final goal of man's heart : then nowhere does the name receive fuller illustration than in the Psalms of Israel. For the whole secret of their unrest, their passion and their rhythm, is God Himself : the end of their aspirations the satisfaction of their desire, the return and the rest of all their argument. When Balaak brought Balaam to look upon Israel that half-inspired prophet said of the people—

Yahweh their God is with them  
And the noise of a King among them.

They had then no human king : they were a crowd of tribes so loosely bound that after a few years they broke apart. But in the confused noise which rose from their camp by the Jordan to his lonely station on the heights of Moab, this discerning Pagan caught the rhythm of a natural life conscious of leadership and musical with memories of deliverance ; the heart of a people throbbing towards their God, the murmur of a divine destiny. So are the Psalms

to us who look and listen across them : the *noise of a King* is through them all.

Bless the Lord, O my soul,  
And all that is within me, bless His Holy Name.

GEORGE ADAM SMITH.

## THE BIBLE.<sup>1</sup>

### I.

WHY do we read the Bible ? Why do we teach it ? Why do we set it in a place of its own, apart from other books and above them ?

Once the question might have been easily answered. There was a time—it is past now—when men believed in “verbal inspiration” ; believed that every verse, every line, every letter of the book was divinely, infallibly, and equally inspired ; believed in an inspired original, an inspired translation, and, I might almost say, an inspired punctuation. That simple and unquestioning faith has not come down to us. Our lot is cast in darker, stormier days ; we cannot break with the present unless we break with ourselves. We cling to a belief in inspiration, but we are often in doubt as to what inspiration means. We are eager to get at the meaning of the Book, but we are perplexed as to the true method of interpretation. That is the experience of men and women inside the churches as well as outside them. It is your experience and mine.

But still we read and revere : why ? Let me try to answer the question, not for theologians, scholars, or philosophers, but for ordinary men and women living under commonplace conditions. I shall assume nothing ; shall start with no theory. I ask what men without bias, with-

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered at Leeds to University students and others on November 5, 1911.



out prejudice, have thought of the Book. We might call thousands—tens of thousands—as witnesses; put them in the box and ask them for their testimony: men of to-day; men of the past; men who have helped to make the world; men whom the world has broken; men who have been lights and leaders; men who have lived alone and obscure. And the voice of the living present, the voice of the vanished past, the voice of society, and the voice of solitude, the voice of all classes, of all conditions of men, would make answer and say *The Book*.

Will you listen to some of those voices?

Take Thomas Carlyle—that austere prophet who proclaimed the gospel of duty rather than the gospel of love, and in the strength of it loyally served the Master whom he could not always see: what has he to say?

“There never was any book like the Bible, and there will never be such another.”

Put the same question to his countryman, Walter Scott, foremost in genius, foremost in fame, when his sun is setting in clouds of ruin and storm: how does he answer it?

“Read to me”—he said.

“What shall I read?” said Lockhart, who was watching by his bed.

“Can you ask me?” Scott replied, and bade him read a chapter in the Gospel of John.

No book like this.

And then I turn to one, dearer to me, if not greater than Scott or Carlyle, who suffered much and loved much, and in hiding the pain was apt to hide the love. It would be easy to find a score of passages in which Thackeray caught his inspiration from gospel or from psalm. But there is one passage in which he reveals himself unconsciously; and unconscious revelations are the surest. You remember the story of George Warrington in *Pendennis*—the young man

who has made shipwreck, and has to atone for a single act of folly by a life without ambition, without love, and almost without hope. He is left to face it all, alone ; alone with the flowers that recall the vision of joy that has come and passed him by, and with the Bible that a grateful mother has left as a parting gift ; the fading flowers, and the unfading book ; alone with them, alone with the night.

“ And the morning found him still reading in its awful pages, in which so many stricken hearts, in which so many tender and faithful souls have found comfort under calamity, and refuge and hope in affliction.”

Calamity, affliction, broken hearts : yes, no book for them like this.

May I call one witness more, and only one ? It shall be Charles Dickens, who did so much to make life more brotherly and more humane. But again one has to choose. I might give you the well-known words of his will ; but a will is a formal thing : the making of it is a solemn act ; and the words of it owe something of their impressiveness to the importance of the occasion. And so I prefer to take the letter written to his youngest son, when the boy was leaving home to join his brother in Australia, just because the letter is so unstudied, so simple, and comes so straight from the heart, and because sometimes we are wiser for our children than we are for ourselves.

“ I put a New Testament among your books, for the very same reasons, and with the same hopes, that made me write an easy account of it for you, when you were a little child. Because it is the best book that ever was, or will be, known in the world ; and because it teaches you the best lessons by which any human creature who tries to be truthful and faithful to duty can possibly be guided. As your brothers have gone away, one by one, I have written to them such words as I am now writing to you, and have entreated them

all to guide themselves by the Book, putting aside the interpretations and inventions of man."

A lamp and a guide to the feet when life is beginning ; a spring of comfort and of strength in the stress and sorrow of life ; a rod and a staff in the dark valley at the close of life : no book like the Bible.

You have heard the testimony. But what of the witnesses, and their right to speak. They speak with authority, not because they were men of learning, but because they were masters of the human heart ; because human nature, in its hopes and dreams, in its possibilities of joy and sorrow, in its greatness and its degradation, was an open book to them ; because they could read and interpret the secrets of the soul ; because their genius, through sympathy with men nobler than themselves, with men like themselves, and with men baser than themselves, their imagination and their insight, gave them a right to speak, not for themselves only, but for the race, on things that concern human nature and human life. When they speak of such things they speak of what they know, and we are bound to heed what they say. It is this fact that gives to their testimony such supreme value.

## II.

And now, do you see, we have got down to bed-rock ? Religion—in the truest and deepest sense of the word—is a thing of experiment, a thing of experience. We discover its worth by living, not by study ; not by criticism, but by action. "The certainty of faith" as Bishop Creighton said, "comes from believing." "If any man willeth to do his will he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." It is by experience that we are to test the message of the Bible. The Bible itself is one long record of faith, and the experience of faith.

It is for spiritual experience, spiritual truth, that we should go to the Bible ; not for science, not for history, not for other knowledge of the same kind. For it is a law of the divine economy not to do for man what man can do for himself. If we go to the Bible for science, it will not serve us. Its purpose is not to answer the questions that science can, but the questions that science can not answer. It does not tell us when or how the world was made : it tells us Who made it. It does not tell us how man was created : it tells us Who created him, and why he was created. It passes through the doors of mystery to which science has no key ; it solves the problems before which science stands, and has ever stood, helpless and dumb. And that the mind of man may understand—the simplest mind and the humblest, the mind of man in all races, in all times, in all lands—it embodies the truth in imagery. The Bible begins with parable in the book of Genesis, and ends with parable in the book of the Revelation. The trouble came because we went to it for what it does not try to give us, and because we did not read aright the message that it holds.

### III.

I have been speaking of experience, as a test of religious truth, as an element of religious conviction. Let us apply the principle to the Gospels of the New Testament.

I admit, frankly and without reserve, that it makes a difference, an immeasurable difference, whether on the one hand the story that the Gospels contain, or the substance of it, was written by men who had either seen the things that they recorded, or had heard them from the lips of those who had lived with the Master ; or whether, on the other hand, those Gospels were written by men who lived a century or more later, and without anything to help them in their task save tradition and legend. Criticism has its place.

The Gospels cannot evade the test. We do not ask that they should. But I say this—that the court of criticism is not the court of final appeal—that the last word does not lie with it.

Let us assume—it is an enormous assumption—that the critics have come to their work without bias ; that they have done their work without prejudice ; that they have reached a general agreement in their conclusions ; that their conclusions have stood unchallenged for thirty, twenty, or even ten years ; that they have proved to their own satisfaction that the Gospels were not written when we believed them to be written, and that they were not written by the men whom we believed to have written them. What then ? What has criticism done ? It has touched the record : it has not touched the revelation.

Indeed, when we have got so far, our difficulties are only beginning. I might dwell on the difficulty of explaining in any reasonable way how men, not only obscure but unknown, should have had the genius—the literary, intellectual, and moral genius—to weave broken memories and fading legends into a work that stands imperishable and immortal, steadfast amid the ruinous sea of change. What answer—what sufficient answer—is there to that question ? We have a right to put the question and to insist that the question shall be answered.

Or we might fairly urge this :—if the echoes are so marvellous, what must the voice have been ? If the shadow, the dim and distant shadow, the shadowy presence with its shadowy crown, stands before the world in such regal majesty, what of the Person ? The wider the gulf of time between the men who wrote and Him of whom they wrote, the greater the mystery, the more overwhelming the marvel.

But a more profound problem is before us : the problem not of literature, but of life.



Blot out the record : the revelation remains. Discredit the messengers : the message survives. Dismiss the testimony of the Book : the testimony of experience is left. How shall we deal with that evidence ? How shall we deal with those witnesses ? How can we refuse to take account of them ? How can any theory that does not take account of them be accepted as adequate or complete ? In science, a theory, if it is to hold us, must account for all the facts—for all the things that we *see*. In religion, too, a theory must account for all the facts—for all that we *feel*. A theory that deals with a part and not with the whole, is a delusion. It must account for everything, if it is to account for anything.

And how much there is to account for. From generation after generation, from century after century, from men divided by speech, by custom, by character, by calling, the evidence flows in ; and the evidence agrees. They tell us that when burdened by the sense of sin they listened to the message of the Book and found peace. They tell us that when evil, which they knew to be evil, held them in its iron grip, they listened to the message and found deliverance. They tell us that in the dark hours when death came, or sorrow, or pain, they listened to the message, and listening found comfort and strength. They tell us that in their own experience the miracles of redemption and deliverance and healing have been repeated in new and marvellous forms. They state the facts in different ways. But as to the facts themselves, the facts of pardon, restoration, freedom, the power and the presence of Christ in the heart, they agree. Can we set aside a mass of evidence like this ? Is there any way of explaining the facts simpler and surer than the explanation of the Bible ?

There was a time when some lines of Matthew Arnold seemed to me supremely beautiful and supremely true.

In a series of superb stanzas he traces the rise of ancient civilization, its consummation, its corruption, its decay, and its despair ; and with it he contrasts the new faith that came into the world and transformed the world. It would have been salvation, he feels in these days of doubt and depression,—it would have been bliss to have lived then.

“ Oh, had I lived in that great day,  
How had its glory new  
Fill'd earth and heaven, and caught away  
My ravished spirit too !  
No thoughts that to the world belong  
Had stood against the wave  
Of love which set so deep and strong  
From Christ's then open grave.”

I still feel the beauty of the lines : I have learnt to doubt their truth. At the best they are but half true. We have lost much that was given to those early days, but we have gained more.

Ask yourselves what it must have meant when the Christian faith was still a new thing, when Christ's was a new name, when His followers were nameless—what it must have meant then to make the great experiment of faith, and to make it for the first time ; what it must have meant to break with traditions and associations, to abandon the familiar home and to go out into a strange and unknown land, to leave all, and follow Him.

We have so much, I repeat, where they had so little : nations and centuries bearing evidence, the evidence of experience, where they had but the testimony of solitary souls. So many have made the venture now ; so many have tried the experiment ; so many have tested the truth of the message by living, and by living have found it to be true. Criticism has its place. But experience has its place too. And while we listen to what criticism has to say about the record, we shall listen, if we are wise, to what

experience has to tell us about the revelation. We shall appeal from the jury of the day to the tribunal of the ages.

“Never man spake as this man”—that was the verdict of the generation that listened to the Master. “Never book spake as this Book”—that has been the verdict of generations that have heard its message: that is still the verdict of those who listen to it to-day.

Be content to leave many things unexplained. This is a world of mystery; you and I are mysteries to ourselves; the meanest flower that blows has its own impenetrable secret; the viewless wind of heaven is as full of mystery as the splendour of the midnight sky. Be content to leave many difficulties unsolved; a thousand difficulties do not make one doubt. And as for doctrine, which represents the effort of man to reduce to a logical system things that transcend logic, to express in terms of finite reason truths that are infinite, remember this—that as doctrine is expressed in speech that changes with the changes of the world, so it is also shaped and fashioned by the changing ideas of man, and that it follows and obeys the great movements of human thought. Doctrine, philosophy, thought, speech, these are things that change. But human nature remains the same; and the human heart and its needs remain unchanged; and the great facts of life—sin and sorrow and pain, and the love of what is good, and the consciousness of dependence on something higher than ourselves and better than ourselves at our best—these are things that abide.

Teach these facts, the facts of spiritual experience, not the printed book, but what your own soul has felt and seen and known, and the divine message that you yourself have heard from the voice with which God speaks to man and in man—teach these things, your own experience, what you know, not more but not less, with the passion of personal conviction and the fervour of living faith, and then you will

find that your teaching has not been in vain. For then, like your Master, you will teach with authority, and not as teach the Scribes.

Take the Book into your life. Try the precepts, test the promises ; not in thought but in action ; not in the study but in the school, the shop and the street. Prove them, not by the experience of others, but by your own. And then you will revere even more than you revere to-day the Book in which the Divine Law and the Divine Love are proclaimed and revealed ; and with new loyalty and devotion you will adore, trust and obey the Person—the Living, the Eternal Saviour—from Whom the Book derives its power.

ALFRED DALE.

### THE BOOK OF JUDGES.

#### III. DEBORAH AND BARAK.

THE Judges, as we have seen, were local leaders, who rose up to save and deliver particular districts of Israelite territory, when danger threatened. This time the area threatened was in the north. The "Great Plain," as Josephus calls it, the "Plain of Megiddo" (2 Chron. xxxv. 22 ; Zech. xii. 11), through which the Kishon flows, bounded on the N. by the Galilæan hills and Tabor, on the E. by "Little Hermon" (*Jebel Dahî*), Jezreel, and the back of the Gilboa range, and on the S.W. by the mountains stretching out to the N.W., and ending in Carmel, is held by the Canaanites : Sisera, their leader, has his residence at Harosheth, which is identified, if not certainly, yet very plausibly, with *Tell el-Hārithiyeh*, very near the right bank of the Kishon, on the slope of an outlying spur of the Galilæan hills, which projects into the plain opposite to Carmel, and thus, as sheet V. of the great P. E. F. Map at once shows us, forms a narrow pass, less than a mile across, through which, close

at the foot of the Carmel range, the Kishon flows to its mouth in the Bay of Acre. The hills above El-Hārithiyeh are covered now with a fine oak forest. The Tell consists of a large double mound, with remains of walls and buildings ; and a stronghold on it would effectually command the entrance to the Great Plain from Acre (the ancient *Accho*), and the commercial highways which led through it.<sup>1</sup> Megiddo, Taanach and Ibleam,<sup>2</sup> on the slope of the hills on the S.W. and S. of the Great Plain are Canaanite fortresses (Jud. i. 27). As is now well known, Megiddo and Taanach have been recently excavated, and extensive remains of the ancient walls have been discovered.<sup>3</sup> The Vale of Jezreel, leading down on the E. of Jezreel into the Jordan valley, with the fortress of Beth-shean, at the bottom, is also held by Canaanites (Josh. xvii. 16, cited on p. 397). The historical significance of all this is that the four northern tribes, Issachar, Zebulun, Asher, and Naphtali, are cut off from the tribes of Central Canaan : the national unity of Israel is imperilled by the aggressive movements now being made by the Canaanites ; and the removal of the danger is a national concern.

Such, briefly, is the historical situation. Before proceeding further, however, we must consider our literary sources. We have two accounts of Deborah and Barak, a prose

<sup>1</sup> See Thomson, *The Land and the Book, Central Palestine*, pp. 215, 216 ; Moore, *Judges*, p. 122.

<sup>2</sup> Probably, where *Bileam* (a name found only in 1 Chron. vi. 70 [Heb. 55]), in *Wady Bel'ame*, is marked in G. A. Smith's Maps, 8 miles S. of Jezreel (Moore, pp. 44, 46). Conder's site, about half-way between Beth-shean and Endor, must have found its way into G. A. Smith's by an oversight : Smith himself (*H. G.* p. 387 n.) does not mention it. Besides, as can easily be shown, Bileam and Ibleam were really the same place : in Joshua xxi. 25 (the source of 1 Chron. vi. 70) *Gath-rimmon* (which corresponds to *Bileam* in 1 Chron. vi. 70) is manifestly repeated from verse 24 by a *lapsus calami* ; and LXX *Ιεβθα* (cod. B) can be nothing but a corruption of *Ιεβλααμ*.

<sup>3</sup> See for particulars the writer's "Schweich Lectures" on *Modern Research as illustrating the Bible* (1909), p. 80 ff.



account in Judges iv., and a poetical account in Judges v. The two accounts should be carefully compared : in most particulars they agree ; but there are also some divergences, which, as A. B. Davidson remarked long ago, “ can be accounted for only on the supposition that ch. iv. is an independent tradition.”<sup>1</sup> The song is contemporary with the events : the prose narrative is based upon tradition, and is later ; where, therefore, the two differ, the poem must be followed by preference.

The compiler tells us in iv. 1-3 how he viewed the situation. Jabin was “ king of Canaan,” and he reigned in Hazor. Hazor has not been certainly identified<sup>2</sup> ; but it can hardly have been far from Kedesh of Naphtali.<sup>3</sup> Kedesh of Naphtali is the modern *Kades*, on the East slope of the mountains of Naphtali, 4 miles N.W. of Lake Huleh (doubtfully identified with the Waters of Merom),<sup>4</sup> in a small green plain, encircled by wooded hills, and with various remains of ancient buildings. Jabin had 900 chariots of iron ; and Sisera was the captain of his host, who lived at Harosheth. But there are difficulties in this view. Thus (1) though the compiler, both in verse 2 and in verses 23, 24,

<sup>1</sup> EXPOSITOR, January, 1887, p. 50. [(In my last article, p. 523 note for *Theology of the Old Testament* read *Old Testament Prophecy*.)]

<sup>2</sup> See Moore, pp. 111, 112.

<sup>3</sup> Notice how Kedesh and Hazor are mentioned near one another (Josh. xix. 36, 37 ; 2 Kings xv. 29 ; 1 Macc. xi. 63 f., 67). Three miles S.S.W. of Kedesh there is a *Jebel Ḥaḍīreh*, which recalls the name Ḥazor, though as “ Ḥaḍīreh ” is a common Arabic word meaning *sheepfold* (Moore, p. 112), no great stress can be placed on the similarity. As on J. Ḥaḍīreh there are moreover no ancient ruins, this itself can hardly be the site ; so Buhl (*Geogr.* p. 236) regards either (Robinson) *Hurēbe*, 2 miles to the E. of J. Ḥaḍīreh, or (Dillm.) *Ḥarra*, 2 miles still further to the E., as the real site of Hazor, supposing the name to have been transferred in the course of centuries, as has happened in other cases, to a neighbouring site. G. A. Smith marks Hazor at J. Ḥaḍīreh itself : but it is unfortunately difficult to feel sure whether this expresses his own judgment on the question, or only his engraver's. Guthe, in his beautiful and very scholarly *Bibelatlas* in 20 Haupt- und 28 Nebenkarten (1911), Map 3, places Hazor at *Hurēbe*.

<sup>4</sup> See the art. MEROM in the *Encycl. Biblica*.

calls Jabin king of Canaan, in the older narrative which he incorporates into his narrative he is only king of *Hazor* (ver. 17); (2) if Sisera is his general, it is a little strange that (supposing the site of Harosheth to be rightly identified) he lives so far from his master's capital, some 35 miles, as the crow flies, to the S.W., and with many difficult mountain ranges and wadys intervening; (3) the Song speaks (ver. 19), not of a "king" of Canaan, but of "kings" of Canaan, and Sisera's mother is attended, not by ladies, but by *princesses* (ver. 28): in other words, she is the queen-mother, and Sisera is a *king*! The representation of the poem is thus this: the foes of Israel are not *a* king of Canaan, with Sisera as his general, but the *kings* of Canaan—i.e., presumably, the kings of the Canaanite fortified towns, Taanach, Megiddo, etc., in the neighbourhood of the Great Plain—with Sisera as their leader. This is in accordance with the book of Joshua, which speaks throughout of the kings of Jericho (ii. 2), Ai (viii. 1), Jerusalem (x. 1), and other individual towns (x. 3, 28, 33; xii. 1, 9–24), but never of a "king of Canaan." If we look further, we find other indications in the prose narrative, which support this view. Not only, as I have pointed out, is Jabin called king of *Hazor*, not king of *Canaan*, but Jabin is moreover a mere name: he takes no part in the struggle. The real leader is Sisera: and the 900 chariots, which the compiler assigns to Jabin (ver. 2), are *Sisera's* (ver. 13) in the independent narrative. It is also remarkable that in Joshua xi. we read of a "Jabin, king of Hazor," who with his three allies,<sup>1</sup> the kings of Madon (probably not far from Hazor<sup>2</sup>),

<sup>1</sup> Verses 2, 3 mention other allies; but these verses, like verse 8 (first and last clauses) and verses 10–23, are a Deuteronomic expansion (EXPOSIT-  
TOR, November, 1911, p. 403 *n.*).

<sup>2</sup> The "king of Madon" (LXX *Maron*) is mentioned also in Joshua xii. 19, in the list of kings smitten by Joshua, next before the "king of Hazor"; but without any clue as to the actual site of the city.

Shim'on, in Zebulun (Josh. xix. 15),<sup>1</sup> and Achshaph, in Asher (Josh. xix. 25), is defeated by Joshua.

The conclusion to which these facts point, and which is adopted by nearly all recent writers on the subject,<sup>2</sup> is this, that the foes with whom Barak had to contend were the kings of Canaan, with Sisera, also a king, at their head ; but that there has been a confusion : the oral tradition underlying ch. iv. has interwoven with the memory of this victory of Barak over Sisera reminiscences of the victory of Israel over Jabin, king of Hazor—some 30 miles N. of the scene of Barak's victory—recorded in Joshua xi. (vers. 1, 4-7, 8 *middle*, 9)—the two traditions having been superficially harmonised by Sisera being made into Jabin's general. The compiler afterwards further harmonised *his* view (that Jabin viz. was "king of Canaan") with that of the older narrative (that Jabin viz. was "king of Hazor"), by describing him as "king of Canaan, who *reigned* in Hazor." It is moreover noticeable that whereas in the Song nearly all the tribes N. and S. of the Great Plain take part in the rising, Issachar, Zebulun, and Naphtali on the north, and Ephraim, Manasseh, and Benjamin on the south, in the prose narrative only the tribes of Zebulun and Naphtali are mentioned. Whether, however, the mention of Zebulun and Naphtali alone in ch. iv. is to be attributed, as has been supposed, to the fact that the war with Jabin, king of Hazor, though represented in Joshua xi. as waged by Joshua and "all the people of war," was in reality a struggle, undertaken by these two tribes for the purpose of gaining possession of their territory in the N., is less certain : it is possible that in the tradition on which Judges iv. is based, the names of Zebulun and Naphtali were alone preserved,

<sup>1</sup> So read, probably, with LXX, both here and Joshua xix. 15, for *Shimron*. It may very well be *Semûniyeh*, five miles W. of Nazareth (see *E. B. s.v.*). Achshaph is not certainly identified ; see *E. B. s.v.*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the arts. JABIN and SISERA in *D.B.*

as those of the two tribes which were the most prominent, and most brightly distinguished themselves under Barak (ver. 18). This view of the relation of Judges iv. to Joshua xi. does not materially modify the picture which we form from Judges iv. and v. respecting Deborah and Barak, and their victory over Sisera : it leaves the general representation untouched, and merely bids us disregard a few elements in ch. iv., which have properly no connexion with Sisera.

Let us then, disregarding the notices of Jabin in ch. iv., endeavour to form a picture of the whole occurrence. I will try to work into it the particulars of both the poetical and the prose narrative. There are parts of the poem in which the text is corrupt, and the meaning consequently uncertain ; but the general sense is sufficiently clear.

The state to which the Israelites had been reduced before the deliverance is vividly portrayed in the poem—

- <sup>6</sup> In the days of Shamgar, son of Anath,  
 In the days of Jael, caravans ceased,  
 And travellers walked through devious paths ;  
<sup>7</sup> Villages ceased in Israel, they ceased,  
 Until thou, Deborah, didst arise,<sup>1</sup>  
 Till thou didst arise,<sup>1</sup> a mother in Israel.  
 Was there a shield to be seen, or a spear,  
 Among forty thousand in Israel ?

The Canaanites apparently took the aggressive. The country was harried by armed bands of Canaanites : travel on highways was consequently stopped : men travelled by circuitous or unfrequented by-paths ; villages were deserted by their inhabitants : as compared with the well-

<sup>1</sup> So nearly all recent scholars. As Lagrange remarks, in verse 12 the poet *addresses* Deborah : she can consequently hardly be the author of the poem herself. Ehrlich (*Randglossen zur Hebr. Bibel*, ii., 1911, p. 82) points out in addition that, if Deborah were speaking herself, Heb. idiom would have required the separate personal pronoun to be added (as Dan. ix. 2, x. 2, 7, xii. 5, Eccles. i. 12), which is not here the case. The rendering involves no change in the Heb. text : קמתי has the old ending of the 2nd fem. sing. ; see G.-K. § 44 h.



equipped Canaanites, the Israelites could be described—naturally with some hyperbole—as unarmed. Even now, we are told, when the government is weak, highways at once become unsafe: wandering bands of Arabs cross the Jordan for plunder: villagers leave their homes and enter the towns for protection; and travellers are obliged to confine themselves to by-ways.<sup>1</sup> The number of warriors, 40,000, contrasts favourably with the immense figures by which later writers often estimate the former military resources of their country.

As, so often in the history, it is a prophet who discerns the needs of the times, and counsels what is to be done to relieve them, so now Deborah, a prophetess, takes the initiative. Her home, we are told (iv. 5), was between Ramah 5 miles N. of Jerusalem, and Bethel 10 miles N. of it, in the territory of Benjamin; and there, under a sacred palm-tree—like Saul under the pomegranate-tree at Migron, or the tamarisk tree at Ramah (1 Sam. xiv. 2; xxii. 6)—she sat as arbitress, to adjudicate differences which the Israelites brought to her for decision.<sup>2</sup> Deborah was the moving spirit in the rising against the Canaanites. She calls upon Barak, of Kedesh in Naphtali, to take the field; and bids him march 10,000 men of Naphtali and Zebulun to Tabor. Let us look again for a few moments either at the P. E. F. Map, or at G. A. Smith's Map, which distinguishes so clearly the elevations. Here is the Great Plain; and here in the N.E. angle of it is Tabor, 30 miles S. of Kedesh. Here, on its E. edge, is Jezreel, the later residence

<sup>1</sup> *Land and Book*, *ibid.* p. 223.

<sup>2</sup> It is remarkable, however, that Deborah's home should be so far from that of Barak; and Judges v. 15 at least suggests that she belonged to the tribe of Issachar. It is not impossible therefore that Deborah's connexion with Bethel and Ramah may be due to a confusion with Gen. xxxv. 8 (where another "Deborah," Rebekah's nurse, is buried under an oak tree "below Bethel"), and that her home was really in the North, in the tribe of Issachar.



of the house of Ahab, whence the Plain stretches out, as far as the eye can reach, an almost unbroken level, well fitted for the evolutions of chariots and cavalry, to Carmel, 20 miles to the N.W. Jezreel stands on a slight elevation ; and if we remember its relation to the country around, we can picture the scene in 2 Kings ix. 17-20, where the watchman on the tower in Jezreel descries in the distance Jehu and his horsemen drawing nearer and nearer. Here is the Kishon, running down from very near Ibleam, with numerous tributaries flowing into it ; and here are the three Canaanite fortresses, Taanach, Megiddo, and Ibleam, on the slope of the hills, on its S.W. edge. Here is Nazareth, on the edge of the hills on the N., 5 miles across the valley to the W. of Tabor. And here are Nain and En-dor, on the hills across the valley on the S. of Tabor. Tabor is a land-mark conspicuous far and near. It is a symmetrical, rounded mountain, 1,843 ft. in height above the sea, with a large oval platform, some 3,000 ft. by 1,300 ft., at the top, rising nearly 1,600 ft. above the Great Plain, and commanding a view over nearly its entire extent. " Its situation and natural strength made it a most advantageous position in a struggle with the Canaanites of the Plain." Deborah adds, to encourage Barak, that, when he has massed his men on Tabor, Yahweh will lead the enemy on to his ruin (iv. 7) : Sisera will be tempted to advance against him, and will be brought thereby into the valley of the treacherous Kishon, and " delivered into his hand." The words in this verse, " the captain of Jabin's army," referring to Sisera, if the view taken above be correct, will not belong to the original story of Sisera. Deborah and Barak go together to Kedesh : there Barak summons Zebulun and Naphtali to join him ; and the two together, with their 20,000 men, proceed to the trysting-place on Mount Tabor.

But if we look at the Map, a difficulty appears here. Kedesh of Naphtali is in the mountainous country, 30 miles N. of Tabor; and Hazor, Jabin's capital, presumably not far off (see p. 26). Is it not remarkable that Barak should go to Kedesh, in the very heart of the enemy's country, summon his troops to meet him there, and even, if Hazor is rightly located (p. 26), march then unmolested almost past its very gates, to Tabor? If "Jabin, king of Hazor," has no real place in the narrative of Barak, the difficulty would disappear. Or is the "Kedesh" of Judges iv. 9, 10, 11, distinct from the "Kedesh of Naphtali" of ver. 6, and to be placed with Conder (*T.W.* 69), and G. A. Smith (*H. G.* 396 n.), at *Kadis*, a mile S.W. of the Sea of Galilee, and 10 miles E.N.E. of Tabor? Then Barak would not have approached Hazor within 23 miles. Happily, this uncertainty does not affect our general idea of the means by which Barak achieved his victory.

A parenthetic note explains here in advance what the reader needs to know about the scene and the perpetrator of Sisera's tragic death. "Now Heber the Kenite had severed himself from Kain, even from the children of Hobab, the father-in-law of Moses, and had pitched his tent as far as the terebinth of Baz'annim (cf. Josh. xix. 33<sup>1</sup>),<sup>2</sup> which is

<sup>1</sup> Where R.V. marg. has *Bezaanannim*.

<sup>2</sup> Identified by Conder (*T. W.* 69; *Memoirs of P. E. F.* i. 365 f.; cf. *Names-lists*, p. 121) with *Bessâm*, a ruined site 4 miles W. of the *Kadis*, S.W. of the Sea of Galilee, mentioned in the text above. The names, however, do not agree phonetically. As the reader will now understand, the site depends wholly upon the assumption that the Kedesh of Judges iv. 11 is this *Kadis*.

The treatment of the name in English Maps, professing to mark ancient sites, is remarkable, but characteristic. In the  $\frac{3}{8}$  inch to the mile Map of the P. E. F., sheet 6, just N.E. of *Bessâm* there is marked a plain called *Sahel* (= "plain") *el-Ahmâ*, and immediately below it, in the large red letters indicating that it is a Biblical site, *The Plain of Zaanaim*. (It should be explained that *Zaanaim* and *Baz'annim* [or *Betsaanim*] denote the same place, according as the *be* at the beginning is regarded as the preposition, or as part of the word: the latter view is much preferable.)

by Kedesh." The Kenites were a people who, tradition told, had been friendly with Israel at the time of the Exodus. Hobab had been pressed by Moses to become "eyes" to Israel, when they left Kadesh-barnea, to show them the best camping-places in the wilderness (Num. x. 31), and, it may be inferred from Judges i. 16, had in the end acceded to the request. Jethro, the name which he bears in another tradition,<sup>1</sup> in an interesting and important chapter, which sets before us Moses legislating (Exod. xviii.), advises Moses what to do when the burden of judging the whole people was too much for him; and it has been conjectured that the Hebrews even derived some elements of their religion from their association with the Kenites. However this

The Map of Palestine at the beginning of Hastings' *D. B.* "according to the P. E. Survey" [see, on this misnomer, *EXPOSITOR*, Nov., 1911, p. 389] obediently follows, marking *Plain of Zaanaïm* in the same place. Dr. Grundy, in Murray's shilling Map, does the same. Even G. A. Smith (not noting Bessûm at all) marks *Betsaanim*—in the Map in *H. G.* without a query, in the large wall-map with a query—above *Sahel el-Ahmâ*, as the name of the plain. But the remarkable thing is that a "plain," whether of Zaanaïm, or Baz'annim, is a *non-existent locality*,—as non-existent as the "Plain of Mamre," which—*mirabilissimum et mirabundissimum dictu*—figures even in G. A. Smith's maps: for, as a student reading his Hebrew Genesis for the first time, as soon as he reaches xii. 6, discovers, "plain" is simply a mistranslation of עֵץ, and the word beyond all question denotes a *tree*! probably a terebinth (so, naturally, G. A. Smith himself, *H. G.*, p. 318, and, of Betsaanim, p. 396). Yet the authorities responsible for all these maps, in defiance of philology, continue to mislead English students by inserting in them these non-existent "plains." Naturally, the Map of Galilee in the *Enc. B.*, and the Map in Guthe's *Bibelatlas*, are both in this respect immaculate.

<sup>1</sup> In Exodus ii. 18 he bears a third name *Reuel* (perhaps inferred incorrectly from Numbers x. 29, as though the words "Moses' father-in-law" referred there to Reuel and not to his son Hobab). Prof. Sayce, however, writes, with regard to Reuel and Jethro (*Early Hist. of the Hebrews*, p. 163): "Tradition has handed down more than one name for the high priest of Midian"; so clearly none of the passages which mention either Jethro or Reuel can be regarded by him as written by Moses. See further, on the confusion between these three names, Chapman, *Introd. to the Pent.* (1911), pp. 104–7. There seem also to have been different traditions about the nationality of Moses' father-in-law: for Hobab is a *Kenite* here (cf. i. 16), but a *Midianite* in Numbers x. 29, as Jethro also is in Exodus iii. and xviii.

may be, Judges i. 16 describes them as accompanying Judah, when the tribe "went up" from Jericho to gain possession of its territory, as far as Arad (16 miles S. of Hebron). Afterwards, however, true to their Bedawi instincts, they settled, not in Judah, but further to the south, among the Amalekites, as must certainly be read for the vague "with the people," with MSS. of the LXX, in Judges i. 16.<sup>1</sup> The argument in favour of this reading is clinched when we find that Saul, about to start on his expedition against the Amalekites, sends a friendly message (1 Sam. xv. 6) to the *Kenites*, resident among them, bidding them leave the Amalekites, and so escape his sword, "for *thou* shewedst kindness to all the children of Israel, when they came up out of Egypt." In 1 Sam. xxvii. 10 they are found settled in a district called the "Negeb of the Kenites."<sup>2</sup> These friendly relations with the Kenites continued in David's time; for in 1 Sam. xxx. 29 David sends presents of his spoil to them. The main body of the Kenites was thus settled in the far south of Canaan; and the present note explains how Heber belonged to a family which had separated from the main body, and migrated to the North.

The prose narrative mentions Zebulun and Naphtali, but says nothing about the other tribes who took part in the rising: let us hear now what the poem says about these. The poet enumerates them with evident pride—

<sup>13</sup> Then came down [viz. from Tabor into the Plain] survivors of nobles,<sup>3</sup>

The people of Yahweh came down for me<sup>4</sup> as warriors.

<sup>14</sup> Out of Ephraim [came they] whose root is in Amalek,  
After thee, O Benjamin, with thy clansmen;

<sup>1</sup> העם for העמלק.

<sup>2</sup> See EXPOSITOR, November, 1911, p. 394, note °.

<sup>3</sup> So the Hebrew; but the text cannot be right.

<sup>4</sup> LXX for him, i.e. for Yahweh (לו for לו).



Out of Machir came down truncheon-bearers,<sup>1</sup>

And out of Zebulun they that hold<sup>2</sup> the marshal's staff.<sup>3</sup>

A district in Ephraim is called the "mountain of the Amalekites" (xii. 15), presumably from having been once a settlement of Amalekites; and "those whose root is in Amalek" is accordingly commonly supposed to mean the inhabitants of this region. But the text cannot here be correct: the expression is a strange one, and a verb is also strongly desiderated. The line cannot, however, be restored with any confidence, though *Out of Ephraim they took their way into the Vale* (cf. ver. 15) has been suggested.<sup>4</sup> The second line is understood to mean that the Ephraimite contingent followed Benjamin, Benjamin led the attack: but again the text is suspicious. Machir was the principal clan of Manasseh: in the Hexateuchal source J he is his "firstborn" (Josh. xvii. 1b, 2), i.e. not, of course, as an individual, but as the most important clan, the clan most early developed, and the successful conqueror of Gilead; in P he is Manasseh's *only* son, the "father" of Gilead, the *country*<sup>5</sup> (Num. xxvi. 29-32)—the clans, Abiezer, Helek,

<sup>1</sup> So Moore: men bearing truncheons (Numb. xxi. 18: EVV. "sceptre") as emblems of rank and authority.

<sup>2</sup> Or perhaps *march with*. The exact meaning is uncertain. See Moore, p. 153.

<sup>3</sup> See the note below. Prof. Sayce's imputation (*Monuments*, p. 56) that critics have invented this rendering in place of the familiar "pen of the writer" for the purpose of getting rid of the early reference to the use of writing, rests upon an extraordinary misconception: for the rendering 'marshal' (see note<sup>3</sup> p. 36) itself *presupposes* the use of writing! So Bertheau in his Commentary (1883) gives "*Schreiber*" as the primary sense of the word.

<sup>4</sup> מַשְׁרֵי, from מָשַׁר to *journey* (once in Hebrew, Is. lvii. 9 [Ez. xxvii. 25 is very doubtful]; also in Ass. and Arab.), for מַשְׁרֵם; and בְּעֶמֶק, with MSS. of LXX, for עֵמֶלֶק. But it is difficult to feel sure that מַשְׁרֵי would have been the word used in the present connexion. If it was used, מְנֵי for בְּנֵי would give it the somewhat needed explicit subject: "The children of Ephraim (Ps. lxxviii. 9) took their way into the vale."

<sup>5</sup> The name has the *article*, shewing that it denotes not a person, but a country.



etc., who in J are his brethren, being in P his grandsons<sup>1</sup>: the clans, it is evident, were by different genealogists brought differently into relation to one another.<sup>2</sup> Machir is elsewhere a clan, with considerable possessions, on the E. of Jordan (cf. Num. xxxii. 39 "And the children of Machir went to Gilead and took it"); here they are still pretty clearly on the West of Jordan. The passage supports the view referred to above (EXPOSITOR, November 1911, pp. 398, 400) that Machir acquired its settlements in the N. half of Gilead (Josh. xiii. 31), by a raid not from the East of Jordan (Num. xxxii. 39-42), but from the *West*. The truncheons and staffs are ensigns of authority: the "marshal" (R.V.) or (Moore) "muster-master,"<sup>3</sup> is the officer who enrols the troops—here probably the chieftains themselves.

<sup>15</sup> And the princes of Issachar were with Deborah,  
And Issachar, so Barak:

Into the Vale were they let loose at his feet—

i.e., they sped forth, following him from Tabor down into the Great Plain. The second line reads in the Hebrew as here translated: but the text cannot be right. Perhaps "Issachar" is a *lapsus calami* for "Naphtali": *Naphtali also* (נַפְתָּלִי) *was with Barak* is the kind of idea which we should expect.

But some of the tribes are reproached for not coming forward to assist in repelling the national danger—

<sup>16</sup> Why satest thou among the sheepfolds, to hear the pipings<sup>4</sup>  
for the flocks?

Among the septs of Reuben were great soundings of heart.

<sup>1</sup> Contrast Joshua xvii. 2 (J) with Numbers xxvi. 29-32 (P).

<sup>2</sup> See more fully Hastings' *D.B.* ii. 231 f., where the different genealogies of the tribe of Manasseh are drawn out in tabular form.

<sup>3</sup> Lit. the *scribe*,—the scribe (in connexion with the army) being an officer who in later times seems to have had charge of the enumeration and enrolment of the troops (cf. Jer. lii. 25 "the *scribe* of the captain of the host, who mustered [lit. *made to war* or *serve in the host*] the people of the land"): here, probably, the "chieftains themselves, who muster the quotas of their own clans" (Moore).

<sup>4</sup> Lit. *hissings*—the *pastoria sibila* of Ov. *Met.* xiii. 785 (Moore).

To crouch down "between the sheepfolds" is attributed to Issachar in Genesis xlix. 14, as a mark of indifference and indolence. To "search" a man in Hebrew means to *sound* him, to discover what is in his mind (see 1 Sam. xx. 12): so the "searchings of heart" of A.V., R.V. does not mean anxious self-questionings, as the expression is often understood to mean, but mutual inquiries to ascertain each other's feelings and purpose. There were great inquiries, great discussions among the different septs of Reuben; but they resulted in nothing: "the fractions of the tribe were divided in counsel, and squandered in dissensions the time for deeds." The tribe was inactive: another poet once declared that it should not "excel" (Gen. xlix. 4); and it verified its character on the present occasion.

<sup>17</sup> Gilead abode beyond Jordan;

And Dan, why doth he sojourn among ships?

Asher sat still by the shore of the sea,

And abode by his creeks.

Gilead was the rugged, yet picturesque, mountainous and wooded region E. of Jordan, partly N., partly S., of the Jabbok (the modern *Nahr ez-Zerkā*). The name stands here for its inhabitants, i.e. the Gadites, who occupied its southern half (Josh. xiii. 25). Gad was a tribe celebrated elsewhere for its martial prowess (Gen. xlix. 19 "Gad, a troop may troop upon him, But he will troop upon their heel": see also the glowing description of the Gadite warriors in 1 Chron. xii. 8, with "faces like the faces of lions, and as swift as the roes upon the mountains"); but now it was satisfied to remain quiet in its own home. The second line seems to mean, Why is Dan—i.e. the *Northern* Dan (above, p. 525)—content to serve as a foreign mercenary on Phœnician ships? Asher held most of the seaboard between Carmel and Tyre (Josh. xix. 24–31); and there it now remained, devoted to its own occupations, perhaps

maritime undertakings, heedless of the nation's welfare. The same words, *by the shore of the sea* [Heb. *seas*], are used in Genesis xlix. 13 of Zebulun: "Zebulun shall dwell by the shore of the sea."

But in contrast to the lethargy and indifference shown by these tribes, the gallantry and bright example of Zebulun and Naphtali are warmly praised—

<sup>18</sup> Zebulun was a people that contemned its life unto death,  
And Naphtali upon the high places of the field—

i.e., probably, on the mounds and hillocks of the Plain, used as rallying-points by the hard-pressed Canaanites, but stormed and carried by Zebulun and Naphtali with reckless hardihood. "So at least we may imagine it; a certain interpretation is hardly to be given" (Moore).

But I must break off here; and reserve the sequel for another occasion.

S. R. DRIVER.

### *TWO AMERICAN BIOGRAPHIES OF LUTHER.<sup>1</sup>*

THE year 1911 will be memorable in the annals of the Luther literature. At the moment when German experts are discussing the volumes of the Jesuit Professor Hartmann Grisar of Innsbrück, two American scholars have written on Luther from the Protestant point of view. Professor McGiffert's book, reprinted from articles in the *Century Magazine*, is an unambitious effort to introduce the personality of the Reformer to the general public. Students who know the thoroughness and competence of Dr. McGiffert's work in other fields will learn with disappointment that he ignores their needs entirely. What are we to think of a *Life of Luther*, published in 1911, which is without

<sup>1</sup> *Martin Luther: The Man and his Work*, by Arthur Cushman McGiffert (T. Fisher Unwin); *The Life and Letters of Martin Luther*, by Preserved Smith, Ph.D. (John Murray).

preface, notes, bibliography, or the briefest list of authorities? Our first indignant thought is that only a literary style comparable to that of Max Lenz, Gustav Freytag, or Adolf Hausrath, could excuse such negligence. But after comparing the translations of Luther's letters with the originals in De Wette and Enders, we gratefully acknowledge the scrupulous accuracy of the author's renderings. If his boat never ventures into dangerous waters, it is seaworthy for all purposes of the land-locked bay.

A very different study of Luther is offered us by a younger scholar, Dr. Preserved Smith. His admirable bibliographies have been compiled with the help of Dr. Kawerau and Dr. Harnack. Whatever may be the faults of his book, it is not a careless or a lazy production, and the only German work of recent years to which it owes a heavy debt is Dr. Kroker's *Katharina von Bora*.

We hear the ring of hammers in the Luther workshops of Berlin, Leipzig and Weimar, and meet the craftsmen who are toiling at the great Weimar edition. English admirers of Dr. Kawerau will read with pleasure in the preface a grateful acknowledgment of the kindness shown by him to the author.

The American biographies cover partly the same ground, and the unlearned reader who compares the two books will be surprised to notice discrepancies in translation. We take an example from Luther's letter to Prince Joachim of Anhalt, dated June 12, 1534.

Dr. Preserved Smith gives the closing passage as follows (p. 324):

"Your Grace must really look out for that marvellous chess-player, Francis Burkhardt, for he is quite sure that he can play the game like a professional. I would give a button to see him play as well as he thinks he can. He can manage the knights, take a castle or two, and fool the peasant-pawns, but the queen beats him on account of his weakness for the fair sex, which he cannot deny."



Professor McGiffert prefers the following (p. 299).

"Your Grace must look out for Master Francis at chess. He thinks he can play very well, but I will wager a beautiful rose he cannot play as well as he pretends. He knows how to assign their places to the knights, to seize the castles, and to hoodwink the peasants (pawns) but the lady is his master in the game, perhaps elsewhere as well."<sup>1</sup>

Here, as elsewhere, Dr. McGiffert translates with watchful accuracy. An occasional pawn is all that the critic will capture from him. Dr. Preserved Smith, on the other hand, often goes astray in his renderings. Take, for example, Luther's letter written to Melancthon from Coburg on May 12, 1530.<sup>2</sup> We print in parallel columns some sentences from the original, with the American biographer's translation. He professes to give the letter in full, except at one point, where he marks an omission of a single sentence.

*Luther's Words.*

"Mi Philippe, a die octava Maji coepimus vobis respondere ad literas vestras Norimbergae datas, sed intercidit negotium, ut haecenus distulerim, et interim etiam ex Augusta recepimus fascem literarum vestrarum."

*Dr. Smith's Translation.*

"Dear Philip, I began to answer your letter from Nuremberg on May 8, but business interfered to prevent me finishing my reply" (p. 253).

The last part of the Latin sentence, "and in the meantime I have also received a packet of your letters from Augsburg," is omitted by Dr. Smith without any explanation. A few lines further on Luther tells about his work on the Prophets.

*Luther's Words.*

"His absolutis Prophetas in manus sumpsi, et impetu magno rem aggressus, statuebam ante Pentecosten omnes Prophetas versos habere. Post Aesopum et alia. Et fecissem certe, ita procedebat opus."

*Dr. Smith's Translation.*

"Then I took the Prophets in hand and attacked the labour with such ardour that I hope to finish it before Pentecost, and after that turn to Æsop and other things."

<sup>1</sup> For the original German see De Wette, vi. 149.

<sup>2</sup> Enders, *Luthers Briefwechsel*, vol. vii. pp. 332, 333.

For "hope" we should of course read "hoped" or rather "planned." This error is no doubt a misprint, but why is the sentence "And I should certainly have done so, as the work was getting on so well" omitted without mark or sign?

In the middle of the letter, after telling of the trouble in his head which had compelled him to stop work, Luther breaks out into the pathetic complaint, "Es wills nicht mehr thun, sehe ich wohl, die Jahr treten herzu." "I get worse as the years go on" is scarcely an adequate translation. Did not Luther—then aged only forty-seven—mean rather, "My head won't work any more, I see well. Years are growing upon me"?

Take another passage from the same letter :

*Luther's Words.*

"Libentissime scripsissem Principi (ut tu vis) juniori de Macedone, et seniori, vobisque omnibus, sed {faciam suo tempore."}

*Dr. Smith's Translation.*

"I would most willingly write, as you suggest, to the Landgrave of Hesse and to the Elector and to all of you, but I must take my own time."

Here Dr. Smith has missed the point. The sentence should read : "I would most willingly have written (as you desire) to the younger Prince<sup>1</sup> about the Landgrave, and to the elder,<sup>2</sup> and to you all," etc.

*Luther's Words.*

"Haec nostra } interna ; foris  
alia, inter quae mihi etiam  
Geckium significas denuo bellare  
una cum Billicano tuo. Was  
hat man sonst zu thun auf dem  
Reichstage ?"

*Dr. Smith's Translation.*

"Such is our domestic news ;  
other news comes from abroad,  
such as that you mention about  
the strife between Eck and  
Billican. What is happening  
at the Diet ?"

The latter part of this passage from the word "mention" does not mean that Eck is striving with Billican, but that

<sup>1</sup> John Frederick, afterwards Elector of Saxony.

<sup>2</sup> John the Constant, the reigning Elector in 1530. Melancthon, writing on May 4, had requested Luther to write to the younger prince. On May 22 he advised that the letter should not go.

"Eck is again on the war-path along with your friend Billican." "What else," adds Luther, "is there to do at the Diet?" Dr. Smith has forgotten to refer to Melanchthon's letter of May 4, to which this letter of May 12 is a reply. There we read of Eck :

"Postulat a Principibus, ut instituatur disputatio contra Lutheranos. Habet subscriptorem meum veterem amicum Billicanum : is vero horribiliter minatur nobis."<sup>1</sup>

We give one other very well-known passage from the letter of May 12 :

*Luther's Words.*

"Sed heus tu, quod unice volebam, vide, ut meo exemplo caput tuum perdas. Itaque ego mandabo tibi et universo sodalitie, ut sub anathemate cogant te in regulas servandi corpusculi tui, ne fias homicida tui, et fingas postea obsequio Dei id fieri."

*Dr. Smith's Translation.*

"Give heed to my example and be sure not to lose your head as I have done. I command you and all my friends to keep regular habits for the sake of your health. Do not kill yourself and then pretend you did it in God's service."

This passage was rendered more accurately in Köstlin's biography. "Luther warned him [Melanchthon] by his own example, against injuring [not losing] his head by immoderate exertion. He wrote to him on May 12: "I command you and all your company, that they compel you, under pain of excommunication, to keep your poor body by rule and order, so that you may not kill yourself and imagine that you do so from obedience to God."<sup>2</sup>

The biographers differ in their version of Luther's epigram, written with chalk on his dining-room table :

Res et verba Philippus,  
Verba sine re Erasmus,  
Res sine verbis Lutherus,  
Neque rem neque verba Carrollstadius.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Enders, vii. 323. For the changing conduct of Billican and his return to the Roman Catholics in 1530 see Enders, vii. 325, note 11.

<sup>2</sup> We quote in this case from the standard English translation published by Messrs Longmans, p. 347.

<sup>3</sup> We take the original as given by Kroker, *Luthers Tischreden in der Mathesischen Sammlung*, No. 786, p. 427.

Professor McGiffert writes (p. 265): "Of a different kind was Luther's somewhat amusing judgment expressed in the following epigram: 'Philip has both matter and words, Erasmus words without matter, Luther matter without words, Carlstadt neither matter nor words.'"

Dr. Smith says: (p. 286): "August 1, 1537, Luther wrote on his table:

Deeds and words, Melanchthon;  
Words without deeds, Erasmus;  
Deeds without words, Luther;  
Neither words nor deeds, Carlstadt."

Surely the contrast in Luther's mind was not between deeds and words, but between "substance and style," or, as Dr. McGiffert puts it, "matter and words."

Take a passage from the *Table-Talk*, in which Luther is speaking of Melanchthon.

*Text in Kroker's edition.*

"[Er hat aber mit seiner weiss nicht vil ausgericht und seine bucher ubel dedicirt."]<sup>1</sup>

*Dr. Smith's Translation* (p. 287).

"In his way he has accomplished much, but he has often been unfortunate in the dedications of his books."

The omission of the word "nicht" makes nonsense of the passage. Luther's point, as the context shows, is that Melanchthon had not accomplished much by his extreme moderation.

We pass from comments on translations to consider a few passages in which Dr. Preserved Smith, as it seems to us, is not strictly accurate in his statement of facts.

(1) Has he not missed the point of Luther's little joke on Bugenhagen, parish minister of Wittenberg, which is given as follows by Kroker:<sup>2</sup>

*"Jocus de Pomerano.*

"Cum mulier non bene coctum cibum proposuisset marito, dixit, 'O, ich meinte, es wurde Pommer heut predigen.'"

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* No. 236, p. 154.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* No. 99, p. 106.



(“ When a woman set badly cooked food before her husband, she said, ‘ O, I thought Pommer was preaching to-day ’.”)

Dr. Smith writes (pp. 326, 327): “ Another joke on Bugenhagen, who, notwithstanding his dignified position in both the upper and lower worlds, seems to have been unable to deliver a palatable sermon, was made about the same time as the last:—When a woman put badly cooked food before her husband, he said, ‘ Oh, I expected that Bugenhagen would preach to-day ’.”

Dr. Pommer was in every sense a “ palatable ” preacher, but his sermons were notoriously lengthy. Köstlin, in his article on Bugenhagen in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, says, “ As a preacher he ranked next to Luther in his simple, vigorous, popular style,” but notes his tendency to long-windedness. The woman meant ‘ I thought Dr. Pommer would keep you so long in church that I should have time to cook the dinner ’.”<sup>1</sup>

#### LUTHER AT WEIMAR IN JUNE 1540.

(2) On page 380 Dr. Smith says that the Elector “ invited Luther to Weimar, where the Reformer arrived on June 28.” The date ought to be changed to 22 or 23. The most recent German authorities seem to have overlooked the important letter from the Elector to the Landgrave of Hesse, printed by Dr. Max Lenz in a note to Part I. of his “ Correspondence ” of the Landgrave with Bucer. John Frederick, writing from Weimar on June 27, says: “ At our request Dr. Martin Luther arrived here four days ago.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Professor Hermann Hering, in his excellent short biography of Bugenhagen, notes that Luther used to find fault with the length of his friend's sermons. See p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> *Briefwechsel Landgraf Philipps des Grossmüthigen von Hessen mit Bucer*, part i., page 338, note. We give this important passage in the original. “ Am 27 Juni schreibt der Kurfürst dem Landgrafen über Melanchthons Krankheit so: ‘ Auch wissen wir E. L. nicht zu verhalten, dass ihne, Meister Philippen Melanchton darob solche bekummerliche Gedanken zu

The months of June and July, 1540, marked a critical period in the lives of Luther and Melanchthon, for it was then that they suffered the worst consequences of their ill-fated "confessional counsel" to the Landgrave. Köstlin has truly said that the scene in Melanchthon's sick-room at Weimar, which is described by Ratzeberger, was one of the most important incidents in the latter part of Luther's career.<sup>1</sup> Hausrath says it is like the story of an awakening of the dead.<sup>2</sup> In German Protestant circles, the restoration of the sick man was regarded at the time and long afterwards as a miraculous answer to prayer. Mistaken dates for these weeks are supplied by more than one recent German authority, and we venture to set out here the Reformers' itinerary between June 11 and July 7, 1540.

*Friday, June 11 (St. Barnabas' Day).*—Melanchthon left Wittenberg to attend the conference at Hagenau.

*Monday, June 14.*—Melanchthon wrote Luther a very short letter from Weimar, in which he said: "I am still doubtful about my journey. My health is growing weaker, because each day I hear worse news about the Landgrave's business."<sup>3</sup>

*Tuesday, June 15.*—Luther wrote to Anton Lauterbach,

Gemuert gezogen, dass er nun fast bis in den vierzehenden Tag allhier bettriess gelegen und noch liegt, und man kann auch nit achten wie <sup>es</sup> der Allmächtige mit ihm zum Leben oder Sterben schicken will. Haben auch derselbigen seiner Schwachheit halben andre an sein Statt gegen <sup>H</sup> Hagenau vorfertigen müssen. So ist Dr. Martin Luther, uf unser Erfordern vor vier Tagen bei uns allhier ankommen'." For further references to the text of the Elector's letter, see the Life of John Frederick by Professor Georg Mentz of Jena, part ii., p. 261, note 4; and W. W. Rockwell, *Die Doppelhe [des Landgrafen Philipp von Hessen]*, p. 181, note 4. The letter was written from Weimar, as we see from the use of the word "allhier." Melanchthon was lying ill at Weimar on June 27.

<sup>1</sup> *Köstlin-Kawerau*, vol. ii. p. 527.

<sup>2</sup> *Luthers Leben*, vol. ii. p. 402.

<sup>3</sup> The original has been lost, but there is a copy in the archives of Zerbst. The letter is printed in Kolde's *Analecta*, page 351, and in Enders, xiii, 84, 85.

asking him to pray for Melanchthon, who had been "sent into the midst of the enemies."<sup>1</sup>

*Wednesday, June 16.*—The Elector wrote to Luther from Weimar a cautiously worded letter,<sup>2</sup> announcing Melanchthon's breakdown, and asking Luther to come to Weimar for consultation about affairs at Hagenau.

*Friday, June 18.*—In the earlier part of the day Luther answered Melanchthon's note of the 14th in a long consolatory letter.<sup>3</sup> He had not yet heard of his friend's actual collapse.

Later on the same day he must have received the Elector's summons to Weimar, and probably also a letter (now lost) from Chancellor Brück, in which it was suggested that Melanchthon's illness was a tertian fever.<sup>4</sup>

*Monday, June 21?*—Luther left for Weimar. The date may have been Sunday the 20th. As Dr. Kawerau points out, the exact date cannot be definitely fixed.

*Tuesday (22) or Wednesday (23)*—(probably the latter).—Luther reached Weimar, and was taken to Melanchthon's sick-room, where he found his friend at the point of death. The historic scene described by so many biographers must have taken place on this day.

*Sunday, June 27.*—The Elector wrote the letter to the Landgrave (mentioned above) in which he states that Luther had been four days at Weimar.

*Monday, June 28.*—The Elector, who had moved to the neighbouring town of Gotha, wrote a letter of encouragement to Melanchthon, whose condition was still serious, though hopeful. In the letter he mentions that Luther and

<sup>1</sup> Enders, xiii. 86.

<sup>2</sup> *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. iii. col. 1045.

<sup>3</sup> Enders, xiii. 91.

<sup>4</sup> Kroker, *Luthers Tischreden*, No. 241, and see also the important note on p. 158. Dr. Kroker thinks the Elector's letter cannot have been received later than the evening of the 18th.

Jonas were with the patient, and that he wishes all three to come to Eisenach as soon as Melanchthon was fit to travel.<sup>1</sup>

*Saturday, July 3.*—Joachim Moller, a boarder of Melanchthon's, who had accompanied his professor to Weimar and helped to nurse him, wrote to Westphal at Wittenberg: "Philip is gradually regaining strength, having dismissed from his mind all sadness and anxiety. . . . He is so much stronger that he wishes to go to church to-morrow with Luther."<sup>2</sup>

On Monday, July 5, or Tuesday, 6 (almost certainly Monday) Luther, Jonas and Melanchthon left Weimar for Eisenach, where they arrived, as Jonas mentions in a letter, on Wednesday, the 7th.

(3) Dr. Preserved Smith says on p. 379: "After the conference at Schmalkalden Melanchthon fell ill of a disease something like malaria, then called 'tertian fever'." His authority is Dr. Rockwell,<sup>3</sup> and Rockwell's opinion is accepted in the latest Enders-Kawerau volume,<sup>4</sup> but in our view all three writers are mistaken. Melanchthon's illness at Weimar was not a "tertian fever."

Two reasons only can be suggested in favour of Dr. Smith's theory. The first is the remark of Luther in the conversation dated by Dr. Kroker June 18: "Philippus moerore paene contabescit et incidit in febrim tertianam."<sup>5</sup>

The sentence begins, "Cum redderentur Doctori literae a Pontano, lectis iis dixit, etc." The letter of Chancellor Brück (Pontanus) is lost, so that we cannot verify the reference, but it was written from Weimar at latest on June 16, and was delivered to Luther either before or along

<sup>1</sup> C. R. iii. 1051.

<sup>2</sup> Sillem's *Briefsammlung des Hamburgischen Superintendenten Joachim Westphal*, vol. i. p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Doppelhehe des Landgrafen Philipp von Hessen*, p. 191.

<sup>4</sup> *Luther's Briefwechsel*, vol. xiii. pp. 153, 154.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 156.



with the Elector's letter of the same date, which summoned the Reformer to Weimar.

On June 16, the true nature of the illness was not known at Weimar. The Elector, in his letter of that day, writes vaguely of "Schwachheit" (weakness) and in his letter of June 19 to his representatives at Hagenau, he says he would have sent Melanchthon and Myconius from Weimar, "if Master Philip had not been overcome with such great exhaustion and weakness."<sup>1</sup>

Luther's conclusion from the missing letter of the Chancellor is worthless unless confirmed from other sources, and such confirmation is entirely lacking. Dr. Rockwell has no authority whatever for his suggestion that the fever from which Justus Jonas suffered at Eisenach in the last week of July had any connection with Melanchthon's illness. Is it not a significant fact that although Melanchthon wrote to various friends about his miraculous restoration during the months following his return to Wittenberg, he never once suggested that he had been suffering from a fever? On the contrary, he wrote as late as November 27, 1540, to the Abbot Frederick Pistorius of the Egidian monastery at Nürnberg, that his sufferings had not been caused by any bodily disease.<sup>2</sup> His physician, the illustrious Dr. George Sturtz of Erfurt, was perfectly well acquainted with the symptoms of the intermittent malady known as tertian fever, and Melanchthon himself was an eager student of medicine, who could write a prescription as well as any doctor in Wittenberg. Is it likely that after five months he should have

<sup>1</sup> "Wo Magister Philippus nicht so mit grosser Mattigkeit und Schwachheit befallen gewest." C. R., iii. 1050.

<sup>2</sup> The passage is as follows: "Ex D. Osiandro intellexi te non solum gravi morbo conflictari, sed etiam accedere inusitatos pavores, et animi certamen et luctum. Coepi igitur eo magis vicem tuam dolere, quia similitudo tui periculi me de meo morbo admonuit qui me proxima aestate subito oppresserat, cum nulla corporis aegritudine laborantem soli dolores animi horribiliter prostratum paene extinxissent." C. R., iii. 1174.

been unaware that he had suffered from one of the most commonly recognised sicknesses of the age ?

His fatal illness in April 1560, was a "tertian fever," and his son-in-law, Dr. Caspar Peucer, with another expert, Dr. Veit Winsheim, has left us an account of the varying symptoms almost from hour to hour. They naturally refer to the Weimar illness of twenty years earlier, but instead of calling it a tertian fever, they mention that the cause was "heart-weakness." A modern physician would have diagnosed it as a severe case of neurasthenia, with a tendency to heart failure. Dr. Sturtz tried to strengthen the heart's action by applying crushed coral.<sup>1</sup>

#### LUTHER'S CHARACTER AND WORK.

The American biographers do not emphasise, like Grisar, every unpleasing detail in Luther's writings and conversation, yet with them also, and especially in Dr. Smith's chapter entitled "Character and Habits"—we observe "a manner somewhat fallen from reverence." They are too ready to adopt an apologetic tone, forgetting the words of Principal Lindsay, "To his contemporaries Luther was the embodiment of personal piety." Dr. Harnack, in a recent article,<sup>2</sup> has expressed surprise that the learned Innsbrück Jesuit should drag to light every coarse and careless passage from the *Table-Talk* and other sources, while he ignores the incomparable greatness of Luther's character and service.

It was perhaps inevitable, that with the lapse of centuries, keen criticism of the heroic man should take the place of unquestioning love. Vinet's words are true of Luther: "In spirits thus gifted—its burning and shining lights—the Church must be willing to rejoice 'for a season,' for much that they bring with them will depart when they

<sup>1</sup> Loesche, *Analecta Lutherana et Melanthoniana*, Nos. 182 and 186. N. Müller, *Philipp Melancthon's letzte Lebenstage*, etc., pp. 19, 20.

<sup>2</sup> *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, November 25, 1911.

go ; the foreign elements will break up and scatter when the cord which binds them together is slackened by absence or unloosed by death. . . . Much of their work seems to vanish with them, reappearing after a time in humbler forms."

Dr. Preserved Smith would have been well advised to cut out more than one sentence on the objectionable passages in Luther's conversation. Has he forgotten the lines which Melancthon wrote in the diary of Conrad Cordatus :

"Omnia non prodest Cordate inscribere chartis,  
Sed quaedam tacitum dissimulare decet" ?

How can we tell whether the scribes who ate at Luther's table, and copied down his chance sayings amidst the noise of a crowded dining-room, may not themselves have been responsible for some of the expressions which are displeasing to modern taste ? Dr. Kroker may perhaps say something on this point when he arranges the *Table-Talk* for the Weimar edition. We prefer to dwell on the countless passages of fresh and wholesome humour, the many happy illustrations of Scripture, which enriched Luther's daily conversation. Here is one example from a recently edited report by George Rörer :

Speaking on the childhood of our Lord, Luther said : " At Nazareth He must have helped his father Joseph to build houses, for Joseph was a carpenter, as the Gospel says. What will the people of Nazareth think at the last day, when they see Christ sitting in His majesty ? They will say to Him, ' Lord, didst not Thou help to build my house ? How art Thou come to these honours ? ' " <sup>1</sup>

For our final estimate of Luther, we must turn, after all, to the letters and speeches of his most intimate friends. Take this passage from a letter of Veit Dietrich, who was Luther's companion at Coburg in 1530 : " I cannot sufficiently admire the remarkable firmness, cheerfulness,

<sup>1</sup> *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, 1908, p. 356.

faith and hope of the man in these most bitter times. These he nourishes steadily by more diligent meditation on God's Word. Not a day passes on which he does not devote at least three hours to prayer, and those the hours most suitable for study. Once I happened to hear him praying. Good God, what spirit, what faith there was in his words ! He pleaded with such reverence as if he felt himself to be talking with God, with such hope and faith as if he were speaking with a father and a friend. ' I know,' he said, ' that Thou art our God and Father. I am sure, therefore, that Thou wilt defeat the persecutors of Thy children. If not, the danger is Thine as well as ours. The whole of this business is Thine ; we have been compelled to meet it ; defend us therefore.' I, standing apart, heard him praying with a clear voice in almost these very words. My soul also burned with a strange ardour as he spoke so familiarly, so solemnly, so reverently with God, and as he prayed he pleaded promises from the Psalms like one who was sure that all the things for which he asked would come to pass."<sup>1</sup>

For passages like this we look in vain in the American biographies. From Dr. McGiffert's Index, we are led to suppose that the Veit Dietrich of 1530 is the same as the " D. Vitum " of 1518, whom he calls " Dr. Veit."<sup>2</sup>

Each of these large volumes is wound up so hurriedly that no space is left for even a mention of the memorial tribute paid to Luther by Melanchthon in the Castle Church of Wittenberg. The oration, as Ellinger says, ranks with the best examples of mournful eloquence in the world's literature. Melanchthon had known Luther intimately for nearly a generation. He had experienced from him never-failing generosity and the tenderest indulgence. Knowing that he spoke to Europe and that jealous eyes would scru-

<sup>1</sup> C. R., vol. ii. col. 159.

<sup>2</sup> See note in Enders, i. pp. 302, 303, on Veit Warbeck.



tinise his every sentence, he ventured to place his friend beside Isaiah, John the Baptist, St. Paul and St. Augustine. The note of personal sorrow was hushed as he dwelt with awe and gratitude on the work divinely accomplished in these latter days through Luther. "And there came a fear on all; and they glorified God, saying, That a great prophet is risen up among us, and, that God hath visited His people."

JANE T. STODDART.

### *THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.*

#### VIII. THE BASIS OF PAUL'S THOUGHT—(2) GOD IS GOOD.

THE religion of Paul was definitely and absolutely inconsistent with the characteristic Oriental doctrine of a pantheistic type. Yet all such forms of thought start, as Paul did, from the perception that man is by the very fact of his existence separated from God and ought to aim at reunion with Him.

Why then did not Paul take the step which so many Asiatic forms of religious thought have taken? How did he avoid the pantheistic view and the inference from it, which was so tempting to an intensely emotional and devotional nature like his, that man should seek re-absorption in the Divine through liberation from the human nature, that man should strive to lose his individuality and to be merged in the one God?

Paul was saved from this step by the whole force of Hebrew tradition and the promise given to his fathers. The Promise had been made and must be fulfilled; and fulfilment of the Promise led in the diametrically opposite direction from that dream of absorption in the Divine nature, which was the goal of the highest Asiatic religious thought outside of the Hebrew people. The fulfilment of the

Promise lay in the perfecting of the race through the perfecting of the individual, not through the loss of individuality.

The Promise is just a more simple expression, such as an early people could most readily understand, of the philosophic principle that God is good. In the act of creation He has bound Himself; he has given a pledge or a Promise. He will never violate the Promise which He has repeated time and again to His chosen people. What God has done must be good and perfect; it cannot fail or become worse; it must grow towards perfection. Man, who was made in the image of God, must attain to the true end of his nature in some way and by some process, planned from the beginning by God. This process was to be realised through the coming of the Messiah. That is the Promise, or the Covenant or Testament (*διαθήκη*).

Promise, Covenant, Testament, these are terms that describe only in an imperfect way the act which they designate. Being English terms, they denote things that are different from the things which were designated by the ancient words thus translated. Moreover, even the ancient terms denote human actions, whereas this action of God is unique and unlike any ordinary event: it is alone in its class, and names that describe other acts do not exactly suit this action. Yet each of these terms describes correctly some side or aspect of its character. Like a promise it is purely voluntary: it comes entirely from one side and is received by the other: the giver is all-powerful, the receiver has no influence over it (except the influence of prayer). Like a covenant it is legally binding and cannot be broken: it makes and is the law, and has all the force and inviolability of law. Like a testament<sup>1</sup> it is a legal document, in which

<sup>1</sup> The term is not much used in the text of the English Version; but it is the ordinary rendering of the Greek term *διαθήκη*, and it is the name given to each part of the Bible.

one party alone confers by his free act all the validity and legal force, and in which the person benefited simply accepts without having any authority to influence the act. On the other hand the term covenant is unsuitable in so far as it suggests the idea of two parties entering into a voluntary agreement : the term testament is free from the suggestion that there are two parties, but it has serious defects as implying that it is revocable at any time by change of mind in the testator and that it comes into force only at his death<sup>1</sup> : the term promise loses all the solemnity and the terror (so to speak) of the law.

The Promise of God is the necessary expression of His goodness. It is His free gift to man, yet it arises inevitably from His character and His relation to man. It is the outcome of His nature, for His nature is love. The early Hebrews did not lay much stress on the love which is the nature of God. They dwelt far more on His power, as was inevitable in the earlier stages of their history, because the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom ; and thus they were taught by the law as their pedagogue to obey and to be in a certain degree wise. Yet they had a firm hold on this expression of the love of God in the Promise, which implies that ultimately His love will be triumphant and unmistakably manifested.

That God is good, that He has made the Promise to the Hebrews and through them to the whole of mankind, was not a principle that Paul sought to prove by any ratiocination. He seems always to say to his audience, " You know it for yourselves." In the perception that *God is*, there is also involved according to Paul's view the perception that

<sup>1</sup> Even in that early stage of the development of a testament, when it was instantaneous in its effect and irrevocable (according to Maine, *Ancient Law*), the testament denuded the giver to enrich the heir ; but such a stage need not be considered.

God is good. Only through a perversion of view can we imagine that God exists really without being good, for it is only through His gifts and goodness that we perceive His existence. From His works we know Him.

This principle was burned into Paul's nature by generations of experience. He was the heir to many centuries of Jewish history. None but a Jew could have had that perfectly firm and unhesitating grasp of this truth. The fabric of Paul's thought is purely and simply Hebrew.<sup>1</sup> Already before his birth he was marked out first as the Apostle, and secondly as the Apostle to the nations, because the whole of Hebraism and all the results of Jewish wisdom and religious experience were interwoven in the constitution of his thought. He could not hesitate himself. He could not understand, nor sympathise with, nor pardon and make allowance for, any hesitation on the part of others. They must see. They must know. His own intense and unhesitating belief, the very fact that he could not allow any doubt or seek to demonstrate to his hearers the axioms of the Faith, made him such a power among men. Had he been capable of feeling and of pardoning doubt, he might have been greater as a lecturer on abstract philosophic theory, but he could not have become such a power in the world as he was and is.

Here again Faith is the initial force which makes men recognise this truth. Faith is really a force that moves the minds of men. It is not a mere fact : it is a driving power. The failure to recognise this truth is already a mark of degeneration and degradation, i.e. of sin, which deteriorates

<sup>1</sup> So far Dr. Garvie is, as I fancy, wholly in agreement with me : the strength and the power of Paul were purely Jewish and Greek had no share in his deeper nature, but only in the expression of it and in the moderation, the reasonableness and the charm (the *ἐπιεικεία* and the *χάρις*) which characterised it. Paul always knew where to stop, which the purely Semitic mind frequently does not know.



and distorts the will. Paul estimates the sanity and the working power of men according to their ability to discern and believe the unseen. The Divine truth is not to be handled and weighed with common scales. It is appreciable through the natural power, granted to all men, to recognise the truth, and the natural tendency to follow it. This power is Faith, and by their possession of the power we must estimate men.

These may seem to be two very big assumptions. What right has Paul to take as the obvious and necessary principles of right thinking, these two axioms, that God is, and that God is good? Is that philosophically justifiable, or must we admit that after all Paul had not thought out a philosophic basis for his religion, and that the Greek form of thinking was in the last resort alien to him and lay outside of his circle of thought?

The refusal to doubt the truth of one's thought, however, is not necessarily a proof of an unphilosophic mind. The tendency to divest oneself of one's thought, to hold it apart from oneself and contemplate and reason about it, and frame arguments to justify it, was discordant with Paul's emotional and active nature. He found that this tendency became strong in his Hellenic Churches, as they were established. The purely philosophic mind was in danger of losing itself in abstract contemplation; and all the while there were the Greek cities, the Roman Provinces, the Latin cities, the barbarian tribes, the whole world, to conquer, to convince and to save. Such abstract speculation was hateful to Paul. He saw in it the enemy taking a new form in his young Churches; and as this enemy grew more clearly defined he denounced it with the vehemence of his nature.

Those who regard the thoroughgoing denunciation of this kind in the Pastoral Epistles as un-Pauline miss a

certain side of Paul's nature. In those letters he does not refute, but simply sets aside as wrong and dangerous and fatal all the heresies and false teaching to which he refers. In the case of a Church like Colossae, founded only a few years ago by his coadjutors, or of the Galatian Churches, founded not long before by himself, he could in his letters regard their errors as due to a mistaken zeal for right. Especially was that the case with the Galatian converts : they were full of eagerness to do well : they were unsparing in exertion and in the observing of useless yet burdensome ceremonies. Their zeal had to be guided ; and the way to guide them was to proclaim and explain more fully the Gospel with its knowledge now revealed, i.e. its mysteries and their meaning. Later, in the letters to Timothy at Ephesus, another method was needed. It was vain to explain mysteries and revelation to those who were deliberately wasting the golden opportunities for making the resurrection known to the heathen and for saving the world, while they indulged in curious speculations about the nature of the resurrection and its time, and the meaning of time, and so on. Such people had already too much knowledge, or rather too much conceit of their knowledge. They did not need more knowledge, they wanted the whip and the rod. There is a fit time for all things, a time for the refutation of errors by the imparting of further knowledge, and a time for denunciation and flat condemnation. Just as Paul would have denounced the pagan hearer who declared that there was no God, and would have refused to argue where argument was vain and unprofitable, so in A.D. 66 he denounced the Ephesian Christians who theorised and allegorised and reasoned instead of acting. The Christian life, to Paul, lay not in contemplation but in work.

Such was Paul's character. Is it inconsistent with a consciously thought out basis for his action ? Is it unworthy

of the mind that has passed through the philosophic stage, and gone on to the religious stage, and resolved to carry its religion to the world? This impulse to move the world was to Paul the essential nature of God and of the man who is made in the image of God. God exists to make and to perfect the world. The world is His creature, and He is the Creator: but a creator who creates nothing is a contradiction in terms. Equally self-contradictory and absurd is the creature that disregards its Creator and tries to ignore Him and to live without Him. Every breath that we draw is through the Divine power. Every thought that we think is through the Divine mind. Nothing is rightly understood except in its relation to that First Power: the world becomes real only as the envisagement of Him. If we refuse to recognise this, and if we turn away from God, we are reducing our own life to a negation; and we are turning from life towards death. There is no truth without this recognition of God: there is no real truth except this, that God is. Every other truth arises out of this in orderly evolution.

That then is Paul's position, and it is a perfectly sound philosophic position. As he says in Romans xi. 36, "from Him and through Him and to Him are all things."<sup>1</sup> Outside of Him there is nothing, for anything that existed apart from Him would be an independent existence over against Him, and therefore a negation of the truth that *God is*. So again in Ephesiains v. 6 "one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all,"<sup>2</sup> or in 1 Corinthians viii. 6, "for us there is one God the Father, from whom are all things and we unto Him,"<sup>3</sup> and one Lord Jesus

<sup>1</sup> *eis*, i.e. with a view to Him, to attain to Him again.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Colossians i. 19 f.

<sup>3</sup> *eis*, the same preposition as in Romans xi. 36, used with the same force.

Christ through whom are all things, and we through Him." Everything originates from God and returns to Him; the Divine power through whom the world is maintained and carried on in its process or evolution is the Son and Saviour. God is the goal and final stage of salvation; the process of salvation moves on "with a view to God," i.e. it is a process of returning through Jesus to its origin.

It is of course implied in this that God is not real and existent apart from the world which He has created. It is His nature to concern Himself with His creation, to regulate it, to make it good. It is the true nature of man to have faith in the justice and goodness of God, and never to regard Him as malevolent or as careless of man. The pagan doctrine that God is cruel and must be soothed and propitiated, the philosophic doctrine that the gods live a life apart from and heedless of the world, are both equally abhorrent to the Hebrew belief and to Paul as a Hebrew sprung from Hebrews.

In the nature of the real and true God it is also involved that He must be always in communication with the men whom He has created. They are not merely "from Him": they are also "through Him." In every act and thought and word of theirs pulses the Divine power, for they are made after His fashion. He must rule and guide His creatures. They have to attain the goal and return "to Him." In doing so they realise His will and purpose. It is in accordance with the nature and consciousness of man that they must recognise that will in the process of realising it. To know it and to become conscious of it are equivalent to the working out of it in life. To know God's purpose and will you must make that purpose your life: nothing merely abstract and inactive is real knowledge. You must live it before you can know it.

This way of consciously living their knowledge comes only



“through Him.” Therefore the knowledge is communicated by Him to man. Once more the motive power lies in Faith. The intense belief, this mighty driving power, brings man into relation with God. Man knows with all his heart and might that God cares for His creatures, and that He cannot stand apart and leave them unaided to their own devices ; He is constantly guiding men, and revealing Himself to them if they will only listen to His voice. Everything that takes place in the world around us, when rightly understood, is the expression of His will and the declaration of His character. All the powers of nature are His messengers, and “if He thunder by law, the thunder is still His voice” ; but most true it is that, as the prophet of old found, that the Lord was not in the wind, nor in the earthquake, nor in the fire, but in “a sound of gentle stillness.”<sup>1</sup> To each and every man, according to his nature, the will of God is manifested in the most suitable way, if he is ready to hear ; and one must will intensely with all the power of one’s nature, if the attaining unto God is to be possible.

In the case of Paul the critical and epoch-making manifestation of the Divine will and nature took a form that appealed primarily to the senses, and only subsequently to the intellect. The reason why that fashion of revelation to the man of most acute and powerful intellect among all who were then living was suitable and necessary will be discussed in the sequel.

Paul was well aware that revelation of the Divine purpose may take place in many ways. In Acts xvi. 6-10, it is described as having been made to him three times in three different fashions. The characteristic of it is absolute certainty. When a man has heard the Divine voice, there is left no room for doubt. What he has heard or seen becomes a

<sup>1</sup> The literal translation, as given in the margin of the Revised Version : 1 Kings xix. 12.

lasting possession and a power in his life. He sees the nature of the world and the permanent values of things in a new way, and he cannot acquiesce in his former valuation of them. In every case where a man, in what we might call a moment of inspiration or exaltation, seems to himself to appreciate more truly the nature of the world, his own relation to God and to other men, and the worthlessness of most things<sup>1</sup> that men strive after, Paul (as I doubt not) would recognise a Divine revelation. There are such moments, few or many, in every man's life, when conventional values are recognised as shams, and one stands face to face with truth, or as Paul would say, with God.

Faith is the force that raises man above all hesitation regarding the goodness of God. If the experience of life instils a doubt, as the losses increase, as apparently purposeless and unmerited suffering obtrudes itself all around, as friends depart—the one penalty of growing old—and life grows grey in their absence; or if history appals us with its crimes and massacres and the ruins of great civilisation what is Paul's answer? Suffering is training and preparation: we must suffer that we may attain the glory of God: through Faith we have this assurance about the future: we must "suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him; I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed towards us."<sup>2</sup> The assurance of this is the guarantee that it will be. Paul's feeling was expressed in the words of the old Hebrew prophet, "though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him." The suffering, the evil, the disappointment, are a stage in the purpose of God.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Philippians iii. 8, "I suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but refuse."

<sup>2</sup> Romans viii. 17 f.

<sup>3</sup> τὸν ὑποτάξαντα, him who subjected it (Rom. viii. 20), is certainly God and not some power counteracting God.

This reliance on the goodness of God we attain through the power of Faith, and do not learn through any process of ratiocination. We must feel that there is this Divine purpose and Promise, that the world is the unfolding of the will of God, that the will of God is the soul of history, that to suffer is to learn (in the literal Greek phrase of the poet). But this you must assume—through Faith: you must accept—through Faith. To be able to do this you must strip off all your wisdom, you must get down to the simple first principle that God is good, you must be born again; otherwise you cannot hear the voice of God and you cannot enter the Kingdom of Heaven. No mere intellectual acceptance possesses any power over the deeper feelings of man.

At this point<sup>1</sup> we begin to come in contact with Greek influence and Greek expression in Paul's conception of religion. Yet it would be a profound blunder to lay too much stress on this, or to infer from such a passage as Romans viii. 20 ff. that Paul regarded evil as undeveloped good, and as a necessary stage in the upward progress of man towards God. Gloss it over as you may, wrap it up in such form of words as you please, the Greek idea of sin or error is always involved in that opinion, which is radically opposed to the Hebraic and Pauline idea. To the Greek<sup>2</sup> what he might call sin (*ἁμαρτία*) was only a failure to hit the true aim, an overplus or a falling-short which keeps him from hitting the true mean: it was a mistake ultimately intellectual, a stage in the process towards true knowledge and wisdom and Sophia. However some Greek thinkers might attempt to introduce into their idea of "error" or "sin"

<sup>1</sup> That suffering is learning was the lesson on which Aeschylus insists, e.g. *Agamemnon*, 170.

<sup>2</sup> Aeschylus has a deeper and truer conception of sin than any other Greek of the Classical period: to him sin is typically the issue of *ὑβρις*, the arrogant trampling on the right order of nature.

an element of volition, they could not get free from this thoroughly Greek way of contemplating the problem of evil except by de-Hellenising their thought (as some were trying to do, though imperfectly and in theory) of which, owing to the loss of most of their writings, we are not perfectly informed. To Paul, on the contrary, sin is not merely an error of the intellect ; it is a deterioration and degradation of the will, progressive and illimitable, ending in death, as "righteousness" leads towards life. To the Greeks sin was a failure ; to Paul it was a crime. The Greek blamed the Gods, or Fortune, or Necessity, or Ate, or some such superhuman conception, for his error. Paul laid the fault on man himself. To the Greeks, error was an episode, happily and usually only temporary, in the natural life, a failure to balance accurately the various powers of nature which unite to form the man's being, producing as a consequence the temporary ascendancy of one among these powers. In the estimate of Paul sin was a voluntary declination from nature, carrying man away from the Divine life, weakening his will and leading inevitably onward in progressive deterioration, out of which the only hope of salvation lay in a reinvigoration of the power of Faith, so that the sinner might be strengthened in will towards salvation. Taking a rough illustration the career of a drunkard exhibits in a simple form the Pauline conception of sin ; the first indulgence weakens the moral power, which continuously deteriorates with fresh indulgence, so that there is no limit to the depths of infamy and degradation yawning to engulf the sufferer ; no cure is of any value, no drug has any real influence, unless the will of the drunkard can be strengthened ; and (so far as experience shows) no salvation is possible for him except through reawakening his faith in the goodness and kindness of God.

In this simple case the contrast between the Greek and



the Pauline view is clear. To the Greek the drunkard is a worshipper of the divine power Akrateia. To Paul he is a slave of the devil, turning his back on God and good and on faith in the goodness of God. To recreate Faith in the criminal is the only way of Salvation : no other force or power is of any avail.

Thus Faith is the force which makes a man capable of hearing the Divine will. The perfect belief that God does enter into communication with man and the strained eager longing to be so favoured are both necessary. Faith is not merely an intellectual belief ; it is a moral and an emotional force. At every stage and in every act of the higher life, Faith is the one supreme requirement. Without it nothing can be achieved. With it everything becomes possible.

Although our examples and quotations must necessarily be taken from Paul's writings, and therefore belong to his Christian period, yet I cannot doubt that, when he was persecuting the Church, or still earlier, when he chose the Divine life and came to Jerusalem, he was eagerly bent on hearing and obeying the Divine voice. As he said to the High Priest and the Council, " I have lived before God in all good conscience unto this day " ; and undoubtedly he included in this claim his early pre-Christian life. He had from infancy believed in the Promise, and was ready always to stake his life on the assurance that the Promise must be fulfilled and the Messiah must come. It was through a new revelation, made possible because of his unhesitating Faith in the Promise, that he learned that the Messiah had already come ; and the conviction that his mind and life must be remade was the necessary result of this revelation.

Something can be gathered from a comparison between the Pauline basis of thought, as stated in these two principles, and the Confession of Islam. Mohammedanism is essentially a revival of the Hebrew religion in a form suited

to appeal to the Arab tribes. Although (as I believe) it must have arisen in the soul of Mohammed after intercourse with Christians, and especially with Christians who had rejected the orthodox doctrine through disapproval of the stress which that doctrine laid on the person and the sacredness of the Mother of God, and although it accepts the Divine character of Jesus, yet it loses almost all the Christian development of Judaism and emphasises specially the older and simpler elements in the common Faith.

The Confession of Islam is expressed in two propositions. The first is practically identical with the first of the two Pauline axioms : it shows merely verbal variation, though there is much history and psychology and poetry (on which we need not dwell), underlying the variation : “there is no God but God.” The second proposition exhibits very marked variation from the second Pauline axiom, yet the variation is less than appears superficially : “Mohammed is the Messenger of God.” The stress is here laid on the personality of Mohammed, a historical fact in the development of the original Jewish Faith as expressed in the first proposition of the Islamic confession : Mohammed was the prophet and apostle to whom the further truth was revealed. In other words, revelation by God has been continuous and progressive in Judaism and Islam ; the old Hebrew prophets had shared in this revelation of truth (as was fully admitted) ; but their knowledge required to be completed by Mohammed’s revelation. The fact that Mohammed was a man to whom the truth was revealed by God is the guarantee offered by Islam that revelation of the Divine nature and will to man is always possible.

Thus, apart from the historical fact, the second proposition involves several fundamental truths about the nature of God : He reveals His truth to man in a progressive series of acts ; He cares for man, and guides man’s course in the

world : He is good. Still, Islam lays little emphasis on the kindness or the love of God, even less emphasis than Judaism did. It has fallen back from the great progress which Christianity made in that respect. It lays almost all stress on the greatness, the power, the justice, the awfulness, of God : the Promise of God fades away into an extension of Islam by force, by massacre and slavery, by the Holy War, so that it shall become the universal religion by the extermination of unbelievers.

The comparison shows how thoroughly Hebraic was the texture of Paul's religious thought : the development of Hebraism in his mind was not an addition of any foreign or discordant element, but merely the explanation and emphasis of an element already existing. Even in Islam, that revival of Judaism, the same element is not wholly lost, but is partly left unemphasised and partly distorted.

As yet we have found no Greek element in Paul's thought except the way in which he explains the suffering of the apparent evil in the world. This is not necessarily or exclusively Greek ; but, as we shall see, it is expressed by Paul in a form that is characteristic of Hellenic philosophy.

The Promise is the free, gracious act of God, proceeding out of His own nature and purpose, and not earned by man as a reward or resulting from any joint agreement or bargain between the two parties—as, for example, was the case according to certain common pagan conceptions of sacrifice. So Prometheus offered a victim as a sacrifice, and divided the carcase into two parts, offering the gods their choice : they chose the larger heap, which included all the bones and worthless parts of the victim, leaving to the offerer the finest portions of the flesh. So, again, the Hindus acquired merit (*dharma*) proportionate to the number and splendour of the victims offered ; and each acquisition of *dharma* was stored up as invested power in the bank of

faith, until in one case a king acquired such an accumulation of strength as to be dangerous to the gods themselves. So in the common conception of Greek and Roman suppliants the act of prayer was a regular bargain between the worshipper and God: the suppliant entreated for such and such reward, stipulating by vow that he would pay so much in offering and gifts: if the deity thought the reward sufficient, he fulfilled the prayer, and the suppliant paid his vow: it was however always possible that the suppliant might cheat the god after the prayer was granted, though by such dishonesty he incurred the wrath of the god and was sure to suffer ultimately by some act of the divine power. He had made his god his enemy. So again the blood of the victim was in some cases regarded as a means of giving strength to the god and thus enabling him to fulfil the prayer of the suppliant.<sup>1</sup>

All such theories of the divine nature were to Paul degrading to man and sure to work a deterioration in his character and conduct; and this deterioration is progressive, increasing from stage to stage. The Promise and the gift of salvation are the free act of the goodness of God, unbought by man.

Yet while this act is perfectly free and not motivated by the conduct of man, it must be earned by man before it becomes operative. There is no contradiction between the two statements: the Promise is the free gift of God, and yet it must be earned by man. The two assertions are quite harmonious. As Paul said to the pagans of Lystra, rain and fruitful seasons are the free gift of God to men, "filling their hearts with food and gladness." The rain and the climate and the soil are always there; but the food

<sup>1</sup> This was specially characteristic of the cults in which the dead man, weak and bloodless in death, was yet an embodiment of superhuman power, that could be strengthened to help living men,



and gladness are gained by work. Before rain and soil can be made to produce harvest, there is much toil needed on the part of man. He has to earn the gifts before they become anything to him. He has to go out of himself, to expend energy, to sacrifice the present for the future, and to give a part of himself, before the free gifts of God materialise in real benefit to him.

There is always needed this double action, both on the part of God and on the part of man. The latter must respond to God. He must seek for Him. Such is the rule of the universe. The Divine in man answers to the Divine above man, and makes a step in the long course upwards towards reunion. This principle is evident in the humbler and more material sphere ; otherwise human life would fail. Judaism and Christianity universalised this principle over the moral universe. In other words the Hebrew Faith, as Paul learned it from his birth and inherited it from his forefathers, forced into his nature the truth that we attain to God, not by sacrificing and shaking off our individuality, but by perfecting it.

From the statement of this truth we started in this section, and to it we now return.

Paul states this apparent contradiction most emphatically in the letter to the Philippians iii. 7-15. His righteousness is not his own : it is the gift of God through Faith : there is nothing else of the smallest value in the whole world except this knowledge, through which he has obtained fellowship with the sufferings of Jesus and has come to be in conformity with the life which was consummated by the death of Jesus. He had no part in attaining this condition : he had simply been seized upon by Christ without conscious action on his own part. Yet, as he also says, he has not yet actually succeeded, on his own side, in seizing Christ : he has not yet attained : he has not yet been made righteous : in other

words, his part has not yet been done. He is only struggling onwards through the hard trials of life, forgetting everything except the prize of righteousness that lies before him, hurrying towards the goal like a runner straining every nerve and staking all his energy in reaching the mark and gaining the prize. He has not attained salvation, and yet he has attained it. He has not been made perfect, and yet he is made perfect : “ let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded ” (verse 15).

The perfect union with God, then, is the perfect development and perfection of the individual nature. Not even Mohammedanism, much as it has sacrificed of this truth, has forgotten it wholly. These are all religions of energy and of work (though history shows how little Islam has remained true to its start).

W. M. RAMSAY.

### *THE ELEPHANTINÉ PAPYRI.*

THE long-expected collection of Aramaic Papyri and Ostraka from Elephantinê is now before the world ; and general admiration is being aroused by the editor's patience and industry, ingenuity and learning. The difficult texts, some hundreds in number, have been deciphered, copied, translated (to a great extent), elucidated, indexed, and had their grammar and vocabulary tabulated ; whatever is now said about them can only be in the nature of gleanings after Professor Sachau's harvest. A volume of the first order has therefore been added to the archaeological library of the East.

Yet it must be confessed that the result is most disappointing. Even if the authenticity of the Biblical books were still generally maintained, we should look eagerly for the discovery of copies or parts of copies nearer the time of the authors than those late MSS. whereon our editions are based ; for even the most “ orthodox ” would allow the

possibility that some alteration had taken place during the long series of transferences. But in times when the Biblical books are usually regarded as patchwork belonging to different ages, when e.g. Isaiah is supposed to contain materials dating variously from the eighth to the third or even second century B.C., even a few pages of a Biblical book belonging to the fifth century B.C., which is the time of most of these papyri, would be of incalculable value. They might establish or they might refute the pretensions of critics. They might bring into the region of reality such phantasms as the Elohist and Jehovist, the Second and the Third Isaiah, or dismiss them finally to fairyland. They would furnish a sure basis for criticism, such as at present is lacking.

The library of the Jewish colony at Elephantinê offers us instead considerable fragments of *the Story of Achikar*, and an Aramaic version of the Behistun Inscription! Its contents in addition to these are various fragments of letters, contracts, receipts, registers, etc. If the fragments of Achikar are compared with the texts already known in Syriac, Armenian, and Arabic, it is doubtful whether anything has been gained even for the understanding of this fabrication, which by no means deserves any profound study. The Aramaic fragments are not only wanting in continuity, but they are rarely intelligible; they do not admit of more than occasional translation. In places it is evident that this Aramaic text is a bad translation from some other language; thus in a sentence like one which the Jewish Oral Tradition attributes to Ben-Sira Achikar is made to say, "I have lifted straw and I have lifted a *plough*, and there is nothing lighter than a sojourner." The word "plough" looks very like a misreading and mistranslation of the word for "bran" used by the Rabbis in the passage cited.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> סובין, *Baba Bathra*, 98b. Unless פֶּרֶן stands for the German *Faden*, "thread." The Aramaic also uses נָסַב wrongly for "lift."

Now the suspicion that these papyri are forgeries has already been mooted, though it has not spread, and it may be observed that a skilful forger who in these days wished to father documents on a community of the fifth century B.C. would almost certainly select the Behistun inscription and the story of Achikar. For such persons are by no means anxious that a strong light should be shed on their works. Hence the skilful fabricator Simonides forged works of Greek authors whose names were familiar to few even among professional scholars. Where the discovery of a text would make or mar a hundred reputations, the microscope and chemical analysis would certainly be called in to help the study of it; and the forger does not wish his works to be submitted to such cross-examination.

Linguistically, much of the matter contained in the Sachau papyri appears to the present writer highly suspicious. A document (papyri 8 and 9), purporting to contain the description of a ship, seems to be made up of late Hebrew and modern Persian, with an admixture of some other languages. It has two Armenian words, *navapet* for "naval commander," and *hamarakar*, "accountant." For "commander" we might expect it to employ the Armenian *hramanatar*, since in Jewish Aramaic the Armenian form is used; but it offers instead *farmandar*, which appears to be a fabricated word. The sentence כלתרין נופתיא זי כרכיא נגידה עלתבלא, "both naval commanders of the cities are an affliction on the world," may belong to the fifth century B.C., but it looks like a reference to present day politics and the naval rivalry between two great states. The sentence with which the list of items commences ערן הוה זנה אשרנא זי אפיתי אופשרה למעבר "it is time to squeeze the dough which I have baked," consists of one Hebrew word, one modern Persian word in the Judaic spelling, *afshurah*, and one old Aramaic word given a modern



Persian etymology (*âshurdan*, "to knead"), for that which is baked must be kneaded. Among the articles connected with this ship is הנרונה זרניך "a pumpkin of arsenic"; now the genuine Persian form for the name of "arsenic" is thought to be not *zarnīk*, but *zarnah* or *zarni*.<sup>1</sup> The word for "pumpkin" bears no sign of antiquity. Among the parts of the ship two at least, the הן and the הלא, appear to be modern Persian for "hold" and "rudder" or "oars."<sup>2</sup> Further, this document, like many others, appears to reckon values in modern Egyptian piastres, כרשן, on the supposition that the name is connected with *Cyrus*, whereas it is really the German *Groschen*; the error, which consists in substituting a K for a Q, is a natural one.

The following facts are also to be borne in mind. There is still a papyrus factory at Syracuse, and when there is a factory, there must be a market for its output. The German expedition appears to have gone for the purpose of discovering Aramaic documents belonging to the old Jewish colony. The first papyrus edited by Dr. Sachau looked in facsimile as if it had been written very recently; and its spelling of the name *Kambyzes*, *Kanbuzi*, whereas the Greek has *Kambyzes*, and the old Persian *Kabuiya*, had a savour of the German pronunciation of the name. Besides, it was not natural to find in Elephantinê a document sent from Elephantinê; according to the Arabs the practice of keeping copies of *state documents* commenced with the Caliph Muawiah in the seventh century A.D., and a begging letter is not a state document, and we should still less expect a copy of it to be kept. These considerations all seem to the present writer very serious, but naturally he cannot pronounce decidedly on a subject which involves so much varied knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> Lagarde and Horn.

<sup>2</sup> *Pakhtemoni*, "supports," is an artificial form based on the modern Persian *pushtabân* or *pushtimân*. *Tamīs* is the Turkish *tamīz*, "clean," thinly disguised, etc.

Still we can account for the absence of matter that is of real value from this collection in other ways. That which is worth preserving is worth destroying ; the waste-paper basket serves as a repository only for what does not deserve preservation or demand destruction. Neither the banknote nor the compromising letter finds its way thither ; its contents are indifferent and insignificant. Now the papyri brought to Europe and housed in our Museums and Public Libraries are the contents of ancient waste-paper baskets ; not one per cent of those which are deciphered and edited with so much care tell us anything worth knowing. Let any reader of Deissmann's *Light from the Ancient East* estimate the amount of elucidation which its learned author has been able to get out of contemporary papyri for the difficulties of the New Testament, and he will see " that what we say is true."

That which was valuable in the way of literature was either effectively preserved or effectively destroyed. At one time it was the practice for men to destroy their libraries before their deaths ; thereby indicating the value which they put upon them. A savant of the tenth century, Abu Hayyan Tauhidi, burned his collection when he had reached an advanced age ; when a letter of reproof was addressed him, he replied that numerous men of eminence had done the like. One had buried his books in the earth and no trace of them had come to light (in Mesopotamia, whose soil does not preserve like that of Egypt) ; another had thrown his into the sea, uttering over them as he flung them in, " Ye have been good guides, but a guide is no longer necessary for one who has reached his destination " ; another had consigned his books to a mountain cave, of which he afterwards closed the entrance ; another had thrown his books into a furnace ; another had torn his to pieces and flung them to the winds ; another, leaving his books to his son, had warned him to burn them if ever he suspected the

doctrine which they contained. The Jews, who have shown such skill in preserving the twenty-four books of their Law through so many migrations, expulsions, and threats of extermination, have also known how to destroy.

Hence the light which the Elephantinê find—*assuming that it is genuine*—throws on the Old Testament is rather indirect than direct. If the Achikar papyri are genuine and of the age to which Professor Sachau assigns them, it follows that Ben-Sira must have borrowed copiously from this source; for the same aphorisms are found in both collections. Ben-Sira does not indeed mention Achikar in his list of sages, but then he has also omitted Greek authors with whom he seems to have had some acquaintance; although, then, the intellectual calibre of Ben-Sira appears to be vastly higher than that of Achikar, we may conceivably have here one of the sources of the former. Now it is observable that Achikar is quoted in another Apocryphal book, that of Tobit; whence it might appear that the separation made by the Jews between canonical literature and uncanonical was based not merely on subjective grounds. Of the Apocryphal Literature the sources were known to be tainted, of the canonical literature they were thought to be pure.

The indirect light may however turn out to be of great importance. Professor Sachau observes that his documents prove that the Jewish colony was in origin a military colony, and its Temple according to the first papyrus published by him had probably been built by mercenaries employed by Psammetichos II. against the Ethiopians near the beginning of the sixth century B.C. The authority for their being so employed is Aristeas, the author of what is ordinarily thought to be a mythical history of the origin of the LXX translation of the Old Testament, who is thus partially at least rehabilitated. Now in Isaiah xix. 19 there is a prophecy that “in

that day there shall be an altar to the Lord in the midst of the land of Egypt and a pillar near her boundary to the Lord." Mr. Box (after other authorities) dates this prophecy about 275 B.C. ; i.e., about three hundred years *after* its fulfilment ! Why such a prophecy should be made at all after it had been generally agreed (at any rate in Palestine) according to the Higher Criticism that there could be an altar only in Jerusalem, is far from apparent ; it would seem clear that the prophecy belonged to a date long before such a rule had come to be recognised. But the fact that the prophecy was fulfilled renders it practically certain that the dating of the oracle must be erroneous to the extent of at least three hundred years. Nor again is it easy to apply the theory of *vaticinium post eventum* ; for such prophecies are only fabricated when evidence is required of the genuineness of some prediction not yet realized ; a person, e.g., who could be shown to have prophesied the English occupation of Egypt might claim credence for a prophecy of the Italian occupation of Tripoli. On the other hand if the prophecy of the Temple at the extreme end of Egypt was uttered only a little before its actual erection, it is not clear why it should have been ascribed to Isaiah ; for prophecy was at that time a recognised form of literature, and there was no reason why an oracle of this sort should be attributed to an earlier prophet. Hence the conservative side in the matter of the ascription of this prophecy is the strong side, and it is the destructive criticism which is involved in difficulties.

It is probable that those with whom prophecy is neither history nor guesswork, but *vision* or second sight, will find the paragraph Isaiah xix. 16-25 in the highest degree instructive in the new light which the Elephantinê discoveries have shed. "Five cities in Egypt will be speaking the lip of Canaan." What is the "lip of Canaan ?" We should



imagine *Hebrew* ; but the word used by Isaiah for that is *Jewish*. For *Syriac* his word is *Aramaic*. The mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic which is used in these documents, and which is the “ lip of Canaan ” as late as the Palestinian version of the Gospels, is then probably what is signified by this term.

That a prophecy such as that contained in these verses could in any sense be a fabrication appears to the present writer unthinkable ; it has the peculiarity of the words ascribed to this Prophet, viz., that “ they burn like fire.” But it seems likely that from the study of these and others like them a theory of prophecy as *second sight* may be evolved which, though differing from both the traditional theory and the prevalent theory, will be far nearer the former than the latter. It will endeavour to discover in the prophecies laws of *perspective* ; laws neither analysed nor understood by the Prophets themselves, who in consequence make grave errors both in the location and in the estimation of events ; which errors are evidence of the genuineness of their second sight. As in photography, what are called the “ high lights ” come out first, as the plate is developed ; these with Isaiah are the altar to the Lord near the frontier of Egypt, the sacrifices and meal-offerings made to the God of Israel, the vows that are promised to Him and paid ; the five cities speaking “ the lip of Canaan ” ; these are familiar and therefore clear. In the matter grouped round these “ high lights ” much is obscure and may be incorrectly arranged, distance both in space and time being misunderstood. And this may be the account of the thrilling though bewildering prophecy that “ in that day ” Egypt, Assyria and Israel will all three be a blessing in the middle of the earth ; the names “ my people,” “ the work of my hands,” “ my heritage,” so similar in import, being bestowed upon them. Something seen by the Prophet from his “ watch-

tower " found expression in this wonderful oracle ; but it needs another prophet to interpret it.

If this notion of Israel's as the world's religion pervades the book of Isaiah, there is another which equally binds the whole together and like a threefold cord is not quickly broken. It is the reunion of a scattered Israel. The documents from Elephantinê help us to throw back the date of the *diaspora* in such a way as to render it intelligible that the Prophet should make it his main theme ; for even if he lived more than a century before the employment of the Jewish mercenaries by Psammetichos II., it is likely that these were not the first Israelites so employed. Dispersed or to be dispersed to the four corners of the earth, for the Prophet was well aware that the chief dispersion was yet to come, they were yet again to be gathered to their land, when all jealousies and enmities would be forgotten. The vista which this opened out, the glory and splendour where-with it was surrounded, have inspired the Prophet to utterances which in fervour surpass anything to be found in any other literature ; if, as our texts imply, it enabled him to break through the veil of futurity so as even to read correctly the name of a king yet unborn, those texts are not necessarily to be altered. But it is of interest to us to know that the dispersion whereto he foresaw so glorious a termination had begun in his time ; though, as he foresaw, the chief agency in bringing it about was to be not the Assyrian power which loomed so large to his contemporaries, but Babylon as yet far from its zenith.

Hence it may be that the discoveries at Elephantinê will have marked the commencement of another reunion after dispersion, viz., of the prophecies attributed to Isaiah, the gem of the Hebrew Scriptures. The emptying of the waste-paper baskets of Elephantinê will perhaps lead to the filling of others at home with even less valuable material.

For it is clear that criticism must be content to let its performances be generally judged by those cases whereon a certain pronouncement can be made. The authorities who through ignorance of facts which have afterwards come to light misdated a document by three hundred years can claim little value for similar conjectures where there is a like probability of future discoveries proving them to be in error. Mistaken conclusions are invariably due to mistaken premises ; and the premises whence the misdating of the prophecy about the "pillar to the Lord at the border of Egypt " was derived are that prophecy means not second sight, but preaching, pamphleteering or guess-work, and that classical Hebrew of the first order could have been composed in the third century B.C. A third premise which is probably as false as the others is that the Sacred Books were liable to interpolation on a great scale ; whereas the probability is that the operation was a difficult one, which could only be executed on a minute scale, e.g. the substitution of the word "damsel " for " virgin " in Isaiah vii. 14, which, slight as it is, has left its traces in an obvious contradiction, for an ordinary domestic event was not comparable to " any sign in heaven or earth." But the alteration of a word or a letter in a case where the existence of the community seemed to depend upon it bears little or no analogy to the introduction of fabricated texts on a large scale where there was no such necessity. The demonstration that this process has been falsely assumed in one case may therefore embolden us to deny its existence in other cases. And this may save the printers of " Rainbow Bibles " some of their trouble.

Professor Sayce, in the November number of this magazine, called attention to another result of the find, which became apparent almost as soon as Professor Sachau's first papyri were published. The first stone in Wellhausen's building is the hypothesis that the Priestly Code assumes that sacrifice can

only be offered in one place, Jerusalem, and that the Deuteronomic Code does not assume it, but institutes it. As was shown in another article, Wellhausen's opening sentence is as unsound as a sentence can be ; for he quotes as " the Gospel " a passage in the Fourth Gospel (whose authenticity is constantly questioned), a passage put not into the mouth of the author or any person of authority, but into that of a Samaritan who could not speak authoritatively about Jewish beliefs, and a woman, who could not so speak about religion at all, and a woman who in the course of the narrative is proved to be of bad character ; and whose words finally say something very different from what Wellhausen wishes her to say. The Elephantinê papyrus (*if genuine*) shows that in the fifth century, when the Priestly Code had become established in Jerusalem, not only was there an altar with sacrifice to the Lord at the extreme end of Egypt, but the sacrificers counted on the sympathy of their brethren at Jerusalem and their co-operation in getting leave to rebuild their temple when it had been pulled down. Professor Gunkel in a paper printed in this magazine hoped to elude this argument by endeavouring to show that the priests of Elephantinê counted on that sympathy in vain ; but even if this could be shown, no argument could be based upon it. Thus quite recently the governor of the Sudan appealed to England for subscriptions towards a cathedral at Khartum. It might reasonably be inferred from this that he supposed such an enterprise would be countenanced in England ; and it would by no means follow that it was not countenanced, even if not a single subscription were sent. For men cannot always do the thing which in principle they approve ; they may have other uses for their money that are more pressing, and they may doubt their influence with the persons to whom they are asked to appeal. However Professor Sachau has produced a fresh document showing that an ordinance and *firman*



was transmitted to the Jews of Elephantinê bidding them keep the Passover in accordance with the provisions of Deuteronomy. Clearly then these Jews were not "outside the pale," but recognised as within it.

The transmission of this ordinance suggests another explanation of the absence of religious books in addition to the cause already mentioned. It is likely that the Sacred Books were until quite late times the property of a few individuals. The Law was brought from the East to Palestine by Ezra ; apparently the Palestinians had not had it in their possession before his arrival. Isaiah desires his oracles to be sealed and bound among his disciples ; they were to remain with him, his seed and his seed's seed for ever. The king, according to Deuteronomy, is to make himself a copy of the Law "from before the face of" the Priests, the Levites, i.e., at their dictation. The explanation of the festal rites was to be communicated orally by the fathers to the children, when the latter inquired about them ; the children would not then be taught the book which contained the explanation. The historical works were apparently records intended for the use of the government ; similar to the chronicles of the kings of which we read in connexion with the Persian court, and at a later time in connexion with that of Baghdad. The Psalms give the appearance in large portions of belonging to a limited community, possibly a religious order. The Proverbs claims in part to have been a collection made by order of and doubtless for the private use of a particular king. Hence one reason why there is none of the Bible among the papyri of Elephantinê may be that none of the Sacred Books had as yet been published.

But it may further be added that, if any credence is to be placed in the statements of the canonical books, they won their way to general reverence and affection very slowly, even after the return from the Exile. Up to the time of the

Exile their devotees were regularly persecuted. According to Jeremiah and Ezekiel idolatry by no means ceased immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem. These documents present the Jews of Elephantinê as entertaining foreign cults to a degree which the stern prophets of monotheism would certainly have condemned. In one document the phrase "the gods" appears actually to be used. Certain names of deities are "associated" with Yâhô in others, as if there were nothing improper in such association. The triumph of monotheism appears therefore to have been exceedingly late, and the argument drawn from the observation of the Law to the character of the Law to be weaker than ever.

Certainly the documents before us give little evidence that the Jews of Elephantinê were conscious of any sublime mission such as Isaiah would have supposed to be the purpose of their exile. They resemble other papyri in their contents, which are mainly connected with business transactions, inheritance, money-lending relations between the Jews and their governors or their neighbours, and their own domestic relations. Women figure as owners of property, which Sachau rightly regards as a sign that the colony had long been settled in their land; for the first colonists would assuredly be only men who had served.

The question suggests itself: by what process were these Jews originally enrolled? And this leads us to a variety of investigations connected with ancient history for which we have as yet very imperfect materials. Nevertheless the later history of the East suggests some analogies. One method of enrolling foreign regiments was by the purchase of children as slaves; the *Mamluk* or slave dynasty of Egypt was based on this principle; and indeed it would seem that the Turkish bodyguard which at an early period became supreme in the Caliphate of Baghdad was formed of persons

sent as tribute from Turkestan. The prophet Joel upbraids the Phœnicians with trading in the children of Judah and the children of Jerusalem, whom they sold to the Greeks in order to remove them from their border.<sup>1</sup> Such persons in the course of their service were manumitted and often rose to high offices in the state; in Egypt, though they appear to have ordinarily taken wives from the population of the country, they kept apart at least for some generations. Another mode was that whereby a tribe under its sheikh entered the service of a government; they would receive lands as the reward for their services, but in such a case the women of the tribe would accompany it in its migration. Yet a third method was that whereby *condottieri* organised troops of soldiers of fortune, whom they placed at the disposal of some power in need of troops. Finally there were cases in which a sovereign handed over to another a body of troops for temporary employment in the first instance, but who might elect to settle in the country of the sovereign under whom they had served. This is the origin of the Moslem colony in China.

Which of these was the process whereby a regiment of Jews came to be established in Upper Egypt is uncertain; the probability is in favour of one of the processes which would admit of the women accompanying the men. For where that does not happen amalgamation with the neighbouring population necessarily takes place rapidly, and the language of the settlers disappears. Moreover it is clear that in this Jewish settlement the national religion was really maintained so far as service under rulers of another religion permitted. In ancient warfare religion played so important a part that the hostile attitude which Judaism as we know it adopted towards other cults could not be consistently held by Jewish soldiers under a foreign flag. Ancient poetry

<sup>1</sup> Joel iv. 6.

and ancient inscriptions attest the belief that the fighting was really done by the gods ; the *rôle* of the human fighters was secondary. Foreign service was therefore service under a foreign god ; and though the corps might have a regimental cult, that cult could not be in any open hostility to the god or gods who conducted the chief operations. When Mohammed declined to let any who rejected his system serve in his army he drew the true consequence of monotheism as the ancient world understood it. If a god was offended by worship paid to another god, or by worship differing in form from that which he had prescribed, his help would not be forthcoming in any engagement ; on the contrary he might be expected to hinder and even wreck the joint operations. Now this is what is meant by the “ jealousy ” ascribed in the Old Testament to the God of Israel, and such of His worshippers as held that doctrine would thereby have been excluded from military service under the followers of any other deity. The contempt wherein they held their confederates’ gods would be resented by those beings if they existed ; whereas if the Jews were in the right, then the operations would be wrecked for another reason.

It has also been pointed out that the Jewish Sabbath and feast-days would interfere seriously with military operations, and indeed are known to have done so. Whenever the Jews in monotheistic times formed a state, their Sabbath gave the enemy his chance ; for in warfare neither ancients nor moderns could or can afford to be chivalrous.

From the very fact of their being enrolled as a foreign legion then the Jews were compelled to be tolerant, and even, as the Old Testament expresses it, to serve other gods. They had to do what the Israelites throughout the Bible are taunted with doing, reject the Law of the Lord, and indeed the first commandment. We cannot infer from this that the first commandment did not exist ; the truer inference



is that the Biblical representation of the national history is in general trustworthy, viz., that the system prescribed to the Israelites was absolutely repugnant to the majority of them ; that after the Exile as before they wanted none of it. Even the Prophets from Moses onwards undertake their mission with unwillingness, have to be compelled to undertake it after offering excuses vainly ; and their message is received with anything rather than thanks and approval. Isaiah complains of violent ill-treatment, and the same is attested in other cases. The Israelites wished to be like the other nations of the earth, and to have no obvious distinction from those other nations ; they wished, in short, to ignore what was to be their mission. The Law, the Prophets and the Hagiographa therefore belonged to a small minority of the nation.

It agrees with this that the Elephantinê sanctuary has priests who do not apparently claim to belong to a tribe specially appointed to discharge sacerdotal duties. According to Professor Sachau's index the word " Levite " does not once occur in these documents. It is well known that in one period of the Old Testament literature the Priests are specified as the Levites, whereas in another the two are distinguished. It is probable that the same difference of opinion might exist on the subject of the necessity of sacerdotal, succession, as is to be found in these days in the Anglican community. If a number of lay members of the Anglican Church are settled in a foreign land, must they necessarily dispense with the ceremonies of religion, and especially the Eucharist, or may a layman in the absence of an ordained minister celebrate ? May a layman in such circumstances read the Absolution which according to the Rubric may only be read by a Priest ? The liberal view (which is held by few persons) answers this question in the affirmative ; the view that is probably orthodox in the negative. Yet neither in

these days do people go through religious rites merely as a matter of form, nor in ancient days did they sacrifice for no purpose ; the ceremonies were a matter of vital importance. In these days persons in the predicament described are said in consequence to leave the Anglican community and join some other ; and the Jewish colonies would similarly have had to choose between the services of a priest who was not a Levite, and quitting the Jewish religious union for some other. Those of Elephantinê clearly chose the former alternative ; probably adopting therein a middle course between orthodoxy and apostasy ; but they may have been unaware that that course was unorthodox.

In spite of all this they do not appear to have conciliated their heathen neighbours. On the one hand there is every reason for believing that the Egyptians themselves were intolerant and fanatical ; on the other even this modified form of Judaism could probably not conceal its inherent hostility to Paganism. Probably too the Jewish colony came to be identified with the foreign power under whose protection it lived, and when that foreign domination was removed, the Jews were swept away with it. Somewhat the same was the fate of the Jews who long after lived in Spain under Moslem protection ; when the Moslem power had been broken, the Jews, who had themselves not enjoyed the most favourable conditions under that power, were expelled. Their desire to be like the nations of the earth could be gratified only by actual amalgamation with the nations of the earth. Their attempt at maintaining a state within a state here met with one of its earliest failures.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

### THE "DAWN" IN HEBREW.

WE are accustomed to think and speak of the Dawn, as the Oxford Dictionary defines it, as "the first appearance of light in the sky before sunrise, or the time when it appears, the beginning of daylight, daybreak." It is, however, to be remembered that there is a morning-dusk, the *Morgendämmerung* or *Morgengrauen*, as well as a morning-glow, the *Morgenröthe*; in other words a twilight, in which the dividing line may be difficult to draw; and that it is as possible to speak of the end of the night as of the beginning of the day. The question is: From which side did the Hebrew writers regard the dawn? For it should not be forgotten that there are other things besides their mode of writing from right to left in which these writers take a different point of view from that which we assume as a matter of course.

First of all, the name given to the dawn, *shahar*, is from a stem meaning to be black. The simple verb occurs in Job xxx. 30: "My skin is black (and falleth) from me." And there are several derivatives with the same signification. The derived form (*Pi'el*) in the sense of "seeking early" is rightly regarded as a denominative, and has no apparent implication of either light or darkness.

Then, the mode of speaking of the dawn is to be noted. Whereas there are fixed terms for the sun's rising, as there are for its setting, the verb used with the dawn is never one of these. So also, the "morning" and the "light" have their appropriate locutions, but these are different from the expression applied to the dawn. The sun "rises" or "appears" (*zārah*), or "comes forth" (*yātsā*), so light "arises," or "comes forth," or "is parted," or "breaks forth," or "shines"; but the dawn invariably "goes up" or ascends (*ālā*). And this usage is more frequent than our Versions would lead the English reader to suppose. Thus we read:

"when the morning arose" (Gen. xix. 15); "there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day," and "let me go, for the day breaketh" (Gen. xxxii. 25, 26); "about the spring of the day" (1 Sam. ix. 26); "when the morning rose next day" (Jon. iv. 7); "from the rising of the morning till the stars appeared" (Neh. iv. 21, *Heb.* iv. 15). In all these cases *shaḥar* is conjoined with the verb *‘ālā*, and in no case does *shaḥar* appear with any other verb. The stereotyped phrase to denote the time of dawning is *‘ālôth hash-shaḥar*; so that the *shaḥar* by itself does not express time, as, e.g., the "morning" (*bōqer*) does. There are two apparent exceptions to the usage referred to, but they only confirm the usage: "Then shall thy light break forth as the morning" (Isa. lviii. 8); and "His going forth is sure as the morning" (Hos. vi. 3). In both cases the *kaph* has its frequent force as a pregnant particle of general comparison, as in Ps. lxxxiii. 10, which is literally "Do to them as Midian, as Sisera, as Jabin at the brook Kishon"; and it is to be observed that in the passage in Isaiah it is the "light" that breaks forth or is "parted," according to the phrase used elsewhere, and in the passage in Hosea it is God's "going forth" which is expressed by a term applied to the Sun. And to show how even an expert in the language would be liable to depart from the usage, unless it had been well fixed, it may be mentioned that Salkinson, who in his Hebrew New Testament is generally so happy in his representations of the Hebrew idiom, uses the expression *ka'ālôth hab-bōqer* for "it was early" in John xviii. 28, although there is no occurrence of the expression in the Old Testament.

It may therefore be stated as the regular usage to denote the dawning that *‘ālā* is the verb used with *shaḥar*; and the various combinations into which this *‘ālā* enters may give us some idea of the conception underlying the *shaḥar*. Now,



in addition to its usual sense of local movement of bodies, the verb is applied, e.g., to the going up of mist (Gen. ii. 6), of dew (Exod. xvi. 14), of smoke (Gen. xix. 28), of a cloud (1 Kings xviii. 44), of fire (Jud. vi. 21), and so forth. The idea one would get from these combinations is that of some entity, more or less palpable, rising up from the surface of the earth, not darting out or breaking out as the light does, but being lifted up when the light is "parted" and the morning appears. It is, indeed, conceivable that the *shahar* might have been thought of as light coming up over the verge of the horizon; but these usages suggest something different, and the verb *'ālā* is never applied to the Sun itself, which "comes up" so conspicuously in that sense. So that, if we consider the *shahar* as something dim or dark, it would be a covering spread over the earth which is lifted to make way for the light.

There is a remarkable passage in Job xxxviii. 12-15 which may help us here:—

Hast thou commanded the morning since thy days began,  
And caused the dayspring to know its place;  
That it might take hold of the ends of the earth,  
And the wicked be shaken out of it?

Cheyne (*Job and Solomon*, p. 77) takes this as an instance of a primitive myth having died down into a metaphor, of which we have an even more striking indication in the "eyelids of the dawn" (Job iii. 9, xli. 10, *Heb.* xli. 18). "The personified Dawn," he says, "seizes the coverlet under which the earth has slept at its four ends, and shakes the evil-doers out of it like flies." Passing by the euphemism of the last word, I should say this is a better explanation than that of Driver (*The Book of Job in the Revised Version*): "The earth is pictured as a vast coverlet, and the dawn, which darts in a moment from east to west (Ps. cxxxix. 9) seizes this by its extremities, brings to light the wicked upon

it and shakes them off it like dust." It is somewhat difficult to follow the action here. Surely the extremities are the skirts or edges of the garment or coverlet spread over the earth, and not the earth itself. The question is, who takes hold of this covering, and what is it? The commentators say that the dawn seizes the covering, and our Versions imply as much by rendering the very indeterminate Infinitive *le'ēhoz* "so that it may take hold of." There are numerous cases of such a use of the Infinitive without an expressed subject. Thus: "Since man was placed (*minnî sîm*) upon earth" (Job xx. 4); "When the assembly is to be gathered (*behaqhil* Num. x. 7). Or, if we must have a definite subject, why should not Job himself be understood? The connexion would then be: "Hast thou . . . So as to take hold of." Let us consider the situation. In the context, Job is confronted with the wonderful phenomena of nature and challenged to do the like. He is asked if he has ever tried to perform the miracle of daybreak; the scene is set, and he is told what is to be done. Morning (*bōqer*) is to be commanded to stand ready; Dawn (*shaḥar*) is to be told where to take its place; and all is then ready for the covering of the earth to be seized, lifted up and shaken that the surface of the earth may "stand forth." And the verse cited by Driver from Ps. cxxxix. 9 would be admirably in keeping with this view: "Should I take up (*'essā*) the skirts of the dawn, and dwell in the uttermost part of the sea,"—the remotest spot from the rising sun.

Here it is proper to draw attention to the features of an Eastern dawn, which are very different from what we are accustomed to in our humid and cloudy atmosphere. Travellers notice at once the shortness or entire absence of evening twilight, and have to be warned against exposing themselves to the sudden fall in temperature and deposit of dew. The morning twilight has the same sudden evanescence. Van de

Velde<sup>1</sup> was impressed by the fact that at Shechem, owing to the greater moisture and abundant vegetation, there was more colour to be observed in the morning and evening sky than elsewhere in Palestine, where in general, he says, "there is an absence of colouring, and of that charming dusky haze in which objects assume such softly blended forms, and in which also the transition in colour from the foreground to the farthest distance loses the hardness of outline peculiar to the perfect transparency of an Eastern sky." This last feature of hardness of outline is precisely what is meant in the passage under consideration. When day appears, the earth "is changed as clay under the seal, and all things stand forth as a garment."

And here is a description of the dawn in the North African desert, as seen by a brilliant French writer<sup>2</sup> :—

"In this country, morning and evening twilight (*crépuscule*) does not exist. Scarcely ever does one see those beautiful clouds, trailing, empurpled, detached, variegated, and fantastic, which colour our northern horizon at the moment when the sun rises, as well as at the hour of its setting. Here it is first a very vague brightness, which augments, extends, and fills the whole space in a few moments. Then suddenly, at the crest of a mountain, or it may be at the foot of an infinite plain, the sun appears such as when he mounts into the heavens, and without bearing that ruddy aspect, as if half-asleep, which he shows at his rising in our hazy latitudes."

On many a summer morning I observed the same thing during my residence in Syria. One would start before sunrise from a village in the Lebanon in order to reach the plain of Beyrout before the heat of the day. It was practically dark at starting,—as dark at least as a cloudless and

<sup>1</sup> *Syria and Palestine*, 1854, vol. i. p. 388.

<sup>2</sup> Guy de Maupassant, *Au Soleil*, p. 107 f.

star-lit sky made darkness possible; but before one had gone an hour it was full day. Little warning was given; the covering of the earth was lifted, or, shall we say, the *portière* of the bridegroom's chamber was raised, and the sun came forth "rejoicing as a strong man to run a race." Darkness flew away and it was high day.

It would seem then, if there is anything in the foregoing observations, as if the Hebrews were particularly impressed with the darker side of the dawn, and coined an expression which, whether based on myth or metaphor, has become well fixed in the language, and denotes the rising or lifting up of a covering in order that the light of day may come forth. It remains now to inquire whether, in the literature of the Old Testament, there are evidences of this dark connotation adhering to the word. And there are two passages which, I think, would gain in lucidity if this view were accepted.

Joel, in depicting the approach of the locust (Joel ii. 2) says :—

A day of darkness and of gloominess,  
A day of clouds and thick darkness,  
As the dawn spread upon the mountains.

Here, if we take "dawn" as the morning dimness, we have a perfect parallelism; otherwise there is a sharp contradiction. Professor Driver, in his commentary on the passage,<sup>1</sup> in order to remove this contradiction, says that the words in the last line should go with what follows: "as the dawn spread upon the mountains, a people great and strong!" But, to say nothing of the inappropriateness of this comparison, the succeeding context is self-contained, and has no reference either to light or darkness:

A great people and a strong,  
There hath not been ever the like,  
Neither shall be any more after them,  
Even to the years of many generations.

<sup>1</sup> *The Book of Joel*, in the Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.



Taking the usual view of the dawn, Professor Driver repeats the oft-quoted passage from Credner :—"The day before the locusts arrived, we were certain that they were approaching, from a yellow reflexion produced by their yellow wings in the heavens. As soon as this was observed, no one doubted that a vast swarm of locusts was at hand." I have no doubt that, on the occasion referred to, as is generally the case when the locust is "coming," there was that marked yellow haze, the accompaniment of a Sirocco wind, the appearance of which, especially after a prolonged drought, leads people in the East to say, "The locust is coming," very much as we say, in a very different condition of our atmosphere, "We shall have snow." But that the reflexion of the wings of the locust was seen a whole day before the locust appeared, *Credat Credner!* For, when the locust actually comes within the horizon, it is not a day of even reflected light, but a day of darkness and gloominess. And the descriptive word "spread" (*pārûsh*) should not be overlooked, a word never used of light, but applied, e.g., to wings, to a garment, to a net or snare, and so forth, and giving the common word in Arabic for a carpet or mattress, or what in recent time has come to be called in this country a "bed-spread."

I remember vividly my first acquaintance with the locust at Beyrout in 1865, a visitation to which one of the extracts in Dr. Driver's interesting *Excursus* refers. Every touch in the picture of Joel was seen to be true to the life; and not the least impressive detail was the sudden darkening of the sky at mid-day.<sup>1</sup> And I see that Meyrick, in the *Speaker's Commentary* on Joel takes the view here advocated, rendering: "like the glimmering twilight of the morning."

Another passage in which *shaḥar* has a significant place

<sup>1</sup> I may be permitted to refer to a "Wayside Sermon" on "The years that the locust hath eaten" in the *Sunday Magazine*, Dec., 1881.

is very unintelligible in our Versions. The A. V. of Isa. viii. 20 reads :—"To the law and to the testimony : if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them " ; while the R.V. renders the last clause : "surely there is no morning for them." Kittel, in his *Biblia Hebraica* says that some words have dropped out ; and Professor Skinner (*Camb. Bib. in loco*) ends his note on the passage by saying : "The original is so obscure that no great confidence can be placed in any translation." Let us see whether *light* on the passage does not come out of the *darkness* of the one significant word.

The context represents the "infatuated, God-forsaken people " asking the " believers in Divine revelation " (these are Skinner's phrases) " to seek unto them that have familiar spirits and unto the wizards, that chirp and that mutter " ; and the prophet says : " Should not a people seek unto their God ? " And then, just as Jeremiah puts into the mouth of his contemporaries a form of words with which to confute the idolaters of their time (Jer. x. 11,) Isaiah here gives a formula or guiding maxim for the emergency : " To the Law and to the Testimony ! " The immediately following two words 'im lô', improperly rendered in A.V. *if . . . not*, since there is no apodosis, should be rendered as in R.V. *surely*. So David Kimchi has it in his Commentary here, citing as a parallel example, "Surely I have stilled and quieted my soul " (Ps. cxxxi. 2), and there are many others, e.g. 1 Kings xx. 23 ; Isa. v. 29 ; Jer. xv. 11. And then, if "this word " is the motto or rule which the prophet has just given, the remaining clause *ăsher ên-lô shahar* may be translated quite literally : " which has no dimness." There is no need to supply a single word, and, what is more to the point, the contrast with the preceding context is complete and forcible : the "seeking to " unmeaning, mysterious black arts on the one hand, and, on the other, the appeal to the Law which

is Light. "Surely they should speak in this wise" instead of calling you to go after lying vanities.

We get no help from the LXX in this passage, which has "concerning which there is no giving of gifts," apparently reading *shohad* a "present" or "bribe." Reference must, however, be made to the rendering proposed by Professor Margoliouth <sup>1</sup>:

"Assuredly they shall say unto you thus: there is no witchcraft for it." This seems partly to follow the commentators in the Rabbinical Bible; but the connexion is not clear. The rendering is based on the Arabic equivalent of *shaḥar*, which has the sense of charming or bewitching; and it has been adopted by many expositors, and appears in the R.V. margin, in the passage Isa. xlvii. 11: "Evil shall come upon thee, thou shalt not know how to charm it away." There seem to be no other examples of this sense adhering to the Hebrew word <sup>2</sup>; and it is pertinent to remark that, even in the Arabic, the idea of witchery does not seem to be primary. There is a *saḥara*, for which the Dictionary quotes the Hamasa for authority, meaning to overlay or cover silver with gold; and the noun *saḥar* is defined as *tempus paulo ante auroram*. Fleischer maintains that the primary meaning of the Arabic root, according to the *Ḳāmus*, is that of "whitish black." If so, it seems very probable that the Arabic *sāḥir* or *sahḥār* was so named from his working underhand, in fact, using the black art. And it is a very curious and interesting fact that the word nigromancy or negromancy is older in our language than necromancy although it seems to have been coined with a reference to the Greek and Latin forms.

We come back to the point from which we started. The

<sup>1</sup> *Lines of Defence of the Biblical Revelation*, p. 128; appeared in EXPOSITOR, Sixth Series, i., p. 339.

<sup>2</sup> If we took the word in the sense of "the end of the night" we might have a passable rendering—an interminable and unmitigated evil.

border line in the relations of space, and still more in those of time, is so shadowy that the indicating of these relations becomes a subjective matter, depending upon the point of view of the speaker. The present is but momentary, and we can express it, as the Hebrews also do, by a verb either in the perfect or in the imperfect. A striking example of the varying point of view is seen in the use of the two terms *l<sup>e</sup>phānîm* and *āḥôr* in Hebrew. The former of these words means "to the front" and points forward, while the latter means "behind" and points backward. So Jeremiah says that, from the days of Egypt, the people "went backward (*l<sup>e</sup>āḥôr*) and not forward (*l<sup>e</sup>phānîm*)" (Jer. vii. 24). And (2 Sam. x. 9) "Joab saw that the battle was set against him before and behind" (*mippānîm ûmē'āḥôr*). Yet we find *l<sup>e</sup>phānîm* in the sense of "formerly" (Deut. ii. 12, 20; Josh. xi. 10, etc.), and *mill<sup>e</sup>phānîm* "from beforetime" (Isa. xli. 26); while *ahărîth*, lit. "afterpart," comes to mean the end of time, the most distant future; the speaker transferring himself, in the one case, back to the front of the past, and, in the other, forward to the end of the future.

It is this which causes what rhetoricians call *antiphrasis*, according to which a word assumes in related branches of a Language-group, or even within the compass of one of the group, meanings which are opposite or contradictory. Within the circle of the Semitic languages there are to be found quite a number of terms which have one sense in one of the languages, and the very opposite in another. In the Arabic alone there are said to be 400 words having contradictory senses; and there was published in 1896<sup>1</sup> what claimed to be the first attempt at a systematic exhibition of such words in Hebrew. Dr. E. Landau, the author, includes our word *shaḥar* among them. He admits that the root indicates darkness, and quotes Rashi on Gen. xxxii. 21,

<sup>1</sup> *Die gegensinnigen Wörter im Alt- und Neuhebräischen.*



who says : " Till the going up of the dawn, i.e., till the withdrawal of the darkness of the night," although he adds : " and some say that the dawn is the semblance of light which is seen in the clouds before sunrise." He also notes the significant and prevailing locution of the dawn " going up." But he claims three passages in which the word has the sense of light. These are " His eyes are like the eyelids of the dawn " (Job xli. 10) ; " Who is this that looketh forth as the morning, fair as the moon, clear as the sun," etc. (Cant. vi. 10) ; " Then shall thy light break forth as the morning " (Isa. lviii. 8). It will be observed that the *kaph* of comparison comes into play in all these examples, and its pregnant significance has already been referred to.

It is not contended here that the Hebrew writers may not have thought of light when they used this word, for, in the nature of the case, they could not do otherwise. But it was, at best, an uncertain or imperfect light that was in their mind's eye,—the last of the darkness, rather than the beginning of the light ; and the stereotyped significant term by which they denoted the appearance of the dawn would alone be sufficient to show how firmly this conception had fixed itself. Our word " dusk " would more accurately express the idea ; and, since the word " dawn " has in our usage become restricted to the bright aspect, it would be well, in our interpretation of passages in which the word occurs, to bear in mind that, in any case, it is not the *brightness* of the morning that is referred to, but its *dimness*.

JAMES ROBERTSON.

## THE PRIESTLY CODE AND THE NEW ARAMAIC PAPYRI FROM ELEPHANTINÊ

READERS of the EXPOSITOR have recently been indebted to Dr. Sayce for two interesting articles on the Aramaic papyri discovered at Elephantinê in 1906. The earlier of these articles,<sup>1</sup> written shortly before Dr. Sachau's publication of the papyri in September last, dealt for the most part with the three important documents the preliminary edition of which was made by Dr. Sachau in 1907,<sup>2</sup> though containing some hints based upon private information as to the contents of the yet unpublished papyri. The second article,<sup>3</sup> written after the appearance of Dr. Sachau's splendid edition of the whole of the papyri,<sup>4</sup> gave a fuller account of the documents than was previously possible, and a fresh and more complete statement of the author's views with regard to the questions which they raise.

In the present article it will be assumed that readers have a general knowledge of the contents of the papyri, from Dr. Sayce's articles if not from firsthand study; and I do not therefore propose to occupy space by a re-statement of facts which by this time should be familiar in outline to all. My purpose is to consider Dr. Sayce's conclusions as to the bearing of the evidence afforded by the

<sup>1</sup> "The Jewish Garrison and Temple in Elephantinê," EXPOSITOR, August, 1911.

<sup>2</sup> *Drei aramäische Papyrusurkunden aus Elephantine.*

<sup>3</sup> "The Jews and their Temple in Elephantinê," EXPOSITOR, November, 1911.

<sup>4</sup> *Aramäische Papyrus und Ostraka aus einer jüdischen Militär-Kolonie zu Elephantine.*

papyri upon the current critical theory of the origin of the Priestly Code in the Pentateuch.

The point with which we are concerned in this connexion is this. Of the three papyri first published two are duplicate copies of a letter sent by the Jewish garrison at Elephantinê to Bagoas the Persian governor of Judah, dated in the 17th year of Darius II., i.e. B.C. 408, and petitioning for the restoration of their temple which three years previously (B.C. 411), in the absence of the Persian governor Arsames, had been destroyed by his temporary representative Waidrang at the instigation of the priests of the Egyptian god Khnub. In this letter the Jews state that "when Kambyeses entered Egypt, he found this temple already built; and though the temples of the gods of Egypt were all overthrown by him, no injury was done to this temple": i.e., the temple had been in existence since some time prior to the Persian conquest of Egypt in B.C. 525. Dr. Sayce makes out a plausible case for dating "the establishment of the Jewish garrison in Elephantinê at the time when Psammeticus was engaged in war with the Ethiopian King at whose court the revolted native troops of Egypt had taken refuge. This would have been about B.C. 655, in the latter years of Manasseh's reign" (p. 114).

The sacrifices offered at this Jewish temple, which since the destruction of the temple had been perforce discontinued, are specified as "meal-offerings, frankincense, and whole burnt offerings." It is upon the basis of this allusion that Dr. Sayce states (p. 106) that the rites and ceremonies carried on in this temple of Yahu at Elephantinê "were the rites and ceremonies prescribed by the Levitical Law—that 'Priestly Code' which according to fashionable critical theories had been devised in post-exilic times long after its injunctions were being obeyed at the southern extremity of Egypt." Later on in his article (pp. 114 f.) he reverts

to the same point : “ One of the most important results of the revelations which we owe to the Elephantinê papyri at Berlin is that as far back as the middle of the seventh century B.C., the ritual and prescriptions of the Levitical Law were observed in the temple of Yahu at the southern extremity of Egypt just as they were in the post-exilic temple of Jerusalem. It is clear from the petition to Bagoas that the temple in Elephantinê had been built in the early days of the settlement of the Jewish garrison, and archæological confirmation of this is to be found in the Saitic potsherds which I have picked up in the Jewish quarry at Assuan. I have already noticed that the ritual law contained in Leviticus ii. 1-2 was strictly carried out in the Elephantinê temple ; in other words, ‘ the Priestly Code ’ of literary hypothesis of which the law in question forms part was already known to the Jews of Elephantinê in the age of Manasseh. It is difficult to see how this fact can be reconciled with the post-exilic date assigned to the ‘ Priestly Code.’ A revision of the date ascribed to the ‘ Priestly Legislation,’ however, brings with it far-reaching consequences, not the least being a revision of the date currently ascribed to the book of Deuteronomy.” The passage in Leviticus to which Dr. Sayce refers ordains that when any one offers a meal-offering to Yahwe, this shall consist of fine flour, and he shall pour oil upon it, and place frankincense thereon.

In his second article Dr. Sayce produces additional evidence from the other papyri that the Jews of Elephantinê were acquainted with the Priestly Code. “ One of the papyri now published by Professor Sachau shows that this was also the case as regards the law of the Passover. An interesting letter on the subject refers to the ‘ Priestly Legislation ’ in Exodus xii. ; indeed, as Professor Sachau points out, the words of Exodus xii. 18 are actually cited



in it " (pp. 427 f.).<sup>1</sup> Further evidence pointing in the same direction is derived by Dr. Sayce from Papyrus 5, where a very fragmentary and obscure passage is taken to refer to the Levitical regulations for sacrifice (pp. 429 f.).

Now granting that Dr. Sayce is correct in his assumption that the Jews of Elephantinê were acquainted with ritual regulations identical with regulations which are embodied in the Priestly Code, and that their observance of these regulations goes back at least as early as the period of the reign of Manasseh, what is the bearing of these facts upon the critical theory as to the origin of the Priestly Code? The answer is that the critical theory remains quite unaffected. No "revision of the theories of Pentateuchal criticism will be necessitated." The statement that "according to fashionable critical theories" the Priestly Code "had been devised in post-exilic times" is a travesty of the critical position; and that this is so is a fact which should be obvious to any one who has taken the trouble to make himself really acquainted with the conclusions of critics and the grounds upon which they rest.

When allusion is made by critical writers to "the post-exilic origin of the Priestly Code," the reference is to the origin of the *system* of the Priestly Code, and of particular laws (such as those relating to the priesthood); but certainly not to the origin of the *fundamental* laws of feasts, sacrifices, and ceremonial, since it is *an essential element of the critical position* that the Code embodies ritual usages which grew up during a long period, and many of which are doubtless of immemorial antiquity.

The fact that certain critics hold that the Priestly Code embodies laws the origin of which goes back to much earlier times is grudgingly recognised by Dr. Sayce in his second

<sup>1</sup> In Dr. Sayce's article Exodus ii. 18 is of course a printer's error for xii. 18.

article (p. 432). He quotes Dr. Driver as stating that "the date of the *redaction* of the laws in Leviticus must be carefully distinguished from the date of the laws themselves. The laws embody usages, many of which are doubtless in their origin of great antiquity, though they may have been variously modified and developed as time went on. . . . The various compilers or redactors did little more than reduce to a permanent form the legal and ceremonial tradition which had long been current in priestly circles."

Dr. Sayce then goes on to remark: "It may, therefore, be urged that the references in the papyri to the Levitical law happen to be just those 'usages' which belong to a 'legal and ceremonial tradition.' This is, of course, to beg the question." His reader is thus left to infer that concessions of antiquity in the case of certain legal usages have been forced from critics at the sword-point of archaeological evidence, and that they have to this extent been compelled to readjust the position of criticism as to the origin of the Priestly Code.

Such a view implies the crudest of misconceptions. The critical theory of the composition of the Priestly Code has always, from its earliest formulation, laid stress upon the fact that the post-exilic Code represents the systematising of earlier traditional usage. This essential element in the theory is again and again emphasised in the writings of its earliest exponents as a result of their minute examination of the Pentateuchal sources; and therefore the contention that critics have perforce conceded the antiquity of certain parts of the Priestly Code, and that in such forced concession we have a begging of the question, is nothing less than absurd.

This fact may perhaps be brought home to those who are willing to keep an open mind by a few quotations of the *ipsissima verba* of writers who have been instrumental in

shaping the critical theory of the composition of the Priestly Code, as it is at present understood.

We have already observed that the starting point of Dr. Sayce's attack upon the critical theory lies in his contention that the reference in the Elephantinê papyrus to "meal-offering, frankincense, and whole burnt offering" implies that the ritual regulation of Leviticus ii. 1, 2 was known and practised by the community at Elephantinê. Dr. Stade, one of the most radical of critical scholars, in writing so far back as 1888, makes the following remark: "We find in Leviticus i.-vii., xi.-xv., xvii.-xxvi., Numbers v., vi., ix., xv., xix. laws which for the most part must be recognised as the *formulation in writing of pre-exilic usage*." <sup>1</sup> It will be noticed that the passages cited from Leviticus include the law upon which Dr. Sayce bases his argument.

Stade's opinion thus expressed is quoted with approval by Dr. Driver in a footnote to a passage in which he expresses the same views. After summarising the "cogent arguments" which "combine to make it probable that the *completed* Priest's Code is the work of an age subsequent to Ezekiel," this scholar goes on to remark: "When, however, this is said, it is very far from being implied that all the institutions of P are the *creation* of this age. The contradiction of the pre-exilic literature does not extend to the *whole* of the Priest's Code indiscriminately. The Priest's Code embodies some elements with which the earlier literature is in harmony, and which indeed it presupposes: it embodies other elements with which the same literature is in conflict, and the existence of which it even seems to preclude. This double aspect of the Priest's Code is reconciled by the supposition that the chief ceremonial institutions of Israel are *in their origin* of great antiquity; but that the laws respecting them were gradually developed

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, ii., p. 66 note.

and elaborated, and *in the shape in which they are formulated in the Priest's Code* that they belong to the exilic or early post-exilic period. In its main stock, the legislation of P was not (as the critical view of it is sometimes represented by its opponents as teaching) 'manufactured' by the priests during the exile; it is based upon *pre-existing Temple usage*, and exhibits the form which that finally assumed. Hebrew legislation took shape gradually; and the codes of JE (Exod. xx.-xxiii.; xxxiv. 10-26), Dt., and P represent three successive phases of it." This passage, which occurs in the current (eighth) edition of the *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, pp. 142 f., is to be found, in identically the same form, on pp. 135 f. of the first edition, published in 1891.<sup>1</sup> Dr. Driver cannot, therefore, be accused of "begging the question" by making concessions in deference to evidence adduced by Dr. Sayce or any other opponent of the critical theory.

We can, however, go further back than this in proof of the fact that the recognition of an ancient element in the Priestly Code is of the essence of the critical theory. No names are more commonly or more justly associated with the modern development of Pentateuchal criticism than those of Wellhausen and Kuenen; and no one was more prominent thirty years ago in establishing for the Biblical scholars of Great Britain the scientific basis of Old Testament criticism than the late Dr. Robertson Smith. Dr. Wellhausen, in his *Prolegomena to the History of Israel*, p. 404, speaks as follows of the legalistic systematisation which produced the Priestly Code:—

"Deuteronomy was the programme of a reform, not of a restoration. It took for granted the existence of the cultus, and only corrected it in certain general respects. But

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also the remarks of the same writer in his article "Law (in the Old Testament)" in *Hastings' D.B.*, iii., p. 71 b.



the temple was now destroyed, and the worship interrupted, and the practice of past times had to be written down if it was not to be lost. Thus it came about that in the exile the *conduct of worship* became the subject of the Torah, and in this process reformation was naturally aimed at as well as restoration. We have seen (p. 59) that Ezekiel was the first to take this step which the circumstances of the time indicated. In the last part of his work he made the first attempt to record the ritual which had been customary in the temple of Jerusalem. Other priests attached themselves to him (Lev. xvii.-xxvi.), and thus there grew up in the exile from among the members of their profession a kind of school of people who reduced to writing and to a system what they had formerly practised in the way of their calling. After the temple was restored this theoretical zeal still continued to work, and the ritual when renewed was still further developed by the action and reaction on each other of theory and practice: the priests who had stayed in Babylon took as great a part, from a distance, in the sacred services as their brothers at Jerusalem who had actually to conduct them. The latter indeed lived in adverse circumstances and do not appear to have conformed with great strictness or accuracy to the observances which had been agreed upon. The last result of this labour of many years is the Priestly Code.' Here we have the point which forms the subject of our discussion brought forward with considerable emphasis: "*the practice of past times* had to be written down if it was not to be lost"; "a kind of school of people who reduced to writing and to a system *what they had formerly practised in the way of their calling.*" This passage, which is quoted from the English translation of the *Prolegomena* which appeared in 1885, occurs in the same form in the first edition of the original German work, which was produced in 1878, i.e., thirty-

three years ago. Another passage (p. 366 of the Eng. trans.) was added afterwards (*Proleg.*, 1883, p. 388) in view of the criticism of opponents, and supplies in itself a complete refutation of the arguments of Dr. Sayce. Dr. Wellhausen says, "The fact is insisted on [by opponents of the critical theory] that the laws of the Priestly Code are actually attested everywhere in the practice of the historical period; that there were always sacrifices and festivals, priests and purifications, and everything of the kind in early Israel. These statements must, though this seems scarcely possible, proceed on the assumption that on Graf's hypothesis the whole cultus was invented all at once by the Priestly Code, and only introduced after the exile. But the defenders of Graf's hypothesis do not go so far as to believe that the Israelite cultus entered the world of a sudden. . . . They merely consider that the works of the law were done before the law, that there is a difference between traditional usage and formulated law, and that even where this difference appears to be only in form it yet has a material basis, being connected with the centralisation of the worship and the hierocracy which that centralisation called into existence."

Has Dr. Sayce ever read these passages from the work which may be regarded as the text-book of modern Penta-teuchal criticism; and, if so, with what face can he maintain that critics hold that the Priestly Code *was devised in post-exilic times*, or that the evidence of the papyri is detrimental to the critical theory? Dr. Sayce is in fact attempting to father upon the critical school an opinion which was expressly repudiated by Wellhausen twenty-eight years ago, and has since then been repudiated by other critical writers times without number.

Passing on to Dr. Kuenen (*The Origin and Composition of the Hexateuch*, Eng. trans., 1886, of the 2nd Dutch edition

1885), we need only notice his statement (p. 272) that "the priestly laws, in the narrower sense, which we find in the Pentateuch, likewise include regulations which would not have been misplaced in the collections just named [the Book of the Covenant, and the Deuteronomist's other sources], and which may have been written down, in their present or in some earlier form, before Josiah's reformation."

On p. 287 we read, "But no one maintains that P<sup>1</sup> [i.e., the Law of Holiness in Leviticus] invented these and other such precepts [contained in passages previously cited]. They may even have been in writing long before his time. . . . The date of P<sup>1</sup> himself must not be confounded with that of his sources."

Dr. Robertson Smith, in his *Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, published in 1881, speaks to the same effect of the formation of the Priestly Code (pp. 383 f.): "The development of the details of the system falls therefore between the time of Ezekiel and the work of Ezra; and the circumstance already referred to, that the culminating and most solemn ceremony of the great day of expiation was not observed in the year of Ezra's covenant, shows that the last touches were not added to the ritual until, through Ezra's agency, it was put into practical operation. But, while the historical student is thus compelled to speak of the ritual code as the law of the Second Temple, it would be a great mistake to think of it as altogether new. Ezekiel's ordinances are nothing else than a reshaping of the old priestly Torah, and a close study of the Levitical laws, especially in Leviticus xvii.-xxvi., shows that many ancient Torahs were worked up, by successive processes, into the complete system as we possess it." Further down on p. 384 the writer speaks of portions of the Levitical legislation as consisting of "old Torahs handed down from time immemorial in the priestly families."

Citation of similar expressions of opinion as to the antiquity of certain elements in the Priestly Code might be multiplied indefinitely. It will be sufficient to add two more only, from the writings of Bishop Ryle and Dr. Cheyne.

Bishop Ryle, in his *Canon of the Old Testament*, published in 1892, remarks (p. 71): "That the Priestly Laws existed in any one complete compilation before the time of the exile, so that they could be referred to, for literary purposes, as a code well known to the people at large, is hardly any longer possible to be maintained; but that the customs and institutions, with which these laws are concerned, had most of them existed for centuries, and were provided for by appropriate regulations, is not denied."

Dr. Cheyne's opinion is found in his *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, published in 1898. He tells us (p. 81) that "The number of ancient elements in the priestly legislation forbids us, as I have said, to call it in the strict sense of the word, a new, that is an entirely original law book. It exhibits the form which the older legislation took under vastly altered circumstances, and it only differs so widely in many respects from that older legislation because of the great outward revolution through which Israel had passed, and which was resulting more slowly in an equally great change in the inner man."

These lengthy quotations from the works of different critical scholars have been necessitated by the fact that this is by no means the first time that Dr. Sayce and others who hold similar opinions to his have imputed to the critical school the view that the Priestly Code was "invented" or "devised" in post-exilic times, and have argued, on the basis of this wholly unwarrantable assumption, that evidence of the existence and practice in earlier times of regulations contained in the Code must therefore prove fatal to



the critical theory. Such a line of argument rests, as we have seen, upon a misconception of the *real* position taken by critics, and consequently leaves this position wholly unaffected.

C. F. BURNEY.

*EPHREM'S HYMNS ON EPIPHANY<sup>1</sup> AND THE  
ODES OF SOLOMON.*

It need not be proved that Ephrem's hymns on the Epiphany are baptismal<sup>2</sup>; every one who has read them, will remember this fact. Now it is striking that especially in these hymns, only fifteen in number, there occur so many expressions and thoughts which bear the closest resemblance to the Odes of Solomon.

I give the parallel places here.

1. Ode 3. 2: "His members are with Him"; and Ode 17. 14: "because they were members to me and I was their head."	Ephrem (ed. Lamy) i. p. 89, line 17 <sup>3</sup> : You [the baptized] are so the children of the Spirit and Christ is your head; you are also members for Him."
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2. Ode 3. 7: "And I shall not be a stranger" [ܐܢܝܢܐ]; cf. Ode 6. 3: "For it	Ephrem i. 41, 6 <i>seq.</i> : "Come, ye lambs, and take your sign <sup>4</sup> ; . . . this is the
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<sup>1</sup> I think these hymns are genuine, for 1st, In Ephrem's Biography (Roman ed., iii. p. lii.) it is said that he composed hymns on "Birth, Baptism, Fasting," etc. 2nd, The thoughts and language point to Ephrem as the author. 3rd, An allusion to the Diatessaron (ed. Lamy, i. 127, 16) is to be expected in Ephrem rather than in a later author. (Cf. Burkitt in *Texts and Studies*, vii. 2, p. 67.)

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Ploof writes me: "On the connection between Epiphany and Baptism, cf. Usener, *Das Weihnachtsfest* 2, 195 *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> I cite Ephrem everywhere in this note in this way.

<sup>4</sup> ܐܝܢܐ, the usual expression for baptism or the unction before it.

[Love] destroys what is sign which separates the housemates from the strangers" [ܠܝܠܝܢܝܐ].

Ephrem i. 31, 1 *seq.*:  
 "The oil of Christ<sup>1</sup> separates the ܠܝܠܝܢܝܐ from the ܠܝܠܝܢܝܐ, and by it are separated the people within, that they may be distinguished from the people without."<sup>2</sup>

3. Ode 7. 6: "He was reckoned in likeness as myself in order that I might put Him on."

Ephrem i. 43, 12: Descend,<sup>3</sup> my signed<sup>4</sup> brethren, and put on our Lord." i. 85, 17 *seq.*: "Those who have descended,<sup>2</sup> been baptized and put on that one—born." *Ib.*, l. 21 *et seq.*: "He who has been baptized and has put on the one-born, the Lord of many people."

I. 91, 17 *et seq.*: "Jesus has mixed up His strength with the [baptismal] water; put Him on, my brethren."

4. Ode 11. 20 we have a cognate thought: "And the Lord renewed me in His raiment."

Ephrem i. 43, 18: "Ye, too, acquire from Him a new raiment in the water."

<sup>1</sup> I.e. the baptismal oil.

<sup>2</sup> The person who is being baptized is not allowed to have anything *strange* (i.e. which does not belong to the body) on him. Cf. *Test. Dom. Nostri*, ed. Rahmani, p. 127; Funk, *Didascalia*, ii. p. 109. (From a letter of Dr. Plooiij.)

<sup>3</sup> Into the baptismal water.

<sup>4</sup> ܠܝܠܝܢܝܐ; those who have received the unction.

5. Ode 11. 13: "And my face received the dew."

Ephrem i. 53, 21 *et seq.*: "Sprinkle from Thy dew on my lowliness," cf. i. 77, 9 *et seq.*, where he says, that God sprinkled heavenly dew on the three men in the furnace at Babel, who were baptized in the flames.<sup>1</sup>

6. Ode 20. 1: "I am a priest of the Lord, and to Him I do priestly service, and to Him I offer the sacrifice of His thought....

Present your reins before Him blamelessly."

Ephrem i. 33, 25 *et seq.*: "The anointed priests were offering the bodies of slain animals; ye, excellent anointed,<sup>2</sup> your bodies are your offerings. The anointed Levites offered the reins of animals; you are more excellent than the Levites, for you have sanctified your hearts."

7. Ode 30. 1, 2: "Fill ye waters for yourselves from the living fountain of the Lord, for it is opened to you; and come, all ye thirsty, and take the draught; and rest by the fountain of the Lord."

Ephrem i. 109, 1 *et seq.*: "Baptism is the fountain of Life, which the Son of God has opened by His Life; . . . Come, all ye thirsty, come and enjoy yourselves."

8. Ode 35. 1 *et seq.*: "The dew of the Lord is quietness He distilled upon

Ephrem i. 7, 5 *et seq.*: "The cloud covered and sheltered the camp from

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Plooiij writes me: "This goes back to Daniel iii. 49 *et seq.* (LXX)" and compares Origenes, *Exhortatio ad martyrium*, c. 33 and Zeno Veronensis ii. 71.

<sup>2</sup> See above.

me ; and the cloud of peace  
He caused to rise over my  
head, which guarded me  
continually ; it was to me for  
salvation."

9. Ode 39. 8 : " The Lord  
has bridged them [the rivers]  
by His word " ; 11 : " and  
a way has been appointed  
for those who cross after  
Him."

10. Ode 8. 21 : " And by  
my own right hand I set my  
elected ones." <sup>1</sup>

11. Ode 6, 7 *et seq.*, the  
back to Ez. 47. Ephrem is using the same place, i. 103  
*ult.*, et 105, 1 *et seq.* : " Great is the mystery which the  
Prophet saw : the brook, that grew strong. Into its depth  
he looked and saw thy <sup>2</sup> beauty instead of himself . . .  
for thy hidden flood sweepeth away the impurity of heathen-  
dom."

These quotations may speak for themselves. I only  
wish to emphasise two points : Firstly, the fact that  
Ephrem's baptismal language is closely connected with  
the Odes is a strong argument in favour of Dr. Bernard's<sup>3</sup>  
and Dr. Plooy's opinion, that the Odes are baptismal  
Psalms.

Secondly. From the examples given above it is clear

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Plooy compares Diettrich, *Nest. Taufiturgie*, 49 : . . . " in der  
neuer Welt möge er euch zu seiner Rechter stellen " ; and Funk, *Didascalia*,  
i. p. 204 and i. p. 140.

<sup>2</sup> The church is spoken to.

<sup>3</sup> *Journal of Theological Studies*, October, 1910, p. 1 *et seq.*

heat ; it was a symbol of the  
Holy Spirit, which covers  
you in baptism, and protects  
your bodies against the  
flame."

Ephrem i. 99, 19 *et seq.* :  
Christ's birth, baptism,  
death and resurrection " are  
a fourfold bridge to His  
kingdom ; and lo, His flock  
are crossing it in His steps."

Ephrem i. 53, 23 *seq.* :  
. . . " And let me be at  
Thy right hand and be  
mingled with Thy saints."



that Ephrem on baptism is not speaking an altogether new language. Two things are possible :<sup>1</sup>

Either Ephrem as well as the Odists are speaking a common baptismal language,

Or Ephrem is citing the Odes.

Perhaps the two parts of the dilemma are true.

A. J. WENSINCK.

<sup>1</sup> *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, September, 1911, p. 449 *et seq.*

*EPHREM'S USE OF THE ODES OF SOLOMON.*

THE contribution which Dr. Wensinck makes in the present number to the interpretation of the *Odes of Solomon* is of the highest value, and the question with which he concludes, as to whether the parallelisms which he notes between Ephrem's *Epiphany Hymns* and the Odes ought not to be treated as a case of literary dependence, is one which can, as I believe, be conclusively answered in the affirmative. In which case it must be clear to every critic who is following the arguments for this or that interpretation of the Odes that we really are making progress with the matter, and that, however thick and obscure the wood may be, we ought to be able, before very long, to see the end of it. In the first place, it has been increasingly evident for some time that there was more light coming on the Odes from the Syriac literature, whatever may have been the original language in which they were composed: and by this I do not mean that there were more illustrations to be found from the Baptismal rituals of the different Eastern Churches, but that apart from ritual parallels (and these are not only Syriac, but Coptic and Ethiopic as well as Latin and Greek), there were literary parallels, which could not be traced to the details of a baptismal service, unless such homilies, exhortations, and hymns were included in the service as might naturally be held to lie outside it; and there were also parallels which could be found in Ephrem's writings quite unconnected with the rite of initiation.

In the next place, the question to be settled, if we are really to succeed in placing and dating the Odes, is precisely this one, which Dr. Wensinck has raised, of their relation to the writings of St. Ephrem the Syrian; and for some time past I have been examining Ephrem's writings with

a view to settle whether Ephrem knew the Odes and used them, or whether the parallels which came to light so frequently in his writings were due simply to a common use of early baptismal symbols. If Ephrem used the Odes, we shall have to allow for their existence in Syriac, at least as far back as the fourth century, and we thus obtain one more proof of the antiquity of the songs and of their wide diffusion in the early Christian Church. It will not be a case of writings only known to Lactantius and the Egyptian Gnostics: when Syria, Egypt and Rome attest a group of documents for the third and fourth centuries, we can hardly allow the compositions to be of late date or of limited circulation.

Starting, then, from Dr. Wensinck's point of view, the significant thing in connexion with the parallels that can be adduced from Ephrem is that they lie thicker in the *Hymns on the Epiphany*, although, as I have shown elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> they exist in the *Nisibene Hymns*, and also in other compositions of his. And as the *Hymns on the Epiphany* are fundamentally and entirely Baptismal Hymns, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the Odes of Solomon are explicable from the point of view of the Baptismal service rather than from any other, unless it can be shown that Ephrem has handled earlier matter in his treatment of the Odes and handled it with what I may call a special Baptismal accentuation. In which last case we must allow for Ephrem's personal equation, and begin the discussion over again with his special accent removed, and from the view-point of an earlier day than his own.

We start, then, with the assumption that the *Hymns of the Epiphany* ascribed to Ephrem are baptismal in character, and that they furnish striking parallels to the Odes.

<sup>1</sup> See EXPOSITOR for November, 1911.

The first point is obvious ; as Lamy says in his preface to the hymns in question :

Observabat diligens lector hos hymnos continuo in baptismum Christi et fidelium dirigi. Hoc exinde provenit quod in Ecclesia Syrorum tunc temporis baptismus in die Epiphaniae solemniter conferebatur. Qui usus adhuc apud Nestorianos perseverat. Praeterea in festum Epiphaniae praesertim in memoriam manifestationis suae in die baptismi sui, . . . institutum erat.

The diligent reader has noted the fact, and has also, with Dr. Wensinck's aid, absorbed the second point that the *Hymns of the Epiphany* furnish striking parallels to the *Odes of Solomon*. What is now needed is a little closer scrutiny than Dr. Wensinck was able to give, in a preliminary investigation, of the inner meaning of the observed parallels.

For example, Dr. Wensinck notes the coincidence (it is his first observation) between the description of the baptized as members of Christ in Ode 3. 11, and 7. 14 and the opening of the ninth *Hymn of the Epiphany*, ("Ye are the children of the Spirit and Christ is your Head ; ye are also to Him the members"). So far no idea is introduced, which was not in the New Testament : but that the parallel is rightly made may be seen as follows : the opening verses of the hymn are thus :

O John ! he saw the Spirit  
Which dwelt on the head of the Son :  
That she (the Spirit) might show that the head of heaven  
Had descended and been baptized,  
And (from the water) had gone up to be head of earth :  
You have therefore become children of the Holy Spirit :  
Christ has become your head ;  
And you are become his members.

The word-play is on the simple idea of "the head," the motive is in the sentence

The Spirit descended upon the head of Christ.



Now why did Ephrem play upon this word "head" in this detailed manner?

The answer lies in the opening of the 24th Ode of Solomon,

The Dove fluttered over the Messiah,  
Because *he was her head* :

in which we have an allusion to Christ's baptism and an unorthodox doctrine of the subordination of the Holy Spirit to the Divine Son. Ephrem takes up the opening from the baptism and then explains carefully that Christ is the head of heaven (*not* of the Spirit) and becomes the head of earth also, for are not believers His members? And it is Ephrem's stanza that makes us see what the Odist was doing: he also in his first form was playing with the word "head," and no doubt had, in the Greek form,

The Dove fluttered over (the head of) the Messiah:  
For he was her head.

It is so like Ephrem's treatment of a subject that one could almost think Ephrem had written both: the two hymns belong to similar schools of thought, and Ephrem's is the later composition.

In the eleventh hymn Dr. Wensinck notes a parallel (§ 6) between the river seen in the vision of Ezekiel, where

The prophet saw a great mystery,  
A torrent which became strong;

and the famous passage in the sixth Ode of Solomon, where

There went forth a stream  
And became a river great and broad.

It must be noticed that Ephrem continues as follows:

On the depth of the torrent he fixed his eyes;  
And instead of seeing himself he saw thy beauty:

this is evidently a case of the water being used as a mirror; and we naturally compare the thirteenth Ode of Solomon:

Behold ! the Lord is our Mirror :  
 Open your eyes and see yourselves in Him :  
 And learn the manner of your face,  
 And tell forth praises to his Spirit :  
 And love his holiness :  
 And clothe yourselves therewith.

The question at once arises whether Ephrem did not read this Ode in a modified form (which would require very little change in Syriac),

Behold ! the water is our mirror :  
 Open your eyes and see yourselves in it :

at all events it is a fair suggestion that he thus knew it : and the hypothesis becomes a practical certainty when we find in the ninth hymn (§ 7) such a sentence as this :

*The water by its nature is a mirror*  
*To him who attentively looks therein ;*  
 \* \* \* \*

Look into the (water of) baptism  
 And clothe yourselves with the beauty that is hidden therein.

Compare also the previous stanza :

How fair is (the water of baptism) *to the eyes* of the heart :  
 \* \* \* \*

*The glory that is (hidden) in the water*  
*Impress it upon your minds.*

Surely there can be no doubt that Ephrem has not only alluded to Ezekiel's torrent as in Ode 6, but also to the beautiful thirteenth Ode with its comparison of the Lord to a mirror of the spirit. The only doubtful point is whether Ephrem has changed "the Lord" to "the water," or whether we have to amend the text of the published Ode.

Those who may wish for further confirmation of the use which Ephrem makes of the mirror in the thirteenth Ode may be interested in comparing a passage in the *Hymns on the Church and on Virginity* ascribed to Ephrem in Lamy, tom. iv. 602. I give Lamy's translation without troubling to revise it or translate the Latin :

O speculum purum populis propositum !  
 illi acquisierunt oculum internum et  
 accedentes intus intuiti sunt : quia  
 aspexerunt probra sua seipsos reprehenderunt :  
 maculas suas deteraserunt : ornamenta  
 eorum pulchra apparuerunt ; beatus qui  
 probra sua reprehendit videns pulchritudinem  
 tuam et in se imprimit imaginem tuam.

Almost every clause in this passage finds its motive in some line or other of the thirteenth Ode. It is purely unnecessary to labour the point further : if the hymns are Ephrem's they betray the same dependence on the Odes that we find in the *Hymns on the Epiphany*.

The same thing comes out when we study the *Nisibene Hymns*, only here the ground of coincidence appears to be the allusions to the Descent into Hades. In a recent number of the EXPOSITOR, I have shown how the parallels from these hymns explain why "Sheol was made sad" (Ode 4. 11) and how "the abysses deprived of food cried to the Lord" (Ode 24). One more instance shall be given on this subject. The 22nd Ode has in one place used the story of the Valley of Dry Bones in Ezekiel, and the question has not yet been answered as to what slaughter and revival was alluded to in the Ode. The answer comes from *Carmina Nisibena* 37.

I saw in the valley that Ezekiel who quickened the dead when he was questioned : and I saw the bones that were in heaps and they moved : there was a tumult of bones in Sheol, bone seeking for his fellow, and joint for her mate. . . . Unquestioned the voice of Jesus, the Master of all creatures, quickened them.

The parallel can easily be made with Ode 22. 8-10 :

Thou didst choose them from the graves and didst separate them from the dead : thou didst take dead bones and didst cover them with bodies ; they were motionless and thou didst give them energy for life.

It would be easy to show other cases of probable dependence of Ephrem upon the Odes : but I think enough has

perhaps been said, and that we may consider this dependence established. The writings of Ephrem now constitute the earliest commentary upon the *Odes of Solomon*, whose antiquity is once more demonstrated.

Every point raised in the discussion raises another point. For example had Ephrem our Syriac translation, or is it possible that he may have had an earlier form antedating even the Greek : for it is not Greek Odes that he is using ? Has he, perhaps, imitated actual metrical Syriac hymns, and not merely the unmetrical prose of a Syriac translation from some Greek form ? These questions become of increasing importance when we remember that Ephrem is not the inventor of Syriac poetry : he has antecedents : when our Odes were first published, I remember that Mrs. Lewis and her sister Mrs. Gibson remarked to me that these Odes look like the models of Ephrem's hymns ; I put the suggestion on one side at the time, but the fact is that Ephrem had models. His models were the hymns with which Bardesan and his son Harmonius had captured the imagination of the people of Edessa. Early models being conceded, ought we to seek for the origin of the Odes among the Christian or Gnostic Schools of Edessa, or would such a suggestion obscure more than it would illuminate ? The direction of our next inquiry should perhaps be among these literary antecedents of St. Ephrem.

RENDEL HARRIS.



## THE BOOK OF JUDGES.

### IV. DEBORAH AND BARAK (*continued*).

WHEN we broke off last time, we left Barak, with his forces massed, on Mount Tabor. The Great Plain opens out before him ; and there we can picture him watching the “lengthening line of the enemy’s chariots” emerging from the opposite angle, some 16 miles off, in which (probably) just behind the projecting spur of the Galilaean hills, Harosheth was situated, and advancing across the Plain. We are not told the exact site of the battle ; but we may infer from Judges v. 19 that it was very near Taanach and Megiddo. We read, viz.—

<sup>19</sup> The kings of Canaan came, they fought,  
 Then there fought the kings of Canaan ;  
 At Taanach, by the waters of Megiddo,  
 Gain of silver they did not take.

Taanach (15 miles S.W. of Tabor, and 4 miles behind the Kishon), and Megiddo (6 miles N.W. of Taanach, also behind the Kishon), both on the slope of the hills, are the Canaanite fortresses (Jud. i. 27) we have spoken of before. The “waters of Megiddo” will no doubt be rivulets—several of which are marked on the larger maps—running down from the “copious springs”<sup>1</sup> in the hills above it into the Kishon. Somewhere on the plain, between Taanach and Megiddo and Tabor, the armies met : but particulars fail us, and we cannot say exactly where. But wherever it was, the Canaanites, in spite of their 900 chariots, could not withstand the “fierce highland charge” of Barak’s men—“Into the Vale were they let loose at his feet” :—perhaps they fell upon them at some point unfavourable for the manœuvring of chariots : it is highly probable also, to judge from the words of the poem—

<sup>1</sup> W. Ewing in *D.B.* iii. p. 4b.

<sup>20</sup> From heaven fought the stars,

From their courses they fought against Sisera—

that, as Josephus states, a violent storm of sleet and hail burst at the moment from the E. or N.E. full in the faces of the advancing foe: the powers of heaven seemed thus to take their part in the fray. Dean Stanley<sup>1</sup> reminds us of the battle of Cressy, when the slingers and archers were disabled by the rain, and the swordsmen crippled by the biting cold.

The Canaanites turned in flight—it is natural to suppose, down the Plain towards Harosheth. But the treacherous Kishon, swollen by the sudden rain, rose into a flood: and when they attempted—or were driven—to cross it, carried them away; and the chariots and horses, which they expected would be their mainstay, only assisted in their ruin.

<sup>21</sup> The wady Kishon swept them away,

The on-coming<sup>2</sup> wady, the wady Kishon.

The precipitate retreat of the Canaanites we seem even now to hear in the verse describing, with a piece of graphic word-painting, the stampede of the horses in their impetuous flight—

<sup>22</sup> Then did the horsehoofs stamp,

Through the gallopings, the gallopings of his chargers.

Where exactly all this took place, we again cannot be sure: but the “gallopings of the chargers” must have been in some part of the Plain. If the Canaanites really retired to el-Hārithiyeh, many may have perished in the narrow pass, a mile or so S. of it, where the valley contracts to a few rods, and where the river “dashes against the perpendicular base of Carmel,”<sup>3</sup> so that swollen by the

<sup>1</sup> *Jewish Church*, i. 329. He adds an even more exact parallel in the defeat of the Carthaginians by Timoleon in Sicily.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. the cognate verb קָרַב, *to meet* (Deut. xxiii. 4), *come before* (Ps. xcv. 2),—in a hostile sense, *to come upon in front* (Ps. xviii. 5, 18; Isa. xxxvii. 33).

<sup>3</sup> Thomson, *The Land and the Book, Central Palestine*, p. 215.

rains, and deeper and swifter than it would be higher up, it would the more readily entangle and carry away horses, chariots, and men together.

The Plain of the Kishon is often dangerous ground. In summer, at least in its higher reaches, it is a "diminutive, insignificant stream, but in winter it overflows, and turns the surrounding country into a morass" (*E.B.* s.v.). The conditions, moreover, writes Mr. Ewing,<sup>1</sup> who resided for long at Tiberias, and knows the locality well, "change with great rapidity, intensifying the treacherous character of the river. A few hours of such rain as sometimes falls on the encircling mountains are sufficient to change the dry bed into the channel of a rushing stream, and the baked earth along the banks into a quagmire." "The ground about Megiddo is extremely treacherous," as in 1892 Mr. Ewing<sup>2</sup> himself experienced, "even as late as the month of May." There is said to be<sup>3</sup> a parallel to Sisera's defeat in the battle between the French and the Turks in April, 1799, when many of the latter were drowned while attempting to pass the morass in their flight.<sup>4</sup>

The pursuit must have been a long one. One place, by which pursued and pursuers both passed, gave no help, and is bitterly denounced in consequence for its lack of patriotism—

"Curse ye Meroz, said the angel of Yahweh,  
Curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof;  
Because they came not to the help of Yahweh,  
To the help of Yahweh among the mighty.

<sup>1</sup> *D.B.* iii. p. 5a.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> But see Moore, p. 159 n. ¶.

<sup>4</sup> Psalm lxxxiii. 10 speaks of *En-dor* as the spot where "Sisera and Jabin" perished. *En-dor* is about 2 miles S. of Tabor, on the hills on the S. side of the valley between, and thus in an angle of the Great Plain, some 8 miles from the Kishon, and 15 miles from Taanach and Megiddo, far away from the site for the battle suggested by Judges v. The allusion, it seems, must be to some incident not mentioned in Judges iv., v. at all.

No doubt it was an Israelite village, whose inhabitants, instead of cutting off the fleeing enemy, allowed them through indifference or cowardice to escape. Such disloyalty deserved a curse. Was some punishment meted out to it, as in the rather similar case of Succoth and Penuel, in Judges viii. ? The site is unknown—*El-Muruşşuş*, 9 miles almost due E. of Jerzeel—not, however, on the straight way down the valley to the Canaanite fortress, Bethshean, but—some 500 ft. up in the hills, two miles to the N., has been suggested : but the names do not agree phonetically ; nor does the site seem very probable.

So much the more glorious seemed to the poet to be the deed of Jael, wife of Heber, the Kenite. Sisera fled on foot. There are, however, uncertainties as to the locality in which Heber's tent was, and consequently as to Sisera's route ; and these, before going further, we must briefly consider. Let us look at the Map again. Sisera flees to the tent of Jael (iv. 17), by Kedesh (iv. 11). This certainly reads as if it were the Kedesh of verses 9, 10, and the Kedesh of Naphtali of verse 6 : if so, he fled 43 miles N.N.E. from (about) Megiddo, as the crow flies, over a rough and mountainous country, while Barak (ver. 16) pursues the chariots and host as far as Harosheth, 10 miles N.W. of Megiddo, and 37 miles from Kedesh of Naphtali. There Barak, learning, we may suppose, in what direction Sisera had fled, turns off in pursuit of him ; and after a 37 miles' journey over a mountainous country, passes by Jael's tent just after she has killed Sisera. Is such a coincidence probable ? Perhaps, in estimating it, we should remember that the account is condensed : it is silent, for instance, as to the impediments which Sisera may have met with on his flight, and on the information which Barak may have received, as to the direction he was taking ; the flight and the pursuit may also each have well occupied several days.

Nevertheless the difficulty has led Conder (*T. W.* 68 f.), and G. A. Smith after him (*H. G.* 395 f.), to identify the Kedesh of verse 11—Conder, also, the Kedesh of verses 9, 10, and the two do seem to go together—with the *Kadish* S.W. of the Sea of Galilee (see above, p. 32), 25 miles North-East of Megiddo. As Tabor, the rallying-point of the Israelites, was mid-way between Megiddo and Kadish, one would think that this was a dangerous and unlikely direction for Sisera to take: it is also very difficult to reconcile with *iv.* 16, which says expressly that Barak “pursued after the chariots and the host, as far as Harosheth” (i.e. 10 miles North-*West* of Megiddo: if (*H. G.* p. 396 *n.*) the narrator meant that Barak only despatched his troops to Harosheth in pursuit of the main body of fugitives, while he himself went in a north-*easterly* direction, after Sisera, would he not have expressed himself differently? On the whole, especially if Jabin, king of Hazor (see. p. 28), had really nothing to do with Sisera’s rising, the improbability of Barak overtaking Sisera near Kedesh of Naphtali is not decisive; and *Josh.* *xix.* 33 (see the footnote) strongly supports the usual view that the Kedesh of *iv.* 9, 10, 11 is the Kedesh of Naphtali of verse 6.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The natural sense of the narrative seems certainly to be that the Kedesh of verse 11 is the same as that of verses 9, 10, and as the Kedesh of Naphtali in verse 6. Still, it is no doubt in itself possible that the Kedesh of verses 9–11 is the Kadish S.W. of the Sea of Galilee. It must not, however, be forgotten that the apparently forcible argument by which Conder seeks to support this identification is philologically unsound (above, p. 32 *n.*), and that there is really no ground whatever for supposing that a “plain” (!), or even that a place, called anciently Bets’annim (in *Jud.* *iv.* 11, בצענים, in *Jos.* *xix.* 33, בצענים—the vocalisation is uncertain), has been discovered S.W. of the Sea of Galilee.

Not only this, but, if words mean anything, *Joshua* *xix.* 33 shows beyond question that the “oak of Bets’annim,”—and with it Kedesh,—was in the *North* of Naphtali. It is there said, viz., that the border of Naphtali extended “from Heleph, from the oak of Bets’annim, and Adami-ha-Nekeb, and Jabneel, to Lakkum,” after which it ended at the Jordan, and then turned back westwards to Aznoth-Tabor, presumably a place near Mount Tabor. The site of Heleph is not known, though, to judge



But, wherever Heber's tent was, Sisera's course took him past it. He halts to beg a drink of water; and Jael, adding liberality to hospitality, but with treachery in her heart, offers him a bowl of *leben*, or soured milk, a grateful and refreshing drink, highly esteemed in the East, and the best that the Bedawin have to give; and while he buries his face in it in his thirst and haste, she deals him a blow on the head with a heavy mallet, which fells him to the ground at her feet—

<sup>24</sup> Blessed above women shall Jael be,<sup>1</sup>

Above women in tents <sup>2</sup> shall she be blessed.

<sup>25</sup> Water he asked, milk she gave,

She brought forth *leben* in a lordly bowl:

from the "from," it was at the N. end of the border of Naphtali. In a passage in the Jer. Talmud (*Megillah* i. 1: see Neubauer, *Géogr. du Talmud*, p. 224 f.), dealing with this verse, it is said that Adami is *Damin*, not improbably (Buhl 218) *ed-Dāmiyeh* (see G. A. Smith's maps), 5½ miles W.N.W. of Kadish; and that Jabneel is *Kephar-Yama*, no doubt (Buhl, *ib.*) *Yemma*, 5 miles S.E. of *ed-Dāmiyeh* and 4 miles S.W. of Kadish: the site of Lakkum is unknown. If, now, these identifications are incorrect, they afford no further clue as to the site of Bets'annim; if they are correct, they do not favour Conder's site, Bessum; for the terms of Joshua xix. 33 clearly imply that the "oak of Bets'annim" was somewhere near the N. end of the border of Naphtali, if not the very spot near Heleph where the border began, whereas Bessum is south of *ed-Dāmiyeh* (Adami),—1½ miles from it by the large P.E.F. Map,—and so near the South end of the border.

As has been already remarked, G. A. Smith's maps, invaluable as they are, do not, for whatever reason, always express his own views; and the fact has to be borne in mind by those who use them. A notable case is Gibeah: contrast *Jerusalem*, ii. 92 ("3 miles north of Jerusalem"), with the map in vol. i (9 miles N.W. of Jerusalem). We have another instance here. In *H. G.* p. 396 *n.* the site *ed-Dāmiyeh* is accepted, at least with "perhaps," for Adami; but in his *maps* (following the ⅔ inch to the mile map of the P.E.F., and P.E.F. *Memoirs*, ii. 89) Adami is placed, without any (?), at *Admah*, 6 miles S. of the Sea of Galilee. This seems quite incompatible with Joshua xix. 33: the border is described from N. to S.: Adami is mentioned *before* Jabneel, and will consequently be north of it, whereas "*Admah*" is four miles *south* of it!

<sup>1</sup> The words which here follow, "The wife of Heber the Kenite," disturb the parallelism of the verse, and are probably a gloss from iv. 17.

<sup>2</sup> I.e., women living in tents, nomad women (cf. Gen. iv. 20 "he was the father of such as *dwell in tents*," where the Hebrew word is a collective singular, as here).

- <sup>26</sup> She stretched out her hand to the peg,  
 And her right hand to the workmen's <sup>1</sup> hammer <sup>2</sup>;  
 And with the hammer she smote Sisera, she effaced <sup>3</sup> his head,  
 She shattered, and pierced through his temple:  
<sup>27</sup> Between her feet he sank down, he fell, he lay,  
 Between her feet he sank down, he fell,  
 Where he sank down, there he fell, undone! <sup>4</sup>

That Sisera is struck down while he is drinking the *leben*, seems clearly to be the representation of verse 27: כרע is often used of *bending down* on the knees, as to drink, Judges vii. 5, 6, or in prayer, 1 Kings viii. 34, also (2 Kings ix. 24) of Ahaziah, who, when mortally wounded, "*sank down* in his chariot"; and "*fall*" distinctly implies a previously upright position.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand the prose version (iv. 21) represents Jael as killing her victim by driving a tent-peg through his temples while he is lying on the ground asleep. And verse 26 in the poem agrees with this, in so far as it represents her as making use of a tent-peg, though it neither says nor implies that this was done while he was asleep: on the contrary, the effect

<sup>1</sup> Lit. *labourers* (Prov. xvi. 26).

<sup>2</sup> Not the word used in iv. 21, but cognate with the verb in the next line, rendered, to preserve the connexion with this line, "with the hammer she smote."

<sup>3</sup> If the text is correct, this, or something like this, must be the meaning: for the word, though not found elsewhere in the Old Testament, occurs in post-Bibl. Heb. in the sense of *rub off*, *rub away*, *rub out*; in the Mishnah (*Shabb. vii. 2*) it denotes two of the kinds of "work" prohibited on the Sabbath, viz., rubbing the hair off a skin (in tanning), and erasing writing. In Arabic the corresponding word means to "*destroy utterly* so that no trace of the thing remains."

<sup>4</sup> Lit. *violently entreated* (נִלְחָץ), a victim of violence. The word does not mean *dead*: see R.V.m., and (e.g.) Ps. xvii. 9 ("From the wicked that *spoil* me"). The verb is often used of devastating a city, a country, or a people, being usually rendered *lay waste*, or *spoil*, as Is. xv. 1, xxxiii. 1; Jer. iv. 13, 20; and it is applied occasionally to individuals, as Ps. xvii. 9 just quoted, and Prov. xix. 26 ("He that *violently entreateth* (R.V.m.) his father, and chaseth away his mother").

<sup>5</sup> This is the general view of recent scholars: see e.g. G. A. Cooke, *D.B.* iv. 551b.

of the blow (ver. 26) is that he *falls* (ver. 27). Perhaps we may suppose that she first struck him to the ground with the hammer, and then, as this alone might not have done more than stun him, completed the deed by driving the tent-peg through his temples; and that this gave rise to the version according to which she did this in his sleep.

Sisera is slain: but the poet does not leave him yet; and in a singularly dramatic scene transports us from his lifeless corpse into the palace at Harosheth, where he pictures the queen-mother anxiously expecting her son's return. "The presentiment of evil which she herself stifles, the sanguine confidence of her princesses, who see in imagination the division of the booty, an Israelite maiden or two for each man, and abundance of the richly dyed, ornamented stuffs which they themselves prize so highly—all this is depicted with inimitable skill. Their light-hearted anticipations form a striking contrast to the ill-suppressed forebodings of the mother's heart; and the whole scene produces on the reader, who knows the ghastly reality, an incomparable effect. Lowth says justly that there is nothing in literature more perfect in its kind than these verses."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Through the window she looked forth, and cried,  
The mother of Sisera (cried) through the lattice:

"Why doth his chariot disappoint in coming?"<sup>2</sup>

"Why tarry the hoof-beats of his chariots?"

<sup>29</sup> Her wisest<sup>3</sup> princesses gave answer,  
Yea, *she* returned her answer to herself:<sup>4</sup>

<sup>30</sup> "Are they not finding, are they not dividing spoil?"<sup>5</sup>

"A damsel or two for every man,

<sup>1</sup> Moore, p. 166 f.

<sup>2</sup> See the same idiom in Exodus xxxii. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Notice the irony implied in this epithet.

<sup>4</sup> In the same words, viz., which the princesses use, and which now follow: her son's return is delayed by the immense booty he has secured.

<sup>5</sup> The vividness of the original has vanished in the tame (and incorrect) rendering of A.V., R.V. "Have they not found, have they not divided the spoil?" The tense is the graphic Hebrew imperfect.

“ Spoil of dyed stuffs for Sisera,

“ A piece of embroidery or two for the neck of the queen<sup>1</sup> ? ”

<sup>31</sup> So perish all thine enemies, O Yahweh !

But may those that love him be as when the sun cometh forth  
in his might.

The “ So ” is very expressive. As Moore remarks, it brings again the whole scene before our eyes—the defeat, the panic, the wild flight, the king’s humiliating death by a woman’s hand : “ *So* may all thine enemies perish ”—with the same completeness, and the same dishonour ! And in the last line the triumph of the loyal worshippers of Yahweh is compared finely to “ the full burst of the sun out of the darkness of the night or the darkness of a storm, ‘ a hero [Ps. xix. 5] in his strength.’ ”<sup>2</sup>

The poem is a masterpiece of lyric poetry ; and ranks high among the triumphal odes which the literature of the world possesses. The poet’s literary power is indeed remarkable, and is such as to make it evident that poetry had long been cultivated among the Hebrews. By its exuberant buoyancy it reflects the ecstasy of elation into which the people were thrown by their success. It excels in vigour, picturesqueness, and dramatic force. First, in a fine exordium, the national God is thanked for the martial ardour with which the people have been inspired—

<sup>2</sup> When the locks grow long in Israel,<sup>3</sup>

When the people offer themselves willingly,<sup>4</sup> bless ye Yahweh !

<sup>1</sup> The text has here for the second line—

[Spoil of dyed stuffs,] a piece of embroidery,

[Dyed stuff,] two pieces of embroidery, for the neck of the spoil. But the lines are ill-balanced, and seem over-loaded ; and the words enclosed in brackets are probably glosses. “ Spoil ” at the end cannot be right ; and though other emendations have been suggested, Ewald’s *the queen* (שֵׁלָל שָׁנָל ; the word used in Ps. xlv. 9 ; Neh. ii. 6) remains the best. <sup>2</sup> Stanley, *Jewish Church*, i. 329.

<sup>3</sup> A mark of devotion to the sacred work of war ; so W. R. Smith in Black’s *Judges* (in the *Smaller Cambr. Bible for Schools*, 1892, p. 39) ; comp. Moore, p. 138. For פָּרַע *locks*, see Numbers vi. 5 ; Ezekiel xlv. 20, comp. Deuteronomy xxxii. 42 ; and for the verb פָּרַע, comp. Numbers v. 18, Leviticus xxi. 10, and elsewhere.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. come forward readily in war ; so ver. 9. Comp. Ps. cx. 3.

- \* Hear, O kings ; give ear, O rulers ;  
 I, unto Yahweh *I* will sing,  
 I will make melody unto Yahweh, the God of Israel.

Then, in words echoed in Psalm lxviii. 7, 8, the poet describes the storm and earthquake with which he pictures Yahweh as marching forth from Edom, His ancient home in the far South, to the help of His people—

- \* Yahweh ! when thou camest forth from Seir,  
 When thou marchedst from the field of Edom,  
 The earth quaked, yea, the heavens shook,<sup>1</sup>  
 The clouds also dropped water ;  
 \* The mountains poured down (torrents) at the presence of Yahweh,  
 At the presence of Yahweh, the God of Israel.

In a thunderstorm the Hebrews imagined Yahweh, enveloped in light, to be borne along in the dark thunder-cloud : the flashes of lightning were glimpses of the brilliancy within, caused by the clouds parting ; and the thunder was His voice (see especially Ps. xviii. 10–13, xxix. 3–9). Hence a theophany is habitually pictured by them as accompanied by a great thunderstorm (e.g. Mic. i. 4 ; Nah. i. 3b, 5, 6b, Hab. iii. 3–4, 6–8, 10–11). Those who have read the Rev. F. W. Holland's graphic description of a terrific storm in the Sinaitic Peninsula, witnessed by him in 1867, in which the lightning and thunder were incessant, rain came down in sheets, and torrents of water, many feet deep, poured down the wadys, carrying with them huge boulders and other *d'bris*, and completely transforming the surface of the soil, will be aware that there is little hyperbole in this, or the other passages cited.<sup>2</sup>

After this there follows the graphic picture of the helpless

<sup>1</sup> Reading either נִיחַן (Ehrlich) or נִיחַן (Moore), for נִיחַן : cf. LXX (MSS.) ἐταράχθη, ἐξεστάθη, and ἐξέστη. *Dropped* no doubt came in by error from the next line : a variation in the verb used is a great improvement. For the idea, see 2 Samuel xxii. 8 ; Job xxvi. 11 ; Isaiah xiii. 13. The Hebrews thought of the heavens as something *solid*.

<sup>2</sup> The description is quoted in my *Minor Prophets* (Nah.-Mal.) in the *Century Bible*, p. 100. Comp. also my notes on Nah. i. 3b, 5, 6, and Hab. iii.



condition of the country (vers. 6–8), which has been already quoted (above, p. 29), the invitation to all—in words which in part, it is clear, are unfortunately corrupt—to praise Yahweh for the deliverance (vers. 9–12), ending with the inspiriting apostrophe—

Awake, awake, Deborah !

Awake, awake, utter a song !

Arise, Barak, and lead thy captivity<sup>1</sup> captive,

Thou son of Abinóam !

We have next the mustering of the troops, the encomiums passed on those who responded, and the sarcastic reproof of those who remained aloof (vers. 13–18), the vivid descriptions of the rout of the foe (vers. 19–23), and the fate of Sisera (vers. 24–27), the dramatic scene in his palace at Harosheth (vers. 28–30), and the patriotic close (ver. 31)—all combining to make a whole of astonishing brilliancy and power. Parts, as has been remarked, are corrupt ; but they do not impair our comprehension of the poem as a whole. We are impressed by the fire and animation which breathe throughout it, by the sudden transitions of mood and scene, and by the felicity and lightness of touch with which the poet has chosen and treated particular episodes so as to call up a picture of the whole.

But the Song is also important historically. It is one of the oldest extant monuments of Hebrew literature ; and almost the only quite contemporary writing earlier than the monarchy. Yahweh, it seems, is not yet fully domiciled in Canaan : His home is in the distant south ; and thence He comes forth to the help of His people in Canaan. That Yahweh should be described as coming from *Edom*, a country generally so hostile to Israel, is remarkable : but the representation recurs elsewhere. Thus in Deuteronomy xxxiii. 2 (dating not improbably from the time of Jeroboam I.), we read—

<sup>1</sup> I.e., thy captives. So in the reminiscence, Psalm lxviii. 18.

Yahweh came from Sinai,  
 And beamed forth unto them from Seir ;  
 He shone forth from Mount Paran,  
 And came from Meribath-Kadesh,<sup>1</sup>

viz., to guide His people through the wilderness to Canaan. Seir, it need hardly be remarked, is the name of the mountainous region inhabited by the Edomites (Gen. xxxii. 3 ; xxxvi. 9, etc.). Mount Paran (or, collectively—the mountains of Paran) will be some mountain, or range of mountains—it is uncertain what—on the W. of Edom, between Elath and Kadesh. And Habakkuk, in the fine Ode (ch. iii.) in which he describes the appearance of Yahweh in a theophany to judge and redeem His people, writes—

\* God came from Teman,  
 And the Holy One from Paran ;  
 His majesty covered the heavens,  
 And the earth was full of his glory.

Teman was a district in the north of Edom (Ez. xxv. 13), mentioned also elsewhere (e.g. Amos i. 12). Perhaps, if we were better acquainted than we are with the ancient religion of Edom, the reason for Yahweh's being represented as coming from it might be apparent.

We have seen already what the historical situation was at the time. The Canaanites were still strong in many parts of the land : their fortresses cut off the four northern tribes from their brethren in central Canaan ; the land was overrun by bands of armed Canaanites ; their " kings," under a formidable leader, had continued to take the aggressive against the Israelites ; and the position of Israel in

<sup>1</sup> The Massoretic text has *out of holy myriads* (sc. of angels) ; but the parallelism leads us to expect a fourth name of a place. Ewald, Dillmann, and other recent scholars all read, for קרשׁ out of *holy myriads*, כַּמְרַבַּת קרשׁ from *Meribath-Kadesh* (Numb. xxvii. 14 ; Ez. xlviii. 28). The Israelites, according to J, stayed at Kadesh nearly the whole of the forty years in the wilderness (comp. Numb. xiii. 26 with xx. 1b, 14, 16) ; and their departure from it marked the beginning of the final stage of their journey to Canaan.

Canaan was seriously threatened. The victory marked a turning-point in the early history of the nation. It gave a blow to the Canaanites from which they never recovered ; and it saved the integrity of Israel, at a time when the northern tribes were in danger of being torn from it. The poem, however, teaches us more than this. It shows us that "when Israel is arrayed in arms against Canaan, every tribe and clan,"—except perhaps Judah, which throughout this period is isolated from the other tribes, and even afterwards was united with them only for a short time—"is bound to come forward to the support of the national God." This is important. As Moore points out,<sup>1</sup> it shows "that the Israelite tribes, though separated and to some extent broken up in the invasion and settlement of Palestine, and the transition from nomadic to agricultural life with all its profound changes, felt themselves to be one people. This consciousness must have come down from a time when the tribes were more closely united than they were in the first centuries of their settlement in Canaan. But it does not spring solely from the fact that they were, or believed themselves to be, of one race, or from the memory of the days in which they had wandered and fought side by side ; it has a deeper root in their religion. Israel is the people of Yahweh (Judg. v. 11, 13) ; its enemies are His enemies (ver. 31) ; its victories, His victories (ver. 11)." He is praised for the martial ardour with which Israel has been inspired (vers. 2, 3) : His angel curses Meroz for not coming forward bravely to His aid. "The whole Ode is a triumphal *Te Deum* to Yahweh, Israel's God."

"Yahweh was not a god of Canaan, whose worship Israel, in settling in the land and learning to till the soil, had adopted from the natives, but the god of the invaders, by whose help they conquered Canaan. His seats were in the distant

<sup>1</sup> P. 134.

South, whence he comes forth to succour his people, and discomfit their foes. Thither, long after the time of Deborah, Elijah journeyed through the desert to the old holy mountain, where he found Yahweh (1 Kings xix.). It is the old and constant tradition that at this 'holy mountain,'—the 'mountain of God' of Exodus iii. 1; iv. 27; xviii. 5; xxiv. 13; 1 Kings xix. 8,—Israel solemnly adopted the religion of Yahweh (Exod. xix., xxiv.). This coincides with the implications of the poem noted above, and explains, as hardly anything else could, the strength of the religious feeling, and the consciousness of religious unity which express themselves in the Ode." Though the political unity of Israel was incomplete, the poem reveals clearly a belief in a common national life and national unity, bound up with the acknowledgement of Yahweh as the national God, and a belief in His interest in the national weal. "The union of Yahweh's people at Deborah's call in a holy war must have done much to strengthen the feeling of oneness in race and religion; and their success must have deepened their faith in Yahweh of armies, the God of the embattled ranks of Israel." Israel was on its way to become an organised nation; and the one thing which made it possible for it to hold its own in a country only partially conquered, and to advance to higher stages of political, social and religious life, was this common belief in their national God—a God, whose religion, as Kamphausen and Montefiore have justly pointed out,<sup>1</sup> must already, and indeed from the beginning, have possessed a distinctive *ethical* character, which alone could have saved the comparatively small number of Israelites from being absorbed by the Canaanites, and adopting their religion as their own. Israel's religion inspired its warriors with patriotic ardour, and filled them with confidence. National interests were at stake; and

<sup>1</sup> See the quotations in *Exodus*, in the *Cambridge Bible*, p. 414.



so the aspects of Yahweh's character which appealed most strongly to national feeling are those which find expression in the poem : He is a "man of war," and fights Israel's battles : the time was not yet ripe for His spiritual and ethical attributes to be realised and emphasised as they were afterwards by prophets and Psalmists.

I close with a few remarks on the art of Jael. Taking chapters iv., v., as they stand, it is, so far as we can see, not possible to acquit Jael of a treacherous murder. The Arabs have strong feelings on the rights of guests : a stranger who has once even touched the tent-ropes of an Arab, still more if he has partaken of his hospitality, is under his protection ; to do him any harm is a flagrant violation of the sacred duties of a host. The East changes little : and it is reasonable to suppose that similar feelings prevailed in Sisera's time. It is also expressly said (iv. 17*b*) that there was peace between Jabin and the house of Heber. Hence Sisera, in accordance with what may be reasonably inferred about the feelings of the time, had every claim upon Jael's protection. In so far, however, as the song differs from the prose-narrative, it may perhaps be held that it does not paint Jael's deed in such black colours. The poem does not distinctly say that Sisera had partaken of Jael's hospitality. He had asked for refreshment, and she had offered it to him : it is not said that he actually drank it. The distinction is a fine one : but in the East there is much punctiliousness on such matters ; and we must not demand that Jael should be governed by the ethical principles of the Sermon on the Mount. An interesting parallel has been quoted in this connexion. Some of you may remember how at the end of the *Talisman*, when Saladin offers the Master of the Templars a bowl of sherbet, and he then suddenly strikes off his head with a sabre for his many crimes, he is careful to do this before he has tasted the liquid ;



and Sir W. Scott makes him say, "Had he murdered my father, and afterwards partaken of my food and of my bowl, not a hair of his head could have been injured by me."<sup>1</sup> If, however, Jael really did what is attributed to her in chapter iv., there can be no question of her treachery.

But there remains a further possibility to be reckoned with. As I said, there are reasons for thinking, and many critics do actually think, that Jabin is no original element in the Sisera-story, and that the notices about him have come in by a confusion of tradition. If this view is right, the notice about peace between Jabin and the house of Heber will disappear. If, however, there was no Jabin at this time for Heber to be at peace with, how does that affect our estimate of Jael's act? The Kenites were friendly to Israel: Sisera, an open enemy of Israel, takes refuge in the tent of one who is friendly to Israel, if not an ally of Israel: is Jael then blameworthy, if she takes advantage of the opportunity, and slays the enemy of Israel? I suppose we may say that, even according to western ideas, she would not be: the enemy's general would have entered her tent with his eyes open, and at his own risk; and his death, even after having partaken of hospitality, would, *in a state of war*, have been justifiable upon national grounds.

The question must, however, be considered also from the point of view of those who may not be satisfied that iv. 17b is not an integral part of the narrative. The difficulty arises, of course, not from the mere fact, as such, that Jael acted treacherously, but because, her act being, or being accounted to be, treacherous, she is eulogised for it in the poem. In judging of this eulogy, we must naturally have regard to the circumstances of the age and of the occasion. The education of the Jewish nation, as of mankind at large,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the note at the end of the novel; and Gibbon, ch. lix. (vol. vii. p. 258, in the ed. of 1862).

was gradual; and the revelation contained in the Old Testament was progressive likewise. This is the great fact which we ought ever to bear in mind: it is often admitted in principle, but the consequences which follow from it are not always perceived. This is due partly to the fact that most of the teaching of the Old Testament does stand, spiritually and morally, upon such a high level, that we forget, and are unwilling to allow, that parts are not on that level; partly it is due to an unhistorical view of the history and literature of the Old Testament, the older history being often brought before us, not as it actually happened, but as it was viewed by a much later age. We must not, however, on *à priori* grounds adopt a theory of inspiration inconsistent with the facts supplied by the Bible itself. A study of the Bible shows that the Spirit of God does not always, in precisely the same degree, subordinate to itself the men who are its instruments; and human passion, and human interests, sometimes assert themselves. In Judges v. the poet glorifies the great principles of freedom, patriotic spirit, and national unity, which have often in the world's history been nobly contended for: it is a triumph-song not only of a nation victorious against its oppressors, but also of a more spiritual religion over one that was unspiritual. We may rightly admire the poet for the power and beauty with which these great and true thoughts have been expressed by him; but we must remember also the limitations incident to his age and position, and not elevate his impassioned outburst of patriotic feeling, uttered, be it remembered, more than 1100 years before Christ, into the deliberate and coolly pronounced justification of what—assuming iv. 17b to be an integral part of the narrative—can be described only as an act of basest treachery.<sup>1</sup>

S. R. DRIVER.

<sup>1</sup> In my last paper, p. 34 *note*, for העמלק read העמלקי.

## THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.

### IX. THE POSITION OF MAN AND THE PURPOSE OF GOD.

SOME years ago the present writer attempted to summarise in three propositions the Pauline philosophy of history.<sup>1</sup> It helps to clarify our ideas on the subject if we compare those propositions with the fundamental Pauline principles as they are stated in the present series of papers, written from a different point of view.

The first proposition was "*The Divine alone is real: all else is error.*" This is merely a statement of the effect in history and society of the first and most fundamental principle in Pauline and Hebrew thought, "*God is.*" Start from that principle: think as Paul thought, view life as he viewed it: the result of your contemplation expresses itself in that proposition: "*There is nothing real except God.*"

The second proposition was: "*A Society, or a Nation, is progressive in so far as it hears the Divine voice: all else is degeneration.*" Here a new idea is introduced, viz., progress. The writer's object in stating those three propositions was simply to express broadly the observed facts of history. Human history is a history of progress; but progress depends on one condition, absolutely and wholly, and cannot be achieved without it.

It may here be added, not because the writer wishes to reply to criticism, but simply to make clearer the present explanation of the subject, that objection was taken by some critics at the time to this second proposition, on the

<sup>1</sup> *The Cities of St. Paul*, Part I.: *Paulinism in the Graeco-Roman World*, p. 12.

ground that it ignores and denies the development which runs through the history of mankind. The contrary is true. In this second proposition it is stated positively as the normal fact that human history is progressive, if a certain condition is observed. Progress is the law of nature ; it is to be expected ; it ought to take place ; but it is not inevitable and invariable ; on the contrary it is rare and exceptional in history,

There is no necessary contradiction between the two assertions, that progress is normal, and that progress has been rare and unusual. As Paul would put it, God's intention was that progress should be the course of man's life, but His intention has been impeded and prevented by the evil and by the fault of man. What, then, is evil ? Is it stronger than God ? Is it able to thwart the will of God ? It has been in the past able to do so ; but it cannot always do so ; for the will of God must in the end triumph. Here we are brought face to face with the problem of sin ; and to put in our current language Paul's solution of this problem so that it shall not be misunderstood by us is no easy matter, and will need some time and careful preparation.

The general principle, however, is certain ; and has been laid down in Section VIII as the second Pauline axiom, "God is good." He cannot be God, if His will does not triumph. He cannot be good, if His creation is to be a wreck. This second axiom finds its historical solution in development : there is a progressive, though slow, triumph over evil. Thus the law of development stated in the second proposition is implied in the second axiom : the presence of evil, suffering, sin and degeneration in the world which God has created are reconciled with the truth of that axiom through the law that these exist to be overcome in the upward progress of mankind.

The will of God is the soul of history. Such is the philo-

sophic theory of Paul. To him the process of human affairs was the gradual evolution of the Divine Will within those conditions of time and space that hedge man in. Paul presents to us the appearance of the Christ in the world as the culmination of the older period of history and the beginning of the new period : the past leads up to it and finds its explanation in it : the later time starts afresh from it. The purpose of God unfolds itself throughout. That apparently evil seems successful is due to too narrow a view : take a wider view, fetch a wider compass, and you perceive that the Divine will is triumphant in its own way and at its own time.

Hence Paul's thought must always be interpreted as dominated by his conception of the Divine purpose working itself out step by step : "When the fulness of the time came, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born under the Law," or "When it was the good pleasure of God, who had marked me out for that end even before my birth, to reveal His Son in me, that I might preach Him among the Gentiles."<sup>1</sup> In these and other places, historical events occurring in the succession and process of time, day by day, or year by year, are pictured as steps in the working out of a foreordained purpose.

This is a thoroughly Hellenic way of expressing the truth. Greek poetry and Greek philosophy, in their highest and most characteristic manifestations, always picture history after this fashion, beginning from the opening paragraph of the *Iliad*, where the confused and tangled web of the Trojan War is described as a series of steps by which the will of the supreme God worked itself out to its consummation, *Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή*). The pure Hebrew might content himself with unshakable faith in the principle that *God*

<sup>1</sup> Gal. iv. 4 and i. 15 f.



*is good*, and that He will give good at His own time ; but the Greek mind seeks to understand the means and to imagine the process.

In the second proposition, then, we meet the Greek-trained Paul : it may be doubted whether a Jew wholly ignorant of Greek thought would ever have expressed himself in this exact way ; the Jewish way is not out of keeping with this, (for both are good attempts to describe the same great truth in more or less figurative terms), but it starts from a different point of view, picturing God as the potter who deals at his will with his vessels and his clay, and advancing from this side towards the same ultimate truth.

Yet, although my purpose was to show Paul as the Apostle who most clearly regards human nature and history as progressive, various critics described me as denying that there has been development and progress in the world. I maintain that there must be, and that there has been ; but there has been very little. And further, I venture to assert that a scientific investigation which starts from the assumption that all history is a history of progress must lead far astray. What of China, or India, or the Mohammedan lands, or the savage degenerates, in short the greater part of the world ? Have they been progressive ? How often in history are we struck with the same phenomenon, a brief period of progress followed by a long time of retrogression and degeneration. Take the religion of Apollo, and the subsequent history of Greek religion. Take the teaching of Aeschylus and the subsequent history of the Attic drama. Take the Mohammedan countries, whose history as a whole has been usually a sudden outburst of moral fervour and enthusiasm, followed by a long period of decay. In every case one finds at first a clearer and stronger perception of the nature of God suddenly acting on a people, and causing a marked improvement, but not able to clarify

itself in a continual progress towards truth. Progress ceases because the nation no longer hears the Divine voice. Or take even European civilisation, which prides itself on its progress ; but it is transforming the world into a series of vast armed camps, and inculcating more and more widely the standard of judgment that a nation ranks as great, not because of its excellence in literature or art or learning or moral rectitude, but because it has trained itself to be able at need to kill the largest number of its neighbours in the shortest possible time. Is that progress ? It is a temporary madness, or it is degradation. A friend, a great Oxford scholar, used to display a beautiful old book, a fine edition of a classical author, and say "They talk of progress." There is much in Europe that is not progress. Yet still progress is the law of nature and the will of God.

Paul stands out in his letters and in history as a man filled with an intense, flaming, consuming passion for "righteousness." To attain this "righteousness" is the true end of man. Righteousness is the nature and character of God ; and to be made one with God, to be in fellowship or communion with God, must necessarily be the true goal of human life. Since *God is*, the single and perfect existence, the truth and reality of the world, man who, by his existence as man, is separated from God sees before him the one straight path whose goal is God ; and to that goal he must either move onwards or degenerate and "die."

Accordingly these and many other various expressions describing the end and purpose of man are practically equivalent : they are rough attempts to express in imperfect human terms, through imperfect imagery and figurative expression, the same thing. To attain unto righteousness, to be in communion with God, to gain everlasting life, is the true career of man ; and this is Salvation. The pagans around were, as has been already said, praying for Salvation,

seeking it by vows and dedications. That is the striking fact of the Graeco-Roman world. Paul preached to those who already were ignorantly seeking what he offered ; or to put the matter from a different point of view, he caught up the term Salvation (Σωτηρία) from them, put his own meaning (i.e., Jesus's meaning) into it, and then gave it back to them. They offered to purchase Salvation by vows and to extort it by prayers and entreaties from the gods ; but what they meant by it was largely material and ephemeral good ; in the dedications and vows the word sometimes appears to mean little more than health, or prosperity, or good fortune, or a union of all three. Yet the word never wholly excludes a meaning that comes nearer to reality and permanence : there lies latent in it some undefined and hardly conscious thought of the spiritual and the moral, which made it suit Paul's purpose admirably. The pagans could rarely have expressed in definite words this vague "something more," which they begged from the gods ; and yet probably almost all the dedicants whose records we decipher had a certain dim consciousness of this indefinable good thing which they desired over and above mere safety and health and worldly prosperity.

As Professor H. A. A. Kennedy<sup>1</sup> says excellently : " All these statements [specimens of which have just been given] are certainly justifiable, as expressing each a side of the truth in which the mind of Paul can rest with perfect satisfaction. They are all, moreover, consistent with one another, for they are all closely linked with his personal Christian experience." These last few words are especially excellent ; it is in the final resort always Paul's own life that determines his knowledge, and so it must be with every, Christian. You know nothing really until you

<sup>1</sup> *St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things*, p. 6 f.

have lived it, worked it into your nature and life, and made it a part of yourself. All the various expressions of this thought which are found in Paul's writings arise out of his own experience; they are not arrived at by abstract philosophic thought, but forged on the anvil of life and work.

As the aim of life Paul looked for permanence. The Divine nature always *is*: there is for God only the present tense, "I am." The certainty, the permanence, the reality, of God are contrasted with the variability, the transitoriness, the uncertainty of all else. As Professor Kennedy translates the words of Steffen, Paul "sighed, as scarcely any other has done, beneath the curse of the transiency of all that is earthly."<sup>1</sup> He longed for the assurance which lies in union with God.

Here Semitic thought closely approximates to Hellenic philosophical expression. It is one of the central ideas in Greek philosophy that the whole universe and every object in it exist through constant motion and change. Nothing remains the same. Some things change more quickly, some more slowly; but all things are involved in this ceaseless movement. You cannot step twice into the same river, for its water flows by, and new water takes its place. You cannot twice climb the same hill, for it is disintegrating and wearing away by a never-ceasing though slow process of change. There is nothing fixed, nothing trustworthy, and therefore nothing real in these things. Existence which is merely a constant process of change is not in a real sense existence.

Thus Paul's thought comes back always to the first principle that God is, while nothing else is. All other

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 6: Steffen in *Zft. f. N. T. Wissenschaft*, 1901, ii. p. 124, to which I have not access at present.



things seem to be, but they only mock the mind with the illusion of being. The philosophic mind is compelled by its own nature to get back behind them to the permanent and the real. It can acquiesce in God, and in nothing else, for there is nothing but illusion except in Him ; and only the superficial and unphilosophic mind can be content with outward appearance without underlying reality.

Of all these expressions for the one truth, however, probably the most suggestive and the one which best seizes the reality is that you must be born again, you must enter on a new life ; "if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature" ;<sup>1</sup> "it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me."<sup>2</sup> Already, in this life on earth, the new life has begun, and one's old self has died : the Divine life has begun ; the goal is attained ; the man is merged in God and united with God, because his former self has died, and "Christ liveth in me" (as every true Christian can say in so far as he is a true Christian). There is nothing in Paul's words and experience that arrogates anything peculiar to him or anything that differentiates him from "all the saints." There is but one experience, and one true life free and open to all.

This new life begins through the death of the old nature ; and the death takes place through suffering, and as Paul figuratively puts it : you must crucify the old self, for "they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the passions thereof."<sup>3</sup> This is the law of the universe : the birth of the new is the death of the old : through death we enter on life : in science it is expressed as the transformation of force.

These are figurative expressions, some of which are used by Paul and others by John. They denote the same idea, from practically the same point of view. Nicodemus

<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. v. 17.<sup>2</sup> Gal. ii. 20.<sup>3</sup> Gal. v. 24.



wholly failed to understand what it meant to be born again ; and it is not recorded that the further explanation in John iii. conveyed a clearer meaning to him at the time. The thought was so totally new to him that at first it seemed to him meaningless and impossible. What does it mean to us ? How shall we express it in modern everyday language, seeking for other figures and other forms which come more into harmony with the cast of current thought ?

May we not say that in this series of figures taken from birth and new life, we have the same idea that we call development or rather evolution ?

In this connexion perhaps the most typical and illuminating passage in Paul's letters is Philippians iii. 10 ff.

Having . . . the righteousness which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is from God by faith : that I may know Him and the power of His resurrection and the fellowship of His sufferings, becoming conformed unto His death : if by any means I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead. Not that I have already obtained or am already made perfect : but I press on, if so be that I may lay hold on that for which also I was laid hold on by Christ Jesus. Brethren, I count not myself to have laid hold : but one thing I do . . . I press on toward the goal unto the prize of the upward calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded. . . . Brethren, be ye imitators together of me.

Two apparently contradictory assertions are here brought together, and Paul passes from the one to the other, and back again. On the one hand he has gained the righteousness of God ; he is made perfect : he is worthy of imitation ; that he should be so, was the purpose of God, which worked itself out in its own way through the developing events of his life. Paul is the Christian ; and what he says every true Christian, every *ἄγιος*, every saint, can equally say. His experiences are the experiences of all the Saints. " Christ . . . was made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness,

and sanctification, and redemption."<sup>1</sup> The man who calls on others to imitate him is claiming to be the model for them: men are made in the image of God, and only one who has the righteousness of God can be a model to other men; yet every saint can claim to be so.

On the other hand, in the same passage, Paul is also saying that he is not perfect: he has not yet attained righteousness: <sup>2</sup> life is the goal towards which he is struggling, and the prize which he is striving to win. "Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee the crown of life." But the crown lies in front: there is still a way to traverse, hard and trying, before the prize is won. Death must be faced and traversed as the gate of life.

Thus almost in the same breath Paul is saying, "I have attained" and "I have not yet attained." How shall we reconcile the two apparently contradictory expressions? There is no real contradiction: the two unite in one complete idea, and the idea is growth.

If we try to put this idea in the simplest and barest form, man, as he is placed in this world, must either move onward towards the better, or degenerate towards the worse. He cannot stand still. He cannot remain the same, as if he were fixed and unchanging. In the flux of the world, nothing can continue fixed and permanent. Movement towards the better is movement towards God and towards life: in fact, it is in itself really and actually life. Movement towards the worse is degeneration and is already death. In Paul's thought degeneration and death are equivalents.

Now without some power to move him, man degenerates,

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. i. 30. Gentiles . . . have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith (Rom. ix. 30).

<sup>2</sup> The word "yet" is omitted by many good authorities (including B and all Latin); it is needed for the thought, but is naturally supplied from the preceding sentence; and the emphasis and variety are heightened if it is left to the reader to supply. The temptation was to insert it from the influence of the preceding.

and thus comes death. A motive power is needed to start him and keep him on the upward path to the better ; and this motive power Paul found in faith. There is no other force sufficient. Everything else has failed, as the history of man shows.

Thus faith is the power that sets man moving in the right direction ; but this is not an external power ; it is a power that works in and through the mind of the man. It is the Divine power, and yet it resides in the human mind, because it is the Divine fire in the nature of man.

This is a difficult idea, for it seems to involve the contradiction that without external aid man must fail, and yet that he succeeds through a power within himself. Each statement can be made with perfect truth, contradictory as they appear. At every point in the life of man, you find yourself involved in a similar apparent contradiction : you can at every point say, as Paul says here, this is and this is not : he has attained and he has not yet attained. This lies in the nature of growth : at every moment that which is growing ceases to be what it has been ; it does not remain the same for two consecutive moments ; but the change is not merely purposeless or vague or shifting, it is change controlled by a law and a purpose ; and this law of development is the Divine element amid the ceaseless variation.

Thus I find myself driven to assert that Paul is the preacher of development and growth, and that only from this point of view can we at the present day put a meaning on his teaching which is thinkable by people in the special stage of thought on which we now stand, advanced beyond the past, but still far from perfect. The teaching of Paul, i.e., the mind of Christ, seems to assume, in every age and to every person, a form peculiarly adapted and sufficient for the occasion. It has to be rethought (as was said in

the outset) by every one for his own purpose to suit his own need. It is perfectly infinite in its suitability; but each man must see it for himself, and each thinks that he sees something special to himself. The variety however, lies, not in the teaching of Paul, but in the nature of men, who contemplate it through the colouring medium of their own various character.

Whether I have succeeded in making clear my reasons, I know not; but I find myself compelled to begin afresh and to approach the whole problem from another point of view. To Paul human conduct is a problem of growth: it is dynamic, not static. In this view everything is seen in a new light. Righteousness is not a state, but a process of growing or approaching towards the nature of God. Sin is a process of degeneration and deterioration, continuously accelerated, and gathering increased momentum: sin is not simply a fact or characteristic definite and stationary. The sinner is a person driven down a hill; his velocity is constantly accelerated; and it becomes more and more difficult for him to stop his course or to turn back. Yet to turn back is necessary if he is to begin to move towards righteousness. Some tremendous power must be brought into play to arrest the impetus of the degeneration towards evil and cause a movement in the opposite direction towards good and God.

Life means the fulfilment of the purpose of one's existence: to fail and to frustrate that purpose is death. "Sin entered into the world, and death through sin."<sup>1</sup> The double statement is put most emphatically in the form: "The wages of sin is death; but the free gift of God is eternal life."<sup>2</sup> Such is the order of God: "whether (servants) of sin unto death or of obedience (to His will) unto righteousness."<sup>3</sup> Righteousness and life are here practically

<sup>1</sup> Romans v. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Romans vi. 23.

<sup>3</sup> Romans vi. 16.



convertible terms ; and these sentences would be equally true and equally intelligible, if the words were interchanged.

The question has been asked and seriously discussed whether Paul would have gone so far as to maintain that, if there had been no sin, there would never have been in the world such a thing as death. This is one of those academic questions with which Paul would have had little patience. If the world, and the Divinely ordained course of the world, had been different from what they are, then many things else would have been different. It is profitless, and worse than profitless, to discuss such questions. They approximate perilously to the logomachies against which Paul fulminates in writing to Timothy and Titus.

When death is conceived as the transition of force from one form to another, it has a different meaning from the other sense, in which it is spoken of as the equivalent of sin. In the latter case it is really degeneration, in which every right feeling, right judgment and right impulse gradually become atrophied and cease to exist. The man who has failed to carry into effect the Divine purpose of his being is ceasing to live, and when all hope is lost he is dead. The common metaphor by which we speak of such a man as dead originates from a true instinct. After all, even in the physical sense, how difficult it is to predicate death as final and absolute. In the case of drowning a person may be practically dead ; and yet sometimes, after hours of therapeutic work, the breath may be recalled, and all that can be said is that he would have been pronounced dead hours before, if it had not afterwards been proved that he could still live. I know the circumstances of a case in which a man was pronounced dead by some of the best physicians in Europe after typhoid fever ; and yet was brought back to life after many hours of effort by non-medical belief and activity. Still more difficult is it to



predicate moral death. There are admittedly many cases in which a person who had seemed utterly dead to all moral feelings and hopelessly lost, has been restored to life. He was really dead ; and yet, after all, there is no moral death so absolute and complete as to be beyond the redeeming power of faith and of Christ. All the issues of life and death are under the power of God.

Now comes the question, whether this way of looking at life is justifiable in philosophy or in common practical sense. It is of course admitted by the questioner that the power of a true and noble idea in history has been extraordinarily great. The influence of such ideas can hardly be exaggerated. The history of mankind is made by them and transformed by them through all the stages of its progress. Without such ideas there is no progress, for they are the Divine element in the world, and the Divine within the collective thought of nations responds to the impulse of a noble idea, where the nation is fitted to receive and comprehend it. The memory of every educated person will supply to him countless examples from past history ; and it is needless to linger over this subject, except to say that often a historical process has been in reality originated and impelled by an idea rather than by the more apparent reasons of material advantage or political strength which also may seem to be involved. This may, however, be left to a historical survey.

It will also be admitted that the transforming and impelling and regenerative power of an idea over the individual man is extraordinarily great. In one's own experience every one knows how even the reading of a noble thought can rouse the emotions and quicken the pulse ; and how occasionally the contact of one's mind with such an idea has affected the whole of one's thought and even given a new direction to one's subsequent life.

This is not merely an analogous : it is a slighter example of the same nature and force. In all such cases the Divine nature and truth within us recognises and responds to the Divine without, and grows stronger by taking into itself a new yet kindred element. I believe it is allowable to say that the mind of Jesus embraces the sum and perfection of all great ideas, and His influence on the world operates in the same fashion but to an immeasurably stronger degree, through infinite love, perfect truth, and absolute power, all combined to influence the human mind that it has laid hold upon.

How far it may be right to say that the intensification of that kind of influence to an infinite degree raises it into a higher category I do not presume to decide. Who can gauge the difference between the finite and the infinite power ? But that this is the right way of attempting to understand the process of faith, and that this places a true philosophic interpretation on it, and that this power is vouched for by common and universal experience, I believe. In every case where a great idea impels the mind of one man or of a nation, it works through the belief which it rouses, and this belief and confidence strengthen the human nature to the daring and achieving of what otherwise lay far above and beyond the human powers.

Those who have studied the remarkable book of Nevius on "Demoniac Possession" will be inclined to say that this is far from exhausting the phenomena under consideration, and will be inclined to claim for the name of Jesus an immeasurable and limitless power over man. Nevius, a trained medical man, who had no belief in the reality of demoniac possession, but regarded all cases so classed as examples of obscure phenomena of a nervous or hysterical character, found himself obliged by the facts that came within the range of his own observation, and were corrobor-

ated by the observation of many trustworthy colleagues, to change his opinion. He came to believe that there was such a thing as real obsession or possession by diabolic power; and he recognised that in numerous cases—almost every case where it was tried—the appeal to the name of Jesus exercised a soothing and more or less curative influence even on obstinately or ignorantly pagan minds. Here we trench on the sphere of the miraculous, i.e., of what has not yet been properly understood.

W. M. RAMSAY.

DR. JOHANNES LEPSIUS ON THE SYMBOLICAL  
LANGUAGE OF THE REVELATION.

A. INTRODUCTION (*continued*).

As Dr. Lepsius defined his position in the first of his articles on this subject,<sup>1</sup> "I do not assert that I am able to interpret the Revelation of John. . . . Nevertheless I think I may say that in our time the Revelation of John can be read with more understanding than was possible before, for the riddle of the symbolic language of the Apocalypse is in the main solved."

The whole series (of which this is the second last) is really the Prolegomena to a scientific study of the Revelation, and not the completed theory.

The subject of which the articles treat is one which to us at first sight seems to be remote from the range of knowledge of the ordinary educated man, and to demand such careful and elaborate study in a library of recondite books as would be inconsistent with the situation of the seer of the Revelation, a prisoner on a rocky and hardly populated island of the Aegean Sea.

This, however, is only a superficial appearance, due to the conditions of modern life. In ancient times not merely was the ordinary man, and especially the rustic, accustomed to regard the heavens as his time-keeper for the day and the year :<sup>2</sup> not merely did general opinion look to the heavens for guidance in difficulties and advice about public affairs :<sup>3</sup> the more educated man, also, was acquainted with astronomical phenomena and their bearing on chronology and history to an extent that we can understand only by an effort. In modern and mediaeval history we are

<sup>1</sup> EXPOSITOR, February 1911, p. 166 f.    <sup>2</sup> EXPOSITOR, May 1911, p. 464 f.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 468.

relieved from almost all difficulty in this respect: one single statement by a trustworthy authority is usually sufficient in itself. This we owe to the Julian and Gregorian calendars. In ancient chronology, however, even when several statements occur regarding the date of an event, all probably equally trustworthy, and any one of them sufficient in itself if we possessed the requisite knowledge to comprehend it as fully as the ancient writer had it before his mind, these may and often do prove insufficient to fix the date. They assume much knowledge that is lost to us. Being made from different points of view and expressed according to different chronological systems of reckoning, they often fail to throw light on one another or to elucidate the problem for us. In many cases a single chronological statement demands an elaborate astronomical treatise to make it intelligible: sometimes the required treatise has been already written by some laborious modern scholar: in other cases there are a dozen treatises all coming to different conclusions regarding the fundamental data according to which the statement must be interpreted.

Astronomical chronology is a difficult and important subject, which few now can understand, and for which special training is needed. Yet in ancient times it was quite natural for the orator *Ælius Aristides* to define the year of his birth by the position of the sun in the zodiac, and it was quite easy for others to understand his meaning. Astronomical illustrations were common in conversation and literature, and were understood by all who ranked as truly educated. Even at the table of the vulgar and uneducated who imitated the manners of educated society, a smattering of astronomical knowledge was considered necessary as a proof of good manners.

There is, therefore, nothing remarkable, nothing that should astonish us, in *John's* ability to employ astronomical



data or numbers in the Apocalypse. His visions were in part moulded by his education, both generally by his past experience from infancy or at school and specially by his familiarity with earlier apocalyptic literature.

After all, the reader must remember that purpose and the result of these papers is to place the reader in a position to study the Apocalyptic symbolism, and not to give a complete explanation of the Apocalypse. That they point the way and tempt him further on in the path of study is among their most useful characteristics.

What are we, in a general view and apart from special details, to take as the chief gain resulting from these studies ? I should venture to regard the following as at least a very noteworthy advantage and a marked step in progress. Just as alchemy was the elementary and unscientific stage of scientific chemistry, and astrology of modern astronomy, so we must recognise in this religious application of astronomical observation the early stage of that method of thinking which has produced in modern times Bishop Butler's *Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*, and in our own time Professor Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*. To the ancients the Will of God and the history of mankind were written in the phenomena of the heavens. As Psalm xix. expresses it : "The heavens declare the glory of God . . . day unto day uttereth speech"; and yet "there is no speech nor language : their voice cannot be heard." The first six verses of the Psalm declare the perfection of the natural world as seen in the heavens. Then the perfection of the moral world as seen in "the law of the Lord" is declared in verses 7-10. The last four verses draw the inference, applying it to the life of the ordinary man as exemplified in the writer of this hymn : "by the law and

commandments of God is thy servant warned." To study and know the ordinances of God is wisdom.

It may be that, in the future, opinion will be divided. Some will look back on the method of Butler and of Drummond as no less antiquated than the astronomical comparisons and symbolism of the Jewish Apocalyptic writings, while others will regard the latter as embodying a truth no less profound than the essays of the two moderns.

This seems to be the spirit in which, and the point of view from which, the Revelation can best be studied. "Behold a door opened in heaven, and the first voice . . . as of a trumpet . . . saying, 'Come up hither, and I will show thee the things which must come to pass.'" The things which are seen in the heaven are a symbolic expression of the Will and law and commandments of God; they show the principles, but not the details of history.

In the present paper Dr. Lepsius devotes considerable attention to explaining the three different statements of the number of days in the cosmic half-week, i.e. three and a half years. I referred to the need for an explanation of this matter in the *EXPOSITOR*, June, 1911, p. 507. The explanation of the cosmic week and half-week seems to me to constitute one of the strongest parts of Dr. Lepsius's theory, together with the exposition of the Apokatastasis (which has played so great a part in thought and literature).

In strictly Apocalyptic writings the half-week of years had only symbolic meaning, and could have no real connexion with any period or interval of three years in history. It is a cosmic, not a historical fact. Even in a book like *Daniel*, where much history is loosely intermingled with eschatological myth, and where general principles of history are mixed with crude recital of details, it is evident that in the last chapter of the book the half-week of years is a cosmic or astronomical idea and its varying length in

different astronomical relations is stated in a way that could have no mere historical significance.

In the eleventh chapter, on the other hand, a historical period is loosely identified with this astronomical period, though the length does not fit : but the dignity of a cosmic fact is imparted to that historical period by the identification.

Similarly as regards historical principles. Owing to geographical circumstances the foreign relations and policy of Palestine were always and necessarily influenced largely by the intercommunication between the land to the north of it and the land to the south, whereas intercommunication across Palestine from the east to the west exercised only the smallest influence on the development of the country. Palestine lay on a great north and south road. Even Assyrian or Babylonian traffic and war came into Palestine and passed across Palestine, moving on the line from north to south ; for though Babylon lies to the east, yet there was no road for an army from Babylon except up to north Syria, and then south into Palestine. That eternal principle of Palestinian history is adapted to a special period in Palestinian history, when the wars and negotiations between the Seleucid kings of Syria on the north and the Ptolemaic kings of Egypt on the south swept back and forward through the lowlands of Palestine and affected the highlands of Judah and Jerusalem. This adaptation of general principles and cosmic facts to the details of history is carried out with pedantic detail in the Book of Daniel, to the sacrifice of almost all apocalyptic dignity and mystery ; but even this would hardly justify the attempt in chap. xii. to bring the astronomical varieties of the half-week of years into detailed agreement with history. Rather the truth is that in the conclusion the book returns to the apocalyptic and mysterious level.

Even the slightest survey of Daniel's visions suffices to

show on how much higher a level the Revelation stands, where the references to Rome and Roman history never descend into pedantic detail, and are generally pitched on the level of historic generalisations and apocalyptic imagery, so that perfect assurance of victory over the mighty Empire and the continuous triumph of the saints and martyrs are the impression achieved through the vision.

W. M. RAMSAY.

### J. THE RESTITUTION OR APOKATASTASIS.

ALL eschatological calculations of "times and seasons" are necessarily founded on the astrological idea of the "Apokatastasis" or restitution of all things. When the disciples asked the Lord (Acts i. 7), "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again (*ἀποκαθιστάνεις*) the kingdom to Israel?" they were thinking of the dawning of the day of perfecting. In the same sense Peter speaks (Acts iii. 21) of the times of restitution (*ἀποκαταστάσεως*) of everything that the prophets have spoken of. The mode of expression gives a glimpse of the underlying chronological idea of the Apokatastasis. Let us try first to give an explanation of the idea of the Apokatastasis.

The idea of the Apokatastasis springs from the astrological view of the world taken by the ancients. The old orientals were convinced that the times and destinies of the world could be read in the movements of the heavenly bodies. According to their view everything on earth is subject to the influence of the stars. The mikrokosm of the earth is a reflection and image of the makrokosm of the astral world. Therefore everything that takes place on earth must be ordered according to the "example of heavenly things" (Heb. viii. 5). Thus the progress of the centuries until the completion of the world's course is decided by the cyclical movements of the celestial bodies. The advance



of the hands of the heavenly dial shows which hour of the world has struck. Already in the story of the creation (Gen. i. 14), the sun and moon, the great and little hands of the clock, have their task allotted to decide "the course of times and seasons, days and years."

Already in very early times the Babylonians and Egyptians learned from their observation of the heavens that the revolutions of the sun and moon, and their relation to the apparent movement of the firmament of the fixed stars, return to agreement with one another only at long intervals of time. The inharmonious movements of the celestial bodies appeared to be an image of the troubled course of the world. Not till the original harmony of the movements of the stars was restored could eternal peace come to the earth. Therefore "a new heaven" was expected as well as "a new earth," for the two are in such close mutual relation that neither can be made perfect without the other.<sup>1</sup> The hope that, after the expiration of a previously determined period, "a time of refreshing from the presence of the Lord" (Acts iii. 20) would bring perfection to the world, led the priesthood to turn their attention to the course of the stars. The latter appeared, after long cyclical periods, to be returning to their original constellations. The astrological term for this return of the stars to their original constellations is "Apokatastasis." From the Apokatastasis, therefore, they hoped for the rebirth and restitution of all things. A soteriological interest lies ultimately at the root of all astrology. The moment in which the hands of the world-clock returned to the same point on the face of the heavens, was looked forward to also as the day of the appearance of the Redeemer-King or Saviour of the world, from whom the restoration of the original harmony of all things was expected. After the

<sup>1</sup> Revelation xxi. 1.



expiration of the inharmonious time on earth which is decided by the inharmonious course of the stars, the age of paradise, the kingdom of eternal peace, the Messianic time would dawn, and all earthly misery, war, disease, sin and death would come to an end.

Upon the priestly astrologers of the ancient religions devolved the duty of calculating the cyclical course of the stars and the periods of adjustment of their motion from the eschatological point of view. The Yugas of the Indians, the Saroi of the Babylonians, the twelve world-eras of the Bundelesh, the phoenix-period of the Egyptians, the great Platonic world-year, all such systems of world-eras are the chronological expression for the hope of a Palingenesis, a rebirth of the universe, in which the whole creation will celebrate its resurrection. The ideas of Restitution (ἀποκατάστασις), Perfecting (τελείωσις), New Birth or Palingenesis (παλιγγενεσία), Resurrection (ἀνάστασις), Refreshing (ἀνάψυξις), are only different forms of the same thought.

In reckoning the appointed day of the world's completion, various cyclical periods were taken as a foundation : first the periods of adjustment between the courses of the sun and moon, then the return of the position of the planets to those signs of the Zodiac which they were supposed to have occupied in the original "*thema mundi*," and lastly the advance of the equinoctial points on the Zodiac, the so-called precession. The astrological term for the final point of agreement of all these cyclical periods is Apokatastasis (ἀποκατάστασις).<sup>1</sup>

The greatest astronomical world-period is measured by the advance of the equinoxes on the zodiac. The longest hand of the dial of the universe is the precession. About

<sup>1</sup> Compare Brandes *Abhandl. z. Gesch. des Orients*, p. 123, The Egyptian Apokatastasis-years.

26,000 years are necessary for this hand to move once round the face of the zodiac. The precession was known already to the Babylonians and Egyptians: whether and how long it was known before is still in dispute. The Babylonians seem to have been unable to discover a more exact mode of reckoning.

The Egyptians required no astronomical calculations founded on observation of the stars to help them to a more or less exact establishment of the precession. They could discover the movement of the precession in a much simpler way, viz., by the shifting of their civil calendar as compared with the fixed calendar of the Sirius-year. In the Sirius-period of  $4 \times 365$  or 1,460 years, in which their civil year of 365 days came round into agreement with the sun-year of  $365\frac{1}{4}$  days by repeating itself 1,461 times, they had an astronomically perfectly exact period, for the determining of which only a regular observation of the heliacal rising of Sirius, the brightest of the fixed stars, was necessary. This period of 1,460 years is expressly alluded to by the ancients as the "Apokatastasis of the zodiac." The Apokatastases of the Sirius period fell in the years 2785 and 1325 B.C., and in the year 136 A.D. The name and the appearance of the false Messiah Bar Kochba (Star-son) in 132 A.D. four years before the Apokatastasis of 136 A.D., may be connected with this.

In the reckoning of the Sirius-period the fixed sun-year, like the Julian, is given 365 days and exactly 6 hours. But in reality the tropical sun-year has only 365 days 5 hours 48 minutes and 48 seconds. In the Egyptian calendar this difference grew in the course of a Sirius-period to about 11 days, and whilst the Sirius-year agreed with the civil year in 1460 sun-years, the tropical year required, with a small deviation from our present mode of reckoning, exactly 1500 years.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. Lepsius, *Chron. der Aegypter*, p. 187.

It appears to be on this observation, which must of itself have been apparent to the Egyptians, that the phoenix-period is based. In every 500 years the civil year of 365 days was shifted in comparison with the tropical year, in such a way that the first of Thoth, the New Year's day, moved forward 4 months each time, so that after 1,500 years the first day of Thoth had returned exactly to the original point. According to the ancients the phoenix period was reckoned as 500 years by the priests in Heliopolis. This number is found already in Herodotus, who states that he heard it from the Heliopolitans themselves.

It is by the ancients too that the astronomical legend which is connected with this period has been handed down to us. Every 500 years, so they tell, the bird phoenix came from Arabia to Egypt and flew into the city of Heliopolis which was consecrated to the Sun-god Ra. According to Herodotus, it brings its dying father into the sanctuary of the sun; according to the others, the dying phoenix itself comes, burns itself in fragrant incense and arises from the ashes, first as a white worm, which, however, becomes a bird, shows itself on the third day in its full strength, and then flies back to its eastern home." Plainly, the story is only an astronomical allegory. The Egyptian hieroglyph for the phoenix-period represents the stem of a palm tree, cut down, cleft and bound together again with a young sprig let into it. The word phoenix is applied to the palm-tree as well as to the legendary bird. Therefore, the renewal of the world-era was represented by the rejuvenation of the palm-tree. The same sign appears not only singly but also doubled; then it designates the double phoenix-period of 1,000 years.

The phoenix-period, like the Sirius-period, was regarded as a world-era leading to the "Apokatastasis." The Greek grammarian Horapollon, who was of Egyptian origin,

writes : <sup>1</sup> “ When the phoenix is born, the restitution of things (*ἀποκατάστασις πραγμάτων*) takes place.”

These explanations were necessary to explain first the New Testament idea of the “ Apokatastasis ” (Acts iii. 21) and the kindred idea of the “ Palingenesis ” (Matt. xix. 2) and their origin from the old oriental astrological view of the world, for these ideas lie also at the base of the biblical eschatology. The acceptance of these fundamental notions leads to the supposition that the chronological elements of the biblical eschatology too, belong to a system which is founded on an astrological basis. Let us endeavour, therefore, to ascertain the system by which the computation of time in the Apocalypse may be numerically explained.

#### K. THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF $3\frac{1}{2}$ YEARS.

We had tried to establish the probability that the contents of the little book (x. 9), which the sun-angel holds in his hand and gives the seer to eat, coincide in the chronological outline of the Apocalypse with the time of the seven trumpets, that is, the last seven years of the apocalyptic jubilee-period. The interpreting-angel of the trumpet-visions (x. 5-7) is also the bearer of the little book which describes the events of this last time in a series of prophetic visions. The assumption that these visions come to pass in the space of seven years,<sup>2</sup> is confirmed by the fact that here, as in Daniel ix. 27, the middle of the year-week of seven years is regarded as the critical point with which the time of the great affliction, that is, the last  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years begin, which precedes the judgment of the world. In the book of Daniel vii. 25 and xii. 7 and 11, this final period is reckoned as “ a

§ <sup>1</sup> R. Lepsius, *Chronologie*, p. 171, where other quotations in elucidation of the Apokatastasis are collected.

<sup>2</sup> In the Mohammedan eschatology, also, the time from the appearance of the Mahdi to the great battle of the nations on the plain of Dabik is seven years.



time, two times and half a time," or 1,290 days. The time of 1,290 days is extended in xii. 11 to a yet longer space of 1,335 days.

In the Apocalypse xii. 14, Daniel's three and a half years are reckoned as 42 months or 1,260 days (xi. 2 and 3, xii. 6). Plainly, both in Daniel and in the Apocalypse, periods are dealt with which belong to the same chronological system.

The jubilee-period of fifty years, which we have discovered from the chronological use of astrological dates, is not mentioned as such in the Apocalypse. The only computation of time, besides the period of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years, which is found in the Apocalypse is the time of 1,000 years (xii. 4-7), after which the "millennium" has got its name.<sup>1</sup>

The period of a thousand years could be connected with the thousand-year periods of the Persian doctrine of the world-eras. According to the Bundehehsh the world is to last 12,000 years. In the first period of 3,000 years the reign of evil is still hidden, and it appears first at the beginning of the second period. Then for 9,000 years the struggle is carried on between Ahriman and Ormuzd, and ends with the victory of Ormuzd. During the last 3,000 years a prophet is expected every 1,000 years, who is to renew religion and bring to pass the earlier revelations. By the time the last prophet appears the world will be almost entirely purified of evil, and a happy age will begin which will last for a thousand years. After the expiration of the last thousand years the resurrection takes place; and Ahriman, who has lost the battle, disappears for ever. This sketch of the world-ages stands in relation with a calculation, attested in the later Jewish literature, by which the world-ages are reckoned as periods of a thousand years.<sup>2</sup> But it cannot be seen either

<sup>1</sup> The ten days in the letter to the Church at Smyrna, ii. 10, offer no occasion for a symbolical interpretation.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Weber, *Sys. d. altsyn. palaestin. Theol.*, p. 355, Fourth Ezra xiv. 11; *Geh. des Henoch*, c. 33.



from the Persian or the later Jewish doctrine of the world-eras, on what astronomical calculations they are founded.

Amongst those astronomic periods of the ancients which are known to us, only the double phoenix-period of  $2 \times 500$  years would come into consideration for the reckoning of a thousand-year era.<sup>1</sup> The phoenix-period of 500 years is ten times the jubilee-period of 50 years, which we thought we could infer from the astrological system of the Apocalypse. So we must investigate whether the period of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years can be explained by this system.

At first it would seem as though such a short period cannot be brought into connexion with a calculation of world-ages. And yet such must be the case. The critical period of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years immediately precedes the dawn of a new world-age, and closes an expiring world-age. As all calculations of world-ages are based on the periods of adjustment of different cyclical reckonings, the differences between the periods which are to be adjusted are significant. Usually they are regarded as critical days or as unlucky days. Thus, amongst the Greeks, the last days of each month (the difference between the solar and the lunar month) were sacred to the Eumenides as powers of Hades. The five epagomenai, the five surplus days of the year (the difference between the year of 360 and the year of 365 days) were regarded by the Babylonians as unlucky days<sup>2</sup>). If it should appear that the  $3\frac{1}{2}$  or  $2 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$  years could be explained as the difference between two cyclical periods, it would immediately be clear why this critical period should be looked upon as a time of misfortune, the time of great affliction. We must, therefore, find first the period of adjustment in which  $2 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$

<sup>1</sup> The phoenix-period is known also to the Midrash on Genesis ; in *Ber. Rab.* s. 19, 19b, it is said of the Phoenix that it lives 1,000 years, and after the expiration of the 1,000 years, fire flares up from its nest and burns it.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. A. Jeremias, *Im Kampf um d. alten Orient*, part. iii. p. 45.

years can be reckoned as the surplus of one cyclical period over another.

With the Sirius-period, as also with the phoenix-period, the calculation is, as we have seen, based on a difference in the length of the year. The civil year of the Egyptians had 365 days, the Sirius-year  $365\frac{1}{4}$  days, the phoenix-year 365 days, 5 hours, 48 minutes, 48 seconds. The apocalyptic period of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years obviously reckons with a year of 360 days and with months of 30 days; for the  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years are reckoned in 42 months of 30 days = 1,260 days. To make the 1,290 days of David an intercalary month of 30 days is added, and to make the 1,335 days of Daniel a further period of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  months = 45 days is added. Is such a year of 360 days attested elsewhere?

It seems, in fact, that in Babylon as well as in Egypt a year of 360 days was used in reckoning. Berosus uses for counting the duration of his oldest Babylonian dynasties of 86 kings a cyclical period of *Saroi*, *Neroi* and *Sossoi*. The *Saros* has 3,600, the *Neros* 600, and the *Sossos* 60 years. From the re-calculation of the duration of the dynasties by Syncellus it appears that the years of the cyclical reckoning of Berosus are to be understood as days, so that the *Saros* is to be reckoned as 10 years = 3,600 days, the *Neros* as one year and eight months = 600 days, and the *Sossos* as 2 months = 60 days. From this we may see at once that the cyclical reckoning of Berosus is founded on a year of 360 days.<sup>1</sup> For the time of Hammurabi, too, a reckoning by years of 6 *Sossoi* (1 šuššu = 60) = 360 days is attested.<sup>2</sup>

As the Egyptians did not reckon with weeks of seven days but with decades, that is to say, weeks of ten days, they must also have been acquainted with a 30-days month independent of the course of the moon and a sun-year of 360

<sup>1</sup> R. Lepsius, *Chronologie*, p. 7 f.

<sup>2</sup> Jeremias, *loc. cit.*, p. 41.

days (to which the 5 epagomenai were then added). The French chronologist Des Vignoles supposed that the year of 360 days was in use amongst the Egyptians earlier than the year of 365 days. He cites as his ground for this supposition the statement of Lyncellus, that it was King Aseth, one of the Hyksos kings, who introduced the epagomenai (the five surplus days in the year), and in support of his view refers amongst other things to the fact that the number 360 (corresponding to the 360 degrees into which the heavens are divided) was frequently used as a symbol for the days of the year. "In the earliest times," he says, "there was in Western Asia and Egypt a year consisting of 12 months of 30 days, or 360 days without any intercalation, the duration of which was almost midway between that of the solar and lunar years, and in agreement with which the orbit of the sun was divided into 360 degrees." "It arose from the observation that the lunar month contained about 30 days and the solar year about twelve of these months; and it remained in use because of its simplicity, notwithstanding the fact which very soon became evident that neither did the months agree with the moon nor the years with the sun."<sup>1</sup> He thinks that such a year is attested by the Mosaic account of the flood and the statements of numbers given therein. According to his opinion, also in Cilicia this year must have been in use, for Herodotus relates that the Cilicians paid to Darius Hystaspes a tribute of 360 horses, one for each day of the year. Diodorus relates that there was an island which was situated at the boundary of Egypt and Ethiopia, on which was the grave of Osiris, with 360 cans which had to be filled daily with milk by the priests charged with that duty; and that in the city of the Akanthoi was to be seen a perforated cask with which 360 priests had daily to draw water from the Nile.<sup>2</sup> These

<sup>1</sup> L. Ideler, *Handbook d. math. u. tech. Chron.* i. p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> Ideler, *Handbuch*, p. 187 f.

symbolical numbers are construed by Des Vignoles as referring to the days of the year.

A month of 30 days, as presupposed in the Apocalyptic reckoning, is variously attested, as in Hesiod, who divides the month into 3 decades of 10 days each. The riddle of Cleobulus too, which is told by Diogenes Laertius, presupposes a month of 30 days and a year of 360 days. "A father," so says the riddle, "had 12 sons and each of these had 30 daughters of two-fold appearance; on one side they are white and on the other black. Although they are immortal, yet they all die."<sup>1</sup>

The assumption of Des Vignoles that before the year of 365 days a year of 360 days had been in use was contested by Ludwig Ideler and Richard Lepsius. The contradiction is certainly so far justified that the year of 360 days can hardly have been in common use anywhere; but this does not preclude the possibility that an astronomical reckoning year of 360 days may have been in use for the calculation of cyclical periods. The Egyptian priests, too, used, besides the civil year, three other reckoning-years. The year of 360 days must have recommended itself specially to the Babylonians for their sexagesimal reckoning. Certainly Daniel and the Apocalypse prove that the year of 360 days was in use for apocalyptic reckonings. This may be connected with the belief that all the stars originally moved in a perfectly arithmetical harmony, and in the end will return to that harmony. On the same belief is based the astronomical myth which Plutarch<sup>2</sup> relates. According to this myth Hermes had won at dice 5 days from Selene and had made them the 5 surplus days of the year. In consequence of this the lunar year had now 355 and the solar year 365

<sup>1</sup> Other illustrations in Ideler, p. 269 f.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *de Iside* 12.

days. Why does he win them from the moon? Sun and moon also must once have been in harmony.<sup>1</sup>

Des Vignoles, therefore, might be in the right with his year of 360 days, leaving out of the question the opinion that this year could ever have been in common use. But what relationship does this year, or a cyclical period reckoned with this year, bear to the critical period of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years?

First, let us see in what cyclical period the apocalyptic year of 360 days adjusts itself to the civil year of  $365\frac{1}{4}$  days. Des Vignoles had already called attention to the fact that 68 "Julian" years of  $365\frac{1}{4}$  days give, with a difference of 3 days, 69 years of 360 days, and that this difference adjusts itself perfectly after about seven repetitions, so that 480 Julian years of  $365\frac{1}{4}$  days are equal to 487 years of 360 days. But Des Vignoles did not observe, nor, to my knowledge, has any other chronologist done so, that the difference between 480 "Julian" years of  $365\frac{1}{4}$  days = 175,320 days, and 480 apocalyptic years of 360 days = 172,800 days gives the number we were looking for of  $2 \times 1260 = 2520$  days =  $2 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$  years.

The critical period of  $2 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$  apocalyptic years =  $2 \times 1260$  days is thus explained as the difference in adjusting a period of 480 Julian and 480 apocalyptic years.

Astonishing as this result is we must not allow ourselves to be satisfied by it; for it still gives no explanation of Daniel's reckoning of 1,290 and 1,335 days.

Since the period of 1,000 years, i.e. a double phoenix-period of  $2 \times 500$  years, is also known to the Apocalypse, and since the jubilee-period also, as the tenth part of the phoenix-period, appears to belong to the same chronological system, it is easy to discover the difference between a cyclical reckoning with a year of 360 days and with a year of  $365\frac{1}{4}$  days, for the period of 500 years.

<sup>1</sup> R. Lepsius, *Chron.*, p. 92.



500 years of  $363\frac{1}{4}$  days are 182,625 days  
 500 years of 360 days are 180,000 days

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The difference gives 2,625 days

Daniel reckons the half year-week as 1,290 days, that is, he adds to the 1,260 days an intercalary month of 30 days. Besides this, he takes into account a surplus of 45 days ( $1,290 + 45 = 1,335$ ). This gives the following statement:—

$3\frac{1}{2}$  years =  $1,260 + 30 = 1,290$  days  
 $3\frac{1}{2}$  years =  $1,260 + 30 + 45 = 1,335$  days

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Total 2,625 days.

Here we have the same final sum as above.

These 2,625 days, therefore, are the difference between a cycle of 500 years of  $365\frac{1}{4}$  days and a cycle of 500 years of 360 days.

From both the reckonings which we have given it would, therefore, appear that the critical period of  $2 \times 3\frac{1}{2}$  years rests on an astronomical reckoning of cosmic ages which was known to the ancients.

In fact, we meet with the period of 480 years as well as the era of 500 years in the Hebrew chronology. The time from the departure out of Egypt to the beginning of the building of the temple is reckoned as 480 years, (1 Kings vi. 1); the time to the consecration of the temple (1 Kings ix. 10; 2 Chron. viii. 1) as 500 years. The building of Solomon's temple, 4 Ezra x. 45, is placed in the year 3,000 after the creation, and in xiv. 11 the history of the world is divided into 12 periods of 500 years each, the time of the world's existence thus being reckoned as 6,000 years.

The chronological system which underlies the Apocalypse appears, therefore, to rest on the Jubilee period of 50

years, which in its turn has an astrological-chronological foundation in the numeration of seven hours, seven days, seven weeks, seven years and seven year-weeks. The Jubilee period when repeated ten times gives a phoenix era. If we should take the Phoenix-period, again, as a unity and regard it as a week of the great cosmic year, 52 cosmic weeks of 500 years make the great cosmic year of the precession consisting of 26,000 common years. We have, however, no support in the sources to justify us in recognising this relation of the Phoenix-period to the great cosmic year as the completion of the chronological system.

JOHANNES LEPSIUS.

*Helena Ramsay trans.*

## PERSONALITY AND GRACE.

### III. AUTONOMY.

As certainly as piety insists on absolute dependence, morals insists on absolute independence. The singular, the unique quality of the personality, from the moral point of view, is its autonomy. It differs from all other things in not being driven by forces *a tergo*. If it is, it ceases to be a moral personality. Before any influence can become a motive, it must become part of ourselves. Events outside of that circle have no direct moral significance. Their influence upon us may be great. They may create situations we have to deal with morally. But they are not themselves moral situations.

First, the moral personality must be self-conscious. Only within that self-consciousness can there be moral action. This means that the world I deal with is my world. All the situations and all the motives upon which morality has to act come from it. Till it is my situation, no moral pro-

blem can arise. We often speak as if we could be driven like a ball by mere might of impulse. But that is an illusion. Acknowledged or unacknowledged, we always act on what Kant calls a maxim. No motive can do more than attract us by the idea of its satisfaction. To do that it must take a place in our self-conscious world. Then with reflection or without it, it must have its value fixed among other motives, other ways of self-realisation. The hand is not put forth to steal by the force of hunger, but by our conscious acceptance of the course of action which the satisfaction of hunger involves. We must bring our whole self-consciousness either up to the level or down to the level of every moral or immoral action. To attain perfectly to total absence of fear of them that kill the body would be victory over all material impulses. In that very true sense to offend in one point is to offend in all, for the whole world of our self-consciousness is related to it.

From this purely moral point of view Fichte regards our whole self-conscious world as built by the soul as a gymnasium for its own moral task. It should be our world, under our feet. Nothing will satisfy the moral demands except a victory which overcomes it. We must be masters in our whole self-conscious existence.

Hence our self-conscious world has in it a moral dualism which requires moral endeavour. It is for us and also against us. When we conquer it, it is our friend ; when it defeats us, it is all the more our foe that it continues still to be our world. It is ours to rule, and when it rules us it is like fire, a bad master, the worse that we can at no moment escape it.

Second, the moral personality must be self-directing. There must be autonomy of conscience as well as autonomy of mind. The self must legislate for itself. Even if an action is not otherwise wrong, it is less than right, unless

we ourselves, out of our own hearts, judge it to be right. In that sense, whatsoever is not of faith is sin.

Conscience can be educated, but it may not be instructed. Even moral education should not consist in telling us on authority what we ought to do. Its business is to make us see for ourselves the thing that is right. If constraint is used, it can only be of moral value, if it is like a barrier in a wrong road to encourage the traveller to seek the right one. To direct the conscience is to ask for non-moral action which may easily become immoral action, for it is always easier to meet the hardest casuistry provided for us by another than to lay ourselves open to the demands of our own consciences. The mere fact that our judgment of right is heteronomy, that is, moral legislation by other people's consciences, not our own, places us in a wrong moral attitude to life and duty.

Even God may not legislate for us morally except through our own sense of right. Though no judgment of conscience is infallible, a moral faith in God as the moral lawgiver is identical with the belief that, in so far as we see right, we find His will, and that His purpose with us in life, is not merely to exact His will, but to enable us in freedom to make our will one with His. If we are to be persons not things, God must govern us through our own conscience of right. Obeyed in any other way, He is not morally served. Otherwise, our certainty of God and our certainty of the moral order would not be identical.

Thirdly, the moral personality must be self-determining. It requires not only autonomy of mind and autonomy of conscience, but autonomy of will. It acts within its own self-conscious world ; it directs itself by its own self-legislating conscience ; and, finally, it has its power in its own self-determined action. What it ought to do, it can do. That fact all sense of duty insists upon. Doubt cast upon it is,

from a moral point of view, mere juggling with moral issues. To justify ourselves by weakness of will is to fall into an immoral fatalism.

What kind of free-will that implies, we need not delay to discuss. Perhaps only our ignorance speaks of liberty of indifference. But it is certainly not any determinism we know, even by the character, for, as has been already said, we may be determined by our character in such a way that our character itself is improved, and in another way so that our character degenerates.

Any idea that the will is merely a vehicle for some outside force, even if we call that force God, is an end of the idea of moral responsibility. On the same grounds the force might be matter, for, if we could admit that it was an alien force, personality would have no part in it. In that case it might in all that concerns morals as well be a direct material force as a direct Divine force. In either case will effects nothing, and to suppose that it does is only to imagine that the shadow moves the body, and responsibility is at an end.

Our sole reason for disbelieving in a mechanical control of the will is the assurance that no experience is so close to us as the experience that will comes direct out of our personalities, and that, when it comes, things are actually done. Probably that experience mediates all other experiences. Our self-consciousness over against the world, and our self-legislation over against the mere law of cause and effect depend upon the reality of our experience when we set ourselves against the world, and do not merely exist in it but are active in respect of it and actually work changes in it.

When it is denied that such action is free, the nature of freedom is first caricatured. Consideration is restricted to the will, and the contention that the will is free is represented as if the will were a balance possessed of the absurd characteristic of ignoring the weight put into its scales and



of moving by accident and sheer arbitrariness. Freedom of the will, being thus interpreted as a faculty of wholly arbitrary action, in indifference alike to motive and character, can easily be proved both absurd and immoral. Do we not, we are asked, approve or disapprove of an action for the one sole reason that it is the outcome of the character? When we consider a person responsible for a bad action, what do we blame him for, except for being a bad character?

If, however, we thought action upon character a fixed, direct, invariable result of force in that mechanical way, we should neither approve nor disapprove of it, nor ascribe to the doer of it any responsibility. We disapprove and ascribe responsibility because we believe that the doer of a wrong action has a character to which the will has not been loyal, a character which disapproves of what it is made responsible for, or, if not, he has lost it by previous disloyalties. Not in indifference to impulse and motive are we free, but in the power of being loyal to our moral selves. That we have, or ought to have, such a power our experience testifies, nor can any morality be a real force of which that is not a postulate. The mere fact that a man may abandon his moral sovereignty and surrender himself to the anarchy of impulse, ending sometimes in the madness which turns him from being a person into a thing, a feather wafted on every air, shows that the will seated on her throne is at least not the mere creature of any form of determination known to us.

An independence of the will to which it is not a mockery to say, You can do right because you ought, is essential to the very idea of morality. Personal independence is thus as vital to morality as personal dependence to religion. The two requirements cannot be compounded in any mere amalgam of both without depriving us of moral independence and of religious dependence alike. It is no solution to say that our moral independence is qualified by our religious

dependence and that here as elsewhere the world is governed by compromise, and that the way of wisdom is in the just mean.

Where religious dependence modifies moral independence, the result is not wisdom but a corrupt morality. It is not an accident, but in the nature of the case, that piety, used as a substitute for moral independence, produces a dubious morality. It has that result because it is cherished as a substitute for the clear moral issue that a man ought to obey his conscience and he can. Consciously pious people are often not moral for the simple reason that the natural man can use considerations of piety, like any other considerations that may be at hand, to confuse straight moral issues. Nor is it necessary to go the length of bribing conscience by the promise that occasional times of dubious but pleasant and profitable action God will wink at. To put conscience on one side and God's mind on the other, and our will on one side and God's succour apart from it, is a frame of mind full of moral pitfalls. Nay, if we only put our own approval of conscience on one side, and doing good to win God's favour on the other, our feet are on a slippery path. The only safe moral attitude is to believe a thing is right because we see it to be so, and to do right solely from reverence for right itself. In consequence the history of modern ethics tells mainly of attempts to free morals from religious authority and religious motives and to display it as itself the sanction and reward of its own laws.

Religion does not thereby suffer loss. It does not prosper by sapping the independence of the moral personality. By putting in place of goodness existing in its own right God's arbitrary will, it loses every standard by which it could judge a doctrine of God. Then it is led to make merit a condition of grace, and grace a sort of plaster for patching up the flaws of merit. Salvation becomes an external pos-

session to be half won and half given, a mixture depending upon God's arbitrary will, and not what it really is, our true, natural and obviously right relation to God and man. Religion in consequence is made to appear indifferent to conscience of right, for which it seems to substitute a way of going to heaven according to God's arbitrary demands and our own foresight towards our selfish well-being. Even at that cost, religion does not succeed in safeguarding the interest of religion itself, because religion ought to be not a partial but an absolute dependence upon God.

If no more can be said, religion and morality must at best ignore each other. At worst they will be direct antagonists. The religious and the moral type will be indifferent to each other, and it will not be strange if at times they are suspicious and hostile. On the one hand, we shall have a man like Augustine, apt to regard whatsoever savours of moral independence as savouring also of ungodliness, apt to regard the appeal to moral sincerity not as an excuse but as an additional offence in any one who on personal judgment differs from what appears to be God's battalions. On the other hand, we shall have to accept a man like Kant to whom every kind of dependence even upon God was only moral flaccidity, so that, in the stress of moral conflict, to betake oneself even to prayer was to endanger our moral integrity.

But if morals and religion are genuine human interests, they cannot be thus kept apart. We know how much a conscious piety, heedless of morals, is worth. We know how it becomes a mere device of the natural man to shield him from the claims of his own conscience. Wherefore, as has been said, it is not an accident, but an obvious resort of the natural man that makes so many consciously pious people not ethical. And it is just as little an accident that makes so many consciously moral people not religious. It

is the unwillingness of the natural man to follow his moral independence to the point where it becomes dependence upon a moral reality greater than ourselves, where it casts down all the rigid ethical boundaries he has set up for himself and brings him face to face with those infinite claims which destroy all idea of merit, and leave him, after he has done his utmost, an unprofitable servant.

As a practical concern, the issue is not doubtful when we divorce morality and religion. Morality has no more a wide heaven to breathe in, or religion a solid earth to walk on. Yet, if morals requires absolute independence and religion absolute dependence, how can they ever be agreed ?

JOHN OMAN.

*EPHESIANS IV. 21 : " AS THE TRUTH IS IN JESUS."*

*Καθὼς ἐστὶν ἀληθεία ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ.* None of the many renderings of this phrase seems to be satisfactory. For the popular form of the quotation—"the truth as it is in Jesus"—there is, of course, no authority; it would be interesting to know the origin of this all too common transposition of the words of the Authorised Version, "as the truth is in Jesus." The Revised Version giving the rendering "even as truth is in Jesus" corrects the A.V. in its insertion of the article before *ἀληθεία*, but raises a new question as to the true significance of the phrase, which presented little difficulty to the reader of the old Version. Dr. Abbott rightly rejects the interpretation given by Jerome and others which expands the meaning into "as truth is in Jesus, so shall it be in you," on one ground that it requires a forced meaning for *ἀληθεία* = holiness, and on a second, to which we should demur, that *ὡμᾶς* is not emphatic. He makes the following sentence the subject of the clause, and translates, "as is right teaching in Jesus: that ye put

off,” etc. But while this also postulates a somewhat forced rendering for ἀληθεία, it fails to account for the change from Χριστόν to Ἰησοῦ. Dr. Abbott’s note does not remove this difficulty: “When obedience to the practical teaching of a historical person is referred to, the historical name is used.” This is what we might expect, but not what we find. Rather is the contrary noteworthy in Paul, that when he does appeal to the authority of his Master he refers to Him as “the Lord,” or “Christ Jesus”; and in the passage to which on Dr. Abbott’s interpretation this would be most closely parallel (Rom. xv. 3) his words are, “for Christ also pleased not Himself.” Neither can it be seriously contended that the teaching which follows is indeed the “teaching of the historical person” Jesus of Nazareth. No doubt, it is in harmony with the teaching He gave; but the mould into which it is cast is clearly that of the Apostle’s thinking, and there is nothing in its contents to justify the suggestion that he is here appealing to the teaching of the historic Jesus rather than to the inspiration of the exalted Christ. Indeed the whole passage proceeds on the assumption that the Ephesians had “learnt Christ,” had “heard Him,” and been instructed in a spiritual sense, doubtless through the medium of human lips, but by the working of the Spirit which is the Lord.

All the renderings of this type take ἀληθεία as a nominative, and all are alike open to the objection, that they do not satisfactorily account for the change from “Christ” in verse 20 to the rare use of “Jesus” in verse 21. The other type of rendering, whether it takes ἀληθεια as nominative or as dative, makes it part of the predicate and supplies as subject Χριστός. Thus we get either “as Christ is truth in Jesus,” or “as Christ is truly in Jesus.” The former of these renderings is adopted by Von Soden in the *Handcom-mentar* without any reference to the one represented by our



Versions ; “ in view of the expressly repeated *αὐτόν, ἐν αὐτῷ* which takes up *τὸν Χριστόν* from the sentence with *οὕτως*, only “ Christ ” can be the subject of this sentence, and not *μανθάνειν* or *ἀκούειν*.” “ The thought,” he proceeds, “ is that they ought not only to believe on a Christ but to recognise Him in Jesus ; and if they wish truly to live in Christ, they must live like Jesus ; just as in v. 25, 29, and 1 Peter ii. 21, this Christ is set forth as an example.”

But these passages which Von Soden quotes precisely fail to support his view ; in all cases it is “ Christ ” not “ Jesus ” to whom they refer. And further his explanation seems to involve a misconception of verse 20. The point from which Paul starts is that these people are already “ in Christ.” Within that sphere they have received instruction. Christ is at once their teacher and their lesson. There is no question raised as to their believing in Christ, no occasion, therefore, to urge them to recognise Him in Jesus. What, again, is meant by the same commentator’s further remark, “ The thought is related to the proposition of Hebrews xiii. 8—Jesus is Christ ” ? The thought, according to his rendering, is that Christ is truth in Jesus, which, whatever it may mean, is not the same as that Jesus is Christ.

The suggestion adopted by Westcott and Hort in the margin of their text, to print *ἀληθεία* as a dative followed by a comma, leads to the translation, “ as He, Christ, truly is in Jesus.” But this does not appear to meet with favour among modern commentators. It yields a view of the relation between “ Christ ” and “ Jesus ” to which there is no parallel in the Pauline Epistles, or, indeed, in the New Testament, however it might be applied in support of later and not very orthodox speculations.

In view of the objections which thus present themselves against any of the current interpretations, some consideration may be invited for a suggestion of quite a different kind.

In the first place the logical pause is not after the *καθώς* clause but before it. This is against Von Soden among others, who “says the *καθώς* plainly corresponds with the *οὕτως* of verse 20, so that any construction of the *καθώς* clause with what follows resulting in a loosening of its close connexion with *οὐχ οὕτως* is excluded.” But this is surely to misconstrue the course of Paul’s thought. It makes him say, “Ye have not so learnt Christ . . . as He is truth in Jesus,” which is the precise opposite of what the Apostle means. The comparison involved in *οὕτως* is with the knowledge, or rather ignorance, of Christ which accounts for the immoral “walk” of those who are “cut off from the life of God.” And this comparison is, indeed, exhausted by the backward reference, so that there is no necessity to find it carried further in the *καθώς* clause. The difficulties above pointed out arise from the attempt to keep this clause in close connexion with what precedes it. Let us try what can be done by connecting it with what follows, by making it supply an analogy to the demand made upon the Ephesians that they should *ἀποθέσθαι τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον*. The construction of *ἀποθέσθαι* is variously explained; but whether it depends on one or other or on all of the finite verbs in the sentence preceding it, there is no doubt as to its meaning, “that ye put off.” The *ὁμᾶς* calls for notice, and gets it from the commentators, some of whom feel that it is emphatic without knowing why, while other deny to it any emphasis at all. The truth is, that the *ὁμᾶς* is otiose unless it is emphatic. After three verbs in the second person plural with no disturbing intrusion the pronoun is uncalled for except for emphasis. Emphasis is governed not by any fixed convention as, e.g., “the place of the word in the sentence,” but by the rhythm of the whole; and if we make the logical pause after *ἐδιδάχθητε*, and then read on, *καθώς ἐστὶν ἀληθεία ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ ἀποθέσθαι ὁμᾶς*, we see the need of the pronoun; it is in

the contrast or rather the partial analogy between something in "Jesus" and something demanded of Christians. And the translation now suggested is: "that as is actual fact in the case of Jesus, ye put off the old man."

For the use of ἀληθεία with this significance a parallel may be found in 2 Cor. vii. 14, ἡ καύχησις ἡμῶν ἐπὶ Τίτου ἀληθεία ἐγενήθη, "the boast I made before Titus turned out to be a fact." So Athanasius contrasts ἀληθεία as "fact" with σκιά (*de Incarn.* c. 40). Παρούσης τῆς ἀληθείας τίς ἔτι χρεία τῆς σκιᾶς ἦν; And there is a very close parallel in Plutarch (*Consolatio ad Apollonium*, 111 F.), εἰ δὲ ὡσπὲρ ἡ ἀληθεία ἔχει = ut res revera se habet. Cf. also the phrase from Diodorus quoted by Stephanus *ad voc.* ἔνια ρὸ ἀληθείαν ἐξέβαινε = verum eventum habuere.

To what, then, does Paul refer as "actual fact" in the case of Jesus, in which he finds an analogy to the putting off of the old man? For it is only an analogy that we need look for; it is not suggested that the Apostles would have described that which was "put off" by Jesus in the same terms as he describes that which is to be put off by the Christian. The clue is offered by the collocation of the name Ἰησοῦς and the word ἀπόθεσθαι. On the one hand, an examination of the passages in which Paul uses the name "Jesus" shows that while in no case does he use it when appealing to His teaching or to His ethical example, in nearly every case (seven out of nine, if I am not mistaken) he uses it when referring to the facts or circumstances of the Saviour's death or resurrection. On the other hand, we have evidence that the idea of our Lord's having "put off" or "stripped off" something at His death, and of that as providing an analogy to what must be done by His followers was not only one familiar to the Apostle but one to which he attached considerable importance.

Reference may be made to two passages in the Epistle to

the Colossians. In the passage of that Epistle which corresponds to the one we are considering in Ephesians, the word which corresponds to ἀποθέσθαι here is ἀπεκδυσάμενοι (Col. iii. 9 ἀπεκδυσάμενοι τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον); and this provides a significant link between the thought of "putting off" (ἀποθέσθαι) or "stripping off" (ἀπεκδύσασθαι) the old man and the picture of Christ suggested by the difficult phrase in Col. ii. 15, ἀπεκδυσάμενος τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας. Whatever may be said of the rendering of this last phrase offered by several of the Latin Fathers (Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine) as a translation—"having put off from Himself *His body* He made a show of them"—there is little doubt that as an interpretation it is correct. That is to say, Paul thought of Christ in His act of dying as divesting Himself of that body which was the medium through which He had been involved in the common human experience of the hostility of "principalities and powers," the spiritual forces which had usurped authority over men. It was they who "crucified the Lord of glory";<sup>1</sup> but in doing so they had defeated themselves. He escaped from their dominion when He stripped off from Himself at once the body and the unseen forces which used the body as an organ of tyranny and attack. Thus the putting off of the old man on the part of the Christian and the stripping off of principalities and powers on the part of Christ represent strictly analogous ideas. And it would be quite in accordance with Pauline thought to find the analogy underlying the language of our passage in Ephesians, and the achievement of Christ in His death held up as an example of the putting off of the old man.

Further, we may bring into illustrative connexion with our passage another verse, from the same context in Colossians : ii. 11, ἐν ᾧ καὶ περιετμήθητε περιτομῇ ἀχειροποιήτῳ ἐν τῇ

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 8. Cf. Everling, *Angelologie und Dämonologie des Paulus*, p. 13.



ἀπεκδύσει τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκός, ἐν τῇ περιτομῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. The current explanations of the phrase, "the circumcision of Christ," are none of them satisfactory. (Lightfoot passes over it in silence.) Abbott rightly rejects all renderings which find a reference to the circumcision of the infant Jesus. But he contents himself with a colourless rendering, "the circumcision which belongs to Christ, and is brought about by union with Him," nearly equivalent to "Christian circumcision." Bernhard Weiss takes it to mean, "the circumcision which is wrought by no human hand but by Christ Himself on the believer, who in his baptism is brought into life-fellowship with Him."<sup>1</sup> But there is no parallel for the idea that Christ somehow confers circumcision on the believer, and on the other hand the explanation takes no account of the ἀπέκδυσις τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκός, which is really the *tertium comparationis* between the περιτομή τοῦ Χριστοῦ and the "circumcision not made with hands."

It is true that the circumcision of Christ here referred to is not the circumcision of the infant Jesus, but nevertheless the genitive is a subjective one. Paul here describes as the circumcision of Christ the same stripping off of the body which has σάρξ for its substance. He assumes that the like circumcision takes place in the experience of the Christian when through ethical union to Christ he dies to sin and is made alive again unto righteousness—an experience of which his baptism is the vivid representation and the seal. The putting off of the body of the flesh is analogous to the "circumcision of Christ," because He also in the act of death stripped Himself of a like body.

If we now return to the passage in Ephesians we find verses 22–24 in closest correspondence with the passage in Colossians both as to underlying ideas and in the language in which they are expressed. In Colossians, when the Christians

<sup>1</sup> B. Weiss, *die Paulinischen Briefe*, 1905, *ad loc.*



are called on to ἀπεκδύσασθαι the old man the analogous achievement of Christ is cited and emphasised as an example and a type. When in Ephesians they are summoned ἀποθέσθαι the old man, it seems natural to find the same thought underlying a slightly different form ; and in the καθώς clause to recognise a reference to the laying aside by Jesus of the σῶμα τῆς σαρκός, rendering the phrase as already suggested, "that as is actual fact in the case of Jesus, ye put off the old man."

C. ANDERSON SCOTT.

### THE MISHNA ON IDOLATRY.<sup>1</sup>

DR. HARKAVY (I think) once observed that whereas the Biblical inheritance of the Jews had been appropriated by strangers, their Rabbinical inheritance was still left to themselves. Encroachments on such estates by capable workers are more often welcomed than resented, and Mr. Elmslie is likely to meet with gratitude from the owners of the Talmud for pegging out a claim. The treatise which he has selected for translation and illustration is the most interesting of all—that which regulates the relations between Israelites and their pagan neighbours ; it is packed full of matter that is of value to the anthropologist, the mythologist and the historian as well as to the Orientalist and theologian. Perhaps it feels strange in its new environment ; accustomed to a commentary that is harder than the text, in Mr. Elmslie's edition it is surrounded by the luxuries of European scholarship, a critical apparatus, a translation which shirks no difficulty, and a commentary which elucidates its various obscurities ; to these are added an Introduction, a series of excursuses and a glossary.

<sup>1</sup> *The Mishna on Idolatry* ('Aboda Zara), by W. A. L. Elmslie, M.A., Cambridge Texts and Studies, 1911.

The publication of this treatise in an accessible form and by so competent a hand may prove to be of considerable importance politically. For the occupation of Palestine by Jewish communities has been going on for years and the introduction of constitutional government into the Ottoman Empire seems to favour the extension of that occupation. Will the resettled Jews adopt towards their neighbours the attitude of extreme intolerance which this treatise prescribes? When the writer was last in Palestine the statements made to him were rather in favour of an affirmative answer to this question: where the territory was occupied by Jews, there was no place for members of other communities. Mr. Elmslie's work should be studied by all whom the Zionist movement interests; and it will be all the more valuable as a contribution to Eastern politics because it is evident that his mind is absolutely free from Antisemitism.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

### ON A NEGLECTED ASPECT OF THE THIRD COMMANDMENT.

I HAVE long been surprised to find how much stress is laid by most commentators upon a secondary application of this commandment, while they almost leave out of sight its plain and primary meaning. For they put *profane speaking*, not *lying*, as the thing chiefly forbidden. Here is an instance of what I mean. In Mant's Bible (1817) stands (as from *Oxford Catechism* . . .): "In this third Commandment are forbidden: 1. Irreverent thoughts of God. 2. Blasphemy, or dishonourable mention of His name. 3. False swearing in avouching an untruth. 4. Perjury, or breaking a lawful oath. 5. Causing the name of God, and our holy profession, to be blasphemed by others."

Now the commandment actually forbids, not 1, 2, 5, but

3 and 4. It forbids plainly *lying confirmed by an oath*. It says, Do not swear falsely, do not swear to do, and then, by not doing, make your words a lie.

This appears clearly enough, when we examine the words of the third commandment in the Hebrew and the LXX ; and also our Lord's own explanation of it in St. Matthew v. 33-37. The commandment is given thrice in the Old Testament.

1. Exodus xx. 7.

לֹא תִשָּׂא אֶת־שֵׁם־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לְשׁוֹן

2. Deuteronomy v. 11, identical.

3. Leviticus xix. 12.

לֹא תִשָּׁבַע בִּשְׁמִי לְשָׁקֶר

In English 1, 2 appear :

1. "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God *in vain*" (A.V., R.V.) . . . "for falsehood" R.V. marg.

"Utter not the name of Jehovah upon a falsehood" : "do not swear falsely," Gesenius.

The Hebrew word *Shav* means "evil, wickedness, iniquity, folly : esp. falsehood, a lie." Gesen. lexicon.

So that the adverbial phrase "in vain" is here weak : not but what "vain" in our Bible English often means false and wicked. And the Hebrew word *Shav* often means falsehood. See Exodus xxiii. 1 ; Psalm xxiv. 4.

3. "Ye shall not swear by my name *falsely*." A.V. and R.V.

The LXX of 1, 2 has ἐπὶ ματαίῳ ; and this Greek may have helped to our "in vain" : but it often translates Hebrew words which mean something stronger, "lie, falsehood."

The LXX of Leviticus is οὐκ ὀμείσθε τῷ ὀνόματί μου ἐπ' ἀδίκῳ. And this "for wrong" = "to make wrong appear right," which is falsehood. And there is added, "Ye shall

not profane the name of the Lord your God "; meaning that a false oath is such profanation.

There are indeed many Scriptural passages enforcing truthfulness and the keeping of vows and promises : the man who shall dwell in God's holy hill is he who speaketh the truth in his heart, who " sweareth and changeth not " (Ps. xv.). " The Lord is the God of truth " (Jeremiah) " A swift witness against false swearers " (Malachi). So that it would be surprising if among the Ten Commandments there were not one plainly forbidding falsehood. But no such omission can be charged upon the Decalogue. Falsehood is twice forbidden, in commandment 3, and in commandment 9.

Turn we now to our Lord's enforcement of the third commandment in St. Matthew v. 33. Christ takes several of the commandments, three unmistakeably (in vv. 21, 27, 33). He begins with the words, " Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time "; then adds something to each, prefacing it with, " But I say unto you." There can be no reasonable doubt that Christ is quoting the third commandment as οὐκ ἐπιорκήσεις, ἀποδώσεις δὲ τῷ Κυρίῳ τοὺς ὅρκους. For, though ἐπιорκεῖν is not in the LXX of this commandment, yet it occurs elsewhere ; it is the plain and common word in Greek for " forswear, swear falsely." And St. Paul says (1 Tim. i. 10), " The law is against liars, perjurers " (ψεύσταις, ἐπιόρκους). So that our Lord certainly quotes the commandment as " Thou shalt not swear falsely." But then He adds, " Thou shalt not speak falsely." Even without an oath you, my disciples, are not to lie. Swear not at all in common interchange of talk : ἔστω ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν ναὶ ναί : yea yea (yes yes) for affirmation ; οὐ, οὐ, no, no, for denial. Those strong adjurations, which men add, come of evil, originate from the evil in man. Men are so often untrustworthy that

their fellowmen will not believe them without oaths, nor will speakers hold themselves bound without oaths. And all oaths imply God in some way, and call on Him to punish falsehood.

But the last part of Christ's words is rather an addition to the commandment—a counsel of perfection—than a statement of what is actually in that commandment. The old law was, Swear not falsely : the new is, Speak not falsely.

It astonished me long ago to find that many (nay most) explanations of the third commandment give hardly any hint that this commandment forbids lying. More than forty years ago it came to be my part to prepare boys for Confirmation at Rugby. A little book much used was *Vaughan on Confirmation*. No doubt it is a good manual in much. But I was greatly surprised when, in more than a page of notes on commandment 3, I found *not one word or hint that it forbids falsehood*.

Here are Dr. Vaughan's very words :

“ Notice here prohibitions : of profaneness in general : (1) an irreverent use of the name of God in conversation : (2) needless appeals to Him : (3) jesting quotations of Scripture : (4) the introduction of names or terms having a solemn or awful import.

“ Of profaneness in *worship*. Whose thoughts do not sometimes wander ? ” etc., etc.

But this great Headmaster says absolutely nothing about truthfulness to his boys ; whereas false speaking on oath is just what *is* forbidden. Not but what mere loose profanity was a fault then, and is still one, I believe, among Eastern peoples. And our Lord's further remarks about the third commandment forbid this : but He distinctly gives them as an addition of his own to what had been said of old time. We must not let this put out of sight the primary meaning of the commandment, a prohibition



of deliberate falsehood. Which is a sin against God, who has given to man the gift of speech, that he might utter truth.

It is a pity that many in their zeal against coarseness and profanity have obscured the plain meaning of the third commandment. The 9th again forbids falsehood, falsehood to the hurt of our neighbour: but this is but a part of truthfulness; and this offence generally brings its own punishment, while on our own character probably the other transgression of truth has a more corrupting influence.

There is also an important thought deserving attention. If the law given by God through Moses to His people, on which so much of Christian morality is based, had said nothing distinct about truthfulness, Christian morality would compare unfavourably with the best heathen morality. We know that in very old times Homer's hero Achilles says: "Hateful to me, yea hateful as the gates of hell, is he who hides one thing in his heart and utters another." We are told that in the education of Persian children one chief thing taught them was "to speak the truth." So that it is inconceivable that this duty could have been omitted from the Decalogue. But, as I urge, it has not been omitted; deliberate falsehood is plainly forbidden, and of course the positive duty of truthfulness is implied.

It may be that the words of St. James (Ep. v. 12) have partly led to this exaggerated stress being laid by so many on what is not actually in the third commandment. Owing to the fact that swearing was a prevailing vice at the time, this Apostle puts very prominently forward his counsel "not to swear any kind of oath at all." Yet in the following words, ἦτω δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ ναὶ καὶ τὸ οὐ οὐ, "let your yes be yes, etc.," he is even more distinct for truthfulness than is the Greek of St. Matthew v. 36. And in the passage

about the tongue's abuses in chapter iii. *μὴ ψεύδεσθε* stands out plain.

And the rather weak "in vain" has misled unlearned English folk. Possibly, too, some have thought that to forbid careless, insulting, and blasphemous words about God was a more specially religious command than to forbid lying, a prohibition common to heathens.

With regard to the total omission of falsehood in Dr. Vaughan's notes on the third commandment : as Dr. Vaughan was (whatever his knowledge of Hebrew might be) a good Greek scholar, he certainly knew the Greek of St. Matthew : so I suppose him to have been led by his zeal against profanity in schoolboys to forget for a time, in dealing with the third commandment, the at least equal importance of truthfulness. But surely it is misleading and dangerous to put out of sight the plainest meaning of a divine command, in order to lay stress upon a minor point that strongly appeals to you.

Are not preachers, when a text is interpretable in several ways, sometimes tempted to sink and obscure the surest and truest meaning, in order that they may enforce a lesson important possibly, but not reasonably or certainly deducible from the words before them ? Such appears to me what has been done in the case of the third commandment. I have always to confirmands taught what I have here urged, that this commandment forbids lying as a sin against God. Nor has it been an unnecessary teaching. For when I have put the question, "What does the third commandment forbid ?" the almost invariable answer has been "Swearing and bad language." Much instruction given by school teachers is, I am sure, to this effect. Misbehaviour and inattention in church or at worship are severely rebuked in children as breaches of the third commandment, while no mention is made of falsehood as belonging to it. Even

since writing most of this paper, I find in a small book meant for teachers put down, as the main point enforced in commandment 3, *reverence*, in commandment 9, *truth*. A misleading perversion! As if untruth in the way of slander were the only offence against truth.

But I am also encouraged by finding that Bishop Gore (to whose writing on St. Matthew my attention has been called) is in exact agreement with me about this commandment. At what time I myself came to see how erroneous was the prevalent "Sunday school" interpretation of the commandment (as one may call it), I can hardly say. No doubt a knowledge of the Greek text of St. Matthew came to me very early, thanks to good home and school teaching (yes, school-teaching at Eton in the forties, when some detractors say we had no religious teaching at all); and, when thus I had learned the right view of the New Testament giving of the commandment, a more careful study of the Old Testament text showed me that "in vain" meant in the original "for falsehood."

Whence I conclude—not as new, but true—that the third commandment forbids deliberate lying.

W. C. GREEN.

## THE ELEPHANTINÊ PAPYRI AND THE OLD TESTAMENT.

THE Elephantinê papyri recently edited, and in most admirable fashion, by Professor Sachau, of Berlin, are the latest to find a place amid the fast accumulating stock of material at the disposal of the biblical student. How remarkable they are is sufficiently clear from the interesting articles in the EXPOSITOR by Professor Sayce (Nov., 1911) and Professor Margoliouth (Jan., 1912) which render it unnecessary for me to enlarge upon their contents. These writers raise two questions—their authenticity and their general bearing upon the Old Testament—and it is to these two points that I propose to devote my remarks. The reasons adduced by Professor Margoliouth for suspecting the genuineness of the papyri may or may not be valid, but it is a necessary task of criticism to undertake a strict examination of its sources. The bearing of the papyri (*if genuine*) upon the Old Testament is also the work of criticism, and a complex one, since, as every one knows, students of the Old Testament differ widely from one another in their attitude to its problems. It happens that both Professor Sayce and Professor Margoliouth handle this question from a standpoint which may fairly be called “conservative,” and they find in the papyri support for their standpoint. Now it also happens that my standpoint might perhaps be called “radical,” and I most certainly believe that I can find in them confirmation of some of my own little “heresies.” This being so, it will be perceived that there is a vital difference

between objective data and the impression they make upon different individuals, and whether any of these individuals—myself included—should prove to be approximately correct or hopelessly incorrect, a clear recognition of this important difference is of the greatest assistance for the future of progressive criticism.

Now, the general principles of criticism are much the same whether daily life, politics, or some branch of research be concerned, and it may be taken for granted that glaring and avoidable contradictions are detrimental to whatever is at stake, and that whatever makes for their disappearance is for the general welfare of humanity. It is probable that at no other time has there been such a heterogeneity of opinion touching the Old Testament, and it is due very largely to the fact that different students view such evidence as they happen to utilize from very different standpoints. The same is doubtless true of the acute conflict of opinion which characterizes the widespread unrest at the present day. It is a period of transition and one of the most fascinating—though frequently disturbing—phenomena of the day is the remarkable conflict of intellects where similar problems are involved. In turning to the Elephantinê papyri, then, we may perhaps see how divergence of method readily accounts for a large and really unnecessary amount of divergence of conclusion, how easily in contesting the views of others we may expose the weakness of our own, and how the failure to recognise the complexity of problems may delay the cause for which one is working or writing.

Are the papyri genuine? Professor Margoliouth has expressed his suspicions so freely and plainly (Jan., pp. 69–72) that the ordinary reader might assume that, if they were seriously meant, the papyri must be relegated to the waste-paper basket and the rest of the article (pp. 74 *sqq.*) would be irrelevant. Since, however, he devotes several pages to



the bearing of the papyri upon the Old Testament it is to be inferred that he is not convinced of their worthlessness, and in this case notice must be taken of the *method* of criticism adopted. Let us suppose that Professor Margoliouth is correct and that the papyri are forgeries, or, rather, since it is not clear whether he condemns all, that some of them are fabricated. He points out that there is a papyrus-factory at Syracuse, and this implies a market ; this is a serious remark (p. 72), but since some of the papyri are palimpsests (see Prof. Sayce, p. 419), it is evident that the supposed forger has had access both to the factory and to some genuine " finds." Next, he observes that " the German expedition appears to have gone for the purpose of discovering Aramaic documents belonging to the old Jewish colony." There is more in this than meets the eye, and we must not forget that an eminent French scholar also journeyed to Elephantinê for the same purpose but met with relatively little success. Professor Margoliouth then proceeds to state that " the first papyrus edited by Dr. Sachau looked in facsimile as if it had been written very recently." But it goes without saying that the excavators, the editor, and all their colleagues were in the best position for determining such a point, and not only is it quite impossible to doubt their good faith, but even the assumption that the ground was " salted " is a very difficult one. Only the strongest reasons could allow even the surmise that they have been imposed upon, and so far no valid reason has been adduced.

The suggestions already noticed are enhanced by Professor Margoliouth's remark that the spelling *Kanbuzi* for Cambyzes has " a savour of the German pronunciation of the name." This damning statement, if made at all, ought to have been made more complete. In Assyrian and Egyptian the name Cambyzes appears as *Kambuziya* (Schrader, *C.O.T.*) and *Kambathet* (Petrie), and although I am unable to decide whether

*Kanbuzi* savours of the German, surely there is not the slightest necessity to bring in an insinuation of this character. "Savours" can hardly count in criticism, and it would be as reasonable to assert that the name Cambyzes "savours" of the two ancient English universities—Camb-Isis! Nay, more, Professor Margoliouth notes that some of the papyri "appear to reckon value in modern Egyptian piastres, כרשן, on the supposition that the name is connected with *Cyrus*, whereas it is really the German *Groschen*; the error, which consists in substituting a K for a Q is a natural one." But although the modern piastre (*kirsh*) derives its name from the German, is it credible that a forger would introduce a modern term and mis-spell it in order to show a connexion with the name *Cyrus*? So far as I can recollect none of the scholars—who naturally regard the papyri as genuine—have thought of associating the term in the papyri with *Cyrus*, and the connexion seems extremely improbable. Elsewhere the papyri use terms of excellent reputation (e.g. shekel, stater).

Professor Margoliouth has taken the responsibility of a very serious suggestion which, however, brings difficulties that will occur to every reader. Of course, if he is correct, our genius of a forger, like most criminals, has "dropped a few bricks" over his Cambyzes and "piastres," but is it not obvious that this theory raises immense difficulties? Besides, *if*—and it is a big "if"—these or some of these papyri are forgeries, we should not forget that the handwriting differs slightly—more than one forger is involved, unless, of course, he is exceedingly clever and crafty. Moreover, he must evidently be a linguist of the very first rank, seeing that he employs terms which are intelligible (and that often not with any certainty) only to experts in Assyrian, Armenian, ancient and modern Persian, etc. As a matter of fact, the character of the vocabulary (p. 71 *seq.*) is strong evidence in

favour of genuineness, since the mixture is a feature found in Biblical Aramaic, and to some extent in contemporary Assyrian tablets; and it is precisely in harmony with the historical conditions of the Persian age.

Professor Margoliouth also asserts that "it was not natural to find in Elephantinê a document sent from Elephantinê"; not until the seventh century A.D. did the Arabs begin to keep *state-documents* (the italics are his). The first statement is too subjective, the second is irrelevant—a great gap severs the rise of Arab culture from that of the Hebrews. Unless the old Jewish historians were familiar with the custom of keeping copies of documents, they would not quote (or profess to quote) letters sent from Solomon to Hiram, from Tattenai to Darius or from Rehum and Shimshai to Artaxerxes. Professor Margoliouth is here referring to the record wherein the Jews of Elephantinê, in sore distress at the overthrow of their holy temple, beg for permission to rebuild it. It is hardly just, therefore, to say: "a begging letter [*sic*!] is not a state-document, and we should still less expect a copy of it to be kept." We must not judge Oriental things from the scrupulosity of a modern European critic—as Professor Sayce would say (pp. 422, 425)—and it so happens that a *second* copy of this record was found at Elephantinê, and with several instructive and intelligible variants. Once more our forger, dangerously clever, though uncommonly stupid in the Cambyses-Groschen affair, has realised the value of giving an air of verisimilitude to his otherwise bald and unconvincing knaveries, or—the supposition of forgery is the height of hyper-scepticism.

The forger by his ingenuity *may* of course outwit the simple scholar, but as a general rule he is not anxious to be found out. Now, Professor Margoliouth has emphasised the fact that the papyri include fragments of the Behistun inscription of Darius and of the story of Ahikar. When there were

rumours of this some time ago the liveliest interest was aroused, because the former is romantically bound up with the rise of Assyriology, and the latter has become well known through recent editions of the Syriac and other versions, and through its points of contact with the book of Tobit and early popular and gnomic literature. Here, then, were two sources clearly calculated to attract the attention of a fairly considerable section of Semitic students. Professor Margoliouth, however, asserts : " it may be observed that a skilful forger who in these days wished to father documents on a community of the fifth century B.C. would almost certainly select the Behistun inscription and the story of Ahikar " (p. 71). No one would dream of saying this unless he was actuated by the belief that they *were* forgeries. But viewed critically this statement is absolutely valueless unless a reason be given, and we can find two. Here is one : Professor Margoliouth continues immediately : " for such persons are by no means anxious that a strong light should be shed on their works." But, in point of fact, the alleged forger has " selected " sources that could not fail to attract the attention of a great number of students of all kinds, sources that were already well known and indeed have appeared in recent editions, sources that can be tested and investigated much more readily than the other papyri, thanks to the existence of the other versions ! Far more intelligible would be the alternative reason : the forger " selected " them because they would be more interesting, valuable or marketable, and because he had Syriac, Assyrian and other sources which he, with his accomplished linguistic attainments, could readily translate into the Egyptian-Aramaic dialect. Anyone who had studied the question and who believed that the documents were forgeries would have given this and not the former reason. But even this, if it ever occurred to any one, would be inadequate, since



the papyri contain numerous variants, difficulties and other features which are not usually found in forgeries or in translations. Our forger is preternaturally clever or—scepticism has defeated itself.

To prove that the papyri are *not* forgeries is a task that cannot be performed with mathematical certainty. Clever forgeries constantly appear, the skill of the forger can deceive experts in any branch, and there might be a genius whose linguistic and other abilities far surpass the collective scholarship of to-day, whose less commendable abilities could deceive excavators and decipherers whose good faith is beyond dispute. The abstract possibility of forgery may be admitted, but since other suspicions could be readily expressed in order to cast doubt upon other material, the speedy result would be that scepticism would lead into a *cul-de-sac*. It is inevitable that suspicions should cross the mind when new material comes to light, but if criticism is to be undertaken with any intelligence and responsibility the suspicions must be tested and worked out, and it does not require “much varied knowledge” (p. 72) to determine whether the suspicions I have discussed convey anything to the reader. We have to make up our mind one way or the other. Professor Margoliouth’s remarks point to a forgery and of German origin; and if this be true, it is futile to ask their bearing upon the Old Testament, and to use them to castigate the critics. This sort of criticism, in casting doubt upon the validity of certain sources, stops half-way and leaves the careful reader in a state of chaos; the ordinary reader, on the other hand, is apt to reach conclusions which may easily do the writer an injustice. You will often find this promiscuous criticism in anti-critical books; it leaves no room for development and synthesis, it is not potential, it is a sort of “hedging” which is inimical to the progress of research. But if we cannot



prove that the papyri are not forgeries, it is at least possible to show that the suspicions have no validity. They are tentative, incomplete, and extraordinarily subjective. I see no particle of evidence strong enough to make me question the authenticity of the papyri, although I cheerfully recognise that, as a matter of abstract possibility, I, in company with others, may be in the wrong. The papyri possess just those difficult features that are constantly found in other sources which we are wont to consider ancient and genuine, and to suspect them is to bring difficulties greater and graver. The supposition that there has been an outrageous fabrication proves on inspection to be so remote, so nebulous, so annihilistic of our conceptions of the human mind that it need not enter into our calculations.<sup>1</sup>

It is far from pleasant to have had to discuss this question, and it is a thousand pities that it has ever been raised. Suspicions may have been mooted, they have now been spread, and it is to be feared that they will be retailed by those who have not endeavoured to test the arguments for themselves. Quite apart from ethical considerations, and simply as a matter of scholarship, it is much to be hoped that others who may desire to express their doubts may consider the pros and cons more carefully, and may avoid remarks that could easily cause offence to those most intimately concerned. We have to remember, too, that the ordinary man will not carry in his head a nucleus of arguments and counter-arguments touching the genuineness of the Elephantinê papyri. He puts the conclusion in a nutshell. He may have gathered, and on high authority, that they are forgeries; he may conclude from these pages that the assumption is an

<sup>1</sup> I have left undiscussed other features (e.g., the character of the proper names) which bring us to the same conclusion—a forger of almost supernatural skill or documents, difficult enough, but reasonable when regarded as genuine.

impossible one ; he may perhaps see that absolute truth is unattainable and that it is a question of the balance of probabilities, and in the last case he has learned the fundamental lesson of progressive criticism.

It is a relief to turn from a discussion of observations which would relegate the papyri to the flames to some brief remarks upon their bearing on the Old Testament. The most interesting feature, perhaps, in the articles of Professor Sayce and Professor Margoliouth is the emphasis which both rightly lay upon the difference between the Jewish religion at Elephantinê and ordinary conceptions of the worship of Yahweh. Professor Sayce points out that in Elephantinê the worship of other deities besides Yahweh was admitted, or at all events practised, the recognition of subordinate deities was not distasteful, and it is evident that the Jewish colony felt itself to be thoroughly orthodox (pp. 422-426). Professor Margoliouth, in turn, justly remarks that these Jews were entertaining "foreign cults to a degree which the stern prophets of monotheism would certainly have condemned" (p. 81), the triumph of monotheism appears to have been exceedingly late. Was this colony ignorant of or indifferent to the Law ? Some may agree with Professor Margoliouth that the Sacred Books were preserved only among small and devoted circles ; they were not yet generally known, the great majority of the people would have nothing to do with the ideals which make the Old Testament unique (pp. 80, 84). Others, perhaps, may agree with Professor Sayce, that though the Law was known, and although these Egyptian Jews were familiar with the Pentateuch "in substantially its present form," they believed that they were faithfully carrying out its injunctions, and if they differed from their brethren of Jerusalem, "it was a matter of interpretation only" (p. 426).

If, as I trust, I have been successful in apprehending the

views of these writers, it seems evident that the ordinary reader must revise his conceptions of biblical religion. The Jewish colony saw nothing wrong in possessing a sanctuary of their own and in recognising subordinate deities ; if they cherished the Pentateuch they were able to reconcile it with their practices by a process of "interpretation" which was evidently as elastic as that which enables some modern writers to find sober history in Genesis i.-xi. But if so, we can place little reliance upon the plain meaning of a biblical source, and the Old Testament cannot be safely used as evidence for the character of the ordinary religion even of the orthodox. And this is true, also, if the sacred writings were not disseminated, if they represented only the ideals of a few, so that—to quote Professor Margoliouth—"The Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa therefore belonged to a small minority of the nation" (p. 84). This then is an instructive result, when we view the papyri in the light of the Old Testament *as it stands*: the Old Testament cannot be used as it stands for the religion of the Jews, even of those who might claim to be orthodox, and should we desire to go below the surface and gain some idea of what the religion was and how it developed we must employ internal criticism.

Next, the papyri make more urgent than ever an exhaustive and comprehensive criticism of the development of Jewish religion and thought. If we agree with Professor Sayce that the Mosaic legislation was known to the Jews of Elephantinê, what becomes of the theory of the post-exilic date of the "Priestly Code"? He himself draws attention to the ordinary critical view, that the post-exilic date of the literary form of these Laws is not to be confused with the date of the Laws themselves, and that some of them may doubtless have been of great antiquity (p. 432). He objects: "This is, of course, to beg the question"; but on what grounds is not clear.

He seems to confuse the attitude of the apologist with that of the inquirer. The critical theory has arisen to explain certain difficult features in the traditional view, and it will fall into the waste-paper basket as soon as another is found to offer a more adequate explanation. But none as yet has been suggested. The antiquity of the Priestly Code is no more proved by the antiquity of certain laws than is that of the Talmud by the close relationship between some of *its* features and the Laws of Hammurabi. From the critical standpoint, if the Pentateuchal legislation is of Mosaic date there are intolerable difficulties throughout the Old Testament—the Book is unintelligible; the only explanation at present is afforded by the Wellhausen literary theory, and only through it can one at present approach the investigation of these difficulties. As in the case of forgeries, the critics *may*—in the abstract—be hopelessly misled, but their opponents are under an obligation to produce something that will settle those preliminary difficulties, the existence of which has given birth to modern criticism. To suppose that these difficulties have been invented or manufactured is as incorrect as to suppose that the problems in other fields of life, now crying for simplification, are equally non-existent, or, at least, exist only in the minds of those who recognise them. The fact is that they *force* themselves, and—so far as regards the Old Testament—it is for us to determine whether to ignore them, obscure them, or to work them out with the aid of all the gifts and material with which we are endowed.

Let us return to Professor Sayce's view of the antiquity of the Mosaic legislation which, he argues, was known at Elephantinê. What is its relationship to the Law, the promulgation of which is ascribed to Ezra? He points out *à propos* of the critical view above mentioned, that the Jews sent their petition to Palestine some time after the promul-

gation of Ezra's law, and he says, " if their ceremonial usages really rested upon an older tradition and sanction than the newly introduced Law-book of the priests at Jerusalem they are not likely to have been silent about it " (p. 433). It is not easy to deal with an argument based upon what is or is not "likely," but in point of fact these Jews refer neither to the Pentateuch (which on Professor Sayce's theory they already knew) nor to any other source which a critical theory might expect, and it is very hard to understand how this argument from silence can be used. The old difficulties still remain and are as obvious as ever. It may, no doubt, seem simple to argue that the Jews of Elephantinê had the Pentateuch but saw no inconsistency between it and their position, and this appears to be Professor Sayce's standpoint (see p. 422). The Jews must have believed themselves to be thoroughly orthodox, and this will apply also to those of Judah. Various reforms are ascribed to certain of the Judæan kings, but Josiah is the first who is said to have made the central sanctuary an accomplished fact. Kings so highly praised as Jehoshaphat, Amaziah, Uzziah and Hezekiah tolerated the high-places, whereas in the time of Josiah they are found to be unorthodox. This can only mean that the ordinary interpretation of Deuteronomy was not realised until many centuries after the time of Moses, and it is precisely this which combines with many other features to make the problems of the Old Testament so perplexing. The more new discoveries *appear* to confirm the ordinary traditional attitude to the Old Testament the more necessary it is to examine patiently and thoroughly whether the problems that have exercised some generations of students are or are not simplified or solved—merely to shelve them does not augur well for the furtherance of biblical research, but this is what is constantly done by those who are blinded by " the Light from the East."

The object of progressive criticism is not merely to defend a



position but to strengthen and improve it, or to replace it by a better. At the present day there is a noticeable twofold tendency towards a position more "radical" and towards one more "conservative." Should the latter leave the numerous *internal* difficulties in the Old Testament untouched, the position will be a decadence, inimical to the study of the Bible. Should the alternative tendency succeed in placing it in a form that will make it appeal both to the masses and to the more intellectual—and the needs of both *must* be kept in view—the possibility of increasing its influence will be obvious.

And this, I believe, will result. In the meanwhile, whatever be our standpoints, it is clear from the Elephantinê papyri that Hebrew religion cannot be estimated from the plain statement of the Old Testament. For some years we have known that the Jews of Elephantinê worshipped Yahweh, we now know that they recognised other deities; even in Palestine itself it is probable that religion was much more in touch with the ideas that prevailed over the old Oriental area than could be gathered from that evidence which makes the Old Testament unique. It is possible that some may lament that Elephantinê has not disclosed any of the sacred writings, but perhaps it is just as well. Should we recover some fragments, if they were identical with the Old Testament, the internal problems would still demand an explanation; if they were different, the work of criticism would be more intricate than it is now. Old Testament criticism is not ripe for sensational discoveries, and so far from considering that the papyri are "most disappointing" (Prof. Margoliouth, p. 69) we should perhaps be thankful that no portions of the biblical books have come to light to embarrass a criticism already sufficiently hampered by a promiscuity of method and by a too frequent superficial acquaintance with the relevant data. Perhaps it is as well

that we should first assimilate the significance of extant material for the development of Hebrew history and religion, and that we should be preparing ourselves for a more serious disturbance of current conceptions. So far as I can see there can be only one sequel to the great mass of material bearing upon ancient Palestine, only one sequel to the tendencies of studies in anthropology, archæology, history and the comparative study of religions ; and the converging lines warn us to refrain from insisting upon the Old Testament as an accurate or trustworthy record of the development of Hebrew history and religion. And the more we may be compelled to look upon the Bible primarily as the outcome of varieties of ancient religious experience the more easily shall we be able to make it once more the greatest book in the world. This is the object of progressive criticism, and I rejoice that the Elephantinê papyri provide another link in the chain of objective evidence.

In conclusion, those who are at all disturbed by any "radical" tendencies of criticism must perceive that they arise out of the keen consciousness of a gap between the Old Testament and individual experience (knowledge, etc.). Most people, I suppose, are "conservative" as regards some aspects of thought and action, and "radical" as regards others ; and if "criticism" is to be employed in all the problems of life, we have to realise that, though our opponents are actuated by the best of motives according to their own lights, the general welfare of us all depends upon the employment of the best weapons. The failure of the "conservative" position is due to its inability to propose a constructive policy ; that of its opponents may be wrong, but it must be proved to be so by means of these weapons. This has not been done, and partly because *its* opponents do not understand it. So long as "conservative" criticism fails to cover the relevant field of evidence,

is unable to produce an alternative position for research, and indulges in that promiscuity of method to which I have referred in these pages, so long can it hardly claim to be of any *direct* assistance to biblical studies. This is not to say that the "critical" position is perfect or beyond reproach. Far from it. But it realises its own difficulties—and far more clearly than do its opponents—it is aware of the imperfections of its tools, and seeks to improve them ; while in dealing with certain real difficulties, which are intimately connected with the present unrest in this age of transition, it would endeavour to do in one of the many aspects of life what its opponents are doubtless doing in others—to solve or at least to simplify grave problems.

STANLEY A. COOK.

# ACHIKAR AND THE ELEPHANTINÊ PAPYRI.

(*To the Editor of the EXPOSITOR.*)

DEAR SIR,—

I cannot pretend to have formed any opinion about the problems which have been raised by the wonderful discovery of the Elephantinê papyri, or about the way in which these affect Old Testament history ; but as co-editor (with Dr Rendel Harris) of the *Story of Achikar*, I feel constrained to reply to some of my esteemed friend Professor Margoliouth's remarks in your January number, and in the *Expository Times* for February, and specially to his doubts about their genuineness. In these doubts I cannot follow him.

I have many reasons for being sincerely grateful to the very learned Oxford professor for his many acts of kindness to my sister and to myself. And none of his many friends has a greater admiration for his brilliant gifts than I. But

I enjoy his expositions of Mohammed and of Islâm more than I do his dissertations on the somewhat scanty remains of the earliest edition of Achikar.

If there be a factory of papyrus material at Syracuse, it must be quite a small one. Its supply can only come from the Anapo, a narrow, muddy, swiftly-flowing stream, much impeded by rushes. I visited the place in 1890, the only spot in Europe where that interesting plant grows wild. After passing the junction of the Anapo with a still smaller blue stream, the Cyane, we were towed past lovely groves, where the tufted heads of the papyrus bent beneath our towing rope. Unless these famous reeds have been cultivated artificially since that time, they would only produce enough pith to find a sufficient market in the manifest and easily detected forgeries that are shown in the antiquarian shops of Egypt and the other lands that lie around the Mediterranean Sea. Those foolish tourists who buy manuscripts which neither they nor their friends are able to read, almost deserve to have such stuff palmed off on them. If the documents are really ancient, to purchase them is to hamper scholars, and to impede the progress of Biblical and historical science by raising the price of what may be vulgarly called its "raw material."

The quantity of the plants in that "sorry stream," as Theocritus calls it, of Eastern Sicily, a stream not sixty feet wide, and filled with abundant water only in the rainy season, cannot allow of anything but a small output from the said manufactory.

But forgers need not go to Syracuse for papyrus. I am told that plenty of it is found quite blank in the tombs of Egypt, ready for their use, left there by the ancient scribes.

The real test of the genuineness of any document would lie in its handwriting. And surely when the Elephantinê archives have passed through the hands and under the eyes

of the most critical people in Germany, if they were a fraud, we should say that the age of miracles is not yet passed away.

But were the documents found by Dr. Rubensohn *purchased* from some one? If they were so, Professor Margoliouth's suspicions might be justified in a slight degree. But if no money passed between the excavators and the natives, except that the latter received their just wages for digging, what profit could accrue to the almost superhumanly clever forger or to the Syracusan manufactory?

The occurrence of Persian words, and specially of official titles, borne by Jews or others, is not surprising. Our own British friends in India, Egypt and Turkey are, many of them, designated—Kaid, Bimbashi, Pasha, Bey, etc., while the Persian title of Sirdar is conferred on the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army. And was not Nehemiah the Tirshatha in Jerusalem?

Dr. Margoliouth suggests in the EXPOSITOR that the word “faden,” for a *plough* (but which, as Dr. Grimme very properly points out, is really used in its primary sense of a *yoke*, has been suggested to the forger's mind by the German word “Faden,” a thread. This is surely a very curious way of looking at it. Dr. Margoliouth is so accomplished a linguist that it is superfluous to point out to him that many words which sound the same in two languages, and are even spelt alike, have often no identical meaning. Thus a German who bears the name of “Hell,” corresponding to our “Bright,” is not necessarily a depraved character; and if a Norwegian speak of a “Pigge,” he may perhaps mean a pretty girl, and not the creature who, as Achikar tells us in his own true proverb, “went into a hot bath with people of quality; and when it came out, it saw a filthy hole, and it went down and wallowed in it.”



This proverb, quoted by the Apostle Peter, must not lead us into thinking too scornfully of ancient Babylonian habits. The reference cannot be to a bath in the interior of a house, but rather to the stream which rushes from a hot natural spring in some volcanic region, where still, as in primitive days, men and animals may rush in at their pleasure. Achikar could not have been thinking of the sulphur springs at Gebel Hammâm Farâ'ûn (the Bath of Pharaoh) in the Sinai desert, near Wady Ghurundel, the supposed site of Elim, whose temperature rises to 160 degrees ; as there no mud could be found for the creature's delectation. But quite possibly he may have known the fountains at Hierapolis in Asia Minor, which cause the river Lycus to be lukewarm as it flows through Laodicea, even after it has received the tribute of the cold Asopus and of the Cadmus ; a system of hydrography which probably suggested the message to the angel of the local church in the Apocalypse. But we do not need to go further than Buda-Pesth to find such public hot baths.

With regard to the camels, I have seen, at Gaza, one of them working along with a bullock, under separate yokes, but drawing the same primitive plough. It was where a nomadic family were beginning to settle down, to use an Arab phrase, "between the desert and the sown."

I am therefore not surprised that a camel should be supposed to say : "I have lifted straw, and I have taken up (or accepted) a yoke ; but there is nothing lighter than a sojourner."

In Papyrus 8, p. 414, לובר חסין תמים would have suggested to me a strong plank of wood, perhaps olive-wood, artificially hardened, rather than a blundering imitation of the English word "lumber." I do not know what חסין stands for in Persian, but is there any objection to our believing it to be either Hebrew or Aramaic ? I

even think that I could find the word in the excellent Syriac *Thesaurus* with which Professor Margoliouth has a relationship of affinity. A strong plank is quite a natural requirement for the construction of a ship.

It will be observed that the official documents found at Elephantinê are all in excellent preservation, carefully written, and carefully kept.

The papyri which contain the text of Achikar, that popular romance (the earliest of its kind) wherewith the garrison of Yeb beguiled their leisure hours, are all in rags.

Do we never find similar phenomena in our own day ?

There is another statement of Professor Margoliouth from which I venture respectfully to differ. He certainly writes as if, when the Jews took service under their Persian rulers, they were necessarily unfaithful to Jehovah, for "even this modified form of Judaism could probably not conceal its inherent hostility to *Paganism*."

But can we call the Persians Pagans ? Of all the heathen cults which succumbed to Christianity, surely the Persian one had most affinity with the worship of Jahve. It was not gross, like the Babylonian ; it was not idolatrous, for the idol, or image, was not used by its devotees ; it cannot be called *poly-theistic*. Though in its dualism it differed from the pure monotheism of the Jews, it yet looked up to one unseen First Principle of Good. That was probably why the servants of Jehovah and those of Zoroaster had no dislike to each other, and why the Jews were so active in the service of Cyrus, Cambyses and Darius.

Yet I think the most striking phenomenon revealed by the Elephantinê papyri is this. God never left Himself without a witness to the conscience of mankind, even in the darkest ages. As St. Paul says, "He gave the rain and the dew from heaven." We now see that after He had made known His will concerning the construction of the Tabernacle in

the wilderness with so much instructive symbolism in all its details (like a " kindergarten " picture to suit the infancy of the human race), and all pointing forward to a coming Deliverer, He never left Himself without a temple of some kind on this earth. The tabernacle was replaced by the Temple at Jerusalem (a tabernacle in stone), and we now know that during the seventy years when that temple lay in ruins, that is, during the Babylonian captivity, another temple of Jehovah was standing in Egypt near those great syenite rocks of the First Cataract, which are really an extension from the granite cliffs of Mount Sinai ; and that there Jewish hands offered the various sacrifices prescribed in the Law. The types were not to disappear until the great Antitype came.

We cannot tell what the reason for this was ; but we note it with awe and wonder as a historical fact. And the frontier fortress of Yeb appears not to have been the only Jewish colony which contained a sanctuary to Jehovah. The other and later one was at Leontopolis, and was founded by Onias in the reign of Ptolemy Philometer, nearly 200 years after that at Elephantinê had been destroyed.

Dr. Rendel Harris is preparing a second edition of the *Story of Achikar*, brought back to date, that is, to about 407 B.C., so as to include any variants found in the *Elephantinê papyri*. For this edition Mr. F. C. Conybeare and I will naturally revise those portions of it for which we are severally responsible : the Armenian and the Arabic versions.

AGNES SMITH LEWIS.

CAMBRIDGE, *January*, 1912.

THE SADDUCEAN CHRISTIANS OF DAMASCUS.

II. THE EXORDIUM OF THE MANIFESTO.<sup>1</sup>

(P. 1, l. 1 to p. 2, l. 13.)

(P. 1 l. 1) AND now hearken, all ye that know righteousness,<sup>2</sup> and meditate on the works of God.<sup>3</sup> For He has a controversy with all flesh,<sup>4</sup> and He will execute judgment on all who condemn Him. For because of their treachery in that they have forsaken Him, has He hidden His face<sup>5</sup> from Israel and from His sanctuary, and given them over unto the sword.<sup>6</sup> Yet remembering the covenant [that He made] with their forefathers,<sup>7</sup> (l. 5) left He a remnant<sup>8</sup> to Israel, and gave them not over to complete destruction.<sup>9</sup> And at the end of the wrath, [namely] three hundred and ninety years after delivering them into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babel, has He visited them, and caused to sprout from Israel and Aaron a root of planting,<sup>10</sup> to possess His land, and to take pleasure in the good of his territory.<sup>11</sup> And they meditated upon their sin, and they knew that they were guilty men. And they were like blind men, and like persons groping their way,<sup>12</sup> (l. 10) for twenty years.

<sup>1</sup> It will be seen that on a number of interesting points the translation here given differs from that published by Dr. Schechter.

<sup>2</sup> On this phrase see "Notes and Discussions," p. 216.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Job xxxvii. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. Hos. iv. 1; Jer. xxv. 31.

<sup>5</sup> Comp., e.g., Ps. xiii. 2; lxix. 18.

<sup>6</sup> Comp., e.g., Jer. xxv. 31; Ps. lxxviii. 62.

<sup>7</sup> Literally, the covenant of the first ones (taken from Leviticus xxvi. 45).

<sup>8</sup> The idea of the "remnant" that was to be saved is, of course, very common in the Old Testament (see e.g., 2 Kings xix. 31; Micah ii. 12); see also p. 2, l. 11.

<sup>9</sup> Compare e.g., 2 Chron. xii. 12.

<sup>10</sup> See "Notes and Discussions," p. 218 sqq.

<sup>11</sup> See EXPOSITOR for December, 1911, p. 512 note.

<sup>12</sup> Comp. Is. lix. 10; Deut. xxviii. 29.

And God had regard to their works,<sup>1</sup> for they sought Him with a perfect heart.<sup>2</sup> And He raised up for them a Teacher of Righteousness,<sup>3</sup> in order to guide them in the way of His heart.<sup>4</sup> And He made known to the latter generations that which He accomplished in the last generation among the congregation of treacherous men,<sup>5</sup> [namely] those who turned aside from the way. That was the time concerning which it has been written: "As a backsliding heifer so did Israel slide back,"<sup>6</sup> when there arose the man of scoffing,<sup>7</sup> who dropped to Israel (l. 15) waters of lying,<sup>8</sup> and caused them to wander in the wilderness where there is no way,<sup>9</sup> to make low the height of the world,<sup>10</sup> and to turn aside from the paths of righteousness, and to remove the boundary which the forefathers had set in their inheritance,<sup>11</sup> in order to cause the curses of His covenant to cleave unto them, so as to give them over unto the sword, executing the vengeance of the covenant.<sup>12</sup> Because they had sought after smooth things,<sup>13</sup> and chose deceits, and looked forward to breaches<sup>14</sup> [of the covenant], and chose the fat and well-liking<sup>15</sup> (or fatness and comfort) and justified the wicked

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Ps. xxxiii. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Comp., e.g., 1 Chron. xxix. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Hos. x. 12 (also Is. xi. 5).

<sup>4</sup> There is here a slight break in the text, not to indicate a lacuna, but to mark the beginning of a fresh paragraph.

<sup>5</sup> Comp. Jer. ix. 1.

<sup>6</sup> The Hebrew is a free quotation (from memory) of Hosea iv. 16.

<sup>7</sup> Comp. Prov. xxix. 8; Is. xxviii. 14.

<sup>8</sup> Compare, e.g., Micah ii. 6, Amos vii. 16 (the original meaning of הָטִיף is "to cause to drop," hence "to prophesy or teach"; here the idea of "dropping" is kept prominent, though "teaching" is meant.

<sup>9</sup> Job xii. 24; Ps. cvii. 40 (exact quotation).

<sup>10</sup> i.e., to lower the authority of the Law, which is regarded as the highest thing in the world; comp. Job xxii. 12, where the "height of heaven" is applied to the Deity (see also Job xi. 8, and comp. גְּבוּהַת שֶׁל עוֹלָם as applied to the Deity in *Tanhūma* of the pericope כִּי תִשָּׂא).

<sup>11</sup> Comp. Deut. xix. 14. <sup>12</sup> See "Notes and Discussions," p. 228.

<sup>13</sup> See Is. xxx. 10.

<sup>14</sup> Comp. Ezek. xiii. 5.

<sup>15</sup> For the justification of this rendering see the "Notes and Discussions," p. 231, note.



one, and condemned the righteous one, (l. 20) and transgressed the covenant, and turned the statute to nought, and trooped themselves together against the life of the righteous; whereas all that walked on the way of perfection<sup>1</sup> their soul abhorred, and they pursued them unto the sword, and they goaded<sup>2</sup> the people to hostility. Wherefore the wrath (p. 2) of God was kindled against their congregation,<sup>3</sup> to make desolate all their multitude, for their doings were uncleanness before Him.<sup>4</sup>

And now hearken unto me, all ye that enter the covenant, and I will disclose unto you<sup>5</sup> [the truth] concerning the ways of the wicked: God, who loveth understanding, wisdom, and effectual working,<sup>6</sup> has placed before Him prudence and understanding; they minister unto Him. Long-suffering is with Him and abundance of forgiveness,<sup>7</sup> (l. 5) to make atonement for those who turn away from their sin. But power, and strength, and great wrath, with flames of fire, wherein are all the angels of destruction,<sup>8</sup> against those who turn aside from the way, and despise the statute,<sup>9</sup> so that there shall be no remnant or escaping for them. For God chose them not before the world's beginning,<sup>10</sup> and ere they were established knew He their deeds, And He abhorred the generations of their pollutedness,<sup>11</sup> and He hid His face from the land,<sup>12</sup> to destroy them until<sup>13</sup> they

<sup>1</sup> See "Notes and Discussions," p. 224.

<sup>2</sup> Read יָדָה (comp. Schechter and Lévi); on the whole passage see "Notes and Discussions," p. 223, where it is shown that we have here a graphic reference to the trial and sufferings of our Lord.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Ps. cvi. 40.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. Ezek. xxxvi. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Literally: "I will uncover the ear"; comp., e.g., 1 Sam. ix. 15; 2 Sam. vii. 27.

<sup>6</sup> Comp. the praise of wisdom in Prov. viii.

<sup>7</sup> The *locus classicus* for this idea is Exod. xxxiv. 6-7.

<sup>8</sup> See "Notes and Discussions," p. 232. <sup>9</sup> Comp. Mic. iii. 9.

<sup>10</sup> So probably, though construction difficult.

<sup>11</sup> See "Notes and Discussions," p. 233. <sup>12</sup> Comp. p. 1, l. 3.

<sup>13</sup> Omit the word מֵ at the beginning of l. 9.

were consumed. But he knew the years of the [priestly] order <sup>1</sup> and the number and functions of their sections <sup>1</sup> (l. 10) for all the aeons that be . . . <sup>2</sup> even as to what may happen in their sections for all the years of eternity. And among all of them did He raise up for Himself men of renown,<sup>3</sup> in order to leave a remnant to the land,<sup>4</sup> and to fill the face of the world with their offspring.<sup>5</sup> And He made them know His Holy Spirit through His Messiah, and He is true. And in the explanation of His name are their names. But those He hated has He caused to go astray.

#### NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.<sup>6</sup>

P. 1, l. 1. The stress that was laid in the *Athenæum* article for November 26, 1910, on the "personal note" that pervades the document, and which stamps it as a manifesto addressed by a religious leader to his followers, is fully endorsed by Dr. Kohler (see second page of his article). Besides the "hearken" at the beginning, we have the even more decisive "hearken ye unto me" in ll. 2, 14 of p. 2. The entire composition, in fact, produces a strong impression that one is listening to the living, earnest, and even passionate voice of a person writing in the midst of stirring events and deeply moved passions.

The phrase יורעי צדק (ye that know righteousness, taken from Isaiah li. 7) appears to be an intentional allusion to the title בני צדק (sons of Zadok) claimed by the sectaries in an important passage on pp. 3-4 in connexion with Ezekiel xlv. 15, as has also been noticed by M. Isr. Lévi and others.

<sup>1</sup> See "Notes and Discussions," p. 233.

<sup>2</sup> See "Notes and Discussions," *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Num. xvi. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. p. 1, ll. 4-5.

<sup>5</sup> Comp. Is. xxvii. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Although in the translation itself only ll. 1, 5, 10, *etc.*, are indicated, the reader will easily recognise the places of the other lines of the original Hebrew referred to in this part by the quotations from the English rendering.

At the beginning of page 5 of the document, David's action in taking several wives is explained, and therefore partly excused, by a tradition that the Book of the Law was sealed and hidden away in the Ark, which had since the death of Eleazar and Joshua not been opened "till Zadok arose." It was therefore this Zadok (perhaps unhistorical, unless they confused him with the high-priest Hilkiah of 2 Kings xxii.), to whom the sectaries looked back as the founder of their body; and as one can hardly suppose that the well-known Zadok of the time of David was meant, this supposed founder must have been placed somewhere between the reign of David and the time of Ezekiel. Anyhow, the document does not endorse the traditional belief that a disciple of Antigonus b. Soko (*Aboth d' Rabbi Nathan*, chap. v.)<sup>1</sup> bearing the name of Zadok founded the Zadokite or Sadducean party. The tradition reflected in the manifesto accords rather (though vaguely) with the theory of Abraham Geiger (*Urschrift*, p. 20 sqq.) that that party derived its name from the founder of the ruling high-priestly dynasty. It is clear at any rate that by the sons of Zadok of the manifesto a body of priests deriving their name from a certain Biblical Zadok are meant.

M. Israel Lévi has an apt reference to the laudatory mention of the "sons of Zadok," i.e., the body of ministrant priests, in the Hebrew text of Ben-Sira (chap. li. v. 12, Strack's edition). But he exaggerates the analogy between this document and Ben-Sira's standpoint. The reason why longer laudations are bestowed by him on the priestly estate than on King David and many others is the fact that in his time the most prominent functionaries of the nation were the priests. In the new document, on the other hand, active hostility is shown to the house of David. The reference to David on p. 5 has already been mentioned, and on

<sup>1</sup> See Taylor, *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*, 2nd ed., p. 112 sqq.

p. 4, ll. 10-11 is the blunt statement that at the end of a certain period of time one should no longer adhere to the house of Judah.

It is quite clear that on this ground alone—even if there were no other reasons—Dr. Ward's idea that the document is of Pharisaic origin would have to be rejected. No Pharisaic teacher would have taken up such an attitude towards the house of David.

Equally impossible is Dr. Kohler's view that the Samaritans would describe themselves as the "sons of Zadok." There is no trace to be found anywhere that they did so, whereas the evidence for the application of the term to the ruling priestly body of Jerusalem is complete.

*P. 1, l. 2.* The word for God is **יהוה** throughout the document, the Tetragrammaton being apparently purposely avoided. But not much should be made of this point, as the peculiarity might be due to the mediaeval copyists.

*P. 1, ll. 5-9.* It ought to be admitted that of no known historical character of the period under consideration could it properly be said that as a result of his work people "meditated upon their sin, and they knew that they were guilty men." There is at any rate no evidence whatever to show that either the uncertain and shadowy Zadok or the equally uncertain, though not quite as shadowy Dositheus was a kind of John the Baptist in his day, whenever that was. Why, therefore, it may fairly be asked, dissociate this characterisation from the only known historical person whom it suits so thoroughly well? The absence of any mention of John's Baptism need cause no surprise, as stress is laid throughout the exordium on the moral and inner view of the dealings of Providence with the people rather than on the outer form employed.

That the designation "a root of planting" has a decidedly Messianic connotation is clear from several Old Testament

passages (see particularly Isaiah xi.1),<sup>1</sup> and the same religious leader is actually spoken of in other parts of the document (e.g., end of p. 12 and p. 20, l. 1) as the Messiah from Aaron and Israel who was expected to reappear in the latter days (may be in a representative character only). But two questions must be considered before passing on to the consideration of date : (1) How could a person, who was not a descendant of David, be regarded as a Messiah ? (2) Why *from Aaron and Israel* instead of *from Aaron* alone ?

(a) There is unfortunately a good deal of misconception as to the expectation of a Davidic Messiah among the Jews at the beginning of the Christian Era. The Gospels themselves show that there was a strong disposition to acclaim John the Baptist as the Messiah (St. Luke ii. 15 ; St. John i. 19-20), although he was, according to St. Luke's account, of priestly descent both on his father's and his mother's side,<sup>2</sup> In the "Testament of Levi," moreover, a pseudopigraphon which is expressly quoted on p. 4 of the document, the Messianic functions are definitely assigned to a priest (for a critical treatment of the text see Kautzsch's edition), and it is also well known that the Davidic descent of Jesus Himself is treated in what is now commonly regarded as an unorthodox manner in the Epistle of Barnabas, by Tatian, and possibly also in the *Didachê* (see Harnack, *History of Dogma*, i. 195).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Comp. *Testament of Judah*, xxiv. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Elizabeth's kinship with Mary (St. Luke i. 36) would hardly seem capable of counting as Davidic descent for St. John the Baptist, though it might suffice to justify the statement that he was descended from both Aaron and Israel.

<sup>3</sup> It should also be remembered that the viith chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews exhibits a polemic in a not dissimilar strain from the generally accepted point of view (mentioning our Lord's descent from Judah, without referring to the Davidic family, and showing the superiority of His Priesthood over that of the tribe of Levi). For a decided modern echo of the view of Tatian and others see Dr. Sanday in *Hastings' Bible Dictionary*, vol. ii., p. 622.



The cause of any decided departure, on the Jewish side, from the Davidic expectation of the Messiah must, no doubt, be sought in the ascendancy of the priestly house of the Hasmonaeans from about the middle of the second century B.C. (aided, no doubt, by the title "Anointed one" which belonged to the high-priest equally with the King), though a sufficiently strong current in that direction probably set in in earlier times caused by the great prominence that was assigned to priestly ministration during the time of the Second Temple; and the Sadducees (the *בני צדוק*) of the document) would, as the active priestly ministrants of the Temple, naturally favour very strongly the continuance of supremacy in the Aaronic line. This circumstance explains why in the pseudepigraphical literature of the time,<sup>1</sup> excepting the "Psalms of Solomon," which are of Pharisaic origin, the Messiah is never spoken of as a Son of David.<sup>2</sup>

(b) But why is the "root of planting" described as coming "from Aaron *and* Israel?—On this point it seems only necessary to repeat what was said in *The Athenæum* for Nov. 26, 1910: the priestly descent of John the Baptist "need not stand in the way of believing that there was a strain of non-priestly Israelite blood in the family" (see the note 2 on p. 219). As this particular branch of the Sadducees consisted mainly of priests and Israelites, it was neces-

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Dr. W. V. Hague, *The Eschatology of the Apocryphal Scriptures*, J. T. S., Oct., 1910, pp. 76-77; Charles, *The Book of Jubilees*, p. 188. Sib. iii. 47 and 288 may refer to an Aaronic line, nor is Ethiopic Enoch xc. 37 decisive. In the other passages mentioned by Charles and Hague, Judah is after all only made to play a secondary rôle, Levi being supreme (this, by the way, perhaps explains the apparent application of the title *נשיא* instead of *מלך* to David in p. 5, l. 1). 4 Ezra belongs to a later period.

<sup>2</sup> The Book of Daniel exhibits the same characteristic; nor should it be forgotten that the Servant of Yahveh in Deutero-Isaiah (though much earlier, unless Dr. Kennett's view be right) is not called a Son of David either.

sary "to assign to their Messiah an origin that would satisfy both parties."

But if John the Baptist is meant by the "root of planting," it would seem to become almost certain that the 390 years after the destruction of the Temple by the armies of Nebuchadnezzar must, as has been already suggested (THE EXPOSITOR for December, 1911, pp. 506-7) bring us down (on the chronological basis of Rabbi Yishmā'el) to near the time we designate as *Anno Domini*. Even so, however, the discrepancy between St. Luke's account, in which John the Baptist and our Lord are stated to have been of practically the same age, and the chronology of our sectaries would be very considerable. According to them the Baptist would have begun his ministry somewhere between 5 and 7 B.C., whilst Jesus Himself entered on His work twenty years after that. But not much should in the present stage of critical inquiry be made of this difference. Other great difficulties are, on the one hand, connected with the time indications in the first three chapters of St. Luke's Gospel, and there is, on the other hand, no reason for assuming that our sectaries were not themselves a little hazy in their marks of time with regard to what happened between fifty and seventy years prior to the composition of the manifesto. The suggestion is that the true chronology may lie between the two extremes, and also that, though John's chief work may have begun at the time indicated at the beginning of St. Luke iii., he might have been in several ways prophetically active before that time.

P. 1, ll. 10-11. It is to be noted that of the "Teacher of Righteousness," who—on the explanation here defended—is also styled Messiah in p. 2, l. 12 and at the beginning of p. 6, no descent is indicated. It is, indeed, quite possible that our sectaries believed the "Teacher" to be descended from David; only in their view such a descent was neither a

recommendation nor a drawback. The personal qualification was everything, and Davidic descent would, if no advantage, be no bar either, for a descendant of David would still be an Israelite. Hence—one may suppose—their silence about it.

An almost startling confirmation of the theory that by the “Teacher” none other but Jesus is meant will be found on the note on p. 2, ll. 12–13. In this place the evidence which directly or indirectly points to the same conclusion will be collected in as concise a form as possible :—

1. The evidence from the title “Teacher” would not be decisive in itself, for Dositheus is reported by Shahrastani to have borne the title *Ilfān*, which has the same meaning; nor would the term “only [or unique] Teacher,” which is found elsewhere in the document, decide the point, although *היחיד* corresponds to the Aramaic *יחידא*, which represents *μονογενής* in the old Syriac of St. John i. 14 (in the Peshitto similarly *יחידא*), for Dositheus is reported to have had a similar appellation (for references on the two points see Schechter, *Intr.*, p. xxiv; Kohler, p. 413, *A. J. Th.*, July, 1911).<sup>1</sup> But it is clear that the correspondence of *מורה* with *διδάσκαλος*<sup>2</sup> which is so often applied to our Lord in the Gospels, at any rate, neutralises the inference in favour of Dositheus; and the same remark fully applies to the term “only” or “unique one.”

But the application of the title, “Teacher of Righteousness”<sup>3</sup> (which, by the way, contains again an allusion to

<sup>1</sup> The title “Star” found on p. 7, l. 18 of the document is here taken to refer to a later personage who was one of the leaders of the migration to Damascus (after A.D. 70). The passage itself reads: “And the star . . . who came to Damascus.”

<sup>2</sup> It is noteworthy that *διδάσκαλος* is also applied to Jesus in the disputed passage in Josephus, *Ant.* xviii., iii. 3. That passage is, according to those who do not reject it in its entirety, held to have been worked over by a Christian hand. If so, *διδάσκαλος* must have stood in it in its original form. Remarkable also is the frequent representation of our Lord in the catacombs with a scroll in His hand to denote His office as teacher.

<sup>3</sup> Professor Moore (*Harvard Theological Studies*, July, 1911, p. 374) confuses the idea of “Teacher of Righteousness” with that of “legislator,”

the **בְּנֵי צְדָקָה**, the word for righteousness being **צְדָקָה**) to our Lord derives special strength from its connexion with what precedes. The office of the "root of planting" was purely negative. People learnt to know "that they were guilty men," but they still remained "like blind men . . . groping their way." Then came the "Teacher of Righteousness," in order to guide them in the way of His heart," and in order, as we are told at the end of the exordium here translated, to make men know the Holy Spirit.

2. A graphic reference to the tragic events which culminated in the ending of the earthly life of Jesus seems to be contained at the end of p. 1 of the document. We there read: They "justified the wicked one, and condemned the righteous one . . . and they trooped themselves together against the life of the righteous one. . . . And they goaded the people to hostility." That an historical act which was vividly present to the mind of the writer is here referred to seems beyond doubt; but to what event could the description be satisfactorily applied except to the great tragedy recorded in the Gospels? <sup>1</sup> (for the goading of the populace against Jesus, see, e.g., Matt. xxvii. 27; if the view here defended is correct, "the wicked one" who was "justified" must be Barabbas).

3. The gift of the Holy Spirit as bestowed by the agency of the "Teacher" has already been referred to under (1); but mention must be made of the fact that other parts of

which, he rightly says, would not be applicable to Jesus. But the two offices are clearly distinct from each other, the former aiming at instruction in moral and spiritual principles, and the latter working for the establishment of detailed laws. Dr. Ward's idea (*Bibliotheca Sacra*, July 1911, p. 444) that the "Teacher of Righteousness" might be Mattathiah, the father of the Maccabee brothers, will, it is thought, not recommend itself to many. The Maccabees were, for one thing, fighters and upholders of the Law rather than teachers.

<sup>1</sup> It has been stated several times that the "Teacher" of the document died in or near Damascus; but there is absolutely no foundation for it. There is no such statement in the manifesto.

the document (see particularly p. 7, ll. 3-4) contain strong warnings against the defiling of the Holy Spirit that had been "apportioned" to them (comp. 1 Cor. xii. 11 ; *διαίρουν ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ καθὼς βούλεται*). The belief in the gift of the Holy Spirit by the members of the body addressed was, therefore, very strongly marked ; and this accords very well with one part of New Testament teaching.

4. Connected with the gift of the Holy Spirit is the moral ideal (though inseparable in their minds from the ceremonial aspect of their religion) which the sect was conscious of following. This ideal is called "perfection of holiness" (p. 7, l. 5 ; comp. also p. 1, ll. 20-21), and its followers are entitled, "the men of perfection of holiness" (p. 20, ll. 5, 7). The word for holiness is, of course, the same as that used in the term "Holy Spirit," and one has a right to assume that the gift bestowed by the agency of the Teacher of Righteousness was in their minds very closely connected with the ideal before them, and that they referred their high moral standard to the "Teacher" in a manner similar to the derivation of Christian saintliness from Christ in the New Testament.

5. Their attitude towards divorce and re-marriage after it would not necessarily prove Christian association, for the Zadokites in general as well as certain other sectaries held similar views on the marriage relation (see Schechter's *Intr.*, pp. xvii., xix.) ; but it is remarkable that the same Scriptural verse as that employed by Jesus in St. Matt. xix. 4 is also used in the manifesto (end of p. 4 : "at the founding of creation male and female created He them"), whereas such an application of the verse has so far not been found elsewhere in Jewish literature (Dr. Schechter only refers to *Aboth d'Rabbi Nathan*, p. 5a, "which uses the same argument of Adam against polygamy, but does not give the verse").



6. After what has been said it seems quite natural to connect the term *הברית החדשה*, which is used twice<sup>1</sup> in the preserved portions of the manifesto (p. 6, l. 19 ; p. 8, l. 21 = p. 19, ll. 33-4) with *ἡ καινή διαθήκη* of 2 Corinthians iii. 6 and Hebrews viii. 8.<sup>2</sup> (for the origin of the idea see Jer. xxxi. 31). If this explanation of the term had no support in other characteristics of the manifesto, one could indeed interpret it differently. But the presence of so many other important indications requires us to assume that the "New Covenant" of the manifesto stands in very close relation to the identical term used in the New Testament.

7. Very important also is the extensive use made in the manifesto of the pseudepigraphical writings, in which we have of late years become accustomed to discern certain analogies with New Testament ideas, more particularly as regards the apocalyptic sections of it. Dr. Schechter rightly says "that it is among the sects severed from the general body of Judaism that we have to look for the origin of such pseudepigraphical works as the Book of Jubilees, the Book of Enoch, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and similar writings" (Intr. p. xxv.). He is no doubt right in regarding the quotations from these works as an argument against the Pharisaic origin of the manifesto. But is there any evidence to show that the Zadokites, if thought of apart from any Christian association, were in the habit of using the pseudepigraphical works in the way this is done in the document? If a connexion with the Messianic movement of John the Baptist and Jesus be assumed, the manner of treating these writings falls at once into its proper place; but apart from such a connexion,

<sup>1</sup> Besides several other references to the *ברית* or covenant, without the express addition of *החדשה*, or "the new."

<sup>2</sup> See also Hebrews ix. 15 ; xii. 24 ; also Matt. xxvi. 28, and parallel passages, including 1 Cor. xi. 25.

one would be here confronted with a problem within a problem.<sup>1</sup>

P. 1, ll. 11-12. The making known of that which was actually accomplished must refer to a prophetic announcement made of some event of which the people then living had seen the fulfilment; and as the prediction was uttered "to the latter generations," and the event itself took place in "the last generation," the prophecy and its fulfilment could not have been far apart in point of time. And if the general interpretation of the document here advocated be correct (to the present writer no other interpretation is, indeed, possible), the prophecy referred to must be that of our Lord concerning the fall of Jerusalem recorded in St. Mark xiii. and elsewhere in the Gospels.

P. 1, ll. 13-17. In these lines the special causes which ushered in the catastrophe just referred to are stated. They are ascribed to the action of the "man of scoffing, who dropped to Israel waters of lying," and through whose agency the people had fallen away from all that they were bound to observe and maintain.<sup>2</sup>

Now who is meant by the "man of scoffing"? It may be confidently asserted that not only do the indications

<sup>1</sup> A point may also rightly be made of the prominence given to the forgiveness of sins which the Almighty had extended to the members of the "covenant" (see the note on p. 2, l. 5). Purely conjectural are the following suggestions: If the document be Judæo-Christian, the ספר ההנהגה, or "Book of Meditation," which is several times mentioned in it, may have been a collection of λόγια attributed to Jesus, and the "Fundamentals of the Covenant" may have contained the principal tenets of their Judæan form of the faith. That the מפקד (translated by Schechter, and formerly also by the present writer, by "Censor") is really — ἐπίσκοπος has also been seen by Kohler and Moore. There may therefore be here an analogy with the New Testament ἐπίσκοπος. The word סרן, by the way, which is connected with the office of the מפקד, is probably an abstract noun formed from סרנא ("officer" or "administrator") used in Daniel.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Josephus, *Ant.* xviii. v. 2, where it is recorded that some of the Jews regarded the destruction of the army of Herod Antipas as a punishment for the execution of John the Baptist.

of the document justify the identification of this character (from the extreme Judaising point of view of the sectaries) with Paul the Apostle, but that no other explanation is possible. Dr. Schechter's idea that the Hellenistic persecutions which preceded the Maccabean revolt are personified by the "man of scoffing," would in any case be excluded by the strongly marked individualistic features that are given him in the document (see. e.g. p. 4, l. 13, where he is regarded as "Belial, who is sent throughout Israel"; p. 8, l. 13; "confused of spirit and a dropper of lies"; but the title "man of scoffing," in the context in which it stands is alone sufficient to mark him out as an individual).<sup>1</sup> Dr. Kohler thinks that Simeon b. Shetach, who led the Pharisaic party about the time of Pompey's invasion of Palestine, is intended; but he has, in trying to prove his proposition, assigned to Simeon b. Shetach and the Pharisees of his day laxities of the School of Hillel which arose later, and which, as Rabbinic students know well, did not gain the approval of the majority of Jewish teachers before the establishment of the great synagogal council at Yabneh between 70 and 80 A.D. And even if these laxities could be laid at the door of the Pharisaic party of about B.C. 63, they would hardly furnish a sufficient handle for the denunciations contained in the document.

One cannot indeed escape the conclusion that these denunciations are in the main directed, not against a party which interpreted the Law differently and in some cases more leniently, but against a person and his following who set aside the Law altogether. The "man of scoffing" who had caused the people "to wander in the wilderness where there is no way," who "had made low the height of the world,"<sup>2</sup> who had turned men aside "from the path

<sup>1</sup> See also the passages referred to lower down.

<sup>2</sup> See note 10 on p. 214.

of righteousness," and had "removed the boundary which the forefathers had set in their inheritance," had—in the opinion of our sectaries—brought upon the nation all "the curses" which are in such terrible detail described in Deut. xxviii. 15–68. By no stretch of imagination surely could the Sadducees of about 63 B.C. say this against Simeon b. Shetach and the Pharisees of his day, or, in fact, against the Pharisees in any period of Jewish history. Among other expressions which cannot but refer to people who set themselves absolutely against the Mosaic Law are such as "those who turn aside from the way and despise the statute" (p. 2, l. 6), "with a tongue of reproaches opened they their mouth against the statutes of the covenant, saying they are not well-founded" (p. 5, ll. 11–12), "at the end of the destruction of the land rose up they that remove the boundaries, and they led Israel astray" (p. 5, l. 20), and "they uttered error against the statutes of righteousness, and they despised the covenant and the pledge of faith which they affirmed in the land of Damascus, namely, the new covenant" (p. 20, ll. 11–12).<sup>1</sup>

Is it possible, one may ask, to apply all this to any but persons who advocated the abrogation of the Mosaic code in its entirety? The explanation here offered—the only sound one, it is maintained—is that the utterly misjudged and most bitterly slandered Paul the Apostle was by our uncompromising Judaisers of Damascus styled "the man of scoffing," because he was responsible for the attacks on the Mosaic ceremonial code which had remained to them an absolutely essential part of their religious life, notwith-

<sup>1</sup> The explanation of this passage is as follows: The new covenant as established at Damascus combined a certain form of belief in John the Baptist and Jesus with the strict observance of the Mosaic Law; but followers of Paul ("the men of scoffing," in the earlier part of l. 10) later on arose in the Damascus community and affirmed that the observance of the Law was not necessary.

standing their acceptance, in a certain way, of Jesus as the Messiah. That they, moreover, should have pursued with equally violent animosity the adherents of the Apostle ("the men of scoffing") both during his lifetime and after his departure, can, of course, not be the least surprising. Their fierce denunciation against St. Paul's non-Mosaic form of Christianity was no doubt mixed with some bitter feeling against their other enemies, the Pharisees, with whom they had several old scores to settle, and possibly also with a certain amount of vituperation against the laxities of the main body of the Sadducees, who had remained aloof from the higher aspirations of our sectaries. Nice and discriminating they were not by any means in the violence of their attack; they confused matters and exaggerated as much as they could. But no doubt should be allowed to rest on the clear fact that their denunciation was in the main—or rather almost altogether—directed against a leader and his followers who maintained that the observance of the Mosaic Law was not an essential part of true religion.

As a further confirmation of this view, the special form which the denunciation takes on p. 4 of the manifesto may be referred to. The leader of the anti-legalistic movement, who is in l. 13 spoken of as "Belial, who is sent throughout Israel" to pervert the nation, is there accused of fostering sexual immorality, running after wealth, and polluting the Temple. It has yet to be shown that all these accusations could with any show of reason have been levelled against Simeon b. Shetach or any other leader of the Pharisaic party. But with regard to St. Paul, the origin of the calumnies is clearly discernible. The charge of polluting the Temple is identical with the outcry against the Apostle recorded in Acts xxi. 28; "a handle for the charge of greed was probably found in his zealous endeavour to collect



money for the poor adherents of the new religion in Jerusalem; and as for immoral teaching, it was quite enough for his enemies to point to the fact that he advocated the abolition of the Law, or they may have had before them some flagrant cases of moral aberration amongst his followers similar to that which he himself castigates in 1 Corinthians v. 1" (so originally in *The Athenæum* for November 26, 1910).

Dr. Ward (*Bibliotheca Sacra*, July, 1911, p. 436) objects to the application of the term "Belial" to an individual person, as that name (in the form of Beliar) is in the writings of the period given to Satan. But why should not in this particular passage "Belial" denote a person whom the sectaries believed to be actuated by the spirit of Satan? A sufficient analogy for such an application of the name is found in the "Sibylline Oracles," iii. 63, where Beliar as a kind of Antichrist is announced to proceed from the Samaritans. To the fanatical Judaisers of the early Church St. Paul must have appeared to be nothing less than a kind of Antichrist, so that the term Belial would be quite in its place here as denoting the great individual opponent of the sectaries, though in other parts of the document the name no doubt applies to Satan or the Destroyer.<sup>1</sup>

Highly significant is the note of time found on p. 20 ll. 13-15 of the document. We there read: "And from the day when there was gathered in [i.e. died] the unique Teacher until all the men of war who walked with the man of lies were destroyed there were about forty years."—There is no reason for doubting that "the man of lies" is the same as "the man of scoffing" (see p. i. ll. 14-15: "who dropped

<sup>1</sup> As against Dr. Ward, it is here again maintained that in the Hebrew word for "sent" (שָׁלַח) a mocking allusion to St. Paul's apostleship seems to stand out clearly, the root being the same as that from which the Hebrew equivalent of *ἐπίσκοπος* is formed.

to Israel waters of lies"; also p. 8 l. 13: "confused of spirit and a dropper of lies"). The only effect of doubting this identity would be to introduce a fresh problem in the manifesto. The expressions used in the passage are, of course, adapted, in the well-known allusive style of which the document (as can be seen from the Biblical references attached to the translation) exhibits so many examples, from Deut. ii. 14-16, the religious rebels here spoken of being compared to the rebellious Israelites who were doomed to die in the desert prior to the entry of the people into Canaan; and it is remarkable that the period here assigned to the activity of the leader and that of his immediate followers is about (note the merely approximate time indication) forty years, a space of time not far removed from the result of recent critical computation (see e.g., Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, vol. iii., p. 715). For forty years or so the sectaries had attempted to withstand the attacks directed against the Mosaic ceremonial code by St. Paul and his immediate followers, and they were then making a final and most determined effort in the same direction. It was an effort, however, which for the good of humanity ended in the victory of Pauline theology.

*P. 1, l. 18-p. 2, l. 1.*<sup>1</sup> The graphic reference to the trial and sufferings of Jesus which appear to be expressed in the words: "and they justified the wicked one and condemned the righteous one," etc., has already been considered in the notes on p. 1, ll. 10-11. In this place it is only necessary to make clear the connexion with what precedes. The forsaking of the Law advocated by Paul was declared to have been the immediate cause of the catastrophe of A.D. 70; and it is now stated that that cause itself was to be regarded as a pun-

<sup>1</sup> A special note is required on the phrase "and they chose the fat and well-liking," lit., "the fairness of the neck," or "fair neck" in p. 1, l. 19; see Hos. x. 11, where the identical phrase is used. No emendation of the text is therefore needed (comp. Schechter and Lévi).

ishment for the nation's guilt in the action they took against "the soul of the righteous one" and all the attendant circumstances. We, therefore, here meet with the well-known idea that one guilt brings in another guilt until finally ruin is the result (see, e.g., Rom. i. 24, 26; also *Pirqué Aboth*, ii. 2: "The fulfilment of one commandment brings another in its train, and one transgression also brings another with it").

It should also be noted that in the Hebrew text of p. 1, l. 19, "And they justified the wicked one," etc.) there is again an allusion to the title of the sect in the forms derived from the root of צדק.

P. 2, l. 5. In the sentence "to make atonement for those who turn away from their sin" one may fairly discern a distinctive note of Christian teaching. The idea is also prominent in ii. 4-5; iv. 6-7; iv. 9-10; viii. 16.

P. 2, l. 6. The reference to "the angels of destruction," as also several other indications of the document (e.g., p. 16 l. 5: "the angel of Mastema," which is an allusion to Jubilees x. 8), show that this section of the Sadducees (the Boëthusian section, as will be suggested in the note on p. 2, ll. 12-13) did believe in angels and spirits, in contradistinction to the main body spoken of in the New Testament.<sup>1</sup> They also seem to have believed in the doctrine of immortality<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is possible, however, that all that is implied in Acts xxiii. 8 is merely that the Sadducees denied the *Pharisaic* development of the doctrine of angels, which was largely based on ideas derived, not from the Hebrew Scriptures, but from Zoroastrianism.

<sup>2</sup> In *Ant.* xviii. i. 4, Josephus, says that the doctrine about the soul dying with the body "is received by but a few [of the Sadducees], yet by those still of the greatest dignity." It should also be noted that what the Sadducees are stated to have denied in Matt. xxii. 23; Mark xii. 18; Luke xx. 27; and Acts xxiii. 8, was not immortality in its purely spiritual sense, but "resurrection," which is really a doctrine of a different kind (see the concise statement of this view in Hastings' one-volume Bible Dictionary, under "Sadducees," where the inference is rightly drawn that Josephus, in the passage named and *Wars* ii. viii. 14, "overstated things in his desire to make the Jewish parties look like the philosophical schools of Greece").

(p. 3, l. 20 : " they who hold fast to it [i.e. the house of Zadok] for the life of eternity "). It is, of course, only too likely that their discipleship of Jesus—however slight it was—strengthened an original disposition to accept those beliefs.

*P. 2, ll. 7-8.* These lines show a distinct belief in the doctrine of predestination and election, thus again showing a decided divergence from the main body of the Sadducees (see Josephus, *Ant.* xiii. v. 9 ; *Wars*, ii. viii. 14). The general agreement between the document and St. Paul's teaching on predestination and election is noteworthy.

*P. 2, l. 8.* The conjectural reading עֲדִיהֶם instead of מִדֶּם has been here hazarded (see the Hebrew text of Isaiah lxiv. 5) ; or נִרְתֵּם should perhaps be read (comp. p. 2, l. 1).

*P. 2, l. 9.* There seems to be no need of connecting מַעֲמִיד with the gnostic idea of the " Standing One " (ἐστῶς or *stans* ; see Schechter, *Intro.* p. xxv.). The term is applied to Temple ministrants in 1 Chronicles xxiii. 28 ; 2 Chronicles xxxv. 15, and it is similarly used in Talmudical literature.

The translation " sections " in the same line finds its support in the use of the Hebrew word by the Samaritans, who employ it to denote the " sections " or " parts " of the Pentateuch.

*P. 2, l. 10.* If the third word of this line is not hopelessly corrupt, one may venture to regard it as a parenthesis and translate : " and it actually so came to pass " ; comp. the use of the Niphal of הָיָה in the Hebrew text of Ecclus. xlii. 19, and see also Proverbs xiii. 19, where נִהְיָה lays similar stress on the natural accomplishment of an expectation or wish.

*P. 2, ll. 11-12.* We here find the sectaries applying to themselves the great promises of the chosen race. They were the true remnant ; the world was to be peopled by them.

P. 2, ll. 12-13. We have now reached the climax of the great exordium, and with it what may fairly be regarded as the *locus classicus* of the document : " And He made them know His Holy Spirit through His Messiah, and He [i.e., the Messiah] is true, and in the explanation of His name are their names." Then again reverting to the idea expressed in p. 1, l. 18-p. 2, l. 1 : " But those he hated has he caused to go astray."

The sentence : " and in the explanation of His name are their names " is a literal translation of the Hebrew as it stands. Emendations of the Hebrew have been proposed, but so far none that gives a clear meaning. Why, therefore, not accept the clear sense of the text as given in the MS. ? As nothing approaching to a satisfactory explanation of a different kind has yet been given one may conclude these notes with the remark made on this point in the *Athenæum* article :—

" The Boëthusians, who are commonly believed to have been a variety of Sadducees (see, e.g., *Jewish Encyclopedia*, vol. iii. p. 285), derived their title from a priest named Boëthos (βοηθός, helper), a name, let it be remarked, which was by no means uncommon among the Jews about the time in question. But the meaning of βοηθός is the same as that of the Hebrew name represented by ' Jesus.' The inference would, therefore, be that the section of the Zado-kites or Sadducees who adopted an attitude of belief towards the Baptist and Jesus were none other than the Boëthusians (perhaps identical with the great company of believing priests of Acts vi. 7), who not unnaturally liked to dwell on the identity of meaning between their name and that of the ' Teacher.' Unless, indeed, a better explanation of the phrase is forthcoming, it is not too much to say that we have here come upon the true key [one of the several keys, one ought to say now] to every part of the riddle and the entire situation."



Professor Moore says that "Boëthos . . . is probably a Greek equivalent for the name Ezra, not for Jeshua" (*Harvard Theological Review*, July, 1911, p. 372); but as the idea of "helper" is contained in both names, it would, in any case, make no difference to an allusion of this kind, as the stress would naturally rest on the meaning rather than on the particular word bearing that meaning.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

## *PERSONALITY AND GRACE.*

### IV. DEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENCE.

SET apart by itself, Personality, like Grace, presents a comparatively simple problem. To explain it we should only require to emphasise its autonomy, to insist that it is self-conscious, self-directing, self-determining.

By thus setting it in isolation, however, the same danger besets our view of personality as besets our view of grace. We are led to think of it in a half-material figure. As we think of grace acting like a direct material force, the moral personality becomes little more to our imaginations than an engine with its fires shut up within it, operating by its own mechanism.

That simplicity is attained by overlooking more than half the problem. Only by relating grace to personality and personality to grace is it possible to have a spiritual conception of either. Grace is grace and not a force precisely because it is the succour of our moral personality ; and a person is a moral personality and not a machine precisely because he must depend upon life yet should be master over it.

Theologians and moralists alike are misled by their abstract and partial conception of personality. They seldom take it in the concrete from their own experience, but accept it in a more or less systematised form from the philosopher, and what they do see for themselves is only with the eyes of their special interest. Thus the moralist recognises only its independence and the theologian its dependence, and both miss the actual movement of life in which dependence and independence are not opposed. They fail to see that personality does not follow the rule of space that where it is nothing else can be, nor any rule of exclusion which would

make all succour by another personality necessarily a limitation of our own independence and freedom.

A moral personality is a self-conscious, self-legislating, self-determining being. But that is only half the reality. The other half is that it is self-conscious, self-legislating, self-determining in a world.

The idea that the moral personality builds its own world is after all a very superficial view even of morality. The strange thing is that it should be able to find its morality the meaning of a world already built for it. Its self-consciousness is not merely conscious of self, but also of a world which is no less independent of us because it is only the world of our consciousness ; its self-legislation is not merely the law of its own being, but is also the meaning of reality, the final law of the actual world ; its self-determination is not merely an activity of the soul, but also works actual changes in a world which is perhaps only realised to be independent of us because we have control over it.

Let us first consider self-consciousness.

M. Bergson tells us that the shape and extent of it are determined by our relation to a world which acts upon us and upon which we act. Our window is designed, not for the view as it were, but to look out upon the road along which events continually march, so that we may guess at them as they come and preserve their lesson as they depart. If by chance it also take in a wider landscape, the accident is happy, but the direct purpose of consciousness is to give us just such knowledge of reality as practically concerns our lives, and not to afford us the widest possible knowledge of the world.

That may not be all the truth, but it is at least so far true that self-consciousness is little concerned with contemplation of itself except in so far as self is concerned with the

conduct of life. Self-consciousness is, therefore, in a very real sense a moral phenomenon. Even personal memory, without which self-consciousness could not have any existence, would seem to have a moral basis, something like imputation of one's doings.

Without a world, therefore, in which we had personal business, we should have no self-consciousness. But that personal business can only be done in subjection to reality. Though our world is strictly the world of our consciousness, we can only reign in it by subjecting ourselves to a reality quite independent of us. Perhaps the very basis of self-consciousness itself is something akin to moral sincerity. Hence we are faced from the very beginning of experience with the problem that in a world which is our own we have to seek our own by what of all things is most independent of us, that is, truth. The world of our consciousness is thus a moral sphere in which we must find our independence by discovering the right kind of dependence.

Our self-legislation still more clearly shows us the same dependence upon an outside reality and the same independence of it.

A moral judgment at the dictate of another is, by that very fact, not a moral judgment at all. To be a moral judgment it must be first of all our own conscience of right. The more utterly personal it is, the purer it is. Yet our own judgment is never isolated from the ideals and tasks around us, but is inextricably mixed up with the development of all mankind's ideal judgments of worth, that is to say, with the things men esteem because they judge them worthy in themselves. The forming of our own judgments of right, which is our supreme personal attainment, is set, as it were, on the eminence of that development of all human ideals which is the supreme attainment of historical progress. Yet that dependence upon the moral ideals of our

time in no way modifies the independence of our own sincere personal judgment of right. Nay, we are the more independent, the more open we are to the best influences around us.

Furthermore, the utterly personal nature of a true moral judgment, instead of making us regard it as a mere matter of private opinion, is above all else what makes us confident of its universal validity. It is legislation by the self, yet it is the legislation which, not the self, but whatever we call ultimate reality decrees, and it asserts itself as life's only safe guide, though life should seem to be antagonistic in all its doings.

Our self-determination involves a similar dependence and independence.

Self-determination is just determination by the self. But that convenient formula does not take us far. The mystery of it is its strange interaction with a world on which it depends, and of which, nevertheless, it should be independent. On the one hand, the self cannot act on any impulse, however external be its origin, till the impulse has transplanted itself within and become our motive. On the other hand, it is not an unimportant part of the moral situation that the impulse springs from a reality outside and independent of us. For that reason loyalty to the self and self-surrender which is just loyalty to a reality outside of self, are in our moral progress not opposed, but identical.

This relation of the moral personality to a reality outside of it upon which, in one aspect, it should wholly depend and of which, in another, it should be wholly independent, is most keenly felt in moral failure. By it we are made to feel that we should at once have had less regard to ourselves and been truer to ourselves, and that we should at once have been less dependent upon outside influences and better served by them.



In consciousness as a moral sphere, in conscience as moral legislation, and in will as moral self-determination alike, our moral personality is related to an outside world upon which we are dependent and which becomes our moral sphere precisely because we are dependent upon it, and yet which would leave no room for any moral reality, if we could not at the same time be its master and not merely its creature.

Our dependence and our independence ought not to be in antagonism, but the one should succour the other, and, in the end, both should be one. We are not made independent, as if we could ride over reality ; but also we are not made dependent as if reality could ride over us. That is the point where morality issues in religion.

In that case the idea of a direct force, either from without or from within, or a mixture of both, explains nothing either in morality or religion for the simple reason that it neither explains the relation of the moral personality to reality, nor the relation of reality to it.

The moral personality is not absolute and self-centred in itself, nor is it overridden by a force absolute and self-centred without. It is not related to the infinite except by having something of the Infinite in itself, so that as it were it must ever live abroad, yet be always at home. It has no knowledge except by going out of itself, but it can only garner what it brings back as its own knowledge ; it has no ideals except in so far as it seeks them as the ultimate meaning of things, but then it returns and finds that they spring from its own constitution ; it knows nothing of will except as it responds to the attractions of a varied outside world, but the will can only possess all things by not being itself under the power of any. Personality is thus both utterly penetrable and utterly impenetrable, and that means it needs religion as well as morality.

Moreover, it is all centre, as it were, and no circumference.

Its world moves its horizon as we move. Thus we have ever a world new and provided, which yet always comes within our horizon and is ours. Nor is it merely ours to look at. It is ours to possess, ours to find our kingdom in, ours even when it is a monster, because it has trembling on its lips the secret of how it is to be turned into our fairy princess. Religion is the discovery of that secret.

That is the experience which makes abstract and especially mechanical speech about a spiritual order unedifying and misleading. The one supreme fact that our relation to our world is personal, escapes it. On both sides the relation is personal, and that fact the rudest polytheism, dealing with an actual pulsing life and not with dried sections of life in abstract thought, has better understood. When men speak of gods they mean that life is to them a personal intercourse, not a mechanical clash of things.

Only when they felt it was one intercourse, through which everything could be made to serve one moral purpose in life, did they speak of God and not of gods many and lords many. Their ground was not philosophical argument but moral victory. It was a discovery not of the thinker, but of the prophet who had been taught how, in spite of every evil, to live his own life in a way which enabled him to say : the Lord God omnipotent reigneth.

Here we find the true relation of moral freedom and religious trust. We cannot have moral freedom in a world which has no moral relation to us, but, on the other hand, the existence of our moral freedom alone can prove the reality of such a moral relationship to us of the world. Wherefore, moral independence and religious trust are essential to each other, and if they seek their road each alone, they can only wander in the wilderness where there is no way and where their hopes turn out to be the mirage.

Grace in that case must be personal. It is only a name

for that personal relation of the world to us whereby we attain our own personal emancipation. With that foundation of moral mastery, to speak of its source as God, does not mean surely that, in an obsession of vanity, we see the reflection of our own faces in the world like Narcissus in the pool, but it has the practical meaning that we have found a relation to life upon which we can wholly depend, yet which is only the way to rely on ourselves. When alike with humility and with courage, with moral independence and with religious trust we can say, "By the grace of God I am what I am," and be in an otherwise alien world masters in our own household, we can have some confidence that we are not self-deluded, but have laid hold of life's real secret.

JOHN OMAN.

### PRESENT DAY CRITICISM.

IN view of some recent developments in the sphere of advanced theological thought in Germany, T. Kaftan has been moved to write a pamphlet with the suggestive title *Wo stehen wir?* The question is not an untimely one for both teachers and students of theology in Great Britain at the present time.

By the term "student" I do not simply mean those who are *in statu pupillari* at our Universities and Theological Colleges. There are many men who, so far as the occupations of busy pastoral work will permit, keep up the student spirit throughout their lives. They have no time to give, and no contribution to make, to the processes of historical and critical research. In the results, however, of these processes they are deeply interested and they regard it as a matter of sacred obligation to keep, to some degree, abreast of the output of them in the press.

Students of theology, in this general and comprehensive sense, can hardly fail to observe with deep concern that in some recently published theological literature a new tone and spirit is, with marked emphasis, asserting itself. It is manifest in three books that have lately been issued: *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, by Professor Lake, the *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, by Dr. Moffatt, and *Miracles in the New Testament*, by the Rev. J. M. Thompson. Each book is from a scholar of acknowledged eminence and high academic standing. Each has appeared about the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. The question, therefore, is not unnatural: "Do these works represent, in the main, the standpoint now reached by theology and criticism in England and may they be regarded as prophetic

of the standpoint from which the theological teaching of the twentieth century will be given ? ”

What are the general conclusions with which a careful reader of the three above-mentioned works would find himself faced ? Broadly these : that Jesus Christ was the son, in the ordinary human way, of Joseph and Mary ; that He performed no “ miracles ” in the usual acceptance of that term ; that after His crucifixion He *did* “ appear to His disciples in some such fashion as to force on them the conviction of His continued existence ; but that these “ appearances ” were quite unconnected with any literal bodily resurrection—in fact, the “ empty grave ” is a myth. That many of the New Testament writings must no longer be attributed to the authorship of the Apostles or the Apostolic men to whom early tradition has assigned them. They are the work of unknown men, nameless geniuses living at the end of the first or in the early years of the second century.

Many who read these pages, doubtless, received their own education in theology in the last twenty or thirty years of the nineteenth century. They cannot therefore help comparing these recently published books and the three authors of them with the books and men of their own younger days. Many names occur at once to the mind. The bearers of some of them have now passed to their rest ; the majority, however, are still with us in active vigorous work. It is curious that, without any artificial grouping, the names, in certain instances, seem naturally to fall into sets of three.

First and foremost comes the great Cambridge triumvirate, Lightfoot, Westcott and Hort. In succession to them, at the same University, we naturally think of Swete, Chase and Stanton. In present day Oxford, the names of Sanday, Driver and Lock, are perhaps most prominently representative of its theological teaching. The name of



Durham has its worthy representatives in Robertson, Plummer and Knowling. Amongst the brilliant names associated with Trinity College, Dublin, those of Salmon, T. K. Abbott and Bernard are worthy of exalted rank. Amongst the leaders of Free Church scholarship there spring at once to the lips the names of Salmond, Moulton, Fairbairn, Denney, Adeney, Orr, Ramsay, Findlay,—with another triumvirate of somewhat younger men, Garvie, Peake and F. H. Moulton. Others may hasten to add the name of some revered teacher of their own, but these names may be permitted to stand as representative of the best English theological scholarship during the last thirty years.

Is there any difference between these men and the three more recent writers of whom we are now speaking? I think there is; a difference not merely in conclusions and results, but in method, tone and temper. It may, of course, be suggested by some critical reader, that the distinguished men whose names I have just enumerated do not form an absolutely homogeneous group; that some of them are more conservative, and some of them more decidedly "advanced" scholars. That is quite true. But when every allowance has been made for that consideration, I think it still remains true that there are certain features, broadly characteristic of them all, which serve clearly to distinguish them from the three writers under discussion.

Amidst all the difference there is one point of resemblance that may be gladly emphasised. No one can deny that our three scholars are men of great intellectual brilliance, of devoted industry, of very great courage in proclaiming and maintaining what they believe to be the truth. And in this respect, our other and larger group need fear nothing from the comparison. Without exception, older and younger, Anglican and Nonconformist, they too stand for exact scholarship, profound learning and the fearless love of

truth. The point of contact may be frankly conceded. Let us now attend for a moment to the contrasts.

It would be, of course, impertinent and very presumptuous, within the limits of such an article as this, to attempt any detailed discussion of the far-reaching issues, both for theology and for history, that have been raised in these lately issued works. Opponents, more than worthy of Mr. Thompson's steel, have appeared in the pages of the *Guardian*. In recent numbers of the EXPOSITOR Professor Ramsay has dealt faithfully with Dr. Moffatt. Professor Lake's book has had an exhaustive and scholarly reply in Professor Orr's *The Resurrection of Jesus*. In contrast with all these fuller discussions my twofold purpose is a very simple one. It is, firstly, to indicate quite generally some of the contrasts between these somewhat "advanced" theologians and their more "conservative" predecessors and contemporaries. Secondly, to ask whether these more "conservative" results and the methods by which they are reached may not still continue to claim the assent of practical, common-sense Englishmen.

I cannot help feeling that there is the greatest possible difference in tone and spirit between the works of these two sets of scholars. And let me hasten to say that it is strictly of the "works" I speak. Each of the writers in question, for anything I know to the contrary, is a sincere and devout Christian. And, in any case, personal criticism would be an offensive impertinence. But I am sure that no one of the three would refuse to any one of his readers the right to form and put on record his own personal impression of the published work.

And, in the exercise of this privilege, I feel bound to assert that in the work of the larger group of scholars there is a general tone of reverence, of awe, of being on holy ground, of dealing with God's written Word, which is singularly lack-

ing in the other three. There is in them, as it seems to me, a coolness, a remorselessness, a merciless and unfeeling destructiveness, all expressed with calm dogmatic assertion which makes older men rub their eyes with amazement and indignation ; while younger men, who are not at all obscurantist, but have been trained on the older lines, find it inexpressibly painful. It represents, of course, the intrusion into English theological literature of certain aspects of the Dutch and German spirit. It may be argued, in some sort of defence, that the critic must be strictly critical and that the New Testament must be treated strictly as other books, and subjected to the same critical processes if truth is ever to be discovered. I believe that a great fallacy underlies this general proposition, and that to start out with the idea of treating the Bible "as other books" is to place oneself straightway at a standpoint from which it is impossible ever to do full justice to it. If I were asked to mention a specimen of minute, searching, fearless criticism, carried out in the older method and temper, I should specify Hort's posthumous Commentary on the earlier chapters of 1 Peter. For minute care, for massive learning, for exposition at once profound and simple, it stands almost without peer in English exegetical literature. To turn from such a writing as this, and to read, for example, the sentence on p. 551<sup>1</sup> of Dr. Moffatt's book in which he accounts for the Johannine deviations from the Synoptic tradition, is to pass into another atmosphere. The sentence referred to is very typical and very characteristic of the general tone of the book. If Dr. Moffatt would speak of the Fourth Gospel in a way a little less *de haut en bas*,<sup>2</sup> and with a little

<sup>1</sup> "The 'Johannine' deviations from the synoptic traditions are to be referred partly to the freedom of the writer's imagination, working under the influence of certain religious preconceptions, and partly—when they are accurate—to an independent historical tradition."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also his remarks on the Pastoral Epistles, p. 415. "They repre-

more appreciation of the place which it holds in the veneration of many who read his book, he would find them far more prepared to consider his theories of its authorship and composition. Passages of somewhat similar quality dealing with the miraculous in general and the Resurrection in particular could be adduced from the works of the other two writers.

The attitude of mind which finds expression in these books is bound to be coupled with a drastic treatment of the text of the sacred writers. Mr. Thompson's account of our Lord's birth can only be obtained from St. Luke i. by the excision of those verses which are most material to St. Luke's account. Professor Lake's treatment of the Synoptic presentment of the events of the first Easter morning is a striking example of authorities being racked and tortured to supply a version the precise opposite of that which their texts apparently contain. The same writer's supposition that the "young man" in St. Mark xvi. 5 was a youth on the spot who tried to persuade the women that they had come to the wrong tomb and that "the most obvious view for that generation in which angelology was so powerful a force, was that he was an angel" is also very characteristic, and quite fails to do justice to the combined force of the Synoptic tradition when viewed as a whole.

While speaking of the criticism of the text of the Apostles and Evangelists, a word may be said on a phase of present-day investigation which has proceeded to very wild and improbable lengths. We are most of us familiar with *Quellenkritik* and know something of the process indicated—the process of detecting by a minute investigation of a writer's

sent not only a natural extension of the letters and speeches, e.g., in Luke's history, but a further and inoffensive development of the principle which sought to claim Apostolic sanction for the expanding institutions and doctrines of the Early Church."

words the varied sources from which he derives his information. It cannot be questioned that such investigation is very fascinating and has led to certain results which possess a high degree of probability. The general dependence of the First and Third Gospels on a combination of St. Mark and Q—the body of “sayings” (or are we to say “narrative and sayings?”), the presence of a special source for St. Luke’s Birth Narrative, the possibility of St. Philip the Evangelist’s being a special source in the earlier part of Acts—will readily occur to the mind.

But it should be remembered that many of these suggestions are only brilliant hypotheses, and are probably bound to remain such. At present each man appears to have his own hypothesis as to the limits and the contents of Q. It is surely well to recall ourselves to the fact that what we have to do is to interpret the Gospels, Acts and Epistles as we have them; that “source” theories are very subjective things, and when they become complicated, are infinitely precarious. To what a condition the unfettered use of them can reduce the Gospel narrative may be seen most clearly in Wellhausen’s *Einleitung*.

One cannot help feeling that in this process of *Quellenkritik* there is tendency very much to underestimate and minimise the personality and the general power of judgment of a St. Mark, a St. Luke, a St. Paul, and a St. John. It is so easy to lay bare, with fancied certainty, the varied sources from which a particular writing is drawn and to say that the general credibility of a narrative is no stronger than that of its sources. But surely this way of regarding the matter is to reduce the writer who has used the “sources” to absolute nonentity. May we not attach a very high degree of value to the judgment of the writer who discriminated between his sources, accepting some and rejecting others? Some of us—*pace* the modern way of regarding



these matters—are still, in view of a comprehensive survey of the facts, prepared to believe that a St. Luke and a St. John were Divinely guided in their use of the available material—or, to put it at the least, were not unintelligent compilers of variegated and mutually contradictory “sources,” but were well equipped for the discrimination of truth from falsehood in relation to alleged facts which formed the basis of all their power to live and of all their hope of immortality.

May we not also, in this treatment of the Gospel sources, when it comes to balancing opposing possibilities, permit what one may call “human” considerations and general “common sense” to have some weight in the scales? In other words, is not a hypothesis that is more matter of fact and ordinary in its character a little more likely to be true than one that is purely literary, and not unartificial at that? Take, for instance, St. Luke’s narrative of the Birth. Professor Lake, in a letter to the *Guardian*, speaks of “the unsatisfactoriness of the actual evidence in its favour, the absence of any evidence in the earliest documents, and *the ease with which it can be explained as due to the tendencies of contemporary thought* (the italics are mine). Put in the scale against this, Professor Sanday’s view that this narrative can be reckoned, with a high degree of probability, as one of the earliest sources; that St. Luke, during his stay in Palestine at the time of St. Paul’s imprisonment there, had opportunity of access to most reliable sources of information—possibly to the women associated with the Virgin herself, and not improbably, as Dr. Chase has recently pointed out, to St. James the brother of the Lord. Is it not at any rate as probable that St. Luke’s information was in this way derived from first-hand and reliable sources as that the story is a later development “due to the tendencies of contemporary thought”?

Another feature of present-day criticism in certain quarters is the general attitude to ecclesiastical tradition—an attitude much less respectful on the whole than that of English scholars generally. Mr. St. John Thackeray puts the matter in a nutshell when he says: “Among the factors to be taken into account by the modern critic early tradition should hold a foremost place and should never be lightly disregarded.”

In this connection, for example, it may fairly be claimed that there is a greater degree of ordinary, human, matter-of-fact probability in the Irenaeus tradition that St John lived to a great age, and wrote the Gospel that bears his name at Ephesus—with the connecting link of that tradition in the person of Polycarp, the pupil of St. John and the master of Irenaeus—than in the precariously attested view that St. John was martyred at an early stage. It is difficult to think that this latter hypothesis would have met with so great favour if it had not been such an effective instrument in excluding St. John from any possibility of being the writer of the Fourth Gospel.

One could quote many other instances where common sense might be of service. It seems far more probable, to put it bluntly, that the relation of *Colossians* to *Ephesians* is to be explained by the fact that they were written by the same man, about the same time, than by any such fantastic theories of literary dependence, as, e.g., that of Holtzmann. It seems far more probable that the recognised differences of the Pastorals from the admitted Pauline Epistles can be explained by advancing age and preoccupation with new needs, than by any theory of accretions gathering round certain genuine Pauline *reliquiae*. It still remains more probable that the minute topographical knowledge displayed by the author of the Fourth Gospel betrays the native and the eye-witness, than that it is “Guide-book”

knowledge amassed by one who was a stranger to the land. If this passage seem unduly dogmatic in tone, it may be pointed out that no expression stronger than "more probable" is used. And one ventures to think that views which may fairly be classed as "common-sense views" are on the whole more probable than highly artificial theories of literary dependence and construction.

The curious fashion of excluding the great personalities of the Apostolic age from the authorship of the works traditionally assigned to them, and of attributing these works to unknown writers of a later age, has been adequately treated by Professor Ramsay in recent numbers of the *EXPOSITOR*. It is—may we not hope and believe?—a passing phase, which, one ventures to think, will take its place before long among the curiosities and antiquities of criticism.

On the question of Miracles in the New Testament, to the discussion of which Mr. Thompson's book is devoted, it must suffice to say that the treatment of the literary evidence will depend entirely on the philosophical presuppositions with which we approach the investigation of it. If we conceive Nature as a rigid system, with "uniformity" as its final and absolute characteristic, then no amount of evidence will suffice to attest a miracle. If, however, in Wendland's strong and ringing phrases, "Belief in miracle stands simply for the fact that if God is alive He must reveal Himself in definite acts". . . . "To believe in the living God and to believe in miracle are the same thing"; that is, if we can banish "the uniformity of nature" from our philosophical vocabulary and believe that God *can* and *does* display His Divine power on the stage of human history—then we approach the literary evidence for the New Testament miracles in a more appreciative and less hostile spirit. We shall not be so ready to rule out the bodily

resurrection and the empty grave as impossible and unthinkable things.

Johannes Weiss in his *Paul and Jesus* has an interesting sentence with reference to our Lord: "In the other discourses of Jesus we are constantly surprised by the numerous appeals to the common sense of mankind, and this is a feature which is eminently of a popular nature and without appeal to scholars. Wisdom and experience of life, not scholarship and criticism, are the leading principles."<sup>1</sup>

It is true that the investigation of the New Testament history and writings is a matter for "scholarship and criticism." But is not that scholarship and criticism likely to be on firmer ground, just so far as it is modified by "common sense," "wisdom" and "experience of life"? In a word, if English scholarship will be true to its past attitude of reverence, of sobriety, of cautious judgment, of steady determination to mistrust brilliant and startling short cuts to truth, it will best play its own most fitting part in all future developments of criticism and theology.

DAWSON WALKER.

<sup>1</sup> *Paul and Jesus*, p. 70.

### THE ATONEMENT IN MODERN LIFE.

THE title of this paper may be read in two senses. It may be read as referring to a theory, or as concerned with a fact. If it has reference to a theory, it raises this question : Is any theory of Atonement possible in modern life, and if so, what theory ? If it is concerned with a fact, it impels us to ask : Is there anything in the real structure of modern life which may rightly be described as Atonement ? Is there anything in the actual experience of men to-day which can be isolated and recognised as Atonement, in the same way that there are things which we can isolate and recognise as gravitation, or civilisation ?

Now it is with the second of these two things that I am really anxious to deal. To me—to all of us surely—the fact of Atonement is vastly more important than the theory of Atonement. Nevertheless, in order to be free to deal with the fact it is necessary first of all to say something about the theory. For if one thing is certain as to the relation between fact and theory it is this : the mind on the look out for facts sees largely what it is prepared to see, and if a man is already convinced that no reasonable theory of the Atonement is possible in modern times, he will, like Nelson at Copenhagen, clap his telescope to his blind eye and swear he sees nothing that gives any evidence of Atonement in modern life. Lecky has elaborately displayed for us in his *Rise of Rationalism* how magic and witchcraft disappeared from Europe. People saw that the theory of magic was untenable, and in a very few years the facts on which that theory rested, vanished. It was not that witches were all killed off. So long as people kept killing witches, witches abounded. Witches disappeared when the new science killed the theory of magic.



## I.

So, then, we shall look first at this problem : Can we men of the twentieth century, heirs of nineteenth-century science, eager to lay aside all useless lumber and mere whimsies in order to do our fair share of the hard work of the new time, can we who must be, and shall be with all our might, men of our own time, treat seriously any doctrine of the Atonement ? Does not modern thought tend to exclude it ? There are certain elements of modern thought which seem to make any doctrine of the Atonement questionable, namely, the nineteenth century philosophy and the modern high sense of ethical responsibility. Each of these seems to veto any theory of Atonement even before it is stated. We will look at each of these in turn and see how far it is justified in prejudicing us against any belief in Atonement. But before doing this it will be necessary to make some brief and rough provisional statement as to what is meant by atonement. There are many theories of the Atonement, and to these individually we must in this paper be indifferent. All that we can attempt is some general statement which will include them all. And the best way to put the matter seems to be this : By Atonement we mean a transaction by which the estrangement between God and man, due to sin, is overcome. The crucial element in this transaction is Jesus Christ and His death on Calvary.

Coming then to our problem, we notice in the first place that the nineteenth-century philosophers enter a *non possumus* at once, and refuse to consider such an Atonement. And let us not depreciate the importance and influence of the philosophers. It is easy to sneer at them as unpractical persons, bookworms aloof from life who write incomprehensible volumes which the would-be cultured praise though they do not read them. We all of us live in the intellectual atmosphere created by the philosophers. Agnosticism and

materialism are prevalent to-day, not because the man in the street has read agnostic and materialist philosophies, but because those philosophies have set a fashion in thinking. Your suburban maid-servant has never been to Paris, but she wears her hobble skirt because the designers of fashions for women in Paris set the hobble skirt agoing some years back. So Englishmen in the twentieth century are still wearing the intellectual hobbles of agnosticism and objective idealism made for them by the fashionable thinkers of last century.

Now there are in particular two types of nineteenth-century philosophy which deny the Atonement. The first is the objective idealist type which, at any rate in its logical implications, refuses to admit that Atonement is necessary. It denies that man is estranged from God. It maintains, on the other hand, that God is everything, and that therefore nothing is evil, but all is the working out in experience of the eternal nature of God. Some of these idealists call themselves monists. There is only one substance, they say, and that is God. And how can God be estranged from Himself, or how can any reconciliation be necessary within God? I do not pretend that our objective idealists express themselves in this crude fashion. But it is in this sense that their teaching is popularly understood. But speaking of objective idealism in any form it must be pointed out that its gorgeous and arrogant metaphysic has a deadly enemy in that still more gorgeous and arrogant thing that we call scientific method. And if one thing is more obvious than another to the scrupulous and scientific student of mankind and of history, it is that human nature is so fallen that some atonement, some reconciliation with God, is necessary. The old-world Jew who said "All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" summed the evidence up in a fashion which no modern thinker can better. And here is some of

the evidence. First of all, consider the devastating disappointment and dissatisfaction which come to any man who has a large first-hand experience of life without any knowledge or experience of Atonement. We can get instances of this to whatever age or civilisation we look. Consider ancient Persia and inquire of her typical poet. Omar Khayyam entered upon life quite in love with it. It seemed beautiful and enticing beyond words, so that he sang :

Here with a little bread beneath the bough,  
A flask of wine, a book of verse—and thou  
Beside me singing in the wilderness—  
Oh wilderness were paradise enow !

And yet before he died he turned with bitter resentment upon the world of which he had had his fill and cried :

Oh Love ! could you and I with Him conspire  
To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,  
Would we not shatter it to bits—and then  
Remould it nearer to the heart's desire !

Not greatly removed from Omar in time or race was Qoheleth, the author of Ecclesiastes. He tells us how he set to work to get the best out of life : “ I made me great works ; I builded me houses ; I planted me vineyards . . . and whatsoever mine eyes desired I kept not from them. . . . Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to do : and, behold, all was vanity, and a striving after wind, and there was no profit under the sun.”

If we turn from east to west, we find the same thing. How terrible is Tacitus' condemnation of his own age and society. After recounting the wickedness of Rome, with its wars, its murders, its adulteries, its ruins, he adds, “ All was one delirium of hate and terror ; slaves were bribed to betray their masters, freedmen their patrons. He who had no foe was destroyed by his friend.” Was ever bitterer and more

scornful sentence penned ? And it is the same from century to century. Even the artificial though polished poet Pope, who thought himself the exponent of that optimistic philosophy which described this as the best of all possible worlds, uttered one of the most pessimistic epigrams in all literature when he said :

“Man never is, but always to be, blessed.”

And to-day, what is the most insistent cry ? It is the cry of discontent with the natural condition of man. Eugenists like Dr. Saleeby, fierce immoralists like Mr. H. G. Wells, advocates of the life-force like Mr. Bernard Shaw, wild Nietzscheites grovelling before a grotesque superman, all agree with Christians that the one thing needed is a new type of manhood.

A second line of evidence that man is estranged from God is this : All the advances and discoveries of human genius are liable to perversion and do actually serve to torture and degrade the race as well as to serve it. The motor car has brought back again a form of highway robbery, and helps clever rascals to outwit the law. The telegraph has made gambling such a disease of the state as it never was before. The aeroplane's most effective work so far has been to help Italians slaughter Turks and Arabs. Education itself has heightened unrest, ambition, and envy. Two thousand years ago humanity boasted two marvellous products of evolution—Roman law and Jewish morality. There came into the world a Man since recognised by all mankind, so far as able to judge, as the noblest and most beneficent of the sons of men. And what happened ? This Man, Jesus, the carpenter of Nazareth, was tortured to death by the representatives of Roman law and Jewish righteousness.

In the face of this evidence then—the judgment of the most capable men of all ages, and the evils which are associated even with the highest goods that humanity

knows or produces—we may dismiss once and for all the assertion of the monist that there is no need of Atonement because there is no estrangement from God, who is All.

The idealistic and monistic philosophy, however, was not the most characteristic English philosophy of the nineteenth century, nor is it the most effective in making the intellectual atmosphere of the twentieth century. This peculiarly nineteenth century philosophy was rather agnosticism whose chief spokesmen—Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Huxley, and Tyndall and the rest—taught men to believe that freedom of the will, a life after death, and real revelation of God to man, were all mere pleasant and flattering fancies. If there was a God at all, men could not know Him, could not be consciously estranged from Him, and could not come back to Him by any Atonement. The only world of which men could have any knowledge or power was the world of matter. All life obeyed the laws of matter. All life, therefore, was determinist, and our supposed purposes, schemes, plans, searches, were poor and pathetic illusions. Now I do not propose to controvert this view of life. All I am concerned to do is to point out that it is not modern. It is not up to date. It is a bit of the furniture of those stolid and respectable mid-Victorian days at which any twentieth-century schoolboy feels it his duty to fling a gibe. It belongs to the anti-macassar stage of domestic history. The formative thinkers of to-day have put it aside once and for all. The late William James in America, Professor Rudolf Eucken of Germany, M. Henri Bergson in France—all these belong to a school which will not have agnosticism at any price, and to which the determinism of the nineteenth century is a mere metaphysical shibboleth. The same spirit is alive in England too. True, we have no one outstanding philosopher, but if Mr. Schiller and Sir Oliver Lodge may be taken as indicating the living



trend of thought, we are far enough away from both agnosticism and determinism.

We have a right to say then that modern philosophy does not put a ban *à priori* upon any doctrine of the Atonement, and that those who will have nothing to do with this central element of Christian belief because of modern thought, are labouring under a misapprehension as to what is being thought in these new days.

And now we must turn to another important phase of thought which claims to invalidate any discussion of any theory of the Atonement, and that is the modern high sense of ethical responsibility. There are not wanting those who condemn any theory of the Atonement as immoral. For every theory of the Atonement must involve the belief that God will do something for man by which man will escape the inevitable results of his own misdeeds, whether those results be pain (*i.e.* punishments) or moral evil (*i.e.* consequences). Putting it crudely, Atonement, we are told, means some one (*i.e.* Christ) bearing the sins of some one else, and so saving that person from the results of his own wrong-doing, which is immoral. The Atonement therefore is ethically impossible. Now this is a very widespread view. Indeed, it is a view which causes a good deal of uneasiness and real concern to many people who are not critics of Christianity, but actual members of the church. I may perhaps therefore be permitted to put forward certain simple considerations to show that this verdict is unjustified and ought to be revised. I want to show that the doctrine of vicarious suffering is wholly in harmony with all that we know of moral evolution. And in order to do this let us adopt for the moment the extremest and most difficult view of the Atonement possible. One theory of the Atonement is that Jesus on Calvary took the place of the sinner and suffered in His own person the results and conse-

quences and punishment of that sinner's evil deeds. Without ourselves accepting this doctrine we may at least agree that if the ethical objection in question to *this* theory of the Atonement can be removed, the ethical objection becomes invalid for *all* doctrines of the Atonement. Now we all agree to-day that there is development in the world of morals. Man advances from a primitive morality to higher forms. Races in the early ages of mankind had lower ethical ideals than are ours to-day. In historic times we can see the process of development going on. Even to-day we can actually ourselves experience the process. We feel in our own persons how lower ideals give way to higher.

Further, the moral development that has taken place from primitive times to the present follows certain definite lines. The process is in a constant direction. Let us isolate two of these lines ; first the line of conscience, and secondly the line of punishment. What is the primitive stage of conscience ? We cannot go back to the very earliest stages, for we have not the evidence. We can, however, go back to the taboo stage, and at that stage we see that the rightness or wrongness of a deed was determined by its relation to some apparently artificial rule which had nothing to do with the intrinsic value of the deed. In some tribes, for instance, to touch a pig, or to come within a certain circle, was a sin ; while to kill a man, or to rob or to lie was not thought wrong at all. But moral development has brought us to a different stage. To-day we see sin according to a larger scale and the individual conscience is very tender. It is the intrinsic nature of the evil deed which hurts the conscience. There is consequently a very different, and perhaps greater, range of possible wrong-doing. A host of things regarded as venial or indeed admirable in primitive times are now abhorrent and treated as criminal. The development

and elaboration of the moral code has made wrong-doing a more complex and widely ramifying system. That is the one process. Sin is more clearly defined and more seriously repudiated. The conscience is more tender.

Parallel with this another process has gone on. There has been a development along the line of punishment, as well as along the line of conscience. But it has been of a very different order. The primitive stage of punishment was relentless, ruthless, sweeping, bloody. The commonest penalty was death. The sinner was destroyed. Often enough his punishment was not death, but torture—torture which did not cease till death proved more merciful than man. Little by little, however, the notion of justice grew up, and the effort was made to “make the punishment fit the crime.” At this stage the watchword of morality was “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” The individual must bear the full weight of his misdeeds: wrong-doing must come home to the wrong-doer. But the process of change did not stop there. It has gone on until now the tendency is to lift the result of his wrong-doing from the shoulders of the individual. While it is recognised that the consequences of evil must be, it is seen that the evil itself is only got rid of in as far as the consequences of the evil are shouldered, not by the culprit but by the community, or rather, by the nobler elements of the community. As yet this tendency has not shown itself as fully in the state as it has done in the family, in philanthropy, and in the church. Every philanthropy, whether it be an almshouse, a Friedenheim, a hospital or an orphanage, is, at least to some extent, and that a large extent, a device for shifting the consequences of wrong-doing on to the shoulders of those not immediately concerned with it—that is, from the guilty to the innocent.

I cannot pursue this matter further. I have, however, indicated, what could be established much more completely, the

fact that the development of the moral sense has, among others, these two results : on the one hand, it makes the conscience much more sensitive to evil, and makes the evil appear much more abhorrent ; and on the other hand, it tends to make the innocent community take a vicarious interest in the wrong-doer, being ready more and more, not to punish him more severely, but to bear his burden for him. The type of morality towards which mankind is moving, then, is a type in which evil will be quickly and keenly detected and resented, but in which, instead of fierce and bitter punishment of the sinner, those sinned against will rather suffer on his behalf. And surely, what is the tendency of the ethical development of humanity is a reliable index of the attitude of God toward evil, and our own moral nature justifies even the substitutionary theory of the Atonement—that theory which regards the perfectly holy God as taking up, and Himself bearing, the sins of mankind.

Perhaps I may push this a little further and say that the Atonement is in harmony with the profoundest laws of our own life as we all of us know it. I know that for every man there are moods in which, on the contrary, the Atonement seems incredible. But I want to set over against such mere moods the consideration that, knowing what we do of life, and given God, it were utterly incredible did we not have a historic Atonement. For consider : if a teacher is to teach, he must give himself for his pupil. Unless he will step down from his grown-up world he abdicates the right to have pupils. Or again, a good man who would save the fallen must somehow go down to him. He must put his arm about the shoulders of the ragged and filthy. If he refuse, he refuses the one chance of success. And a woman who would have a child to rejoice her heart and to be her own must go down to face death that the new life may come. She must be weary that her child may be strong, she must

suffer that the child may rejoice. She must look into the darkness of death if she would lift her little one into the light of life. If she refuse the suffering she refuses the child. A mother she will not be. Beautiful she may be, accomplished and strong—but a mother, never. And I say that here we have a law of life which is consequently a law also of God. If God should refuse to come down to save us through the travail of His soul, He would abdicate His place as God and stultify all His love as Father of our souls. Creator He might be, Allah He might be—but God the Father, never.

We have now completed this first part of our discussion. We have seen that the general philosophic and ethical prejudices which tend to prevent men to-day from even considering fairly the Christian doctrine of the Atonement, are not really valid. The stream of modern thought has really swept these prejudices away. The man who thinks that philosophy and ethics discredit the Atonement, is not a modern man. His dominant notions are obsolete. It is time he discarded them.

## II.

Having now seen that the doctrine of the Atonement is not incompatible with modern thought, we can proceed to the main subject before us, namely, that the Atonement is more than a theory, it is a reality in modern life.

Now Christians claim that with the life and death of Jesus something profoundly important happened to mankind. They claim that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself. They claim that the life and death of Jesus somehow brings man into touch with God, makes a way of escape from the sin and misery of life, and makes it possible for men to have complete confidence in God and use His power for their own individual salvation and for the reconstruction of society.



Well, how can this claim be substantiated ? I do not think men to-day want to doubt the Atonement. They would like to find it. They would like themselves to be reconciled to God, so that the discontent and uneasiness should pass out of their lives. And they would like society to be reconciled to God, so that it should be a pure and strong and noble thing. What is it then that stops men from taking advantage of that real Atonement which Christians say has already been made ? I think one of the things that hinder is this : men feel that what is wanted is not an event in ancient history, but something real in modern life. We have not much use for the merely historical. Things are of no interest to us if they merely happened once upon a time. We are only interested in things in the past which are definitely and inevitably connected with things in the present. If the Atonement is something that happened during thirty years or three years or three days and then stopped, never to go on again, like a clock that has run down, it somehow is not convincing to us. For we find that God does not work by sudden strokes. All the wonderful things of God are processes—unending processes which constantly reproduce themselves in every new age with added beauty and power. The difference between what God does and what man does is just this : what God does is eternal, whereas what man does is sudden. The rose blooming in the conservatory now is a slow product ; not merely has it taken months to produce, but millenniums. It is the latest in an eternal series. That it exists now is due to God, and God has made it by an infinite process, not suddenly. And that is why it differs so profoundly from the artificial rose. The artificial rose is an incident. It has, in a sense, no past and no future. God's rose is eternal, and has an infinite past. It belongs to a sequence which is represented through all time.

Now if the Atonement is really God's work, must it not

be part of an eternal process ? It cannot be simply an incident. But if it is part of an eternal process it must be here now. We must find it somehow in being to-day. It must be in London as well as in Jerusalem, it must be in the twentieth century as well as in the first. We must be able to verify it in modern life. And we will believe in the Atonement if we can do this, if we can find it at work in modern life.

Of course the New Testament claims for the Atonement just this historic and permanent quality. It does not describe or set forth the Atonement as a mere sudden action on the part of Christ or of God, something isolated in the course of history, a freak incident quite different in quality from anything that had gone before or was to come after. Jesus Himself described His own ministry as the culmination of a series in the parable of the landlord who sent servant after servant to his tenants, and afterward sent his son. The apostle Paul, writing to the Ephesians about the Atonement, says : "This is in harmony with God's merciful purpose for the government of the world when the times are ripe for it—the purpose which He has cherished in His own mind of restoring the whole creation to find its one Head in Christ ; yes, things in heaven and things on earth, to find their one Head in Him." And in the book of Revelation we find the astonishing sentence, "all that dwell on the earth shall worship him (that is Antichrist), every one whose name hath not been written in the book of life of the Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world," or, as Dr. Weymouth vigorously puts it, "the Book of the Lamb who has been offered in sacrifice ever since the creation of the world." Such phrases might be multiplied. They show that in the opinion of the writers of the Bible the historic Atonement was not a mere incident, but part of an age-long process : not a momentary act of God, but a revelation of

His constant activity : not something peculiar, the resort of God in despair at the failure of all His previous efforts to redeem mankind, but something typical, the right clue for the interpretation of all prior and subsequent dealings of God with mankind. In Christ, the Christ of Calvary, all the fullness of the Godhead dwelt bodily. He was the eternal Word, the light that lighteth every man coming into the world, and at the same time eternally one with God. What Christ was so clearly and mightily for a few years on earth God is in the unseen world for ever.

This is the explanation of the Church's determined and passionate adherence to the doctrine of the deity of Christ through good report and ill. A wedge driven between the mind of Christ and the mind of God must ultimately split off the Atonement from the eternal process and make it a mere historic incident. Anything that hinders us from believing that the purpose and self-abnegation of Christ is of the same nature, or even substance, as God's central will in relation to man, must hinder man from trusting without reservation to that reconciliation which Jesus sought to effect between man and His Father. If we are to believe that the holiness and love displayed on Calvary are eternal things, resident at the very heart of the universe, and capable by their mastery of framing and dominating all the deepest laws of the universe, we must believe that the claim that Jesus made when He said, "I and my Father are one," was a substantial claim representing a permanent fact in the unseen and eternal world. That is what Christians mean by insisting that the Lamb of God is seated on the throne of God.

Let us be clear, then, that we understand how Christianity regards the relation between the historic Atonement and the eternal processes and activities of God. Here is a simple illustration. I see in the physical laboratory a prism upon which a beam of sunlight falls. This beam passes through

the prism and as it emerges is thrown upon a screen. As it falls upon the screen it is split up into a series of bands or bars of colour from violet to yellow. All imaginable colours are there, and, if we could but see them, some colours at present unimaginable. What does this tell us? It tells us that the beam of light which passed through the prism was composed of a great variety of rays, each of its own peculiar wave length, and that these various rays when combined made the simple white light. But it tells us more than that. It tells us that the rays of light combined in the one beam come from a source of light, the sun, in which are a variety of glowing substances—gold, silver, iron, copper, sodium, carbon, and a host of other chemical elements—each of which contributes to the band of colours displayed through the prism. Nor is even this all that we learn by the spectrum. We learn from this that all the ordinary sunlight that floods our earth, making life and joy possible, producing food and beauty, penetrating every human dwelling and un-failing in its service to every race and generation, has within it knit together all those colours of the spectrum corresponding to all those substances in the sun. So it is with the Atonement. In the wonderful life and death of Jesus we see, not merely a curious and peculiar incident in human history, like a physical or intellectual freak, but a revelation both of the real nature of God and of the secret of His constant and universal activities. True, in this instance we only have the one prism—the one sinless life, the one Cross of Calvary. But the Atonement is not an exceptional activity of God. It is the constant activity of God displayed in an arresting and convincing fashion.

At this point a difficulty arises which we must clear up before we proceed further. If, it may be said, God's activity is always the same, if He constantly feels and acts towards mankind as Jesus felt and acted, where does the value and



peculiar service of Calvary come in ? Is it not true that what is called the transaction of the Cross made a difference both to God and man ? Is it not true that it has made an eternal difference to the relations between God and man ? This is a question of great importance, and something must be said with regard to it here. The historic Atonement of Jesus is unique in various ways, but chiefly in this, that it makes clear for the first time in human history what is the attitude of God to man and sin, and it therefore creates in man confidence and trust in God, doing away with his misunderstanding and suspicion, and so once and for all altering man's attitude to God. But you cannot alter man's attitude to God without also, even though indirectly, altering God's attitude to man. If my friend turns his back on me, I see the back of his head. That is my relation to him. When he turns round I look at his face. My relation to him is changed. I can now do what I could not do before, I can express to him the friendship in my heart by the expression of my face. Now what the Atonement does is (among other things) to induce men to trust in God. They turn their faces to Him. In a sense this does not alter God's relation to them, for He loved them from the beginning. But for the first time it enables God to make His love visible to them. So it does affect not only man but God, and therein lies its uniqueness, and its being wrought once and for all.

"But," some one will say, "have you not thereby given up your contention that the Atonement is an eternal process, operative to-day as surely as two thousand years ago ? Have you not thrown it back again to be a mere incident once upon a time ?" By no means. A mighty and indeed unique incident may be after all necessary to the carrying on of a constant process. John Fiske has somewhere used an illustration for another purpose which will serve here. Suppose you have a cone. Now imagine a plane cutting the cone



parallel to the base, and make that plane tilt up. When the plane was parallel to the base of the cone, it cut a circle. As soon as you tilted the plane it cut an ellipse, and as you tilt it more and more the ellipse becomes more and more eccentric until at last, without any warning, "your plane cuts a parabola, whose sides curve off into infinity, and never touch ends again." But only for a moment. As the tilting proceeds the parabola is deserted as suddenly as it was created. Now you can make that tilting as slow as you like, as slow as the process of cosmic evolution. But, however slow you make the process of tilting, your parabola can only last for one instant. All the past of the process led up to it. Itself is part of the process. After it the process continues essentially unchanged. But nevertheless this sudden parabola was a necessary element in it. So it is in the Atonement as an eternal process. All that process leads up to Calvary. From Calvary onwards the process continues permanently. Calvary itself is an essential element in the process, but one never to be repeated.

So then the Christian doctrine is that the Atonement is a fact to-day. It is in modern life. Just as all the colours of the spectrum are in all the sunlight of every day, however dim that light at times may be, so the whole glory of God's holiness and love revealed by Christ on Calvary are real and operative around us through all the world to-day. This means of course that God is constantly being and doing for us what Jesus was and did on Calvary. Let us try to get at close quarters with this. First, the mind of Christ as shown on Calvary is the mind of God to-day. And the feature of Calvary which is most characteristic is pain, it is the unmerited suffering of the Holy One. This it is that has made all the world pause to marvel, this it is that has sent a thrill and shock through all the human race like the sudden quiver of a galvanic battery, so that the ideals and institutions and

very characters of men are shattered and changed. That Christ thus died—prematurely, unjustly, horribly—“is the wonderful thing, the shocking thing, the thing that has wrenched the whole trend and tendency of human history into a new course. ‘Jesus died’ is a phrase which, like some monstrous magic incantation, has set new and unexpected forces free in the world, and beaten another host of forces back into Hades.”<sup>1</sup> I have said that the characteristic thing about Calvary is the pain. That, however, is not quite true. The characteristic thing is pain on our behalf, and because of our sin. His death was not *mere* suffering. It had a moral purpose in it. It was pain because of sin, and in order to salvation. Jesus was able to appreciate nature—we know how He loved it all. He also delighted in human intercourse and loved life along with His friends, and it must have been bitter for Him to leave it all and set His face steadily towards the Cross. But all this was as nothing compared with the agony which beset Him as He saw the sin of the world. It was not the Roman executioner nor the Pharisaic scoffer that hurt Him really—it was the sinful heart of the world that rejected His love and His Father.

Now in all this we see into the heart of God. Every sin of man pains Him. Every touch of impurity or greed or falsehood grieves His Holy Spirit. Every time we sin God is crucified afresh. What was once in our world on the Cross, is, so long as sin continue, in the unseen world, in God’s heart.

Next, Jesus had a forgiving and saving purpose. He was bent upon destroying the sin that seemed to destroy Him. He proved immediately to be, by His death, stronger than sin. How so? Because He set up in men’s hearts a conquering hatred of sin. When we see what Christ suffered because of sin, we see how hateful a thing it is, we see it in its true colours. “The nature of dynamite is seen in

<sup>1</sup> See *Atonement and Progress*, by the present writer.

the explosion, the nature of prussic acid is seen in death by poisoning, and the nature of sin is seen in the undeserved sufferings of Jesus which offer a vista of spiritual pain to our vision which we know to be beyond anything we ourselves could suffer." But not only does Jesus reveal the nature of sin. He also reveals the nature of holiness. The world has set Him on high as the type of the good man once and for all. He fulfils and transcends all prophecies. His reality makes all imagined supermen foolishness and shams.

Jesus, then, sets before us the vision of sin in all its horror as something to be shunned, and the vision of holiness in all its beauty as what the soul eternally must seek. But these are not mere visions. They are not merely poetic imaginings on the part of Jesus. They are not the creation of a moral of religious genius, without any necessary contact with the facts of daily life. This purpose of Jesus to suffer all that we may be saved, and to show us the way of life at all hazards, is a revelation of the heart and purpose and practice of God. If we look into the heart of the eternal Father we see there both the grief and pain of Jesus on account of sin, and also His unalterable determination to grapple with sin and finally overcome it.

What we see, then, in Calvary is a revelation of the eternal nature and purpose of God. It shows God's repugnance and hatred for sin, and His determination at all hazards, even at the hazard of Himself coming into horrible contact with sin, of saving the children He loves from the enemy. As a mother will fling herself with bare hands upon the wolf in order to save her children, so God grapples with our sin. The Cross of Calvary, then, is on the one hand the exhibition of the very heart and purpose of God, and on the other hand the explanation and characterisation of the whole sweep of human experience upwards. The movement of mankind

from its blind primitive gropings toward the greater light, to twentieth century grapplings with doubt and with social evil, is summed up in the Cross which is the symbol of the Atonement. The death of Jesus compresses into a few pulsations the age-long redeeming work of God ; it is the pivot upon which the human race is being swung heavenwards ; it is the fulcrum by means of which the love of God up-levers sin. More simply expressed, on the Cross God is saving the world. God's whole effective work for and upon man is of the order of the Cross. His Atonement is not momentary but perpetual, not incidental but essential, not a gift but a giving, not a transaction but a process.

Now if all this be true, we see the immense importance of the Atonement to modern life. Surely there can never have been a greater dissatisfaction with human life than there is to-day. The keenest thinkers of the age are impatient of human frailty and folly. They cry out for the Superman. They have mighty visions of a possible nobler humanity. Says Mr. Bernard Shaw : " Are we agreed that Life is a force which has made innumerable experiments in organising itself ; that the mammoth and the man, the mouse and the megatherium, . . . are all more or less successful attempts to build up that new force into higher and higher individuals, the ideal individual being omnipotent, omniscient, infallible, and withal completely, unilludedly self-conscious : in short, a god ? " Well, so far so good. We will not quarrel with Mr. Shaw's phrase, but recognise here, what is very general, a desire to escape the pettiness, folly, and weakness of men : a desire which is really, out of sight as it were to Mr. Shaw himself, a desire for salvation from sin. But the question is, how are we to get this higher manhood ? Too many of our modern advocates of supermanhood call us to go by the way of impulse, self-expression, getting all we desire at all costs. Fatal error ! That has been the way of many—it



has been tried by innumerable Neros and Leopolds, and is now being tried by every contemptible little debauchee in London. The real way toward the superman is the way of the Cross. Self is not the world-movement : selfishness is not the power that fashions a noble destiny for mankind : self-seeking is not the mood and might of the God who sways the ages—Atonement is the world-movement : self-giving is the power : Calvary is the way of God.

In the twentieth century the power of God comes into operation as men share the spirit and way of living of Jesus. God calls for men who will live their lives from His point of view and with His purpose revealed on Calvary. It is the Christ of Calvary who holds the key to the future. He is the true master and fulfiller of modern social aspirations. He is the true inspirer of men who seek by their own lives and labours to uplift mankind. For He did not count it worth while to be on an equality with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men ; and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the Cross. And because this Christ is real and living to-day, the very God in our midst, He is master of the morrow, as well as of modern life. I shall never forget the thrill that passed through a great assembly of three thousand people gathered last summer in Philadelphia when the Rev. J. T. Forbes, of Glasgow, said in his impressive way : " If I had to deliver a dying message to-day it would be, Let us be Christians without compromise." That is, let us make way for the Atonement spirit, the Spirit of God in our own lives, that we may be channels by which the untiring love of God may flood our world. Let us believe that whenever a high impulse moves in us to give rather than to get, whenever we are ready, at our own cost and charges, to arrest and destroy the suffering of others, whenever in business we put the



general interest before our own, whenever we cast our influence and possessions, despite pain, into the stock of human good—we are not acting as curious exceptions to universal law, nor led merely by the sentiment of a weakling, but are in vital touch with the eternal and redeeming work of the God of the ages, we are caught up into the central movement of God as he reveals Himself peculiarly and characteristically in the work of Atonement. Let us also be sure that the mighty surge of life to-day, lifting and bearing away structures that have divided and perplexed mankind for ages, and pulsing with the aspirations and tears of millions of souls, ringing with indignation in face of modern civilisation, and moving toward a vaguely imagined nobler life for the human brotherhood, is not a mere temporary fashion in feeling, or quaint vagary of our weird human nature, but is rightly to be interpreted only when we see it in the light of Calvary and know that the God who would reconcile us to Himself at so great a cost, is ever in our midst with the same purpose, the same self-giving, and the same power of conquering love.

NEWTON H. MARSHALL.

## *THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.*

### X. THE ALTERNATIVE : IMPERSONAL POWER OR PERSONAL GOD.

ACCORDING to the teaching of Paul, there is nothing really and in the highest sense true except (1) the axiom that God is, (2) what arises inexorably and necessarily out of this fundamental principle. The universe around us, then, becomes intelligible to us only through its relation to God, the original power, which gives reality to all the rest of things.

There are some who prefer to regard this primal reality under the impersonal term "power" or "force" or "energy." For many purposes it is immaterial to us at the moment whether you speak and think of "the power which constitutes," or "God who constitutes the whole." After all, distinction of gender is here merely figurative ; the nearer one comes to the Divine, the less important does such a distinction become ; in common experience you observe that "it" and "which" are used nearly as much as the personal pronoun and relative about the child in the first months or years of its life, and as Wordsworth says, the young child is nearest to the Divine :

Trailing clouds of glory do we come  
From God, who is our home :  
Heaven lies about us in our infancy !  
Shades of the prison-house begin to close  
Upon the growing Boy,  
But he beholds the light . . .  
At length the Man perceives it die away  
And fade into the light of common day.

The difference lies in the recognition of personality ; but one need not, therefore, quarrel with those who prefer

the impersonal form, "the force which constitutes the whole," to the personal form. That difference stands apart from our purpose; and we welcome the admission that a certain unifying principle does give intelligibility to the universe; and that this principle is not immobility, but force or energy. We prefer to give a personal form to the fundamental proposition; and we believe that those who choose the impersonal form miss much of true philosophic thought. This impersonal statement of the first principle in the Universe leaves no place in its philosophy for man, and man then becomes an alien, so to say an impertinence or an anachronism, in the scheme of the universe. Such a principle, if it remains hard and does not develop towards a recognition of personality, must lead at last to the Oriental non-Hebrew systems of thought, which find the necessary goal and true end of human existence in shaking off human nature and becoming once more merged in the ultimate and primary energy.

Still we must welcome the recognition of this one constituting "force" as a stage in thought, which is likely sooner or later to produce the consciousness that this is a half-way position; and we therefore find in it an approximation to a better statement of the one ultimate nature. Here we have room and atmosphere wherein to work. On the contrary, we had neither room nor atmosphere in that dull and blind materialism out of which, during the last half of the nineteenth century, scientific theory was gradually and slowly struggling.

To Paul, however, the distinction between the personal and the impersonal expression was, in a religious view, vital—certainly vital in his ordinary preaching. Only misapprehension and misdirection could result if he addressed the masses in terms that might seem to admit the distinction as indifferent; for it is not indifferent, but vital.

There are, however, degrees of opposition. Some forms of religion or of philosophy were more hateful to him, and were regarded by him as more hostile, than others. The superstition and idolatry of the ordinary Anatolian cults were especially detested by him.

Paul knew well that there is a time for everything, and that only among them that are full grown should he speak philosophy.<sup>1</sup> Most dangerous was it to talk philosophically among the Corinthians, a middle-class audience, who possessed that half-education or quarter-education which is worse than a lesser degree of education combined with greater rustic sympathy with external nature. Among them he must insist in the most emphatic terms on the simple and absolute personality of the Divine power and message; he must "preach the Gospel not in philosophic terms," lest the philosophy might make unintelligible the truth about the redeeming death of Jesus.<sup>2</sup> In speaking to this kind of audience he perceived that he must have in his mind nothing save Jesus Christ and Him crucified.<sup>3</sup> To a simpler almost rustic audience he could speak in terms that were wider and less precise, and bid them "turn from these vain things unto a living God."<sup>4</sup>

Paul had experimented in the more philosophic style of address, when he was engaged in discussion with the philosophic teachers of Athens and was required to explain his doctrine before the Court of Areopagus and the audience

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 6.

<sup>2</sup> To preach the Gospel: not in wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made void, 1 Cor. i. 17.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 12: so in Acts xviii. 5.

<sup>4</sup> So the American Revisers rightly. The English Revisers wrongly retain from the Authorised Version "the living God." I shall generally cite the American Revision, which appears to me superior to the English [Revision. Many [years] ago I was struck with the fact that, when I tested any case, in which the American preference is indicated in the list at the end of the English Revised Version, it proved better than the English.

of interested and curious persons who always thronged the courts in that period (as we know from Pliny to have been the case later in the century), and whose keen partisanship and applause or disapproval were more powerful influences even with professional lawyers than the opinion and verdict of judge and jury. There he used a non-personal form of expression: "What therefore ye worship in ignorance, this I set forth unto you"; and perhaps also a sentence or two later "that they might seek the Divine, if haply they might feel after it and find it";<sup>1</sup> and certainly afterwards "we ought not to think that what is Divine [or 'the Godhead'] is like unto gold or silver or stone, graven by art." Paul's purpose in this address is to start from the admission of this universal principle, the Divine nature as immanent in the whole universe including man, who is its progeny, and to argue that his audience must logically take the needed further steps, first to regard the Divine as a personal God, and second to understand the purpose of God in regard to man through the mission of "the man whom he hath ordained," and finally to comprehend the ideas of final judgment and the resurrection of Jesus.

Incidentally I may take this opportunity of acknowledging that I went too far in my book called *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, p. 252, when I declared that the Apostle "was disappointed and perhaps disillusionised by his experience in Athens. He felt that he had gone at least as far as was right in the way of presenting his doctrine in a form suited to the current philosophy; and apparently the result had been little more than naught." I did not allow sufficiently for adaptation to different classes of hearers, the tradesmen and middle-classes of Corinth, or the more strictly university and

<sup>1</sup> Acts xvii. 27. Western authorities read the neuter gender in 27, as all good MSS. have in 29.



philosophic class in Athens. It is true (as there shown) that Luke recognised and recorded the change in style of preaching at Corinth ; but on the other hand it is improbable that Luke would have preserved a careful report of the address at Athens, if he had not recognised it as typical of Paul when speaking to an educated Hellenic audience. Whether it is true that Paul felt disappointed with the results of this address, and resolved to change his method always and permanently to the purely and completely personal evangel, we cannot say. The fact is certain, that (as both Luke and himself mention) he did adopt the latter method definitely and emphatically at Corinth ; yet the inference is also equally certain that both Luke and Paul must have regarded as justifiable in suitable circumstances the other method, viz., taking the impersonal philosophic position as his basis and upon this foundation building up his doctrine of the personality of this primal force, the purpose and plan of the personal (as Paul would say, the living) God in regard to man, and the rest of his evangelical teaching. If he used the latter method less, his choice implied no disapproval of the method as wrong, but only a preference for the other method as more effective.

We notice also, in passing, that Luke marks his report as being only a brief account of a speech, for he implies in v. 18<sup>1</sup> that the listeners caught the word "Anastasis" on Paul's lips, misunderstood it, and mocked at it as the name of a strange deity. Now the word does not occur in Luke's report, but only a cognate verb in inflected form. The actual noun must probably have been used in the address as it was spoken ; and Luke here leaves a proof

<sup>1</sup> Although v. 18 refers generally to the language which was characteristic of Paul at Athens, and not specially to the address before Areopagus, Luke gives this address because it was characteristic, and must therefore have intended that the noun should be understood as implied in the verb.

that he is giving his own summary of a much longer address : that the address was long may also be inferred from the wish of the audience that it should be cut short, though the wish was expressed politely in the form that "we will hear thee concerning this yet again."

In Paul's attitude towards a philosophic statement of the nature of God, we perceive the Hellenic and philosophic side of his mind. The doctrine of an impersonal Divine nature or Divine power may be taken as the beginning of a recognition of the higher truth. Knowledge or truth in religion is not to Paul a hard, definite fact presented in the unchangeable terms of a creed or confession : it is a living idea, capable of infinite growth towards the higher truth, or of perversion and degeneration through being misunderstood and overgrown by error. The idea, though in a sense imperfect, is true while it is growing towards truth. The force through which it grows is Divine.

## XI. THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD.

The true end of life is to attain, or in more accurate language to realise, the righteousness of God in the personality of the individual man. This term, "the righteousness of God," is a wonderful and exquisite expression, concentrating in itself the whole of Paul's aspirations and theory and teaching. His aspirations are his teaching. He is what he teaches, and he teaches what he is. To him "to live is Christ," and the goal is a higher life attained through the term of death, for it is "rich to die, to cease upon the midnight with no pain," and thus to enter by the gates of death into the new and higher life. That process is always going on, moment after moment : the old perishes, and the new begins, because the new is only a transformation of the old, as the fundamental or constitutive force of life passes out of

one state or one form into another ; and this constitutive force is God.

Of this force (which is God) in man, the life, the reality, the essence, lies in progress towards the goal. Attainment is the reaching of the goal ; and the goal is in a sense attained in every moment and in every effort by which the man strives onwards towards it. Yet the goal is not attained if the effort is relaxed and the process of continuous attainment stops. So long as the effort is maintained, the goal is being always attained, and yet it is not attained : it is reached, and yet it still lies in front. Here you are once more placed in presence of the same apparent contradiction which is expressed in that typical passage from Philippians iii. 10 ff. (as quoted in Section IX.) ; <sup>1</sup> and the solution lies in the idea of growth, evolution, development, the continuous reaching forward towards the higher life, the forgetting of what has already been attained, the strengthening in man of the Divine possibility which is innate in him, and thereby the growth into conformity with Jesus, in whom that Divine element wholly overmastered the human element and reigned supreme.

The "righteousness of God" is not to be thought of as a quality or characteristic which is possessed by God, or of which God could divest Himself. The nature and being of God is righteousness : that is involved in the axiom that God is good. The same righteousness belongs also to man in the sense that it is the goal and end which man has to attain. This righteousness is God, and it may come into the possession of man. Just as God is love, so God is righteousness ; and just as man may become possessed of love, so He may come to possess righteousness.

St. Paul, then, as we saw in Section IX., could declare that he (i.e., every saint, every true Christian) possessed

<sup>1</sup> EXPOSITOR, Feb., 1912, p. 145.

that "righteousness of God" which was the goal and ultimate end of his whole life and work, that he had attained already that salvation which he was to gain as the prize of the race of life. Is this a permissible and justifiable mode of expression? Is this the sound and true teaching? Such is a question that may arise at this point; and it may be answered with an unhesitating affirmative. The case may be thus illustrated by turning to another question: Do we possess freedom of will or not? Freedom of the will is that to which we may attain as the crown of growth and the prize of life; but we do not possess it to begin with, nor do we possess it in our life. Our will is largely enslaved by external conditions; yet we have the potentiality of freedom, and we can grow towards the realisation of it. Thus we possess freedom of will, because we can attain towards it if we live aright, and the process of attaining is the proof of our possession. We are free, because we can be free. We have freedom, because we are able to attain freedom. So it is with righteousness. In the attaining towards it, we have already grasped it. He who is growing towards it, has it reckoned to him as his own, according to Paul's expression. It is counted to him because it is his—through the grace of God working in him and through his new life, for he is new born, new made.

This "accounting of a person as righteous" who has never previously done anything good or righteous<sup>1</sup> is, therefore, not retrospective, and does not merely imply that his sin is forgiven. Mere forgiveness of sin by God would be a purely negative idea; but here we are in presence of a positive power or force. That a man's sins are forgiven does not make him righteous. A parent may forgive his son, or a friend may forgive his neighbour; but thereby the son or the

<sup>1</sup> So Paul says emphatically in Romans iv. 5.

neighbour need not necessarily benefit so as to become better ; very often he is no better, and the process may have to be repeated even to seventy times seven, and still be required again and yet again. We want something positive, some energy in the man who is forgiven, before the "righteousness of God" is reckoned to him. There is not here involved any fictitious imputing of righteousness (as it were by a "legal fiction") ; still less is there any actual imparting of righteousness to a man who had none (as if so much money were placed to the credit of a bankrupt). The man himself is remade, and righteousness grows in him through his faith in a Divine idea, and the power that this exercises over his whole nature. This growing righteousness is, in the most real sense, the righteousness of God, the righteousness which is God. The growing tree is the tree, and yet it is only attaining to the perfect tree.

The process then is threefold : it originates from faith, it takes place by means of faith, and it results in faith (*ἐκ πίστεως, διὰ πίστεως, εἰς πίστιν*). The three expressions are not conjoined in any sentence of Paul's writing, although we have here brought them together. The first and third are conjoined in the splendid expression of Romans i. 17, "therein [in the Gospel] is revealed a righteousness of God from faith unto faith," and this follows after the words, "the Gospel . . . is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." The two expressions "from faith" or "by faith" (*ἐκ πίστεως*) and "through faith" or "by faith" (*διὰ πίστεως*) approximate closely to one another. The former tends to be used where the ruling thought in Paul's mind is of the Divine power acting on or in the man's nature, and the latter when the thought rather is of faith working from within the man's nature outwards.

These two manifestations of faith are really, however, one. The power of God exists in and through man. As we saw



in Section VIII., a God who remains apart from and uninterested in man does not fulfil the first axiom that God is : He must show Himself in and through man. A God that is mere negative creative possibility is not the real and living God. God, in order to be really God, must be a positive creating power. Through man God shows Himself in His real and living power. Not merely is it true that there must be God. It is equally true that there must be man, in whom the power of God manifests itself. Hence the faith which works from without on the nature of man is identical with the faith that works from within the nature of man. The former finds its expression in the latter.

The result of the power of faith in action is to recreate or to reinvigorate itself. It grows by itself through expressing itself in deed. The condition of faith is that it must express itself : it must create, because it is essentially creative : it is of God, and like God it exists and lives through exerting itself. Faith is a force, not a mere dead fact ; and a force that does not act, but remains passive, has ceased to be a force. The faith which exists in a man's nature, therefore, must either drive him on into action, or cease and die. Further, the nature of this force is to grow stronger through exerting itself. Where faith has once entered, it becomes forthwith the driving power in the man's character : it absorbs into itself all the man's nature and mind : there remains nothing else alongside of it within the man : all else is subordinated to it and driven on by it. This power is capable of infinite expansion. Through its activity it grows ; and, as the man's entire nature is now summed up in it, that nature grows stronger through action. In each step forward that the man takes under the impulse of this power of faith, he leaves behind him the old self and assumes a new self. He recreates himself in growing, i.e., in acting ; or rather, " it is no longer I that live," as Paul says, " but

Christ liveth in me " <sup>1</sup> and through me. The Divine power having once seized on the man must be single and progressively victorious, going on from strength to strength ; or it must die out in the degeneration of the man's nature.

There is, however, a certain tendency in man always to rest content with the present moment and the present condition. Even when man has once attained, that tendency towards contentment and acquiescence may come into operation. But there can be no contentment and self-realisation (which is the realisation of the Divine element in man) that can last beyond the moment, for the Divine, the righteousness of God, lies always in front ; and one has not yet, at any moment in the course, attained. To cease effort is to permit the beginning of degradation, i.e., " to die." One cannot remain as one was. If progress and effort stop, deterioration begins.

A driving power, therefore, is needed, not merely in the first effort, by which one turns one's back on sin and struggles towards righteousness, but in the sequel. The new effort is a new start, each new effort is again the first step, in a process that stretches onward towards God. The past effort, which gained one stage, forthwith is left behind, and another effort is needed. In each and every effort the driving force is the same ; it is faith, belief in the ideal, the firm conviction that God is good. One starts from faith, one makes the succeeding steps by means of faith, and at each step one attains to a higher power of faith.

The idea that God is working out by a process that extends through the ages the issue of salvation for the individual man, is expressed very clearly in Romans viii. 28-30. First of all, in verse 28, Paul puts in the strongest terms as a starting point his fundamental principle, that God is good : " We know that to them that love God all things work together for

<sup>1</sup> Galatians ii. 20, a passage that must constantly be quoted.

good, *even* to them that are called according to *His* purpose." Everything that happens, however painful or hard, contributes to benefit those who love God ; but such apparent trials and blows of fate must not be contemplated in too narrow a view. In the narrow view they seem calamities ; but if you take a wider view, if you contemplate life as a whole, if you observe how all the circumstances and conditions of life " work together " in the order and purpose of the world, then you find that the total effect is purely for good. Hence the further definition is added : " they that love God " are explained as " they that are called according to His purpose."

Here the will and " counsel of God " (as Homer, *Iliad* i. 5, and the great Greeks would call it) is introduced. This Hellenic and philosophic view is always found moderating and informing Paul's thought. That " counsel " works itself out to its final end through the tangle and confusion of the mixed good and evil of human fortunes ; and the medley of good and evil becomes intelligible only through the Divine will which can be traced in it. Nothing can be understood except in its relation to God. His will is the principle of order which gives unity to the mass of contradictions and difficulties ; and this order expresses itself as growth or development or evolution.

This process or evolution is stated in the next two verses : " Whom He foreknew, He also foreordained to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren ; and whom He foreordained, them He also called ; and whom He called, them He also justified [i.e. caused to be righteous] ; and whom He justified, them He also glorified." God with perfect knowledge saw and knew the whole universe : in other words, the universe is the unfolding in time of His purpose. From the human point of view this knowledge is entitled foreknowledge ; but, in the

nature of the Eternal "I am," this knowledge is only the outlook over the universe as a whole, outside of time, on the plane of eternity, i.e. as present, permanent, real. Towards this permanence Paul is always looking ; for it he longs (as we saw in Section IX.), and he finds it only in God.

This knowledge or foreknowledge of the character and situation of each individual implies the marking out already before their birth of certain individuals to attain the end and consummation of human life, which is that they should grow into conformity with the image and personality of Jesus—for such is (as we have seen) the perfection and goal of man to Paul. It also leads to the calling at the proper moment, "i.e. the fulness of the time," of these individuals ; as for example Paul says about himself in Galatians i. 15 : "when it was the good pleasure of God, who marked me out from before my birth, and called me through His grace, to reveal His Son in me, that I might preach Him," carrying into effect the long-preparing purpose of God. This calling is the act of God, originating from His good will and choice ; but at the same time the choice is not merely arbitrary or capricious ; it is the carrying into effect of a plan in accordance with the nature of the universe and of the individual ; and it presupposes that the individual on his part is able to hear the call and to respond to it.

In the calling, as in the foreknowledge, it is also implied as the certain and necessary sequence that the individual is justified, i.e., that his course turns towards the good and that the idea of the good and the aspiration after the good take possession of his whole nature and personality, so that he struggles with all his might towards the true end of human life and towards perfect conformity with Jesus. It also is implied that this course is ultimately successful, and that the consummation is attained and the individual is "glorified."

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## ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

### I

#### PROLEGOMENA

OURS is an age of new things. In no province is this more apparent than in that of New Testament interpretation. And no section of the New Testament continues to stimulate more revolutionary theories than the Pauline Epistles. It is true that discussions of authenticity have lost the importance assigned to them by scholars of the earlier time, like Baur, or by later critical investigators, like Van Manen. The emphasis has been shifted. The primary question at issue is the essential nature of St. Paul's view of the Christian faith.

The answers given to the question are extraordinarily divergent. Scholars of the calibre of Holtzmann and Deissmann are still convinced that the clue to Pauline Christianity is to be found in the conversion-experience of the apostle. A. Schweitzer, in his recently published *Geschichte der Paulinischen Forschung* (Tübingen, 1911), believes that Paul's doctrine is "simply and exclusively eschatological" (p. 190). For Loisy, Paul has been the chief factor in transforming the original Gospel of Jesus into "a religion of mystery." Professor K. Lake holds that "Christianity . . . was always, at least in Europe, a Mystery-Religion" (*Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 215), and his statement that "Baptism is, for St. Paul and his readers, universally and unquestionably accepted as a 'mystery,' a sacrament which works *ex opere operato*" (p. 385), along with others of the



same drift, suggests that the Apostle of the Gentiles played a prominent part in creating such a type of Christianity.

It is obvious that if this mystery-theory of Pauline Christianity can be established, many of our fundamental ideas regarding the Apostle's religious outlook will require to be transformed. We must courageously face such a transformation if the facts demand it. In the following articles we propose to examine some of the available evidence and to ascertain how far it leads.

It is impossible, however, to appreciate the influences to which St. Paul and his converts were exposed, without attempting briefly to sketch, in the light of recent research, the religious atmosphere of the Hellenistic world, at the time when the new faith began to be propagated throughout the Roman Empire. It is needless to say that here we are supremely indebted to the investigations of Cumont, P. Wendland, Reitzenstein, Bousset, and Dieterich. We shall discuss, in turn, the religious revival associated with Stoicism, more especially those elements in it which may be largely attributed to the famous Stoic-Peripatetic, Posidonius; the Orphic strain so widely diffused over the Hellenistic area; certain influential tendencies appearing prominently in those Oriental cults which began to press westwards; and, finally, various significant features of current (popular) religion which, for convenience' sake, may be grouped under the designation of Earlier Gnosticism. It will often be difficult to draw sharp lines of division between those divergent but related phases of religious thought and aspiration.

It has long since been recognised that Stoicism <sup>1</sup> con-

<sup>1</sup> By "Stoicism" we mean that phase of development in the Stoic school which had become highly eclectic, adopting to a large extent Platonic conceptions, more particularly in its idea of God. See Wendland, *Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*, p. 154, note 3.

tributed many of the elements best fitted to satisfy popular cravings at the time when the national faiths of the Graeco-Roman world were falling to pieces. The general drift towards a more or less vague monotheism was accelerated by a process, mediated in great measure, at least, by prominent Stoic teachers. This was the transformation of earlier deities, with the help of the allegorical method, into a hierarchy of hypostases of the supreme Divinity. Many of the Hellenistic speculations dealing with *νοῦς*, *λόγος*, *σοφία*, etc., have their origin in this circle of thought, and their bizarre outcome is apparent in the more fully-developed Gnostic systems. This type of theologising had a unique attractiveness from the Stoic point of view. The trained intellect regarded the abstractions referred to as attributes of the highest Deity, or as beings having a quasi-independent existence beside Deity.<sup>1</sup> In such an aspect they did not contradict the fundamental pantheism of Stoic thought. On the other hand, they were sure to be interpreted by the popular mind as separate divinities, belonging to a purer mythology than that which they had discarded. But, in effect, they ministered to a far higher religious ideal than the earlier, just because their function was to lead men's minds beyond themselves to the Divine Source from which they emanated, and apart from which they had no real existence.

But this effort of Stoicism was not merely an artifice. It was not merely a compromise between truth and error, intended to preserve what was useful in the beliefs of the masses, while paving the way for a higher type of religion. Through the instrumentality, mainly, of Oriental teachers, the doctrine came to be associated with a Mysticism which had far-reaching influence. An important feature of the transformation-process which we have described was the

<sup>1</sup> See Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, pp. 234, 235.

metamorphosis of the Elements of the Kosmos into Divine forces. Of course we are here reminded of an original element-worship, e.g., in Babylonia and Persia. In that quarter of Asia, also, from the most primitive times, the worship of the starry heavens had not only been an all-powerful feature in practical religion, but had gradually been developed by a learned priesthood along theoretical lines. The development seems to have been conditioned by the advancing knowledge of astronomy, so that here there emerged a notable combination between science and faith. But the ancient Chaldaean worship passed into a new phase under the influence of Hellenised Orientals, and, pre-eminently, of Posidonius, the renowned Stoic of Apamea in Syria.

The acute investigations of scholars like Cumont and Wendland have succeeded in demonstrating that Posidonius was perhaps the most remarkable figure of the transition period between the old era and the new. Cumont describes him <sup>1</sup> as a scholar of encyclopædic knowledge, a rhetorician of a rich and harmonious style, the builder of "a vast system whose summit was the adoration of that God who penetrates the universal organism and manifests Himself with clearest purity and radiance in the brightness of the stars." Posidonius was probably supreme among those Platonising Stoic teachers, who liberated the abstruse and formal astral worship from the domain of the purely intellectual, and wedded it to the highest emotions. For him a reverent contemplation of the heavens culminated in a mystic ecstasy. The soul which is stirred to its depths by the vision of the starry sky is itself akin to that upon which it gazes. For it was a Stoic doctrine that the soul is a fragment detached from the cosmic fires. Like is drawn to like.

<sup>1</sup> *Le Mysticisme astral*, Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres. Acad. Royale de Belgique, 1909, 5, p. 259.

The rapture of contemplation becomes real communion. The gazer is possessed by a divine love. He cannot rest until he participates in the divinity of those living, sparkling beings above. And the experience is intimately associated with ethical purity. Thus, the astrological writer, Vettius Valens, p. 242, 15 (ed. Kroll) : " I desired to obtain a divine and adoring contemplation of the heavens and to purify my ways of all wickedness and all defilement." In an impressive passage Cumont contrasts the calm ecstasy of this sidereal mysticism with the delirious transports of Dionysiac worship.<sup>1</sup>

Its influence in Hellenistic religious thought was very notable. It seems practically certain<sup>2</sup> that Philo was largely indebted to Posidonius in some of his finest mystical ideas,<sup>3</sup> and numerous echoes of his doctrine are found, e.g., in Cicero and Seneca. One of the most convincing evidences of the religious domination of Posidonius appears in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *περὶ κόσμου*, which has been carefully investigated by W. Capelle.<sup>4</sup> The book is a document of the current popular philosophy, dating, probably, from the beginning of the second century A.D. The author begins with a survey of the realm of nature, dealing with various sciences such as meteorology and geography. But the treatise reaches its climax in what is truly a religious meditation upon the harmony of the kosmos in God, from whom and through whom all has its being.<sup>5</sup> Here, therefore, there is presented a religious view of the world, based on a virtual monotheism, which has its foundations in Posidonius'

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 268, 269.

<sup>2</sup> Apelt, *De rationibus quibusdam quae Philoni Alexandrino cum Posidonio intercedunt*.

<sup>3</sup> See an instructive conspectus of passages in the appendix to Cumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-282.

<sup>4</sup> *Neue Jahrb. f. Klass. Altert.*, 1905, pp. 529-568.

<sup>5</sup> See especially *op. cit.*, pp. 556, 563.



re-shaping of the ancient astral worship of Babylon by means of Stoic-Platonic conceptions.

We have emphasised this remarkable strain of thought in St. Paul's Hellenistic environment because, while in certain situations it would inevitably be implicated in the ritual of a cult,<sup>1</sup> it bears witness to the existence of a yearning for communion with God, which could be felt and expressed without the aid of those sensuous ceremonies, so often scarcely distinguishable from magic.

But the development of religious ideas, highly important in their bearing on the appeal of the Christian mission, had been proceeding from another direction. This was distinctly ritual in its origin, and probably continued all along to be associated with mystic rites. Plato,<sup>2</sup> in some of his most remarkable speculations on the destiny of the soul (e.g., *Phaedo*, 69 C, 70 C), speaks of οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς and of a παλαιός τις λόγος, references which, from their contexts, are obviously to be assigned to that cycle of thought known as Orphism. Its origins are shrouded in obscurity. Miss J. E. Harrison, in her fascinating exposition of the Orphic movement,<sup>3</sup> collects and emphasises the ancient evidence for the historicity of Orpheus, "a real man, a mighty singer, a prophet and a teacher, bringing with him a new religion, seeking to reform an old one" (*op. cit.*, p. 470). While her arguments are not entirely convincing, it is plain that from the sixth century B.C.<sup>4</sup> there had been a remarkable re-moulding of certain central elements in the older Dionysus-worship, which was to have far-reaching influence in the Hellenistic world. This refining of grosser ideas is found embodied in mystic doctrines im-

<sup>1</sup> We know, e.g., that Posidonius believed in divination.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Burnet would say, Socrates. See the introduction to his recently-published edition of the *Phaedo*.

<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, pp. 455-659.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*,<sup>2</sup> ii. p. 105.



parted to the initiated. The writers on Greek religion often speak of Orphic sects or communities. And such there must have been. But it seems highly probable that at a comparatively early stage they would become syncretistic. The Orphic tablets found in Southern Italy<sup>1</sup> bear out the references in Greek authors to a connexion between this type of doctrine and Pythagoreanism. Anrich<sup>2</sup> would make them contemporary growths, exercising a direct and decisive influence upon each other. We prefer to suspend judgment on the precise nature of their mutual relations.<sup>3</sup> It appears certain that they came into contact, and probably elements common to both go back to the Dionysus-cult. In any case, the Orphic doctrines seem to have been rapidly diffused.

The relation of Orphism to the Dionysus-cult is of primary importance. Both had come to Greece by way of the north. Fundamental for the Dionysiac religion was the delirious frenzy, common to all orgiastic ritual, in which the votary believed himself to be possessed by his deity. See Euripides, *Bacchae* (ed. Wecklein), 300 f. :

ὅταν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸ σῶμ' ἔλθῃ πολὺς,  
λέγειν τὸ μέλλον τοὺς μεμνηνότες ποιεῖ.

The union was felt to be so complete that the person possessed came to be called by the name of the god. To attain this condition was virtually to share in the immortal life of the divinity. And no doubt, even in the crudest form of their *ἐνθουσιασμός*, in which the worshippers identified the bull which they slew and devoured raw with the god himself, there were dim hints of a craving for a life which should defy the restrictions of mortality. The Orphic sects

<sup>1</sup> See Prof. Gilbert Murray's appendix to Miss Harrison's *Prolegomena*.

<sup>2</sup> *Das Antike Mysterienwesen*, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> As Dieterich cogently observes, the genuinely ancient Pythagorean revelations have still to be determined (*Abraxas*, p. 127, note 3).

seem to have adhered more or less closely to the Dionysiac ritual, but they liberated it from savage excesses, elevating its central conception of union with the god, and, as a preparation for this highest religious attainment, inculcating a life of austere purity. Whether or not we can be as sure as is Miss Harrison of a personal Orpheus, there is probably abundant truth in her statement (which will apply to the action of a community as well as to that of an individual): "The great step that Orpheus took was that, while he kept the old Bacchic faith that man might become a god, he altered the conception of what a god was, and he sought to obtain that godhead by wholly different means. The grace he sought was not physical intoxication, but spiritual ecstasy, the means he adopted not drunkenness but abstinence and rites of purification."<sup>1</sup>

It is possible that Orphism had cultivated an ascetic life before its association with the religion of Dionysus. But from this time onwards the significance of its cathartic ritual and practice has a new emphasis. Purity is needful in order to be set free from the "cycle of births" (κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως). It takes the form especially of ὁσιότης, consecration. The man who is fully initiated in the Orphic rites is ὁσιωθεῖς. What that involves is suggested by the mystic formulae of the Compagno tablet. In answer to the confession of the mystic: "Out of the pure I come. . . . For I also avow me that I am of your blessed race. . . . I have flown out of the sorrowful weary wheel. . . . I have passed with eager feet from the circle desired," the assurance is given: "Happy and blessed one, thou shalt be god instead of mortal."<sup>2</sup> That these cathartic rites were often degraded, there is evidence in many Greek writers, e.g., Plato, *Republ.*, 364 B, 364 E. Apparently the purifying priest

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 477.

<sup>2</sup> J. E. Harrison, *Op. cit.*, p. 586.

was able to carry on a lucrative business among the credulous, and his ritual was mixed up with all manner of superstition and trickery. But that is a feature involved in the history of all religious movements. The new emphasis on purity was destined to make an ever-widening appeal and to rank as one of the most impressive factors in the evolution of Hellenic religion.

The reference above to the "cycle of births" reminds us of the existence of an Orphic theology, with elaborate speculations on the origin of the world and the human soul, implicated in Greek mythology, whose legends of Dionysus are interpreted as a picture of the fortunes of the soul.<sup>1</sup> To discuss this aspect of Orphism is alien to our purpose. We mention it because in the Hellenistic period with which we are directly concerned, fragments of Orphic theogonies are found widely diffused. It is possible that from the beginning these contained Oriental elements (Babylonian?)<sup>2</sup> In the course of their diffusion they came into direct contact with the various types of Oriental speculation. So that by the opening centuries of our era Orphism had been swept into that many-sided syncretistic movement which must be regarded as the source of the main currents of belief and systems of belief usually designated by the safely indefinite title of Gnosticism. There is enough evidence to indicate that from the sixth century B.C. onwards, the Orphic strain of religion had never died out. The collection of hymns which has survived,<sup>3</sup> and whose redaction in their present form is assigned by Dieterich<sup>4</sup> to the second century A.D., contains elements of high antiquity. But in the Hellenistic period Orphism received new life through its

<sup>1</sup> See Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie*, Bd. II., pp. 1034-1041.

<sup>2</sup> See Gruppe, *Op. cit.*, p. 1039.

<sup>3</sup> *Orphica*, ed. Abel.

<sup>4</sup> *Abraxas*, p. 31.

touch with Eastern cults. It enriched them and was enriched by them in turn.<sup>1</sup>

In this movement, which struck its roots in a typically Hellenic soil,<sup>2</sup> it is evident that genuinely religious aspirations emerged, intimately associated with purifying rites and mystic initiation. In the various combinations which it would form, it must have been a pervasive element in St. Paul's spheres of operation. But we must now turn to certain features of primary importance in those Oriental cults, with which Orphism had many affinities, features contributed by them to the environment of the Pauline mission. In a later article we intend to sketch more concretely the main characteristics of the Mystery-Religions of Hellenism with which terms and ideas in the Epistles of Paul have been brought into detailed comparison.

In view of the fragmentary nature of our sources it is often easier to point to a definitely Oriental phase of religious faith or practice than to analyse its component parts, and assign their origin. Such a task, moreover, is endlessly complicated by the rampant syncretism of the Hellenistic period. No more crucial example could be found than that of Egypt. Apart altogether from the influence of primitive Egyptian doctrines, which has perhaps been exaggerated by Reitzenstein<sup>3</sup> in his investigations of the Hermetic literature, but which must surely be reckoned with, there appear the phenomena of Babylonian theology, such as the conception of the seven spheres and the sway of the planets,<sup>4</sup> along with the related belief in *εἰσαρπμένη*, that fatalism which has mysticism as its counterpart.<sup>5</sup> Here also are

<sup>1</sup> On its contact with Phrygian cults, see Eisele, *Neue Jahrb. f. Klass. Altert.*, 1909, p. 630.

<sup>2</sup> For long Athens seems to have been its centre.

<sup>3</sup> See especially Wendland's judicious review of W. Otto's *Priester u. Tempel im Hellenistischen Aegypten*, *Theol. L.Z.*, 1911, 26, Sp. 807.

<sup>4</sup> For the connexion of the planetary spirits with demons, see Bousset, *op. cit.*, p. 54 f.

<sup>5</sup> See Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, pp. 70, 77, 79.

found the curious dogma of the Heavenly Man, whose origin is lost in the mists of antiquity, the typically syncretistic cult of Osiris-Serapis and Isis, and the elaborate practice of magic, with its quaint apparatus of efficacious "names." In this whirlpool of ideas, too, may be discerned the framework of confusing Gnostic systems.

The fact, however, of Oriental influence on the Hellenistic civilisation which grew up from the time of Alexander's conquests, is perhaps the most vital which confronts us in attempting to understand its religious developments. Various aspects of the situation claim attention. It need not surprise us that forces of mighty potency in religion, as in all other spheres of human thought or achievement,<sup>1</sup> pressed in from the East. For in Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor, an intellectual life was pulsing to which there was no parallel in the Western world at the beginning of the Roman Empire. Science, literature, industry, were in this era the province of Orientals, not of Greeks or Romans.<sup>2</sup> And, moreover, as Cumont has impressively put it, "if the triumph of Oriental cults appears at times like a revival of savagery, as a matter of fact, in the evolution of religious forms, these cults represent a more advanced type than the ancient national devotions."<sup>3</sup>

There were many features of Oriental belief and worship which possessed a fascination for the Graeco-Roman world. A halo of reverence surrounded the mystic lore which came from the East. Thus, e.g., the Egyptian priesthood was supposed to have preserved in greater purity the earliest rites of Divine worship. Chaldaeans and Brahmins stood closer to the origins of things than Greeks or Romans.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Except perhaps, the military and legal, see Eisele, *op. cit.*, p. 633.

<sup>2</sup> See Cumont, *Les Religions Orientales*, pp 8-14.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> See Anrich, *op. cit.*, p. 36.



And the Gospel which Paul preached could count on this predilection in its favour. But such a conviction would not have sufficed to extend the sway of exötic faiths. As Reitzenstein has cogently shown, the influence of Oriental cults throughout the Roman Empire became intensely personal. Perhaps this was partly the result of a zealous propaganda.<sup>1</sup> But it was involved in the very method of the propaganda. That was carried on by priests who travelled hither and thither, bearing a message of hope, which was often delivered in ecstatic utterances.<sup>2</sup> These would impress audiences accustomed to a cold and formal ceremonial. Moreover, when they won the interest of yearning souls, they played upon them by the weird rites of mystic initiation. Every means was used to excite the feelings. Overpowering spectacles amidst the darkness of night, seductive music, delirious dances, the impartation of mysterious formulae—these made a unique appeal to men and women who had prepared for the solemn experience by long courses of rigid abstinence. But even more potent was the profounder side of the appeal: that which directly touched consciences unsatisfied by their ancestral rites. What Cumont has said of the Oriental priests in Italy gives the clue to the whole situation which we are trying to review. They brought with them “two new things, mysterious means of purification by which they proposed to cleanse away the defilements of the soul, and the assurance that an immortality of bliss would be the reward of piety.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Die Hellenistische Mysterien-Religionen*, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. in this whole connexion Dill's fascinating chapter on the “philosophic director” and the “philosophic missionary,” *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, pp. 291–383.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 61. It is of importance to note, as Cumont points out, that Oriental cults had a more *restricted* influence in Greece because there analogous doctrines were familiar from the Hellenic mysteries. See *op. cit.*, p. 324, note 23.

The full significance of these truths will appear in a later article, when we examine the fundamental doctrines of the Mysteries in their relation to Paulinism.

One effect of this individualistic appeal is very suggestive. Many devout people, not content with a single initiation, embraced every fresh opportunity that came to them of this means of communion with deity. They felt they could not have too intense a consciousness of the deifying of their own individuality. And, doubtless, behind it all lay the thought, now dimmer, now clearer, expressed in *Diogenes Laertius*, vii. 135 : ἐν τε εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ Εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία πολλὰς τε ἑτέρας ὀνομασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι. The assurance as to the supernatural, confirmed by so many solemn sanctions, opened a new vista for their spiritual vision. The truth which they would fain grasp was presented to them in the guise of Divine revelations, esoteric doctrines to be carefully concealed from the gaze of the profane, doctrines which placed in their hands a powerful apparatus for winning deliverance from the assaults of malicious demonic influences, and above all, for overcoming the relentless tyranny of Fate. It is not difficult to see how various aspects of Paul's message might be superficially interpreted on parallel lines. The word of the Cross might readily appear as a mysterious talisman with superhuman potencies.

Here we touch a crucial feature in the religious life of the Hellenistic period. Anz, in his important study, *Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung des Gnosticismus*, is disposed to find in the doctrine of escape from the rule of εἰμαρμένη the pivotal conception of Gnosticism. This is scarcely probable. Gnosticism is too chameleon-like in its traits to allow of a single unifying idea. But there can be no question that conceptions like that of the seven Archons, who, from their planetary domain, determine the destinies of mortals, were almost

universally influential. Dieterich has briefly sketched the range of diffusion of such doctrines.<sup>1</sup> Originating in Babylon, they have penetrated into the religions of Persia and Egypt. They appear in Jewish Apocalyptic, in Orphic fragments, in Hermetic documents, in Greek astrological texts in every variety of Gnostic system. They can be discerned in the background of the Pauline Epistles, in those hierarchies of evil forces ruled by the *θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*, the *ἀρχῶν τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ αἔρος*.

Perhaps this was the most crushing weight which oppressed human souls in the period with which we are dealing. It is scarcely possible to doubt that the *ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα*, against whose bondage Paul warns in Galatians iv. 9 are the elemental spirits whose iron yoke was so grievously felt throughout the Hellenistic world. Indeed, his words in verse 8 remove all uncertainty: *τότε μὲν οὐκ εἰδότες θεὸν ἐδουλεύσατε τοῖς φύσει μὴ οὖσιν θεοῖς*. Redemption from this servitude, which embittered daily existence, was probably the object of intensest craving in the higher life of Pagan society. It was realised by fellowship with higher powers too strong for these lower. In the present life it could be attained through mystic ecstasy. After death it would be consummated by the ascent of the soul to heaven.<sup>2</sup> The actual apparatus of ritual and magic by which communion with higher divinities was reached is vividly exemplified in the prayers and incantations of the so-called Liturgy of Mithras.<sup>3</sup>

The possession of means for escaping the thralldom of the Archons came at an early stage to be regarded and described as *Gnosis par excellence*. However intellectual might be

<sup>1</sup> *Abraxas*, p. 43 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Wendland, *Hellenistische-Römische Kultur*, p. 171.

<sup>3</sup> Edited and elucidated by A. Dieterich. The second edition, considerably enlarged, brought out, after Dieterich's death, by R. Wünsch, Leipzig, Teubner, 1910.

the original basis of the idea involved, it now indicated the highest practical attainment of the religious life. Gnosis was pre-eminently *δύναμις*. It made possible mystic communion with deity. It was a religious rather than a speculative conception. But when we pass from the term to the communities or sects within which it found its chief realisation, we enter a field bristling with problems. Gnosticism is one of the most flexible designations in the vocabulary of the history of religion. It is used to cover phenomena which, while more or less closely allied to each other, are far from being identical. Some writers restrict the name to those fantastic developments of speculation within the life of the early Church, on which the Fathers pour their scorn. Others include under the title a variety of tendencies in the Hellenistic period, of which some took shape inside the Church, some remained completely Pagan, while some belonged to a debateable border-land, hard to define. But the complexity of the term is still further aggravated. Harnack, e.g., using the designation in its narrower sense, would lay the emphasis on its affinities with Greek philosophy. "Almost everything," he says, "which was matter of controversy between Gnosticism and the Church would have also been in dispute between the Church, on the one hand, and Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, etc., on the other."<sup>1</sup> Wendland, while acknowledging that Gnosticism knew how to provide cultivated minds with speculations, finds the clue to its origin and pervasive influence in Oriental-Hellenistic syncretism. It is not our purpose to discuss these more or less conflicting views. We are not concerned here with Gnostic phenomena inside the Church. What we wish in a sentence or two to indicate is that drift of tendencies in the Hellenistic period which makes itself felt in the environment of Paul's mission, and which, for convenience' sake,

<sup>1</sup> *Theol. L.Z.*, 1908, 1, *sp.* 11.



may be described as incipient Gnosticism. This must directly affect our investigation of the main problem to be dealt with, the relation of Paul to the Mystery-Religions.

For incipient Gnosticism and the Mystery-Religions are overlapping magnitudes. There is an instructive passage in Hippolytus, v. 20, in which, describing the Gnostic sect of the Sethians, he derives their peculiar doctrine from "the ancient theologians, Musaeus and Linus and Orpheus, who, above all others, introduced the rites of initiation and the mysteries," and declares of a particular teaching that "it is found in this very form in the Bacchic rites of Orpheus." Whether the explanation given by Hippolytus have any foundation or not, it suggests a feature of undoubted significance in the movement we are concerned with. In fully-fledged Gnostic systems like the Valentinian, for all its curious mythological formations, we are confronted by philosophical constructions, which seem far removed from a traffic in magical formulae. But there is a "vulgar" Gnosis, of which traces appear even in those sects which exhibit metaphysical developments. It is often purely Pagan. And it reveals the influence of all manner of ancient beliefs and superstitions which, in a time of religious disintegration, have forced themselves up from various levels of popular fancy and tradition. These are associated with ritual (or magical) actions and mystic sacraments, some of which have their origin in early Greek Chthonian worship, and others in the multifarious Oriental rites which were being carried westwards in an unceasing stream. Behind most phases of this earlier "Gnosticism," as later at the basis of its more philosophical expressions, there seems to lie an essentially dualistic view of the universe. Bousset would associate the phenomenon with the direct influence of the religion of Persia, while admitting that in its Hellenistic environment Persian dualism lost its more concrete



mythological embodiment, and made way for a new anti-thesis, that between "the good spiritual and the evil corporeal world."<sup>1</sup> His view is highly probable. In any case, the ground-tone of the movement is a thorough-going pessimism, which often issues, on the one hand, in a rigid asceticism, on the other, in unbridled immorality. These are features which Paul has definitely to deal with side by side in the Epistle to the Colossians.

The truth is that this chaotic outgrowth of Hellenistic religion is our most faithful mirror of the prevailing syncretism of the period. Large additions to the knowledge of its essential character have been made in recent years by the magical papyri unearthed in Egypt. These have preserved fragments of hymns and spells and mystic names of Babylonian, Egyptian, Hellenic, and even Jewish origin. With ritual and liturgical texts are blended, in a bewildering medley, curious theogonies and cosmologies, which find their affinities in documents so far removed from each other as the poems of Hesiod and the Apocalypses of Judaism, and have undoubted associations with Stoic allegorisings. The process of which this is the product must have had a long and chequered history. Corresponding to the extended period of its development would be the width of area over which it was diffused. The graphic delineation of the burning of the books at Ephesus (Acts xix. 18, 19) gives us a casual glimpse of the forces which were potent in the common life of the cities of the Empire. This was a movement which in vague forms must continually have confronted the Apostle Paul as he moved from one great centre to another. Its atmosphere would surround him like the air which he breathed. Was he influenced by it consciously or unconsciously? Is the Christianity of Paul, as Gunkel asserts, "a syncretistic religion?"

H. A. A. KENNEDY.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 118.

*MEMORIES OF PRINCIPAL FAIRBAIRN.*

THE Editor requests me to write for this magazine some account of Dr. Fairbairn. I can only describe the relations which I had with the late Principal, as I am quite incompetent to estimate his theological and philosophical work or weigh his character as a whole.

In a sense I became interested in the man long before I knew him personally. Like many other students or young graduates of Aberdeen, I was keenly interested in his candidature for the Professorship of Moral Philosophy, which occurred while I was an undergraduate at Oxford : I cannot remember the precise year. He was rejected, and another candidate, the admirable librarian of the University, was appointed. The successful candidate was a man of great personal excellence, about whom it was said that there was only one stain on his otherwise blameless life, viz., that he had aspired to be a Professor of Moral Philosophy. He was deservedly most popular with the students in his class, for whom he did everything possible except teach them philosophy, which was a subject as completely outside of him as the higher mathematics ; and their affection for him perpetuated itself in a memorial which they raised to his memory after his death.

As a Professor, Dr. Fairbairn would not have been anything like so popular with the mass of students as his successful competitor. In the case of a Professor in a Scottish University, general popularity has not much relation to eminent ability or knowledge,—these win respect, but popularity is due to certain other virtues, and Fairbairn had not the qualities which would have won the love of boys fresh from school. It would have been different with more mature students, of whom a larger proportion would have

appreciated his power ; and for several students in every year Fairbairn would have been, the one leading Professor of the University—even in a University where Bain, a man of immense ability, but rather of the scientific than the philosophic order of mind, was also Professor—but probably for one or two only.

In the counsels of the University, however, Dr. Fairbairn would have been a guiding and dominant spirit. His powers of work, his insight into the character of men, his far-seeing views of the future of education, his high ideal of what a University ought to be, his wide range of knowledge, his real sympathy with literature and human thought in its highest manifestations, and finally his indomitable perseverance and unflinching resolution, would have made him a power in the University and in all the Scottish Universities ; but therein lay the secret of the opposition to him. They who feared his coming power opposed him, while they spoke fair promises to him.

I have often thought how unfortunate it was for the Scottish Universities, as homes of literary and philosophic study, that McCosh and Fairbairn were both rejected in Aberdeen for local candidates. Bain, who was preferred to McCosh, was an abler man than his rival in many respects ; but a certain coldness and hardness and insensibility to the spiritual side of literature and philosophy restricted his influence and stunted his nature ; and, if he had dominated the reform of the Universities, he would have made them as narrow on one side as they had been previously on another side. Fairbairn, with higher ability and wider reading and broader sympathy than McCosh, was exactly the man that was needed at that critical period, when the Scottish Universities were going to be remodelled. He would have held the balance true. He would have fostered literature with all his heart, and science with all his judg-

ment and common sense. He would have commanded the confidence of the Universities and of almost every section of the public. In his place was selected a lovable, kindly, well-meaning person, not well read, untrained in all the high ways and aims of learning, and a nonentity in the counsels of his own and every other University.

No blow so fatal to the higher development and the influence of the Scottish Universities has been struck in my time as the rejection of Fairbairn. To himself, however, the loss was, in a sense, nothing. He had a career before him, which some may (perhaps rightly) consider a greater and a nobler one. He was not a man to be kept down in spirits, or to be retarded in his career, by any reverse, small or great. What we lost in the Scottish Universities was the gain of English theological teaching.

It was years later before I saw Dr. Fairbairn personally. If I remember rightly, he came to Oxford when Mansfield College was planned, but not yet built; and, mindful of old Aberdeen incidents, I called upon him. Later he invited my wife and myself to be present at the inauguration of the finished buildings of Mansfield; and there we heard Dr. Dale preach in the College chapel.

These two meetings were the beginning of much pleasant intercourse, from which I learned much and profited much. Some articles which the Editor of the *EXPOSITOR* wrung from me by persistent requests, repeated year after year, and which appeared in this magazine in the winter of 1888-9, attracted the attention of the Principal of Mansfield College; and the College invited me to give a course of six lectures on the position of the Christian Church in the Roman Empire. This brought me into closer relations with him; and he continued his friendly intercourse, his kindly counsel and his ever ready help for the remainder of his life. The measure of his friendship and his indulgent



opinion of my work is indicated by the three sets of lectures which I was invited by the College authorities to give at Mansfield (all published and bearing the name of the College).<sup>1</sup> I have, therefore, the right to speak as one honoured with his confidence and as deeply indebted to him.

I knew Dr. Fairbairn only in the maturity of his powers ; and of set purpose I avoided seeing him in his decline. I was not called to do so by any duty, and I preferred to keep the memory of him at his best, and to let no feeling of mere sympathy or pity for the man after he was past his full strength, mingle with my admiration for his great achievements and endowments.

He was called to perform a difficult and delicate task in Oxford ; and he did it with great tact and complete success. He conducted the first experiment in setting down a College (intended professedly and exclusively for theology outside the Church of England) within the pale of a University so thoroughly steeped in the Anglican tradition as Oxford had been by many centuries of history and connexion. The success of the College justified the insight and forethought of those who resolved to make this experiment, bold as it seemed in the beginning ; and among those men Fairbairn was prominent—possibly a leader, but as to that others can speak, for I have not the knowledge. That success also furnished the best possible proof of the judgment and good sense with which the College was managed by its Council. Above all it proved the high quality of the first Principal. His great stores of learning and his readiness of expression made him an important figure in every social gathering of the learned. He was able to be all things to all highly educated men. He had read all

<sup>1</sup> *The Church in the Roman Empire: St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen* (this is honoured also with the name of Auburn Seminary, New York): *The Cities of St. Paul* (Dale Lectures).



that each of them thought most worth reading, and he spoke of it with the ease of one who had assimilated it and could estimate it from a point of vantage.

Finally, and not least, the success of the College justified the University of Oxford ; and proved that it was ready to accept the best from every source and every side, that it could remain true to all that was best in its old tradition and history, and yet adapt itself to the new conditions, and welcome the new men and enrich itself for the future. The struggle between darkness and light, between ignorance and knowledge, between evil and good, must always continue, for the knowledge of one generation becomes the ignorance of the next, if the next generation is satisfied merely to hold and to pass on that inherited knowledge without development or addition. The insensible growth of the Universities through improved method, and the better using of the existing conditions, and the increasing freedom of spirit with the strength that springs therefrom, are more important in their history than so-called "University Reform," which is dependent on the enactment of regular laws and statutes, obtained after long struggles and contest about words and often disappointing the hopes of one side as much as they belie the fears of the other. Fairbairn had his difficulties to meet during the following years, and they were not few or small ; but he was accepted on his merits ; he was invited to put his name on the books of Exeter College and the University offered him the degree of M.A., a much rarer and far more gratifying distinction than an Honorary Doctorate, for it made him a full member of the University with all the privileges of the regular graduate, and the opportunity, if he chose, of taking part in the constantly debated schemes of University Reform as well as in the general business of the University.

Since then the example of Mansfield has been followed

by other bodies, in Cambridge as well as in Oxford ; and these new Colleges have strengthened the study of Theology in both Universities, and made them more truly representative of England as a whole ; but the first conception of this scheme (which at first seemed to some on all sides to be so great an outrage on tradition), and the bold freedom combined with tact and prudence in carrying it into execution, must be credited to Fairbairn and those who were with him. I have rarely listened to any address more illuminative and inspiring than the first sermon (as I think it was), delivered by Dr. Dale in the Chapel of Mansfield College during the inauguration ceremonies, when he stated the plans and hopes of those who were making the new College, and claimed as their inheritance all the achievements of all the heroes in the history of the Church, all their writings, all their sufferings, all their excellence, their endurance and their example.

The late Principal more than once spoke to me of the sympathy and friendly intercourse with various people in Oxford, which had been a help to him in his earlier years there ; and he mentioned especially one great scholar, whose courtesy and kindly feeling had often aided him, but whose name I do not write, as he fortunately still lives and works in the University.

Full of hard work and varied activity as was Fairbairn's life, he always retained the liveliest interest in the Scottish Universities, as well as in the life of his own nation. While I do not mean that he regretted his rejection in Aberdeen, or would have sought to change his lot, if the opportunity to live his life anew had been granted to him by some fairy godmother, yet the memory of that unsuccessful candidature always lived in his mind. He observed with keenest interest the course of change through which the Scottish Universities were passing in his time ; he knew how much

this meant for the Scottish nation ; and sometimes, as he spoke about the situation, one could see that for the moment he would have loved to take part in the struggle for progress. One serious cause of weakness in the Universities of Scotland has lain in the fact that so few of the Professors worked for an ideal of a University as a whole ; almost every one, with very rare exceptions, in my branch of University life—I cannot speak of the Medical or other Faculties—has fought for his own subject, and has argued about every proposal according to the degree in which his own class would (as he thought) gain or lose, without seeking to judge from the standpoint of the efficiency of the University as a whole or of its influence on the life of the nation. The weakness of the reform party in the Scottish Universities lay partly in wrong or defective ideals of what a University ought to be, and partly in the want of leaders possessing the qualities required, such as unwearied attention to business, unfailing readiness to attend meetings, dexterity and tact in making the best of his opportunities, ability to use dexterously the forms and customs of business committees for the attainment of his purposes, in addition to the higher qualities of a true and noble ideal in education and an unflinching determination to realise that ideal.

Fairbairn must have known from his own career, that he would have been a great power in his own country and its Universities, though he never actually said to me anything that would savour of arrogance or self-assertiveness ; but he has said that he would have liked to do something in the remoulding of them, and the memory came back to his mind and his lips of those who deluded him with fair words and the promise of support. The Principal took a kindly view of that event, and recognised that it had all worked for his own good, and yet the memory remained, and the disappointment that for his own land he had done less in a direct way

than he would have liked to do. Yet he continued always to be a power in Scotland ; and in Aberdeen especially the memory of him is still fresh, and his name was an influence throughout his life.

W. M. RAMSAY.

*PRINCIPAL A. M. FAIRBAIRN.*

ON July 9, 1908, Lord Morley was installed as Chancellor of the University of Manchester. Among those whom he had selected as recipients of Honorary Degrees Dr. Fairbairn was included. The Senate decided that the Degree most appropriate for him was that of Doctor of Divinity, and since I was the Dean of the Faculty of Theology it fell to my lot to present my dear and honoured master. I had to condense in the briefest space my estimate of the man and his work, and I venture to quote what I said, since it may form a kind of text for this article, and make up to some extent for certain omissions in it.

“ It is with singular pleasure that I present for the first degree of Doctor of Divinity conferred in this University my former teacher and colleague Dr. Fairbairn. His services to theological science time would fail barely to enumerate. With a profound belief in the trustworthiness of reason and the rationality of history, it has been the main passion of his life to understand and interpret religion. Intimately acquainted with the comparative study of the various forms it has assumed and with the course of philosophical speculation, he has risen from the mass of intricate detail to large and luminous generalisations in the philosophy of religion. An alien in no part of the dominion ruled by the queen of sciences, he has been especially distinguished as an exponent of historical and constructive theology. Himself a preacher whose sermons have been characterised by solidity



and depth of thought and by a massive and inspiring eloquence, he has laboured to create a learned ministry with an adequate technical equipment based on a broad and generous culture. Of this, Mansfield College will be his enduring monument. He did much to frame the scheme of theological studies in the University of Wales, and we gratefully remember the help he gave us in our own similar enterprise. He will pass into his retirement followed by the gratitude of many who owe much to his writings, and with the warmer and deeper affection of those who date a new epoch in their lives from the time when they sat in his classroom and came under his influence. It will be their desire that as the evening closes in after his strenuous day he may find it a season of tranquillity, brightened by many memories and by the assurance of the place he holds in the hearts of all his pupils."

I pass over as briefly as possible the biographical details. He was born near Edinburgh, November 4, 1838. He was educated at the University of Edinburgh, though, strangely enough, the recipient of so many Honorary Degrees in later life, Edinburgh itself leading the way, completed his course without graduating. In the summer vacation he took courses at the Theological Academy of the Evangelical Union Church under Dr. Morison. The time for theological study was short, but in later years he gave an account of the intensity with which the Principal did his work and packed into those brief months a course of training which in institutions of ampler leisure would have been spread over a much longer period. His first pastorate in the Evangelical Union Church was at Fraserburgh, but he soon removed to Bathgate, where he remained from 1860 to 1872. He married in 1868, and this was the beginning of a very happy home life, to which reference was fittingly made, on the occasion of their silver wedding, in the tribute he paid to his wife in the dedication of *The Place of Christ in Modern*



*Theology.* In 1872 he went to Aberdeen, where he quickly made for himself a great reputation by his Sunday evening addresses. In 1877 he became Principal of Airedale College and remained there till 1886, when Springhill College was transferred to Oxford, its name being changed to Mansfield College, and he became its first Principal. This position he held for nearly twenty-three years. He retired at the close of the Lent term 1909. He was Chairman of the Congregational Union in 1883; Muir Lecturer at Edinburgh 1878-1882; Gifford Lecturer at Aberdeen 1892-1894; Lyman Beecher Lecturer at Yale 1891-1892; Haskell Lecturer in India 1898-1899. He served on the Royal Commission on Secondary Education 1894-1895, and on the Royal Commission on Endowments of the Welsh Church 1906. English, Scotch, German and American Universities gave him their Honorary Degrees. To this bare biographical record I may be permitted to add, as indicating the background of my article, a few words on our personal relations. I met him shortly after he came to Oxford in the autumn of 1886. During his first year at Oxford I often heard his Sunday evening lectures and I missed no opportunity of hearing him preach. I saw something of him also in his home or in walks. From 1887-1890 I attended his lectures at Mansfield College, though I was not a student of the College. At the end of this time he invited me to join the staff of the College. I was his colleague for two years only, since, with his warm approval, though to our mutual sorrow, I came to serve my own Church in Manchester in 1892. For several years after this time, however, I was a good deal in Oxford and saw much of him. I am afraid it was my fault if, with much advantage to myself, we generally talked a great deal of 'shop.'

A complete bibliography of his writings apart from his contributions to the daily press or unsigned contributions to

the weekly press is appended to the volume of Mansfield College Essays which we presented to him in honour of his seventieth birthday. Here I simply give a list of his books, appending the dates. They are as follows : *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History* (1876); *Studies in the Life of Christ* (1880); *The City of God* (1883); *Religion in History and in Modern Life* (1884); *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology* (1893); *Christ in the Centuries and Other Sermons* (1893); *Catholicism : Roman and Anglican* (1899); *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion* (1902); *Studies in Religion and Theology* (1910). I need not add that he wrote a very large number of articles and reviews. It is a matter for profound regret that his books are not more numerous. I often talked over his literary projects with him, and was struck with the changes which came over his plans. He was announced to contribute the work on Comparative Religion to *The International Theological Library*. At one time the work was to be in two volumes, then he felt that he must boil it down into one, then the task was in this form abandoned, though he still hoped to do some work on this line in another form. Meanwhile it had for long been his intention to write a comprehensive work on The Philosophy of Religion. A kind of compromise between the two enterprises was later hit upon, and he planned a series of works on the Philosophies of individual religions, of which his last great work, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, is the only instalment which has seen the light. No doubt in the books he succeeded in writing, but also scattered in articles and reviews, there is much to suggest the lines along which his treatment of many subjects would have gone. It was his habit to handle any subject on which he was writing in a large and comprehensive way; and many readers felt that he had a tantalising trick of prefixing elaborate introductions and going off on irrelevant issues.

There was more substance, I think, in this criticism in his latest period, but for the greater part of his career I at least could not urge it. They were really relevant in his own mind, they gave atmosphere and background to his treatment of the subject, they put the reader in his attitude towards it. And now that he has been taken from us, with so much of his work undone, they acquire a new importance to students of his mind in that they make up to some small extent for the books which the pressure of affairs never permitted him to write. The four books I should myself have most wished to receive from his pen would have been a *Philosophy of Religion*, a *History of Religion*, a *History of Christian Doctrine* and a *Systematic Theology* including an apologetic.<sup>1</sup> For the first two we have to turn to his earliest book and his *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, supplemented by his *Religion in History* and by certain articles and reviews. For the last two chiefly to his *Christ in Modern Theology*, but also on some sides to his *Studies in the Life of Christ* and his *Catholicism*. His volume on *The City of God* was of a more miscellaneous character, touching among other things the *Philosophy of Religion*, *Systematic Theology* and *Apologetic*. Looking back I cannot help regretting in particular that his *Christ in Modern Theology* was not twice the size; that he had not turned the first part into a *History of Christian Doctrine*, which, with his wealth of material, would still have been only an outline; and that instead of making "a sketch of the first lines of a Christian Theology" he had given an exposition of the Christian faith as he himself conceived it, without reference to the views of any other theologian. Better still, of course, would have been separate treatises on the *History of Doctrine* and *Systematic Theology and Apologetics*;

<sup>1</sup> The lines on which he thought an Apologetic should be written are laid down in his *Catholicism*, pp. 51 ff.

but we should have had less cause to lament their absence if *Christ in Modern Theology* had been written on twice its scale. He hoped, in fact, to return to the constructive section of the book and deal with some subjects in it much more fully.

His qualifications for such a task were of an exceptional order. He was happily gifted with great strength of constitution and power of endurance, so that his days could be both long and laborious without overtaxing, at any rate till age began to steal upon him, his physical resources. He was a rapid reader, and had to a remarkable degree the faculty of catching quickly the drift of a book and the salient points of an argument. And he had a stupendous memory which seemed to be instantly available. Thus he came to gain his encyclopædic knowledge, to use the hackneyed phrase which in this case at least is not misapplied. I can speak of him simply as I found him, and others may have had a different experience; but I do not remember ever asking for his judgment on any matter in which I was interested without finding him ready to discuss it with a full appreciation of the points at issue. It was astonishing to see how he managed to keep in touch with the development of subjects on which he was not specially working at the time. No doubt this boundless acquisitiveness might have been a real hindrance to the performance of his task if he had conceived it as something to be achieved by speculation alone. But he was never tired of denouncing the practice of those who elaborate theories without an exhaustive study of the facts. No one, he held, however gifted with speculative genius, could construct a stable philosophy either of history or religion who had not laid his foundations deep in a thorough investigation of the actual history of mankind or a patient and prolonged study of all the religions accessible to the investigator. I never knew a man more scornful of pretentious and



dogmatic ignorance, of the airy amateurism which blew brilliant soap-bubbles and mistook them for solid realities. He spoke of one of the tribe as "displaying all the qualities, passions, prejudices, and inability to understand an opponent or his standpoint, distinctive of the mere amateur." (*Contemporary Review*, Nov. 1887, p. 746). It is striking that one in whom the speculative interest was so strong should have resisted the fascination it might have exercised upon him and so strenuously recalled others from the *a priori* path to the actual facts of development. Similarly he approached Philosophy itself through its history, of which it is needless to say he had a wide and exact knowledge. The same applies to his investigation of Christian Theology. Moreover, he was not arrogant enough to think that he could afford to neglect the work which was being done by other labourers in the field. Reviews of individual books often indicated how familiar he was with the whole range of contemporary literature on the subject. He had nothing, however, of that impatient modernness which flippantly dismisses the great achievements of the past; and he would go back to some book centuries old and speak of it as still the greatest achievement in its own particular realm.

And here I must touch on the question whether, with all the mass of his knowledge and the masterliness with which he handled it, we may speak of him as an original and constructive thinker. It was inevitable that his method of treatment should have left on many minds the impression that while he could expound with admirable insight and precision the thoughts of great philosophers and divines; while he could see the weak places and put his finger upon them; while he could trace the organic movement of thought as a living whole in continuous interaction with its environment; he had not himself the architectonic gift and contributed nothing original to philosophy or theology.



I speak on this point with diffidence, well knowing that others with far greater qualifications for expressing an opinion have held a different view. My own belief is that his gift for construction and his capacity for making his own contribution have often been underrated. To some extent his procedure was no doubt to blame. The historical and the critical path which he followed in expounding his subject tended to dwarf by comparison his constructive statement. But he would so manage his account and criticism of the development as to lighten very much the account of his own position. Many issues which he would otherwise have had to face had been faced and disposed of already. Principles had emerged in the course of the earlier discussions which did not need to be expounded again when the time for expressing his own judgment had come. Nor ought we to forget that those who found his position unsatisfactory might easily be less than just to the speculative power he really exhibited. And it was quite natural that an age which has been so profoundly influenced by Ritschlianism should be largely out of sympathy with one who saw in it a retrograde movement in Theology and Philosophy. For my own part I have the impression that behind all he wrote there was a coherent system of thought which he had made his own by profound and exhaustive study at first hand of mental and religious phenomena, thought through and thought together, in the light of intimate familiarity with the best that others had thought and said on these high themes, but also with independence. At the same time I readily grant that the constructive statement was too often meagre and disappointing. Some of his books were far too long postponed, especially his *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, which would have made a much deeper impression if it had been published twenty years earlier.

Whatever may be said of his views it can hardly be denied

that he was original in his way of expressing them. Not a few found his style almost intolerable. It struck them as rhetorical, laboured, artificial, excessive in antithesis, disfigured by purple patches and fine writing. I certainly could not defend his style through thick and thin. I sometimes wished for less rhetoric or rhetoric of a different kind, for less antithesis, for a lighter touch and easier grace of movement. But his style was more spontaneous than those who criticised him were always aware. I happen to know of addresses given on great occasions with but the slenderest opportunity for preparation, in which the descriptive reporter detected a very strong odour of midnight oil. He once told me apropos of some criticism on his love of antithesis that this was the way in which his mind actually worked, and that it came quite naturally to him to express himself in this manner. But there is far more to be put on the other side. I shall never forget one of his addresses which he began by teasing a series of contrasts and distinctions till I writhed in my seat, but which rose into splendid eloquence as he warmed to his theme. And this was characteristic, though in an extreme degree, of the effect his style has upon me. I cannot help feeling it to be at times ponderous or uneasy, and he sometimes attempts to fly in an uncongenial air. Here a juster self-criticism would have been of advantage to him. But he had a singular gift of lucid, powerful and exact exposition. He had unusual readiness, wealth, and resourcefulness of expression; he had a facility in coining illuminating and easily remembered epigrams, which would hit off a person, a principle or an idea. The great thinkers or men of action of whom he spoke were real men to him, significant because they were the embodiment of some great cause or idea, but true bone of our bone. And his great passages, when he really succeeded in getting away, stirred and moved, exhilarated and uplifted the sympathetic

listener in no ordinary degree. The secret lay in the intensity of emotion and the lucidity of vision out of which they were born ; we caught the soaring rapture as we read or heard his words. When he was at his best his style was the expression of the whole man. In those moments I used to be reminded of the description of Luther's words as half-battles, of Luther's own description of Paul's words as having hands and feet, of James Thomson's saying with reference to Browning's words that if you pricked them they would bleed. They seemed indeed to be true words of God, quick and powerful and sharper than the two-edged sword, cleaving without resistance to the heart of some intricate problem or tracking us into the recesses of our conscience ; or like the forge-hammer smashing the stubborn rock. Or one thought of them as a stream of lava in which the hard substance of thought had been fused by the intensity of his emotional heat. For no true estimate of the man himself could fail to recognise the richness and strength of his emotional nature.

Where his central interest lay was indicated by himself in the preface to his *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*. He says : " This book, then, is neither a Philosophy nor a History of Religion, but it is an endeavour to look at what is at once the central fact and idea of the Christian faith by a mind whose chief labour in life has been to make an attempt at such a philosophy through such a history." In the case of one who always conceived his questions in the largest way, it was inevitable that many elements should enter into the problem as he understood it. Religion could not be studied in a vacuum, but only as part of man's whole life. It was organically one with its environment, sensitively responding to all its changes and incessantly reacting upon it. Hence a true philosophy of religion, he says, " will be equally a philosophy of man and history, of human nature and human civilisation." The examination of any religion involved

for him deep research into all that concerned the history, the civilisation, and the culture of the people who professed it. I well remember how nearly a quarter of a century ago our talk turned, during a walk, on the Irish question, and he told me that he had reached his views on it because many years before in his study of Irish religion he had been compelled to examine the system of land tenure in Ireland. Further, his conception of religion forced him to throw the greatest emphasis on philosophy. It was for him neither thought alone, nor emotion, nor will, but all of these, since religion was the expression of the whole man. But he was specially emphatic on the intellectual element. He was never tired of insisting on the greatness of reason and its trustworthiness, or of warning those who flouted its claims for the sake of religion that they were striking a blow at its vitals. "Unless religion," he says, "be an eternal challenge to the reason it can have no voice for the imagination and no value for the heart" (*Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 5). His criticism of Newman and Mr. Balfour turned largely upon this point. Philosophical scepticism or agnosticism was for him one of the deadliest foes to faith, all the more deadly that its corroding action was so insidious.<sup>1</sup> It explains his lack of sympathy with Ritschlianism, an attitude which no doubt limited his appeal to many students of theology, though I believe he saw the truth in this matter more

<sup>1</sup> "Scepticism is a double-edged weapon, and very dangerous in audacious hands. If faith in one class of beliefs is broken down, the result is more likely to be that all classes will suffer than that any one class will specially benefit. Doubt of the veracity of mind in its simplest operations, has a subtle way of becoming doubt all round" (*Catholicism*, p. 369).

"It becomes those who believe that the highest truth of reason is one with the highest object of faith, to make it clear that in their view at least a true theology can never be built on a sceptical philosophy, and that only the thought which trusts the reason can truly vindicate faith in the God who gave it" (*l.c.* p. 388).

"To exercise the intellect is to serve God; Religion has been most vital and most vigorous when the intellect was most critically concerned with it" (*l.c.* p. 132).



clearly than they. His position here may be gathered from a brief notice of Pfeiderer's discussion of Ritschlianism (*Critical Review*, 1892, p. 7). In this Dr. Fairbairn describes Ritschlianism as "a system that attempts to make up for its speculative agnosticism by its historical acuteness and activity. We may, while admiring the work of the Ritschlianner in history, dislike the philosophy which underlies their attitude to doctrine and its construction. This philosophy is as marked a retrogression from the standpoint and the spirit of the older German schools as the Ritschlian historical method is in advance on that alike of Berlin and Tübingen." As this quotation indicates, he was drawn far more to the great speculative movement culminating in Hegel. It would be misleading to speak of him as a Hegelian, but he regarded Hegel's Philosophy of Religion as the one worthy attempt which had been made in this field. But as I have already indicated, he had the firmest conviction that the law of development was not logical but biological. This is clearly stated in his earliest book. He says: "No Philosophy of History is possible without a patient and sufficient study of the facts and phenomena of mind individual and collective. Speculation must build on the solid rock of reality if it is to build into heaven and for eternity" (p. 255). Still more clearly and with explicit reference to religion the law is enunciated in the following passage: "The dialectic that evolves religion is never a purely self-regulated process, working out its conclusions according to its own laws. All kinds of accidents or digressions interfere with its harmonious working. . . . It seems to me then that religion is much too complex, and that the outer factors of its development are too potent both as regards matter and form to allow me to represent it as a sort of spontaneous product or immanent dialectic, or self-regulated evolution of the rational consciousness" (*Critical Review*, 1893, p. 203, in a notice of



Edward Caird's *Evolution of Religion*). The same principle may be found more fully argued, though here with reference to the development of Christian doctrine in his *Christ in Modern Theology*. Abstract speculation accordingly was not adequate to the construction of a Philosophy of Religion. Investigation must move into the realm of the concrete and study the actual facts. And here a great change has come since the days of Hegel. A new science has been born and the anthropologist has collected and classified the facts of savage religion and made them the basis of far-reaching theories. What was Dr. Fairbairn's attitude to the situation thus created ? <sup>1</sup> Of course he recognised that the facts of savage religion must be taken into account and given their full value. But he also believed that the most vigorous criticism should be applied to the reports, and a resolute scepticism adopted towards the theories. He was keenly alive to the difficulty which the civilised must experience in understanding the savage, and to the danger that the facts might in all good faith be very easily misreported, and even if accurately reported might be completely misunderstood. But quite apart from this, while a convinced evolutionist, he held that the higher must interpret the lower, not the lower the higher. For him religion was "the greatest of all man's unconscious creations," to be honoured indeed wherever found, to be studied with sympathy and love in its most rudimentary, as in its most developed forms ; but to be adequately understood <sup>2</sup> only through its loftiest achievements, which cast back their

<sup>1</sup> On this see *The Critical Review* for 1897, pp. 132-134, 140 ff., and *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 204 f.

<sup>2</sup> Lest any one should imagine, however, that he had any undue confidence in results, I append this quotation : "In the history of religion we are beset more than anywhere else with insoluble problems, and philosophers and scholars alike have here to learn how either to leave the insoluble unsolved, or be content with an approximate solution" (*Contemporary Review*, Nov. 1887, p. 749).

transfiguring radiance even on its unloveliest forms. So he was drawn especially to the greater religions, above all to Christianity. And in saying this I am not saying something which might be taken for granted in the case of a Christian theologian. It is well known that at one critical period it seemed to him as if the Christian ministry must be abandoned ; and had it not been that Germany gave him what Britain had not then to give, his career as a minister of the Gospel would have come to a close.<sup>1</sup> And he applied consistently this principle of interpreting the lower through the higher in the claim he made for Christianity that it was the interpretation of all other religions. He was far removed, indeed, from that debased form of apologetic which seeks to win credit for its own cause by slandering or depreciating its rivals. "He who would maintain the Christian must be just and even generous to all the religions created and professed by man" (*Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. ix.). But on the following page he says : "The Son of God holds in His pierced hands the keys of all the religions, explains all the factors of their being and all the persons through whom they have been realised" (l.c. p. x.).

I come then to his conception of Christianity. Believing that man was religious by a necessity of his being, he had no doubt touching the permanence of religion. The too common fallacy that to trace the history of a phenomenon back into savagery, fatally discredited the belief that it had a permanent standing in civilisation, he would have regarded as shallow in the extreme. He was in truth very sceptical about the anthropologist's "primitive man," but quite apart from this he would have said that the vital thing was not the type of satisfaction which the religious instinct of the savage impelled him to seek, but the fact that the instinct was there. But even so the question might still arise, Is

<sup>1</sup> See *A Chapter of Autobiography* in the *Contemporary Review*.

Christianity the final religion ? “ Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another ? ” To this his answer was clear and emphatic. He was a theist, for the very fact that Nature could be interpreted and thus science had become possible, convinced him that there was an immanent Reason in the universe which testified that the ground of being was rational. But he held, too, and that in spite of his familiarity with the difficulties which might be urged against it, that in the nature of man, in his history, and especially in the history of his religion, this ultimate Reality was manifested as Holiness and Love. Such a God must seek the happiness of His creatures and their highest good ; and since He and no other was Himself that highest good, He must enter into fellowship with them and disclose Himself to them. God’s supreme self-revelation was given in Jesus Christ. I must pass by all exposition of Dr. Fairbairn’s Apologetic. It was many-sided and gradually concentrated along many converging lines on Jesus as God’s perfect self-expression, the centre of all history, the incarnation of the ethical ideal, the perfect channel of Divine grace. It would not perhaps be quite true to speak of his theology as Christocentric, it was rather Theocentric. But he believed in the Doctrine of the Trinity and in the Divinity of Christ. The Son of God was from eternity an integral element in the Godhead and had become incarnate in time. No one was more concerned that full honour should be done to the Son, but he felt that even where the idea of a schism within the Godhead was avoided there was a danger lest the Father should be hidden behind the Son. He believed that a new day was beginning for Systematic Theology. We had had abundance of “ agglomerative dogmatics,” the time had come for a System of Theology relevant to the present position, which should be a System indeed, dominated by a sovereign principle. The material principle he found not as Luther in justification

by faith, but as Calvin in the doctrine of God. Only it was not God conceived as Sovereign and all-efficient will ; for the Christian theologian must think of God as Jesus thought of Him, who knew Him as no other had known Him. Here he held that the old theology had largely failed. It had indeed claimed for Christ His true place in the Godhead, He had been passionately loved and loyally served. But His own teaching had been largely neglected in ecclesiastical theology. Now, however, the movement of thought and of criticism in the nineteenth century had driven the Church back to the Person of Jesus. His life, His teaching, His influence had been studied as never before, and we knew His mind as earlier generations had not known it. So we must think of God as He thought of Him, and make His conception of God determinative of our whole theology ; and Jesus thought of God as Father. I cannot, of course, stay to follow the detailed working out of this principle in the construction of a system. But one or two points ought not to be omitted. His doctrine of Fatherhood implied no relaxation of ethical stringency. He urged with convincing power that the Father must be more merciless to sin than the Sovereign, since, while the latter saw in it the disturbance of order, the former knew it to be the ruin of His son. Further, “ the return to Christ,” which was so emphasised in this connexion, might have seemed to involve an undue depreciation of the apostolic writers and notably of Paul. There was no real justification for such a misconception ; but it was effectually destroyed by *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*. The portrait of Jesus in the Gospels is indispensable, but it alone would have assured no permanence to the religion. It is the interpretation placed upon Jesus which has given the religion its permanence. “ It is not Jesus of Nazareth who has so powerfully entered into history ; it is the deified Christ who has been believed, loved, and obeyed



as the Saviour of the world." He says: "Without the personal charm of the historical Jesus the œcumenical creeds would never have been either formulated or tolerated"; but he says further: "Without the metaphysical conception of Christ the Christian religion would long ago have ceased to live."

It will be seen from what I have said that he was very far from undervaluing the apostolic Christology. And this brings me to his general attitude toward Scripture. He had at a quite early period been confronted with Biblical criticism and the problem it created as to the estimate of Scripture. His affinities with Hegelianism naturally attracted him to the Tübingen School. His exposition and criticism of the theory are among the best and most searching that have ever been written, and we may place alongside of it his account and estimate of Strauss. He held that the Tübingen Criticism had failed, and he exhibited in a trenchant manner its defects. Yet he says that its failure was in some essential respects equal to the most splendid success. In one of the last letters he wrote to me he expressed his gratification that in my *Critical Introduction to the New Testament* I had done justice to Baur. On details of New Testament criticism I cannot speak with full confidence. He expressed himself with caution and reserve, and this I believe indicated that his own conclusions were tentative. I remember once telling him how difficult I found the Epistle to the Colossians to be for the commentator. He said that he quite shared that opinion, and added, if I remember rightly, that he thought it the most difficult of the Pauline Epistles. Then he went on to say that there was in the first place the difficulty as to authorship. "I am as sure that Paul wrote Romans as I am that I live," he said, but he added that he had never been able to feel so sure about Colossians. From what he says in his *Christ in Modern*



*Theology*, p. 303, I gather that he accepted all the Epistles as probably genuine, apart from the Pastoral Epistles, which he does not mention in this connexion, and in these I think he would have been disposed to recognise at least a Pauline nucleus. I am not aware that he rejected the apostolic authorship of the Fourth Gospel, but it was less congenial to him than the Synoptic Gospels. So far as the Old Testament was concerned he belonged rather to the mediating school. I doubt whether he ever accepted the Grafian criticism; though as an early review of his in *The Academy* showed, he was following Kuenen's discussion of it in Holland before it seems to have made much impression in England. So far as I recollect I only talked to him about it twice. Once was in my undergraduate days, before I had really begun working at the subject and the reference to it arose out of our conversation on an article in which Robertson Smith had just been pulverising Captain Conder. Dr. Fairbairn said to me that he thought the theory would have to be considerably modified before it was finally accepted. Some years later he said to me very emphatically that there was a great deal of good matter in Professor Robertson's *Early Religion of Israel*. But it must not be imagined that he had any hesitation as to principles. He strongly vindicated the right and duty of criticism, and long before such critical results as the late date of Deuteronomy and the composite authorship of Isaiah had become matters of common belief, he had accepted them. With the stiffly traditional attitude he had no sympathy whatever. At the same time I used to feel that occasionally the leaven of the old attitude still seemed to work in his use of Scripture, and now and then his exegesis struck me as artificial.

There is much on which I have not touched. His view of the Atonement was not easy to discover. That he found a certain theory of it in the apostolic literature would not

necessarily mean that he conceived it in this way himself. One of the most significant statements from his pen that I remember is to be found in a review of Dr. Stevens' *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*, in which he expressed his general concurrence with the author's conclusions, while dubious of some of the paths by which he had reached them. As a general principle one might say that he was deeply impressed with the unity of the universe, and found Christianity of a piece with the religious history of the world, and was not hospitable to the irruption of the catastrophic into theology. But he believed as firmly as those who might differ from him that the power of God was at work for the salvation of man quite uniquely in the gospel. I do not discuss his doctrine of the Church, for that would take me into a controversial region which I am anxious in this paper to avoid. I must try in my closing sentences to say what I felt about the man and about the work he did.

Without external advantages, by sheer strength of personality, by right of genius and equipment, he won and kept a foremost place among the British exponents of the History and Philosophy of Religion. He helped to redeem our Theology from its insularity and provincialism, to bring it out of its backwater into the full stream of European inquiry and speculation. He taught us to be generous to religions other than our own; but he taught us also to prize our own as the highest gift which God had granted to man. He helped us to see on what firm and tested foundations our belief in it reposed. He unfolded before us in all its magnitude what the task of expounding and defending it involved. He had the loftiest ideal of the Christian ministry, and counted no preparation for it too exacting; and what he so admirably illustrated in himself, he laboured strenuously to secure for others. As one who had passed through the valley of deathly gloom and on into the sunlight,

he knew how to succour the souls haunted by spectres of negation and voices of unbelief.

He lived in harmony with his own ideals. His sense of duty was imperious, his standard of honour lofty ; in his presence meanness and hypocrisy were rebuked by nobility and sincerity, hollow pretence and insolence by competence wedded to humility. He was not so absorbed in the study of religion as to have forgotten its exacting claim on his personal relationship to God ; if he believed that all search for truth was search for God, that to exercise the intellect was to serve Him, he remembered that the Beatific Vision is vouchsafed to the pure in heart. He could say strong things on occasion, and he had a great capacity for righteous indignation ; but his disposition was sweet and sunny, his bearing gentle and courteous. It warmed the heart to see the radiant smile of welcome on that rugged, deeply-furrowed face, to touch behind it the intense, vital personality. The perplexed found in him a wise and patient counsellor, the sorrowing were assured of understanding and loving sympathy. Many of us are feeling that when he passed within the veil one of the forces most powerful in shaping our thoughts, our purposes, and our characters, was taken from us. We shall cherish his memory, and look forward with yearning to renew the happy fellowship, now for a little space interrupted by Death.

ARTHUR S. PEAKE.

*MODERN CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC.*

THE power and vitality of the Christian religion are nowhere more manifest than in its adaptability to the changing intellectual conceptions of man. No doubt it is true that human nature remains the same in all places and at all times, and that it is to the fundamental needs of the human heart that the Christian message ultimately appeals. But the appeal, whatever be its objective, has to be cast in intelligible form, and that form must change with a changing mentality. The attempt to make this change, so far as it has meant a conscious process of adaptation, has been known by the not very suitable name of Apologetic. The name does not involve any such suggestion as that it is considered necessary to apologize for Christianity. It is rather accepted as a convenient general title covering numerous efforts to defend the faith, and to restate it in terms of current spiritual need and intellectual outlook. In theology it is that department which concerns itself with such diverse subjects as arguments for the Being of God, criticism of antitheistic, and anti-Christian systems, and the defence of the historicity and authenticity of the Christian records. It follows, therefore, that the study will be useful or otherwise according to the spirit and standpoint with which it is undertaken. If it merely means, as it too often does, the recital of stock theistic arguments, and the setting up and demolishing of theological men of straw, it will prove a very arid and even mischievous exercise. But if it means a reasoned attempt to distinguish between what is permanent and what is merely occasional in the Christian faith, to restate the Christian position in terms intelligible to the men of the time, and to meet the fresh attacks upon it with fresh dispositions both of offence

and defence, then it becomes not only a most necessary exercise but one that should be very fruitful in its results. To carry it out successfully will require not only that a man shall have a living and experimental knowledge of the Christian religion, and be fully acquainted with all its various phases and struggles in the past, but that he shall be extremely sensitive to all the changes in the intellectual atmosphere of the time in which he lives. Above all he must be free from dogmatic preconceptions and from the paralysing influence of that practical materialism which forms so large a constituent in the mental furniture of the present day.

For it will be generally conceded that the danger to which Christianity is exposed in these days is not that of any open attack, but rather of that impalpable thing called atmosphere. Agnosticism and atheism have both almost ceased to be militant, and, as aggressive forces, have become as much things of the past as that type of anti-Christian propaganda which found a first line of offence in the so-called "mistakes of Moses." Far more subtle and dangerous enemies than these are to be found in the spirit which is ready to accept all types of religion or none, and in the tone of mind which relegates everything spiritual to the realm of the unreal and derives all its standards of judgment from the things temporal and seen. It is always true that a man is very much as he believes, and that what he believes has everything to do with shaping and building up his life. Beliefs that lift a man very little higher than the average sentiment of society, and that are loosely and lazily held, will never produce great characters. Christians who are ready to eviscerate their religion of its deep moral content, who water down sin, and salvation and judgment, and who tend to substitute sentimentality for conviction, can do more to damage the faith than its most active and



open opponents. There is a practical atheism that confesses God with the lips and denies Him in the life, that is far more difficult to deal with than any denial of God based on theoretical and philosophical grounds. The temper of mind which assumes that God does nothing and is content to leave Him out of account in the reading of history and in the practical concerns of life is the characteristic feature of modern unbelief and needs to be met and combated at every turn. In order to accomplish this successfully it will be necessary for Theology to come down to the marketplace, and to concern herself, not merely with the problems of the schools, but with the needs of an average human nature.

The first difficulty that confronts us is as to what it is exactly that we have to conserve and defend. Christianity is a very wide term, and for the purposes of any effective apologetic it must be much more closely defined. Do we mean by it the whole body of doctrine which has at any time been accepted as Christian by the Church, or do we distinguish between the form and substance of the faith? Is it possible to arrive at any agreement as to what is fundamental to Christianity and must be preserved at all costs, and as to what may be regarded as but a temporary and accidental expression of the truth? Or again, how far can we make concessions to the time-spirit in any age without changing what ought not to be changed, and destroying the kernel while intending only to strip off its husk? The active discussion of these questions which is going on both in this country and in Germany has at least served to indicate the gravity of the problem involved, if it has not yet suggested any solution. The naturalistic world-view and the strict application of the critical and historical methods have sometimes been assumed to result in a reinterpretation of the Christian faith and the Person of its Founder which

strips both alike of what has hitherto been regarded as their fundamental characteristic. We are left with a religion which is only one among many others and has about it no elements of permanence other than theirs, and with a merely human Christ standing alongside Moses, Buddha and Mohammed, and contributing his element to man's religious development as they contributed theirs. Thus Christian theology is faced with the question as to whether Jesus Christ is the sole object of Christian faith or only its first subject.

In Germany the reaction against the extreme negative position is taking forms the variety of which indicates the confusion with which the subject is still surrounded. The general aim of the writers who set themselves to frame what they call a modern Positive Theology is to retain the fundamentals of the old Christian faith and express them in terms of modern thought. But just what these "fundamentals" are and just what constitutes "modern thought" they are by no means agreed. For example, Theodor Kaftan, in his *Modern Theology of the Old Faith*, finds in Kant the best representative of the new spirit and makes the "practical" character of religious knowledge and the independence of the gospel both of philosophy and theology fundamental points in determining what a modern Theology should be. At the same time he expresses the "old faith" in distinctly theological terms and tends to make of it a creed rather than a faith. On the other hand, men like Seeberg and Grützmacher seek the same end as Kaftan by a process of modernizing the old doctrinal systems without showing any of his hostility to metaphysics. They agree in affirming the theoretic and objective character of theological knowledge, and Grützmacher stoutly contends that faith and theology are inseparable. Seeberg, whilst he makes Christian doctrine but

an intellectual expression of the Christian life and experience, conceives that life too much in terms of mere feeling. Diverse as these positions are, the school which they represent has done good work in emphasising the necessity for some re-statement of the Christian position in terms of the modern mind, and in combating the view that this must lead to a denial of everything that is really distinctive in Christianity. The need for a positive rather than a critical or even merely historical exposition of Christianity is more urgent than ever it was.

We are still, however, faced with the problem as to what are the exact differentia of the Christian position. No real apologetic is possible unless we know and can state clearly what it is we have to defend, and what is the ultimate deposit of truth or fact beyond which we cannot go. Modern historical criticism has so far altered the balance of things that it is no longer justifiable to begin the defence of the faith by advocating a spiritual view of the universe, and by urging philosophical arguments for theism. These are useful and necessary in their place, but they are secondary to the main consideration, which is to establish the historical trustworthiness and present-day pertinence of the Christian appeal. And it needs always to be remembered that this appeal came to the world first neither as history nor as doctrine but as a gospel. There was a gospel at work among men before any of the New Testament was written, and it was the gospel or spoken word that was the cause of the written word and not vice versâ. We have, therefore, to begin with the gospel and to beware of confounding it with the various later explanations and justifications historical or otherwise. The nature of this gospel must no doubt be studied mainly in the effects it produced, but there is no lack of material. For there is no denying the effectiveness of Christianity as a moral and spiritual force when it

first burst upon the world. In dealing with it we have to deal not merely with a theory but with a dynamic which can be felt and measured. The gospel came to men as a word of hope and power. It delivered them from age-long fears and mental oppressions, it read life to them in larger terms, renewed their moral energy, changed their perspective and brought God near. The familiar terms in which it was described, Word, Power, Life, were very characteristic, and were, all of them, abundantly justified. They appealed not so much to the philosophic mind as to the religious temper, and they found their first expression in character rather than in theorising. Just as behind all systems of physical science is the reality called life, so behind all theologies is the gospel, the datum from which they start and the fact which brings them into being. Long before they came to write the story of Him men had learnt to know what they called the "Spirit of Jesus" as a living and active force. However little we may be able to use their terminology, the experience to which they pointed is still familiar to us, and we, like them, may find the beginning of our religion in that personal contact with Jesus Christ which still means, as it always has meant, new life and peace for men.

Thus the process of verifying the Christian facts must be psychological as well as historical. This does not mean, however, that we may be content with a purely subjective view, and that the historicity of Jesus is a matter of indifference. It is true that there is much in the traditional story of the life of Jesus of which we cannot be sure, but this does not alter the fact that behind early Christian experience there is a Person and a life sufficiently great to have caused it and to have made it what it was. The important point for the moment, however, is as to the power of this Person over His followers, and as to the forms which His relation



to them assumed. What we want has been admirably set forth by Mr. T. R. Glover in his book on *The Conflict of Religions in the early Roman Empire*.<sup>1</sup> "Freedom from daemons, forgiveness and reconciliation with God, gladness and moral strength and peace in the Holy Spirit—of such things the early Christians speak and they associate them all invariably with one name, the living centre of all. . . . Jesus is pre-eminently and always the Saviour : the author of the new life : the revealer of God : the bringer of immortality. It made an immense impression on the ancient world to see the transformation of those whom it despised—women, artisans, slaves and even slave-girls. Socrates with the hemlock cup and the brave Thrasea were figures that men loved and honoured. But here were all sorts of common people doing the same thing as Socrates and Thrasea, cheerfully facing torture and death " for the name's sake,"—and it was a name of contempt too. " Christ's people "—Christianoi—was a base Latin improvisation by the people of Antioch, who were notorious in antiquity for impudent wit : it was a happy shot and touched the very centre of the target. " The name " and " His name " are constantly recurring phrases. But it was not only that men would die for the name—men will die for anything that touches their imagination or their sympathy—but they lived for it and showed themselves to be indeed a " new creation." " Our Jesus " was the author of a new life and a very different one from that of the Hellenistic cities. That Christianity retained its own character in the face of the most desperate efforts of its friends to turn it into a philosophy congenial to the philosophies of the day, was the result of the strong hold it had taken upon innumerable simple people, who had found in it the power of God in the

<sup>1</sup> P. 161.



transformation of their own characters and instincts, and who clung to Jesus Christ—to the great objective facts of His incarnation and His death upon the cross—as the firm foundations laid in the rock against which the floods of theory might beat in vain.” To this testimony we may add that of Harnack<sup>1</sup> to the same effect. “Behind and in the gospel stands the Person of Jesus Christ who mastered men’s hearts, and constrained them to yield themselves to Him as His own, and in whom they found their God. Theology attempted to describe in very uncertain and feeble outline what the mind and heart had grasped. Yet it testifies of a new life which, like all higher life, was kindled by a Person and could only be maintained by connexion with that Person.” Here, then, we reach what was central and paramount in the early Christian teaching. The worth and power of it have been evidenced again and again not merely by historical inquiry but by observation and experiment. Under certain conditions the Christian message makes its appeal to the universal human consciousness quite unerringly and independently of the thought-forms in which it may be cast. We have much to learn still from the psychological study of normal Christian experience, but already we know enough to understand that the Christian Gospel is a living and fruitful force in human life and that given free play its results may be reckoned upon. The gospel addresses itself to the whole personality, emotions, intellect and will, and works out in an ethical transformation of character that is both regular and distinctive. Its operation is to be distinguished from anything in the nature of sentimental illusion by the practical results produced. In the life of joyous confidence in God, freedom from the fear and condemnation of sin, and willing self-sacrifice and service which are characteristic of the Christian profession, we find the

<sup>1</sup> *History of Dogma*, vol. i., p. 113. Eng. trans.

ultimate deposit of Christianity rather than in any body of doctrine framed to explicate it.

The tendency thus indicated to appeal to experience is characteristic of modern thinking both in religion and philosophy. It is likely to prove effective in many ways, but at the same time it must be received with caution. It may easily be pressed to a point where it becomes too subjective and individual. While it provides valuable material for Christian Apologetic the material itself needs to be tested and classified before it can be used to any good purpose. The rule "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*," while it is not always applicable in regard to the intellectual expression or ecclesiastical organisation of religion, is much more applicable in regard to its psychological and experimental expression. As has already been said, human nature itself does not change greatly with the changing years and the religious fact or message which finds men under very varied conditions and produces fruit in life and character, has some *prima facie* right to be regarded as reasonable. The pragmatic test of the fruit borne is not one from which Christianity need shrink and its application in the case of the ethical results of Christian experience is never without effect. The familiar contention that the best evidence for Christianity is a Christian, and that it is useless to criticise Christianity till it has been tried in experience, has a certain scientific importance. When it can be demonstrated on a large scale, as, e.g., in the missionary enterprises of the modern church, it leads to an accumulation of material which has a very high evidential value when it is properly weighed. All the same, however, great care must be taken not to press arguments of this kind unduly. It is much to be able to discover in the history of religious experience the naturalness and universality of religious ideas. This may give us a presumption of their truth, but it gives us no more.

The psychology of religion can do nothing to establish the truth of religious beliefs. It needs to be supplemented always by metaphysic and by the appeal to reason. There is an immediate and intuitional appeal in religious experience that is of the utmost value to the individual, but is without any universal validity. The moment it comes to be explained or stated it involves some form of intellectual theory, and this has to be judged on its merits. Part of the merit, no doubt, is the result which it produces in experience, and it is always useful in this way to realise how creed and life act and react the one upon the other. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that experience in religion can give us a method, but that it cannot give us proofs. But here the method is half the battle. We begin with the facts, facts not of history merely, for these are always more or less elusive, but of experience—of a life lived and a duty done. It is on the basis of these that we must begin to build our edifice of proof, and they will supply us with much of our material. Christian theology should never be a mere war of words or discussion of theories. The processes of observation and experiment are as necessary to it as they are to any of the natural sciences, and the inquirer must keep in touch with his facts all the time if he is not to lose himself in a mist of vain speculation. At the same time he must recognise in them only material to be used. He must be prepared to exchange his psychology for a metaphysic and boldly to launch out on the inferences which his facts justify, and on the theories needed to justify them. Even if it be possible to conclude on psychological grounds that religion is natural to man, and that the Christian religion is the most adapted to human needs, that is only to lay the foundation of the work which the apologist has to do.

It is thus the extent to which men are able to objectify the facts of Christian experience that justifies them in

finding in these facts the ground and norm of their Christian belief. In the light of them it becomes at once possible and necessary to re-read the great Christian dogmas and to rediscover the bases of religious authority. For example, the theistic argument can never be complete so long as it is stated as an exercise for the schools and left unrelated to the needs and experiences of the human soul. So again to rely on the authority and inspiration of Scripture is not necessarily to escape the charge of subjectivity. For there is no real authority in Scripture apart from the extent to which it " finds " and speaks to the human spirit and human needs. In the development of Christian doctrine also experience has played a very large part, and ultimately it is in its appeal to experience that its objective validity consists. There is at least one direction in which this principle is being pressed at the present time, and in which it is calculated to do good service from the apologetic point of view, namely, in regard to the modern tendency to exaggerate the view of God as immanent in the universe. This itself is in answer to the undue emphasis laid on His transcendence with its necessary result in removing Him from any intimate touch with human nature or with mundane things. It is good that this should be corrected, but it cannot be corrected by being done away with. A god both transcendent and immanent may be a speculative necessity, but he is also much more. Only such an one can answer the needs of the religious consciousness and moral nature of man. Neither deism nor pantheism, whatever may be said for them on intellectual grounds, have it in their power to satisfy the moral conscience and spiritual aspirations of mankind, and no conception of God which fails here can in the long run hold the field. The modern conception of personality as not necessarily involving finitude but manifesting itself as " the form of an infinite content," allows us to speak of



God even as immanent in personal terms. But the Christian thought of God cannot rest here. It is not as a mere influence or tendency, however great, that He appeals to us, but as a Person who shows Himself in character and will, with whom we have affinities but by whom we are dominated. In this connexion it may be well to note that type of psychological and experimental apologetic which has become familiar to us in the teaching of Eucken. This points, on the one hand, to a type of universal religion which rests on our independent spiritual life in the world, the expression of a transcendent spiritual activity : and on the other to a characteristic religion which makes the unfolding and development of this spiritual life dependent on a definite religious belief. In other words, both the function and justification of religion are discovered through its relation to life, which is always to be interpreted as the home or sphere of spiritual activities.

On the more strictly philosophical side the task of the Christian Apologist is by no means so difficult as it has often been in the past. Fifty years ago it was almost taken for granted that no other than a materialistic view of the universe was possible. There was nothing surprising in this. The rapid growth of physical science and the vivid and practical appeal which it presents to the senses made it easy for men to believe that it accounted for everything, and that outside its range there was nothing worth a moment's consideration. So it came about that a scientific view of things became identical with a materialistic view, in the sense that matter was held to contain in itself the promise and potency of all life. But closer investigation and more profound reflection have brought about a change. It has been recognised that all speculation about the ultimate nature and constitution of the Universe is philosophical whether the terms used be those of the physical sciences or



not. Even the so-called materialistic explanations leave the problem for philosophy just where it was. The larger the place assigned to matter in the constitution of things the more necessary does it become to inquire into the constitution of matter itself. Physics lead inevitably to a metaphysic, and the interesting fact in the present situation is that the physicists themselves have made the discovery and are, as it were, shivering on the brink of the new world to which their speculations and theories have introduced them. The very matter with which they deal, instead of being the simple background of the Universe, is seen to be itself almost infinitely divisible. The atoms of which it was said to be composed are themselves not the final datum of analysis, but bodies of a highly complex order. In the recent work of Professors Larmor and J. J. Thomson it is almost impossible to say where physics end and a metaphysic begins. The atoms and electrons with which they deal are really metaphysical creations arrived at by the method of hypothesis rather than by actual observation or experiment. In their theories there is no doubt much that is open to criticism from the point of view of the physicist, but what we are concerned with here is the fact that these purely scientific speculations as to the composition of matter seem to justify if they do not demand a philosophical view of the Universe. Indeed, it may be said that if some of the theories current among modern physicists were pressed to their logical conclusions, they would lead to a rather advanced form of critical idealism. Those, therefore, who seek to justify a view of the Universe other than that of the materialist have not now to fight, as once they had, for bare standing ground. Their right to make good their claim is conceded to them beforehand.

None the less, however, both philosophers and theologians are compelled to recognise that the scientific method has

come to stay and must regulate for the future both their arguments and investigations. But they must beware of confusing method with results, and they must be ready to accept the obvious limitations of the scientific point of view. When Professor James says,<sup>1</sup> "The aspiration to be scientific is such an idol of the tribe to the present generation, is so sucked in with his mother's milk by every one of us, that we find it hard to conceive of a creature who should not feel it, and harder still to treat it freely as the altogether peculiar and one-sided subjective interest which it is": he is uttering a much needed warning and pointing out a very real danger. Science deals after all with only one aspect of truth, and in so far as her method is limited to the treatment of experience, of causal connexions and of phenomena, she tends to set problems rather than solve them. Under these limitations, however, the scientific method holds the field for the moment, and the modern theologian may find in it a powerful weapon ready to his hand. Among the first effects of it is the discovery that religion, like all other phenomena, has a history, and that its history is but another illustration of the working of the law of development. Anthropology and the comparative study of religions stand now at the threshold of any reasonable theological system and present us with data of immense value which have to be taken into account. They can no longer be regarded as more or less inconvenient addenda to a theological course of study. They stand rather for a point of view the neglect of which will vitiate every theological system. With all the reconstruction they may involve they are yet able to contribute elements of a positive kind. Primitive anthropology, while it enables us to trace religion back to its earliest forms, shows us at the same time that it is something natural to man, springing out of his

<sup>1</sup> *Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 640.

deepest needs, and profoundly affecting the whole course of his development. The study of comparative religions helps us to realise the fundamental and universal character of the religious impulse in spite of the immense variety in its forms of manifestation. Both in its primitive as well as in its more highly developed phases, religion stands for a composite of ideas and emotions more or less conducive to action. It can best be studied perhaps in the various forms of action to which it gives rise, and it is not without significance that this action should be found to be closely allied to the instincts of social advancement and racial self-preservation. The apologist is not greatly concerned with the disputes of anthropologists as to the origins of religious ideas and as to the right nomenclature of primitive religious conceptions. These things belong to method, and though they have an interest and importance of their own, they do not greatly affect the results with which he has to do. Nor, on the other hand, does he share the popular feeling as to the stigma attaching to the anthropomorphism of primitive religions, or to the superstitions which gather round the belief in spirits, or the idea of an "unknown without." He has long since abandoned the notion that a lowly origin detracts from the value of anything. A mother does not think any the worse of her grown son because he was once a puling babe. In the same way no reasonable man will accord to religion any less respect or belief because it can be traced back to animism or fetichism and the like. The essential point to note is that these things have in them the possibility of higher forms of life. They do not, as it were, represent merely blind gropings in the dark but the effort of an age to adapt itself to a light that grows with its capacity to receive it and to see by it. The study of the development of religious ideas not only in their intrinsic truth, but in their value for the moral and social advance-

ment of the race, serves still farther to indicate how they occupy a legitimate and essential place in the human mind and in human experience. Nor is such a study really open to the reproach of being merely subjective in its results. Nothing is more certain than that, in its broader aspects and relations, religion is among the most powerful of all the factors that make for the progress of mankind. It is not only that it advances *pari passu* with the general advancement, but that it is itself a main cause in furthering the onward movement. It supplies the most powerful motives for human action, and tends to safeguard social well-being. In order to discover this it is no doubt necessary to take wide views and to abandon any expectation of finding a smooth and unintermittent course of development in human history. Progress is often by reaction as well as by action, and much ground has to be covered and many data gathered before its course can be traced. But a truly scientific treatment of the data under observation makes it abundantly plain that in the religious phenomena of human history we have a body of truths which are not to be put down either to fraud or illusion, but are an essential part of man's equipment for life and work.

But the application of the historical method to religion involves certain dangers against which the inquirer needs to be warned. It can only be carried out successfully if it is kept free from dogmatic presuppositions, and if the facts with which it deals are suffered to tell their own tale. It must beware of mistaking mere resemblances between various religious types for organic relations, and it must avoid the danger of turning hypotheses into dogmas. The history of religious thought abounds in illustrations of these errors. In this field it is almost impossible to find an unbiassed investigator, so profoundly are men affected by their own religious or anti-religious feelings and prejudices. And



on the other hand, the most acute and open-minded observers are never quite free from the danger of being ensnared by their own cleverness. Some quite brilliant hypothesis framed to account for a certain set of phenomena, and justified so far as those phenomena are concerned, may easily be stretched too far until it becomes a source of obscurity rather than of light. Recent eschatological interpretations of the work of Jesus Christ may be cited as a case in point. Within certain limits these are very highly suggestive and fruitful, but they are sometimes pressed so far as to become most misleading. The first necessity for scientific historical inquiry is the open mind and the willingness to believe that "there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy." And in dealing with religion the necessity is greatest, because there is the greatest danger of prejudice and theorising. This fact itself affords strong testimony to the imperious power of the religious instinct in the heart of man.

The problem with which we are concerned, therefore, is the recognition and interpretation of what is normal in religious consciousness and experience: and the method of dealing with it must be psychological as well as historical. The religious phenomena which history brings under review need themselves to be interpreted by being brought into relation to the needs and nature of humanity, and this can only be done by some process of psychological analysis and classification. The danger of this process is the tendency to lay undue stress either on individual experience on the one hand, or on the abnormalities of the collective religious experience of races or nations. The problem can only be dealt with satisfactorily by keeping a due balance between individual experience and the study of historic religions. As both of these alike seem to point to the existence of certain permanent factors in the religious development of the race,



we arrive at material with which the psychologist may deal with some hope of success. Here many difficulties will be avoided by maintaining the position of the newer psychology as to the unity of the mind and as to the difficulty of dividing it up into compartments and functions which may be supposed to exist and act independently of one another. In the religious consciousness no doubt will, feeling, and intelligence are all operative. But they are not separate and mutually exclusive factors, and it is by no means always possible to identify their action. They have to be supplemented also by the action of the subconscious mind, which is an element of increasing importance for the religious as well as for many other aspects of the human consciousness. But without entering further into the complex questions here indicated we may confidently assert that psychological study of the phenomena of religious consciousness points yet more and more persistently to the fact that religion is not merely the product of environment or social custom or tradition, but that it is a normal and necessary expression of man's inner life and has its roots in his very nature and being as man. Such considerations as these provide a standing ground for the defence of religion the strength of which is more easily recognised than that of one which rests on logical or ontological arguments alone.

But, as has already been suggested, we cannot stop here. The metaphysical side of apologetics is not so entirely discredited as would sometimes seem to be the case. The familiar ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments, if stated in the newer terminology and confined strictly to their proper sphere, still remain valid, and offer suggestions which no student of the subject can afford to ignore. The difficulty in regard to them, however, is that they involve very large assumptions and that it is necessary to do a good deal of preliminary work before we can claim the right to

occupy the ground which they may be said to cover. As Professor Ward <sup>1</sup> says, "The notion of building up a metaphysic without presuppositions, one that shall start from nothing and explain all, is futile." It may be argued without much fear of contradiction that our knowledge of the finite as finite involves presuppositions which lead us up from Nature to God. But this is only one way by which we can reach the goal, and it is not always the first or the best. Feeling and experience as well as cognition have their part to play, and by the due balance and co-operation of them all do we attain the desired end. In the universality, persistence and progress of religion on the one hand, and in the spiritual interpretation of man and of the Universe on the other, do we find our justification of the faith that is "the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen."

W. B. SELBIE.

### NOTE ON THE ELEPHANTINÊ PAPYRI.

I HAVE to thank both Mrs. Lewis and Mr. Cook for the courteous tone of their contributions to this discussion. The suggestion that the Elephantinê papyri are forgeries is scarcely paradoxical, since Mr. Belleli impugned the authenticity of the Sayce-Cowley documents shortly after their appearance, and was encouragingly reviewed in the *Literarisches Zentralblatt*.

My objection to Papyrus 8 is not that its language is mixed, but that it is mixed with modern languages, chiefly *modern Persian*, a dialect the beginnings of which come well within the Christian era. I will justify this statement, since Mr. Cook appears to have misunderstood its bearing.

1. In line 17 occur the words *hinduwānah zarnīkh*

<sup>1</sup> *The Realm of Ends*, p. 225.

להנרונה זרניך), meaning "a pumpkin" or "hard round lump" of "arsenic." The word *hinduwānah* bears no mark of antiquity. But *zarnīkh* is also highly suspicious. I may refer to the *Grundriss der eranischen Philologie*, I. ii. 53. A very good authority, G. Meyer, maintains the old view that *zarnīkh* is borrowed from the Greek ἀρσενικόν, first found in Aristotle; and the fact that with the alchemists arsenic (in accordance with its Greek name) means the male element opposed to the female, mercury, seems to make this certain (cf. Duval, *La Chimie au Moyen Age*, II. p. v.). And indeed the chemical value of "male," i.e. *fiery*, was known to Hippocrates, who did not yet know the substance. The view that the genuine Persian forms are *zarnī* and *zarneh* is against the tradition, which makes *zarnīkh* earlier; and since both these words mean "not gold," whereas *zar-nīkh* sounded like "good gold," they are evidence that *zarnīkh* was felt to be a foreign word. Since then *arsenic* acquired its association with a particular substance in the fourth century B.C. in Greece, the Greek name cannot have been borrowed before that date. Nor is there any evidence of the existence of a Persian word of this form for this substance before Moslem times.

2. In line 10 there occurs the phrase עקי ארו ואר. *Vār* is a modern Persian termination corresponding with the English "ful" or "like." So *umed-vār* "hopeful," *dharra-vār* "atomlike," etc. The phrase ארו ואר, then, means either "cedarlike," if it be hybrid, or "valuable" or "pine-like," if both elements be Persian. The construction whereby the substantive is annexed to the adjective is that of modern Persian also. But whereas *arz-vār* or *erez-vār* would occasion no surprise in the Persian of to-day, it is unthinkable in the Persian of the fifth century B.C.

3. In line 6 occurs the phrase ולעבך אופשרה יתעבך, meaning "and let a fair copy be made." The word used for "copy"

is the modern Persian *afshurah* (with Judæo-Persian spelling), meaning literally "a squeeze." The word preceding it is the Greek λευκ, employed in modern Persian in the form *luqs*, faintly disguised. But the phrase "a white squeeze" for a fair copy implies *acquaintance with the art of printing*; and the spelling of *levq* follows Judæo-German orthography.

4. In line 12 occurs the phrase פחטמוני לפערער חד לאמין תרין, meaning "supports for the side, one at every two cubits." Here *pakhtmōnī* is the Persian *pushtīmān*, "prop, support," faintly disguised; whereas the wholly impossible פערער appears to be the Persian *parrah*, "side," following a Judæo-German spelling.

It is by no means necessary to follow the ingenious authors of this document into all their devices; it is apparently due to the co-operation of two gentlemen, one of them educated in Germany, who has attended Oriental courses, the other a native of Persia, and a caligrapher by profession.

Mrs. Lewis has furnished a valuable piece of information by her assertion that ancient papyrus of Egyptian fabrication is still to be had. Doubtless the skilful forger would prefer this to the Syracusan product.

The papyrus wherein these phrases occur is (to my mind) so clearly a fabrication of the last few years that its society is highly compromising for documents which are less obviously faked. For any one who had genuine Aramaic papyri at his disposal would have no reason for putting such a document among them; whereas one who was producing a set of fabrications might well indulge in a *mauvaise plaisanterie* of the kind.

Mr. Belleli is pursuing his investigations independently of mine, and, I understand, has arrived at the same conclusion on quite different grounds. I am prepared to rest my case on the words collected in this note, and doubt whether

accumulation of evidence in such a matter strengthens the argument. In the classical exposure of a fabrication, Bentley's *Dissertation on the Letters of Phalaris*, the first observation clenches the matter ; Phalaris is shown to refer to *Phintia*, which was founded long after his time, and further evidence is not required ; Bentley, however, accumulates so much, and falls into so many errors during the process, that his reader is less convinced at the end than at the beginning. There is a saying of Bentley's well worth remembering in connexion with such investigations, viz. that to refute an error is a much lengthier and more serious operation than to commit one. The amount of acquaintance with Aramaic, Persian and Armenian necessary for the composition of papyrus 8 is not very considerable ; but when one wishes to demonstrate that the phrase *hinduwānah zarnākh* must belong to a post-Christian century, as has been seen, Eranian philology and the history of alchemy are indispensable, and even after their employment the adversary has merely to say that he does not understand Persian, and one's labour is rendered futile.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

### THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.

#### XII. IS THERE A LIMIT TO SALVATION ?

Now why are some called and not others ? Is this just or right ? And what has Paul to say about those who are not foreordained and called ? They are many. What is their fate ? What is their place and part in the purpose of God ?

The Apostle's purpose does not lead him to answer this question, although it is one which must justifiably and



necessarily rise in the mind of every person. Paul was not writing philosophic treatises, but stimulating and hortatory letters. He knew the nature of a Graeco-Romano-Judaic audience. It was not the problem of the fate of the uncalled that could interest their thoughts or touch their hearts. The melancholy tone that always becomes the permanent characteristic of a long-established paganism was already deeply fixed in the minds of his Graeco-Roman hearers. He had to rouse in them hope, love, and faith, all nearly dormant forces in their nature, so far as the higher forms and aims of those forces were concerned. He had to give them something worth living for and worth dying for. It was useless to set before such minds and eyes a picture of the misfortune of those who were not called. No misfortune could be worse than what they already endured. No lot could be more wretched than that of a Roman noble as their poet Lucretius painted it: "sick of home he goes forth from his large house, and as suddenly comes back to it, finding that he is no better off abroad. He races to his country house, driving his carriage-horses in headlong haste; he yawns the moment he has reached the door, or sinks heavily into sleep and seeks forgetfulness, or even hurries back again to town. In this way each man flies from himself, and hates too himself because he is sick and knows not the cause of the malady; for if he could rightly see into this, each man would relinquish all else and study to learn the nature of things, since the point at stake is the condition for eternity." <sup>1</sup>

Such was the frame of mind in which the mass of pagans dwelt, and in which they prayed and made vows for salvation. To words of threatening or denunciation of future suffering, the ears of such men would be deaf. Lucretius in the passage immediately preceding has just been declaring

<sup>1</sup> Lucretius iii., 1059-1069, shortened from Munro's rendering.

that all threats of punishment in a future life were mere fable, and that the only reality lying behind such denunciation was the ceaseless misery that men suffered in their present life on earth.

Such people had no faith in the present, and no hope for the future : they were filled with a thorough disbelief in the world around them, and utter despair as to the future. Threats and terrors meant nothing more to them in the future than they were already suffering in the present : with these their whole horizon was clouded.

Paul had to recreate the better nature of these men ; and this he did in the only way possible, viz., by recreating their belief in the goodness of God and with this their hope, and as a result their power of loving and serving. It was a matter of no interest to him to discuss speculative questions or even to set forth a complete and well-rounded system of philosophy. Those to whom he addressed himself did not want a system of philosophy ; they wanted life, hope, salvation. Their vows and their prayers were for "salvation."

It must not, therefore, be concluded from Paul's almost total silence on this subject, the fate of those who were not called, not foreordained, not justified, that he had never thought about it. To a certain extent he recurred to his fundamental principle that God is good, and took refuge in the unfathomable depth of the Divine counsel ; " His decisions cannot be sought out in detail, nor His ways traced ;<sup>1</sup> for who hath known the mind of the Lord ? or who hath been His counsellor ? " The entire plan of the universe and the whole purpose of God cannot be comprehended by man. We have to reach, by faith and by direct insight and by the natural power of believing, the truth that God is good, without being able to prove it logically ; we have the assur-

<sup>1</sup> Romans xi. 33.

ance in our heart that this axiom is true, but we cannot demonstrate its truth to one who disbelieves it.

Further, we must accept the world as it is. We have to deal with the universe and its facts, and it is folly to think we could improve them if we had our way, or if we had been consulted. "Who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why didst thou make me thus?"<sup>1</sup> It is the idea of a child or a fool that, if he had had the making of the world, he could have made a much better one.

The Apostle, whether intentionally or not, has given very little indication of his views regarding the choice of those who are called and the fate of those who are not called. While many are not called, yet there stands always the axiom that God is good, and that therefore His purpose, however incomprehensible to us, must justify itself in the final and complete view; but that fundamental principle must not be pressed to the dangerous extreme that the grace of God will in the simple sense save every one. Paul does not teach a universal salvation. He does indeed speak of God's purpose "to reconcile all things unto Himself"<sup>2</sup>; but he does not explain this further, and leaves it in apparent contradiction with his general teaching (as contained e.g. in Philippians iii. 18, i. 28, Romans ii. 4-8, etc.).

As passages like Romans iii. 7 f., vi. 1 f., 15 f. show, Paul had reason to fear lest, by insisting that the infinite grace of God must triumph in the long run, he might do harm to the raw pagan hearers, who would be inclined to ask, and who did sometimes ask, Why should we not continue to sin, and trust to the sure love and grace of God to save us from the consequences? He replies that there is a judg-

<sup>1</sup> Romans ix. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Col. i. 20; cp. Phil. ii. 9-11.

ment, that the choice must be made between sin and righteousness, and that there is punishment for sin : and he makes it clear that salvation can be attained only in one way, and that those who miss that way cannot be saved, but lose the lot of life and the grace of God. He does not, however, dwell much on this aspect of the justice of God ; but prefers, whether from his own natural bent or owing to experience of what was most efficacious, to lay emphasis on the free offer of salvation to all. His teaching and his mind were filled with the thought of eternal life in Christ. He spoke little about the doom of death, and that little was expressed chiefly in his earliest teaching to the Thessalonians (though it also appears a good deal in his second letter to Timothy).

There remains in Paul's public teaching, so far as his letters reveal it, a certain unsolved discrepancy between his fundamental axiom of the goodness of God and his *dicta* as to the death, or destruction, or wrath, that awaits the unrepentant. This we must admit. It is not our business to set forth a complete system of philosophic teaching, but simply to state what Paul taught. He leaves us to accept through the power of faith this discrepancy between the fundamental axiom, which is true and necessary, and the other fact which we can neither deny nor explain. There is, however, a possible opening to a reconciliation of the discrepancy, which will be alluded to in a following Section.

### XIII. THE IDEA OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE TEACHING OF PAUL.

A close parallel to the triple expression " from and through and to faith," is found in Romans xi. 36. There, immediately after the highly emotional sentence regarding the counsel of God, which is so immeasurably beyond the comprehension of man, Paul ends the brief paragraph with a



measured and rhythmical phrase, "of Him, and through Him, and unto Him <sup>1</sup> are all things," which may be roughly paraphrased as an assertion that the entire universe originates from God, and its existence (i.e. its order and evolution) continues by means of God, and its development culminates in the attaining (i.e. the re-attaining) to God. Just as the whole universe comes from God, and exists through Him, and with a view to Him, so faith (which is the working of the spirit of God in man) is the originating and maintaining and consummating force in the reconciling of man to God.

This is a glorified form of the ancient Anatolian thought which was latent in the paganism of Western Asia. Paul raises to an infinitely higher level the beautiful old idea that all men—and especially the chiefs and heroes—come from the Great Mother, all are nourished and instructed and guided and advised by her, and all return to her kindly bosom at death—the Great Mother being the mother earth. A touch of the enthusiasm which characterised the pagan votaries of the goddess lingers in the almost lyrical character of Paul's loftier utterance. As we read a paragraph like this, we feel that it is not necessary to regard the even more markedly rhythmical and lyrical phrases of 1 Timothy iii. 16, or Ephesians v. 13-14, as fragments of contemporary hymns quoted by Paul: they may with equal reason be looked upon as examples of the lyrical expression to which the Apostle rose in moments of emotional and mystic enthusiasm.

The righteousness, then, which man possesses is a process of growth towards the supreme righteousness of God. It is the young tree which will grow into the consummation and the perfect form: it is the seed which will produce that fruit. This thought of growth or development is always present in Paul's mind, when he speaks of the

<sup>1</sup> With a view to Him: *eis* following after and balancing *ἐξ* and *διὰ*.



righteousness which is attributed to, or set to the account of,<sup>1</sup> man. Hence, in interpreting his thought to his audiences in the Greek and Graeco-Asiatic cities, he frequently has recourse to the metaphor of growth culminating in the production of fruit. So in Philippians i. 11, "being filled with the fruit of righteousness, which is through Jesus Christ." So again in Colossians i. 9-10, "that ye may be filled with the knowledge of His will . . . bearing fruit in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God." Here comes in the apparent self-contradiction which is involved in the idea of development, on the one hand "filled with the knowledge of God's will," and yet on the other hand still "increasing in the knowledge of God,"—for the knowledge of His will is the knowledge of Him and of His nature and work. So also in Ephesians v. 8-11, "the fruit of the light is in all goodness and righteousness and truth," whereas "the works of darkness" are unfruitful. By this Paul means that there results from them no good fruit, no progress towards God, but only degeneration and evil. Sin is not inactive. It is as real and vigorous, according to Paul's ideas, as righteousness. It is just as dangerous as righteousness is beneficent.

In accordance with this governing thought Paul twice speaks of those who gain salvation as "in process of being saved" (σωζόμενοι). Similarly the lost are often called ἀπολλύμενοι, who are in process of perishing. In the latter case the idea of a still incomplete process is more often marked by the tense than in the former. The lost may always turn towards salvation; there is always offered to them the opportunity of changing and returning to God; but Paul calls the saved just as frequently "those who have

<sup>1</sup> λογίζομαι is a metaphor from the keeping of accounts, and is more characteristic of the Roman than of the Greek thought and writers. It is also perhaps characteristic of the Jewish mind.

been saved" as "who are in process of being saved."<sup>1</sup> There is in the double description of those who are saved the same apparent contradiction of completed and uncompleted process about which we have already spoken. Those who have entered on the process of salvation rarely turn back: those who have put their hand to the plough rarely withdraw: to begin the process of salvation is salvation. On the contrary, those who are in the process of ruin may always return.

In 2 Corinthians iii. 18 the life of the saved is described as a continuous process of transformation from one stage of glory to another. Each step forward in the path towards righteousness attains a higher level and a glory; and this new stage in turns becomes a mere stepping stone to attain the glory beyond and above.

That this idea of growing, or developing, or being perfected, is implicated in all the teaching of Paul as it appeals to us at the present day, must be presumed. Those in whom this idea is the mould for all their thought must find Paul incomprehensible, unless they recognise that all his thought bears the same form. The good life is a process of perfecting (*τελείωσις*). No word in Paul is more lucid or more typical of his teaching than this.

The meaning of the term *τελείωσις* is clearly explained in Romans viii. 29. It is a process of transformation into the likeness or image of Christ, so that men may be His brothers, and He may be the eldest of many brethren. They begin by being unlike Him; they end by being like Him. Such are the first and the final terms in this process. The process itself is defined in the words just quoted from 2 Corinthians iii. 18; it is a series of stages in the gradual

<sup>1</sup> *σῳσμένοι* Ephesians ii. 5 and 8: *σωζόμενοι* 1 Cor. i. 18, 2 Cor. ii. 15 (compare also Acts ii. 47).

growth of what Paul names "glory," i.e. the glory, the splendour, the nature of God.

In 1 John iii. 2 the two terms of the process are defined thus : " Now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if He shall be manifested, we shall be like Him ; for we shall see Him even as He is." The apparent inconsistency between Paul's statement in Romans viii. 29, that the end of the process is that we become children of God and brothers of Christ, having the likeness of brothers to one another, and John's statement that we are now children of God, is merely another example of what constantly appears when we contemplate the process of growth as Paul describes it. We are in a sense what we are growing to be : we have attained because we shall attain : we possess the righteousness of God because we are developing towards it : our nature is perfected because it is in the process of being perfected : we are the children of God in so far as we are making ourselves His children.

#### XIV. RIGHTEOUSNESS AND SIN.

Since Paul, as we have said, was filled with an intense, flaming passion for righteousness, so it follows that he was filled with an equally intense hatred for sin. The life of man is to him quite as much a struggle to get free from sin, as it is a growing into the righteousness of God. Sin is a force which expresses itself in the deterioration of the individual, and which steadily becomes stronger and more dominant in him. At every step that man takes backwards towards degradation and death, he becomes weaker and less fitted to resist the power of sin that rules him. His nature grows more and more corrupt. His will loses tone, and becomes enslaved to the passions or caprices of the moment.

Moreover, the power of sin increases, not merely in the

individual, but in the family and the race. The stern old Hebrew principle that the iniquity of the father is visited upon the children is only an aspect of this domination of sin. The race deteriorates: the family grows weaker and poorer, and dies out: society and the pressure which it exerts on the individual turn towards evil.

The form in which the power of sin most clearly manifested itself in the Pauline world was idolatry. This he hated with all the strength of his nature, not because idolatry was a philosophic error regarding the nature of God, but because through that error it started mankind on the wrong course towards bad and harmful aims, and became thus the cause of numberless errors and sins. A merely speculative and abstract error about the nature of God might conceivably remain an error in word, not in power, and, if this were so, it need not be very seriously considered; just as a philosophic truth, if it remains abstract and theoretical, a matter of word and not of power, may exert no practical influence and earn no commendation from Paul. But in idolatry the false conception of the Divine nature has become active and misleading, and makes itself a terrible power among men. On this account Paul hated it and fought against it all his life.

All these statements require to be more carefully scrutinised in detail.

Righteousness consists in, and is perfected through, the approach of man nearer and nearer to God. The word "approach" must not be misinterpreted or misapplied. It must be taken as an expression of spiritual truth, not of local character. God is not in one place more than in another. We do not go to any special point or place in order to find Him there. Place is a term of limitation, and can be applied to the illimitable and the infinite only because we have to use the limited ideas and terms of finite existence

for want of more appropriate and correct words. Man approaches to God only in the approximation of his spirit and nature to the spirit and nature of God. He is transformed into the same image from glory to glory ; and as Professor H. A. A. Kennedy says,<sup>1</sup> the likeness is not mere outward appearance, for to Paul the term "image" means appearance that "rests on identity of character, community of being."

Sin, as the contrary idea to righteousness, consists in the movement of man away from God, that is to say, in the increasing divergence of his spirit from that of God, and the increasing opposition between his nature and the nature of God. It is not simply a definite, unchanging fact ; it is a process ; and its character is to become accelerated as it continues.

Moreover, sin is not merely a process ; it is also a force, and it becomes in itself a power ever growing stronger and stronger to draw man away from God. That this is so is evident from the situation of man in relation to God and to the universe. Man is placed in the difficulty of having to re-attain to God. The difficulty is there to be overcome. Through overcoming it the divine element in man is strengthened, and he grows in likeness to God. The difficulty constitutes the opportunity. Only through the possibility of a choice does man learn to exercise his power of choosing the right and rejecting the evil. Thereby his nature is strengthened, and he attains towards real freedom of will. In the strengthening of the will he is strengthening the divine nature within him. The will of God is that man should do good ; and the will or the spirit of God acts in man to make him choose the good.

Thus, on the one hand, it is true to say that the evil in

<sup>1</sup> *St. Paul on the Last Things*, p. 294.



the world exists in order to give man the opportunity of overcoming it and attaining to God. The evil is in this view the measure of man's separation from God ; and human life well lived is the traversing of this intervening distance. Without evil there cannot be the human part of the universe, for unless the human is separated from the divine, there would be no humanity and no cognisable universe. From this point of view, then, evil is mere negation, formless and empty distance between man and God. It is the condition of the act of creation ; now the nature of God is to create, and without interposing the distance that separates Himself from man He could not create this universe.

Yet, on the other hand, evil which is not overcome is thereby made active. If the will of the man fails and is not strengthened by achievement, it does not remain as before, but is weakened. The nature of the man thus becomes less like the nature of God ; the distance by which he is separated from God is widened ; and his energy for work in the future is diminished. The widening gap that intervenes between him and God, the loss of sympathy with and desire to attain to God, becomes a power to dominate and enslave his will and control his action. The opportunity which is missed, the possibility of right choice which is not used, leaves behind the omission an inheritance of increased inability to face and overcome the difficulties of the world.

Being now less like unto God, and being further separated from God, through the growth of weakness and idleness, sluggishness and inactivity, man loses some portion of his original endowment and power of comprehending God and good. Such an endowment man possessed in the beginning : what can be known about God was clear at first in his mind and judgment, for this power was the original gift of God to

man.<sup>1</sup> He loses it by not exercising it ; it is clouded and distorted, and the intelligence is darkened.

From all this there result error and misconception of the nature of God ; and thus comes idolatry. The form of idolatry which was most familiar to Paul and to his readers was the representation of the incorruptible God after the image and likeness of corruptible man (as especially among the Greeks), or of birds and quadrupeds (as especially among the Egyptians), and serpents (as was common everywhere).<sup>2</sup> Instead of contemplating the divine power as it is in its reality, they invented these foolish forms, trying by human skill to compensate for their gradual loss of ability to see God, who was now further removed from them.

It is involved in Paul's view, and this was his inheritance from the ancient and continuous Hebrew conception, that man degenerates through error ; and that man's earliest religious ideas are not so wrong and false as his later conceptions. In other words, the savage man is not the primitive man, but an advanced stage of degradation ; and idolatry in the Greek or the Egyptian or other pagan forms is the result also of degradation from an earlier simplicity which had been nearer the truth.

This Pauline doctrine is not admitted by recent speculations regarding the history of religion and the growth of mythology ; on the contrary, it is a postulate assumed by almost all investigators, that the history of religion is a history of continuous progress. It is not part of our purpose to defend Paul's teaching (for it can defend itself), nor yet to compare it with modern speculative theories ; but it is involved in my design to show that his teaching is reasonable and consistent with modern philosophic views. To do so fully would lead too far at present because it would

<sup>1</sup> Romans i. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Romans i. 23.

require a complete study of comparative religion and comparative sociology from an unfashionable point of view. There are, however, two or three points that can be stated briefly without fear of contradiction. There is, for example, no possibility of disputing the fact that extreme polytheism is a later development alike in Greece and in Egypt: so much is admitted universally. Behind that extreme polytheism, as it was current in the time of Paul, there lay in many cases the simpler and older religion of the common man—not the philosopher who sought and invented a highly philosophic explanation of polytheism, but the uneducated rustic. This common man was often content to reverence “the God,” to be guided by some vague perception of the will of “the God,” to make vows and prayers to “the God,” and to record a confession of his failure to act according to the will and ritual of “the God.” The ideas and actions of the common man were false and bad in many respects; his training and surroundings from childhood had been calculated to turn his conduct into wrong grooves; but at least his views continued to be in many respects the simple issue of his native intuition, of his intercourse with the phenomena of nature, and of his daily contemplation of those eternal witnesses, the sun and the sky. The deep things of God, the invisible things of God, His everlasting power and divine nature,<sup>1</sup> were only to a small degree within their ken; but they had the beginning of knowledge in their hearts, and they had received too little education to lose hold of the simple beginnings, though they had been trained to misapply these initial conceptions.

In the second place, the modern savage is in some and even in many cases found dwelling amid the remains of a higher civilization. His world and his society have degenerated around him, and his habits and thoughts in

<sup>1</sup> Romans i. 20.

maturity are the product of a long degradation. This situation sets in strong relief the truth of Paul's other opinion, derived from his old Hebrew training, that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. This is a scientific fact of the highest importance. All educated men are now alive to it. All are seeking to find some way to avoid it, or to minimise the evils that arise through it. Something, as we think and hope, could be done to give the children a fairer start, and a more even chance in life ; but how ineffective have our efforts been as yet, and how powerless has European civilisation proved to save the children from the consequences of their fathers' guilt.

The stream of life does indeed purify itself as it runs ; the punishment of the children in the old Hebrew doctrine lasts to the third and fourth generation ; but there are certain causes and consequences that last longer and cause a permanent deterioration of society, or even poison (as physicians say) the springs of life at its source.

Sin cannot be localised or confined to one individual in the succession of the generations. We all suffer through the sins of our parents, and we all transmit the consequence of sin to following generations. Racial guilt is a real and powerful force. The Hebrew teaching is fully justified by experience and science ; and Paul, who assumed its truth, was right.

In short, a good life consists in the overcoming of difficulties. Such is the law of nature, or, in other words, the will of God. A difficulty or trial which is not overcome gives an opening to sin. It is the triumph of inertia in the character of the man who fails to do well. His nature ceases to grow, and slips back to weakness and degeneration. The Divine element in him fails and is dulled, whereas by conquering difficulties it would grow stronger and brighter. The progressive development of man, the realisation of



“the chief end of man,” consists in that strengthening of the Divine within him, in the raising it from glory to glory through the stages of life, in the growing sympathy with the place and work of God in the world, and in the consequent identification of one’s personal happiness with the life and triumph of the Divine will.

On the contrary, the force of inertia does not remain constant under failure, but is increased. From being a mere hindrance, it grows into a power actively working on the nature of the man, encouraging his self-conceit (Rom. i. 21), making him more and more selfish and self-centred. He expels from his mind all sense of the divine around him and above him; and thus he loses the desire to attain to God, and makes his own pleasure or success the end and aim of his life. He substitutes for the true God his own conception of what God is. In ancient times and among uneducated races, he expressed his conception in some external and visible form or symbol; and thus arose the kind of paganism with which Paul was familiar in the Graeco-Roman world. In more educated races, the false conception of God remains an ideal of some kind, and is special to the individual mind. Such ideals may be, and often are, of a comparatively lofty order, and the life which aims at realising such great ideals partakes of the nobility of its object. The nobler the ideal, the nearer does it approach the nature of the true God, and the more does the life which strives towards this ideal approximate towards the life of the seeker after God. Yet there remains always a certain manifest difference, for the created ideal, lofty as it may be, partakes of the mind which has created it; and the man who seeks after it is not aiming at an object above himself, but is satisfied with the expression of himself.

The lower kind of paganism, such as St. Paul knew, externalised its own conception of God in a visible form,



which appealed to others, and was almost always common to a whole race, or a tribe, or an association. Along with it there invariably grew up a formal cult and ritual (from which the individual ideal of the higher paganism remained free), because the veneration which is common to a number of persons must frame for its expression a series of actions which are incumbent on all as symbolical of the common purpose. With the ritual grows up a body of priests who know the series of prescribed actions and guide the conduct of ignorant devotees. The passions, the ignorance, the vices and the failings of the multitude, mould the customary ritual, and express themselves in it. The history of paganism, therefore, always becomes a racial degeneration ; because paganism is in its nature human and erroneous, and does not seek after the ideal of the true God.

The picture which Paul draws in Romans i. 24 f. of the results of idolatry in the deterioration of moral character in the society of the Græco-Roman world is not exaggerated, provided one remembers that it was not true of every person. There were noble characters in pagan, especially Roman society. There were philosophers, whose life in many respects corresponded to their philosophy. But the general standard of conduct and of judgment was extremely low, and (what was worse) had been deteriorating through recent centuries.

The force of sin in the form of idolatry was peculiarly one which worked on a race through the generations, and caused a steadily progressive deterioration in the social standards of conduct for the individual and of moral judgment generally. Paul had seen this progressive deterioration in the Graeco-Roman world, and traced it to its cause. The pagans themselves were fully alive to it, and described it in almost equally strong terms ; but they did not trace it to the same cause as Paul did, though they saw something of the truth. Lucretius ascribes this deterioration and un-

happiness to religion : " Human life lay foully prostrate upon earth crushed down under the weight of religion " : the " victory over religion brings man level with heaven " : and therefore " we must well grasp the principle of things above " in order to see the world aright, and to realise how " great are the evils to which religion could prompt." <sup>1</sup>

All this Paul could and might have said in almost the same words <sup>2</sup> as Lucretius ; yet the meaning which he put in them would be totally different. Lucretius would eliminate all religion, and relegate all gods to the lucid interspace of world and world, where they live at ease and neither care nor think about men ; and would substitute for belief in any personal God the study of " the principle of things above, the force by which everything on earth proceeds." In this case, where Paul might adopt the philosopher's most typical words, we must recognise that (as was stated in Section XI.) he was not so diametrically opposed to philosophy as he was to idolatry, and that in suitable circumstances he would have felt himself free (as at Athens) to rest his argument to certain minds on the philosophical basis, and show that this basis was only a stage on the way to the fuller truth.

Such is the order of the universe, and the universe is the embodiment and expression of the will of God. The progress of man towards God, i.e. salvation, according to the will and intention of God, is the consummation of the Divine love. Conversely, the retrogression of man away from God, his growing unlikeness towards God and his increasing inability to comprehend the will and nature of God, is the consummation of the Divine wrath. Hence " the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and

<sup>1</sup> Lucretius i. 65-126.

<sup>2</sup> Naturally, Paul would use the term " superstition," where Lucretius speaks of " religion " ; but all religion was superstition to Lucretius, and he would not have objected to the use of the more opprobrious term.

unrighteousness of men, who hinder the truth in unrighteousness"; and this wrath is manifested against them, because they go wrong in spite of the knowledge of God which by nature they possess. (Romans i. 18).

This "wrath of God" can be defined more clearly when we compare the expression "day of wrath"; and it is rightly treated by Professor H. A. A. Kennedy<sup>1</sup> as an equivalent expression (though used from a different point of view) to the other terms, "destruction," "perdition," etc., which express the lot of the sinful. The inference from it is clear that there is only one power in the universe, that all proceeds from God, that sin is permitted in the purpose of God and is a fact and condition of His created universe "The creation" (i.e. the universe as created) "was subjected to vanity" (i.e. to failure in attaining the ultimate purpose intended by God), "not of its own will" (i.e. not because it deliberately and intentionally aims at and desires to fail), "but by reason of Him who subjected it" (i.e. because this is a stage in the evolution of the purpose of God), "in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God." I should venture to gather from this that in Paul's conception the failure is temporary and the vanity is evanescent, "the evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound,"—but that this is so only when we take wider view of the universal purpose of the Creator. There shall be a new heaven and a new earth<sup>2</sup>; but these come only after a great lapse of time in the movement of the ages.

In the life of individuals the purpose of God has not the width of scene necessary for perfecting itself. That purpose

<sup>1</sup> *St. Paul on the Last Things*, p. 313: "the terms which he employs to denote the fate of the unbelieving are *δλεθρος*, *θάνατος*, *φθορά*, *ἀπώλεια*, *ἀπώλυσθαι*, *ὀργή*."

<sup>2</sup> Second Peter iii. 13, Revelation xxi. 1.

works on a greater scale and through a wider sweep of time. The individual man, therefore, does not in Paul's view fill up a complete cycle of time ; but is only a unit in a greater whole, or, so to say, a link in a long chain ; and the Divine works itself out through a cycle vastly longer than the life of the individual. Paul had not wholly separated himself from the old Hebrew point of view, that the Promise of God is given to the race not to the individual, that the Divine purpose works itself out in the nation, and that the individual cannot be regarded as a complete and independent part of the scheme of the universe, but is merely a unit and part of the race.

May we not see in this a hint respecting the direction in which Paul would have proceeded, if he had been called up to explain the fate of the sinful individual and to reconcile this with the good purpose of God and the necessary triumph of that purpose ? I do not presume to run the risk of seeming to put words into the mouth of Paul, or to suggest groundless hypotheses as to the way in which he would have explained what in his letters he has not found occasion to explain. Yet there is sufficient reason to assert that he had not wholly cut himself off from the Hebrew view (a view characteristically Oriental), that the individual must be judged in his family and his tribe and above all in his nation. We are in modern time, perhaps, too apt in the West to think only of the individual and his single life and his single fate, and to interpret Paul as if he were wholly of our mind in this way of looking solely at the single being as a complete entity and never regarding him as a part of the race, whose destiny ultimately controls and overrides his fate.

W. M. RAMSAY.

*FURTHER STUDIES IN THE EPISTLE OF ST.  
JAMES, CHIEFLY SUGGESTED BY DR. HORT'S  
POSTHUMOUS EDITION.*

JAMES i. 5, εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν λείπεται σοφίας, αἰτείτω παρὰ τοῦ διδόντος θεοῦ πᾶσιν ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, καὶ δοθήσεται αὐτῷ. H., with the A.V. and R.V., here interprets ἀπλῶς by the English "liberally," "graciously," and quotes many passages in which a corresponding sense attaches to the cognate adjective (ἀπλοῦς) and substantive (ἀπλότης). In my note I went too far in denying that the adverb ever bears this meaning. H. instances Polyb. xxxii. 14 (Scipio resolved) πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἄλλοτρίους τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἀκρίβειαν τηρεῖν, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἀπλῶς χρῆσθαι καὶ δικαίως; and we should probably give an ethical force to the same adverb in Prov. x. 10, ὃς πορεύεται ἀπλῶς, "he who walks in singleness of heart." But H. himself allows that, in the passage which presents the nearest verbal parallel to this text of St. James,<sup>1</sup> "ἀπλῶς is not ethical at all, but retains its common classical meaning, 'absolutely,' i.e. (in this connexion) without a substantial equivalent." H. adds that, in St. James, the need for adopting this, the logical meaning, is removed by the sufficient evidence for "graciously," and further that it is excluded by the contrast with "upbraideth."

A single instance can hardly be considered to prove the point, when it is a question of probabilities, and H. only provides one instance of the meaning "graciously." I am rather inclined to think that St. James here had in mind such words as we may read in Matthew v. 45, "Your Father which is in heaven maketh his sun to rise upon the evil and

<sup>1</sup> Εἰ δὲ ἀπλῶς διδόντος λαβεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον, πῶς οὐ πλέον ὅτε μὴδὲ προῖκα, "If it [is] unwise to accept an unconditional offer, how much more a mere bargain." Himerius, *Eclog.*, v. 19.



the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust," with which we may compare Acts x. 34, xiv. 17, xvii. 15 foll. ; Luke vi. 35 ; Isa. lv. ; Philo, *Alleg. M.* i. 50, φιλό-δωρος ὦν ὁ θεὸς χαρίζεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς μὴ τελείοις, Hermas *Mand.* ii. 4, πᾶσιν ὑστερουμένοις δίδου ἀπλῶς, μὴ διστάζων τίνι δῶς ἢ μὴ δῶς, πᾶσιν δίδου. This passage from Hermas, who was certainly acquainted with our Epistle (see my *Introduction*, pp. lxxxiv. foll.), might seem to be written to explain the ἀπλῶς of St. James, which, thus explained, may be taken to represent a higher degree of the quality implied by Dr. Hort's interpretation.

It may, however, be objected that, though the blessings of nature are given to all without distinction, it is not so with the blessings of grace. In ch. iv. 3 we are told (1) that "we have not, because we ask not," and again (2) that "we ask and receive not, because we ask amiss," and in i. 6 we are told (3) what it is which makes our prayers unavailing, viz. our want of faith, our doublemindedness. But might not a similar objection be made to the phrase πᾶσιν διδόντος (which Hermas makes use of as explanatory of ἀπλῶς), and also to μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, since we are told in Matthew ix. 20 τότε ἤρξατο ὀνειδίζειν τὰς πόλεις . . . ὅτι οὐ μετενόησαν, and in Mark xvi. 14, ὀνειδισεν τὴν ἀπιστίαν καὶ σκληροκαρδίαν (of the Eleven). As God gives unconditionally, so we have examples of man asking unconditionally in the prayer of Socrates (*Xen. Mem.* i. 3. 2), εὐχέτο πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τὰγαθὰ διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὅποια ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It may be well to add here some further quotations from Heisen's thesaurus in illustration of ἀπλῶς, Aelian *V.H.* ix. 32 (speaking of the statue of Phryne erected by the Greeks) οὐκ ἐρῶ δὲ ἀπλῶς τοὺς Ἕλληνας . . . ἀλλ' οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀκρατέστεροι: *Plut. Vitae* p. 90 (of Solon's legislation), οὐ μὴν ἀπλῶς τὰς δόσεις ἐφήκεν, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ νόσων ἕνεκεν κ.τ.λ. In relaxing the old law of inheritance Solon did not allow the estate to be unconditionally distributed in presents, but only under special circumstances. The word occurs also in *Wisdom* xvi. 27 τὸ ὑπὸ πυρὸς μὴ φθειρόμενον

I. 7, 8, μὴ γὰρ οἰέσθω ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος ὅτι λήμψεται τι παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου, ἀνὴρ δίψυχος, ἀκατάστατος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ. In my edition I have followed the R.V., translating, "For let not that man think that he shall receive anything from the Lord; a double-minded man, unstable in all his ways," taking ἀνὴρ δίψυχος as in apposition with ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος, the doubter of the sixth verse, which forms the subject of λήμψεται. H., on the other hand, understanding ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος of the man who lacks wisdom in ver. 5, makes ἀνὴρ δίψυχος the subject to λήμψεται, translating, "Let not that man think that a man of two minds, unstable in all his ways, shall receive anything from the Lord." The reasons assigned by H. for his interpretation are (1) that the obvious way of setting aside the last person (i.e. the waverer of ver. 6) and pointing back to the person before him (i.e. ὁ λειπόμενος σοφίας, of ver. 5) would be, in Greek, the use of the pronoun ἐκεῖνος. But the following passages will show that the use of ἐκεῖνος is not limited to such references, but is often employed for emphasis, as in Mark xiv. 21, οὐαὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ δι' οὗ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παραδίδοται· καλὸν αὐτῷ εἰ οὐκ ἐγενήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἑκεῖνος: Matthew xii. 45, γίνεται τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκείνου χεῖρονα τῶν πρώτων: John i. 6, ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ Θεοῦ, ὄνομα αὐτῷ Ἰωάννης· οὗτος ἦλθεν εἰς μαρτυρίαν, ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός, ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσιν δι' αὐτοῦ. οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος τὸ φῶς,

ἀπλῶς ὑπὸ βραχείας ἀκτίνος ἡλίου θερμαινόμενον ἐτήκετο (when it was just warmed by a faint sunbeam), 2 Macc. vi. 6 ἦν δ' οὔτε σαββατίζειν οὔτε πατρώους ἑορτὰς διαφυλάττειν, οὔτε ἀπλῶς Ἰουδαῖον ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι (nor absolutely to confess that he was a Jew). Pricæus, in *Critici Sacri*, quotes ἀπλῶς σοι προσφέρεισθαι from Antoninus (without further reference) for the meaning 'generous!'. It occurs in xi. 15 ὡς κίβδηλος ὀλέγων, ἐγὼ προῆρημαι ἀπλῶς σοι προσφέρεισθαι (but this should have been stamped upon his brow), ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀπλοῦς καὶ εὐμενὴς ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασιν ἔχουσι τοῦτο, where I prefer the meaning 'straightforwardly.' This also seems to me the best translation in two other passages of Ant. iii. 6 ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἐλοῦ τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τούτου ἀντέχον, and iii. 16 ἀπλῶς καὶ αἰδημόνως καὶ εὐθύμως βιοῦ.

ἀλλ' ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός: Mark vii. 20, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πορευόμενον, ἐκεῖνο κοινοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον: John xii. 48, ὁ λόγος ὃν ἐλάλησα, ἐκεῖνος κρινεῖ αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. In the parable of the houses built, one on the rock, the other on sand, which closes the Sermon on the Mount, both are referred to as ἡ οἰκία ἐκεῖνη, by way of heightening the contrast between them. In the present case I think the reader would naturally interpret ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος of the man spoken of in ver. 6: it seems to me unnatural to put the warning intended for the waverer into the mouth of him who lacked wisdom, and whose rôle in the argument comes to an end when he has connected ver. 4 with ver. 6 through λειπόμενος and αἰτείτω. I think, too, that Alford rightly questions whether the writer would have introduced a rare word like δίψυχος as the subject of a new clause. If it is merely added in apposition to the preceding ὁ διακρινόμενος, a clue to its sense has been already given.

H.'s next argument is derived from St. James' use of the word ἄνθρωπος, which occurs six times in the Epistle, but 'nowhere with a trace of reproach.' But is there no reproach in ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ (ii. 20)? Elsewhere we read ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἀνομίας (2 Thess. ii. 3), ἄνθρωπος φάγος καὶ οἰνοπότης (Matt. xi. 19), see also Jude 4 παρεισεδύσάν τινες ἄνθρωποι ἀσεβεῖς, 2 Peter iii. 7 εἰς ἡμέραν ἀπωλείας ἀσεβῶν ἀνθρώπων. H. maintains that, wherever ἄνθρωπος occurs in St. James, it is in emphatic opposition to other beings, here to the Lord, in ii. 20 to devils, and probably also in ii. 24. We may allow this characteristic of the word in iii. 9 καταρώμεθα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς καθ' ὁμοίωσιν Θεοῦ γεγονότας, but I think there is something arbitrary in the distinction between ἀνὴρ and ἄνθρωπος which H. makes in his notes on the passages where the words occur. For instance, in the note on i. 8 he insists that ἀνὴρ is wholly without emphasis, while of πᾶς ἄνθρωπος in i. 19 he says the

expression is “not equivalent to *πᾶς* standing alone, but calls our attention to every one of the human race, that race which is God’s offspring, endowed by Him with a portion of His own light.” On the other hand, of *ὀργή ἀνδρός* in the next verse, he says, “It is not exactly the broad distinction of human, as against divine wrath (which would require *ἀνθρώπου* or *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*), but a single man’s anger, the petty passion of an individual soul.” On *τέλειος ἀνήρ* in iii. 2 the note is, “*ἀνήρ* cannot have the sense that *ἄνθρωπος* would have had ‘one showing the perfection of humanity’: it is simply ‘one that is perfect.’” On iii. 8 *τὴν δὲ γλῶσσαν οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων* H. offers two renderings, “The tongue no one can tame—no one, that is, of men” (which I consider to be the true rendering, reminding us of Mark x. 27 *παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρὰ Θεῷ*); but prefers “No one even of men, even of those beings so highly endowed, of whom he had just been speaking.”

In my note on i. 8, I have distinguished between St. James’ uses of *ἀνήρ* and *ἄνθρωπος*, as follows: *ἀνήρ* is generally accompanied by some characteristic epithet, such as *δίψυχος*, *μακάριος*, *ὀργή*, *κατανοῶν*, *χρυσοδακτύλιος*, *τέλειος*, while *ἄνθρωπος*, as a rule, either stands alone, or is accompanied by some quasi-pronominal word, such as *ἐκεῖνος*, *πᾶς*, *οὐδεὶς*. This agrees fairly with the use in the LXX., the Gospels and the Acts, while, in the other Epistles, *ἀνήρ* is generally opposed to *γυνή*.

In dealing with synonyms, however, it is not only necessary to ascertain their different shades of meaning, at any given period of their development, by comparing the passages in which they occur: we must also endeavour to trace back the later meaning to its original. It is plain, to start with, that the concept “human being,” expressed by *ἄνθρωπος* and *homo*, is a more general term, has a wider extension and a narrower connotation than the word *ἀνήρ*



or *vir*, which excludes the woman, the child and the slave, and stands for the head and protector of the family, being supposed to possess the qualities which belong to that position, courage, endurance, self-control, forethought, etc. These qualities are often known by names derived from the word for "man," as *virtus*, ἀνδρεία. Hence we read in Herodotus (vii. 210) πολλοὶ μὲν ἄνθρωποι, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄνδρες; hence the citizens of Athens were addressed as ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, the early Christians as ἄνδρες ἀδελφοί. Hence, I think, we have μακάριος ἀνὴρ in i. 12, in consequence of the manly quality of endurance by which that blessing had been won (ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν). So we read of ὀργή ἀνδρός because, as Plato tells us in his *Republic*, anger is the raw material of courage. In iii. 2 ἀνὴρ is joined with τέλειος probably because the word ἀνὴρ implies full age (as in 1 Cor. xiii. 11). "In Homer it is used chiefly of princes and leaders, but also of free men, though, to mark a man of rank, a qualifying word is mostly added, as ἀνὴρ βουλευφόρος, ἀνὴρ βασιλεύς. In later Greek ἀνὴρ was commonly joined with titles, professions, etc." (L. & S. s.v. ἀνὴρ). Perhaps this may account for the phrase ἀνὴρ χρυσοδακτύλιος in ii. 2, for ἀνὴρ προφήτης used of Christ in Luke xxiv. 19, for φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ in Plato, *Phaedo* 95 c., ἀνὴρ μάγος in *Axiochus* 371. Such complimentary additions, like our "Mister" or "Esquire," soon lost their meaning, as we may see from the comic ἄνδρες θεοί, and such phrases as πᾶς ἀνὴρ, which scarcely differs from πᾶς τις.

There is a similar degradation of ἄνθρωπος from its highest mark in Psalm viii. 4, in which the Son of Man stands above all other created beings, as the image of God, till it becomes used as a contemptuous term for a woman or a slave, especially in the vocative ὦ ἄνθρωπε. While used, like ἀνὴρ, of the title or profession, it does not in general add dignity (though we find ἄνθρωπος βασιλεύς in Matt. xxii. 2), but



the reverse, as in *ἄνθρωπος γόης*. Both lines of degeneration meet in the *ἄνθρωπος ἁμαρτωλός* of John ix. 16 and the *ἀνὴρ ἁμαρτωλός* of Luke xxiv. 7.

I. 17, *πᾶν δῶρημα τέλειον ἄνωθεν ἐστὶν καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων, παρ' ᾧ οὐκ ἔνι παραλλαγή*. This verse establishes the truth of ver. 13, that God tempts none. "It is good, good of every kind, that flows from Him." The contradiction involved may not be strictly logical, since it leaves it possible that evil also may proceed from Him (see Isa. xlv. 7). In my edition I have called attention to the probability that we have here a poetical quotation, in which strict logic is out of place. H. follows Erskine's interpretation: "Every giving is good and every gift perfect from its first source, descending etc." But gifts may be bad, as well as good, e.g. Pandora or the Trojan Horse. H. is therefore obliged to explain that St. James must mean by "every gift" every gift of God, which is really assuming the point at issue. Nor can I think that *ἄνωθεν* is to be understood here as in Luke i. 3, when we have two other passages in this Epistle (iii. 15, 17), where it is allowed that *ἄνωθεν* can only mean "from above."

#### *Uses of ἐνι and ἐνεστι.*

*Ἐνι* is simply the Ionic form of the preposition *ἐν*, but often stands for *ἐνεστι*, both in the earlier and later stages of Greek, just as *πάρα*, *ἄνα*, *μέτα*, *πέρι* are used, with inverted accent, for *πάρεστι*, etc. Its simplest use is to denote the position of one material object within another, as in *Odyss.* x. 45 *ἄργυρος ἀσκῶ ἐνεστιν*, *Herod.* vii. 112 *ἐν τῷ (οὐρεῖ) χρύσεια ἐνι μέταλλα*, *Xen. Anab.* v. 3, 11 *ἐνι δὲ τῇ ἱερῇ χώρῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ*. A derivative use is that which denotes feelings or faculties existing in a person, as in *Il.* xviii. 53 *ἐμῷ ἐνι κῆδεα θυμῷ*, *Od.* xxi. 288 *ἐνι σοὶ φρένες οὐδ' ἡβαιαί*, *Thuc.* ii. 40 *ἐνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν*

ἐπιμέλεια, Diphilus *Syntr.* ἀγαθὸς βαφεὺς ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ παιδίῳ, Luc. *Tox.* 35 μεγαλουργὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἀνδρεῖον ἐνὶ οὐδέν, Aristoph. *Nub.* 486 ἔνεστί δῆτα σοὶ λέγειν ἐν τῇ φύσει ; λέγειν μὲν οὐκ ἔνεστ', ἀποστερεῖν δ' ἔνι, Soph. *El.* 527 (Clytemnestra avows that she slew her husband) τῶνδ' ἄρνησις οὐκ ἔνεστί μοι ("it is not in me to deny it"), *El.* 1031 (Electra dismisses her sister with the words) ἄπελθε· σοὶ γὰρ ὠφέλησις οὐκ ἔνι, to which Chrysothemis replies ἔνεστιν· ἀλλὰ σοὶ μάθησις οὐ πάρα (where ἔνι, ἔνεστιν and πάρα have much the same force), Herod. vi. 109 ἐν σοὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἢ καταδουλώσαι Ἀθήνας ἢ —, where ἐν σοὶ ἔστιν has the same force as ἐνὶ σοὶ, "it lies in you." Epict. *Diss.* ii. 21. 7 ἐνὶ τε καὶ τῷ ζηλοτύπῳ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, *Test.* xii. *Patr.* p. 733 ὅπου γὰρ ἐνὶ φόβος τὸ σκότος ἀποδιδράσκει, *Acta Xanthippae* (in James, *Apocr. Anecdota*, p. 70, Camb.) λεγέτω ὁ κυρίος τὸ ὄναρ, καὶ ἴδωμεν εἰ ἐνὶ διάλυσις ἐν αὐτῷ (if it affords any key to its interpretation). The third use of ἐνὶ is where it denotes not the presence of one material object in another, or the relation of thought or feeling or faculty to a living person, but the relation of fact or thing, whatever it may be, to the nature of things in general, the order of the world, or some other abstraction, where the verb is often impersonal, as in Isocr. *De Pace*, p. 187, ἔνεστι δ' ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πράγμασιν ἡμᾶς τυχεῖν τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης. "In such a state of things it is included as a possibility (involved as a necessity), that we should obtain this honour." The words ἔστι, ἐγγίνεται, ἐνδέχεται are similarly used. I think scholars have sometimes been too ready to assume that this was the only possible use, even where the verb was personal, and where a simpler meaning gives all that is required. Thus L. & S. translate ἔνεσται χρόνος (Thuc. i. 80) "time will be necessary," where the literal "there will be an interval of time" gives the thought more exactly. Again, in Soph. *El.* 527, which I have cited above, and in

all similar cases, they translate οὐκ ἔνι or ἔνεστιν by "It is impossible," where "it is not in me" seems truer to the Greek. In Plato, *Phaedo*, 77 E, ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς<sup>1</sup> (referring to Socrates' words spoken, just before on the childish fear of death, δοκεῖς δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων) L. & S. say that ἔνι means "possible." As this passage is also adduced by Hort in support of his theory that ἔνι "adds a playful irony ('perhaps it is not impossible that even amongst us, etc.),' and can never become a bare equivalent of ἔστιν," it may be well to give Stallbaum's quotation from Themistius (*Orat.* i. 13), as showing that the latter understood it in the manner objected to by Hort: ἔστι γὰρ τις ἐν ἡμῖν οὐ παῖς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ' οἷόν τις εὐγενὴς νεανίας.

I proceed now to examine the passages in which ἔνι occurs in the N.T. and to give my reasons for dissenting from renderings supported by the combined authority of two such scholars as Lightfoot and Hort. The passages are Galatians iii. 26-28 πάντες υἱοὶ Θεοῦ ἔστε διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε· οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλευθερὸς, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θηλύ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἰς ἔστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Lightfoot explains this in terms with which I entirely agree. "In Christ Jesus ye are all sons, all free. . . . The conventional distinctions of religious caste or social rank, even the natural distinction of sex, are banished hence. Ye are all one man, for ye are all members of Christ." Where I disagree, is in the note which follows on οὐκ ἔνι, " 'there is no room for,' 'no place for' ; negating not the fact only but the possibility." I see no reason why we should not keep the ordinary meaning of the word ἔνι. "In the body of Christ distinctions disappear, Jew is not, Greek is not." What more is needed? If we will go out of our way to

<sup>1</sup> Compare the lines of Diphilus quoted above.

introduce the idea of impossibility, we must change the personal to the impersonal construction, οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαίων εἶναι οὐδὲ Ἑλλήνα τὸν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. St. Paul repeats in Col. iii. 9-11 with slight variation what he had said in the Epistle to the Galatians, and Lightfoot gives the same explanation as before.

The next example of ἔνι occurs in 1 Corinthians vi. 5, where St. Paul blames the Corinthians for appearing before Gentile courts, and asks whether the Church is so entirely wanting in wisdom, that they could find no man who would be able to act as an arbiter in cases in which Christians were concerned, οὕτως οὐκ ἔνι ἐν ὑμῖν οὐδεὶς σοφός, ὃς δυνήσεται διακρίναι ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ; Lightfoot nowhere touches on this passage (though, in his note on Gal. iii. 28, he cites James i. 17 as an instance of the denial of a possibility); but Hort refers to it in his note on James, and gives to the simple question "Is there no one among you who could act as an arbiter?" what seems to me the artificial and exaggerated shape, "Is it impossible that there should be among you, etc." He ends his note with the words, "There is no reason to think that ἔνι ever becomes a bare equivalent of ἔστιν." I should rather say that, wherever ἔνι is accompanied by a pleonastic ἐν, as in many of my citations, there ἔνι may be replaced by ἔστιν. Compare the quotation from Herod. vi. 109 given above.

We have still to consider the passage from James i. 17 παρ' ᾧ οὐκ ἔνι παραλλαγή. Here ἔνι is personal, having for its subject παραλλαγή, "In the father of lights there is no variation." This would be perfectly regular if παρά were replaced by ἐν. We have seen a similar irregularity in Soph. *El.* 1031, where Chrysothemis replies to her sister's taunt, σοὶ γὰρ ὠφέλησις οὐκ ἔνι, with the retort, ἐνεστιν. ἀλλὰ σοὶ μάθησις οὐ πάρα. This use of παρά is not uncommon in the O.T., and is explained by Hort from the Hebrew

instinct of reverence, which preferred the expressions "in the presence of God," "with God," to "in God." He instances Psalms xxxvi. 10 *παρὰ σοὶ πηγὴ ζωῆς*, Psalm cxxx. 7 *παρὰ τῷ Κυρίῳ τὸ ἔλεος καὶ πολλὴ παρ' αὐτῷ λύτρωσις*, etc. See the following quotation from Job, where *μετά* is equivalent to *ἐν*.<sup>1</sup>

It may be worth while to cite here the instances of *ἐν* and its equivalents in the O.T. Job xxviii. 14 Ἀβυσσος εἶπεν οὐκ ἔνεστιν (*al.* ἔστιν) ἐν ἐμοὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ θάλασσα εἶπεν οὐκ ἔνεστι μετ' ἐμοῦ, Sirac. xxxvii. 2 οὐχὶ λυπὴ ἐνὶ ἔως θανάτου φίλος τρεπόμενος εἰς ἐχθράν; "Is there not in it (friendship) a grief unto death, a friend changing to hatred?" 4 Macc. iv. 22 (where *ἐν* is impersonal) "He heard that the report of his death caused the greatest possible joy to the Jews (ὅτι ὡς ἐνὶ χαίροιεν).

J. B. MAYOR.

<sup>1</sup> On the construction of verbs compounded with prepositions, see Winer, *Gr.*, pp. 529-540.



THE APOSTLE PAUL'S HYMN OF LOVE (1 COR.  
XIII.) AND ITS RELIGIOUS-HISTORICAL SIG-  
NIFICANCE.<sup>1</sup>

THE note of the great hymn of praise on love in the 13th chapter of 1 Corinthians is already struck <sup>2</sup> by the Apostle a few chapters before (viii. 1) but is immediately abandoned again for the moment. After some expositions of another sort, he comes, in chapter xii., to the gifts (*χαρίσματα*), regarding which the morally still immature community of Corinth required detailed instruction both theoretically and practically. God distributes the gifts as it pleases Him; they are therefore not to be obtained by effort of will.<sup>3</sup> Further, the gifts all have the same purpose, to build up the community as a whole, therefore all are equally necessary; and to give the preference to one gift and disparage the others is objectionable. As we learn in chapter xiv., the Corinthians preferred before all the gift of speaking with tongues; they all wished, if possible, to speak with tongues; whereas this very gift, in the judgment of the Apostle, is to be regarded, considering its results, as the humblest. Between the instruction on this special point and the general explanation of the nature and purpose of the gifts, Paul has inserted the song of praise to love, which interrupts the didactic exposition both through its subject and its style.

<sup>1</sup> [In the process of translation a few notes have been added for the sake of precision and clearness. These are enclosed within square parentheses. The sections also are due to the translator.]

<sup>2</sup> ἡ γνώσις φυσιοῦ, ἡ δὲ ἀγάπη οἰκοδομεῖ . . . εἰ δὲ τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, οὗτος ἐγνωσται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

<sup>3</sup> [*Man kann sie daher nicht erzwingen.*]

## I. THE TRANSITION TO THE HYMN.

The manner in which the hymn is introduced presents some difficulties. After the Apostle had concluded his general remarks with the lively questions : " Are all apostles ? are all prophets ? are all teachers ? are all powers (workers of miracles) ? have all the gifts of healing ? do all speak with tongues ? do all interpret (the words of those who speak with tongues) ? " he continues : " Strive rather after those gifts which are the higher [better], and yet show I unto you in surpassing wise a way." What is to be understood by the " higher [better] gifts " ? Further, in how far could the Apostle describe the contents of the hymn which now follows as a " way " ? Finally, must we not with Luther and others refer the words " in surpassing wise " as an adjectival qualification to " way " (a more excellent way) instead of connecting them with the verb ?

The first question can be decided with certainty. The " higher [better] gifts " can only be those which in another place<sup>1</sup> are described as the " fruit " of the spirit, love, peace, kindness; and other Christian virtues. In calling them here " gifts " (*χαρίσματα*) he intentionally writes paradoxically; for those virtues are not " gifts " in the narrower sense, since, as they are in themselves actually the expression of the Christian character, they may and must be acquired by every Christian. The " gifts " in the narrower sense, however, really are " extra gifts "; being such they may be regarded as exaltations of the Christian condition; but nevertheless love, joy, peace, etc., remain the truly highest gifts because they are absolutely necessary, because it is only in them that the Christian character finds its expression, and because the eternal destiny depends on them alone. Over against the mania of religious enjoyment and

<sup>1</sup> Gal. v. 22 : " But the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control."

the unholy eagerness which characterised the Corinthians, who attached themselves to the "gifts," the Apostle sets the simple and necessary as the greater or rather as the better thing.

The commentators almost all explain the words "the higher gifts" differently.<sup>1</sup> They hold that the Apostle here exhorts those addressed to prefer amongst the gifts in the narrower sense those which serve most to edify, as, for example, prophecy, or power of teaching or knowledge, instead of speaking with tongues. But "the higher gifts" are obviously opposed not only to the two last-named (speaking with tongues and interpretation), but also to all those which are mentioned in verses 29 and 30 and therefore also those in verses 4 to 11. Every restriction here is purely arbitrary. And it would also be not indeed wholly inadmissible, but at least scarcely comprehensible, if the Apostle, who shortly before had written that God distributes the gifts to all as He finds good (v. 11) should now give the exhortation "Strive after (ζηλοῦτε) these gifts."

Moreover the reading *μείζονα* is not at all assured, least of all by xiv. 5, and xiii. 13; for in both these places gifts of the same category are compared with one another. It appears to me probable that *κρείττονα* was the original reading which has been supplanted by *μείζονα* (xiv. 5, xiii. 13).<sup>2</sup> This reading makes it perfectly clear that Paul is now considering an entirely different category of gifts—namely virtues which he does not otherwise call gifts.

<sup>1</sup> [This paragraph and the two which follow are one single footnote in the German.]

<sup>2</sup> *κρείττονα* is found in DEFGKL al longe plu, d, e, f, vg. (excepto am.) cop.<sup>vid.</sup>, arm., Tertull., Origen, Ambros., Ambrosiast., Chrysostom (οὐκ εἶπε τὰ μείζονα ἀλλὰ τὰ κρείττονα) and other Fathers. *μείζονα* is attested by NABC am., aeth.<sup>utr.</sup> Hieron. and certain Fathers, amongst whom, however, Origen can scarcely be counted as his *μείζονα* appears to be derived from *μείζων* by contamination with xiv. 5. It is possible that Origen himself was doubtful.

In any case *μείζονα* is an almost exclusively Alexandrian reading.<sup>1</sup> Godet and Meyer have declared for *κρείττονα*; the greater majority of commentators prefer *μείζονα*. Heinrici designates the latter as the more difficult reading and follows it for this reason; it is less to the point, not more difficult.

Which are the higher or better gifts, it was not necessary for the Apostle to state expressly to the Corinthians; for, though all the gifts which he had named in chapter xii. did not belong to these, yet every heart must feel and know what he had in mind. Therefore what follows is connected by "and yet" (*καὶ ἔτι*) = "and in superabundance."<sup>2</sup> He does not say, however, that he will now name the better gifts to his readers, but that he will show them "the way" which leads to them.<sup>3</sup> This way into which he wishes to guide the zeal of the Corinthians is love. Therefore "the way" is here to be taken quite literally, and not (as one might think of doing) to be understood as "instruction." Love gives rise to a whole series of negative and positive virtues; and these are—so we must now say specifically—the "better gifts" which the Apostle had in his mind chapter xii. 31; and love, since it is their root, is the means, therefore also the way, to attain to them.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [*κρείττονα* is Western and Syrian": Findlay in *Expositor's Greek Testament*.]

<sup>2</sup> The reflections which Klostermann has based on the very meagrely attested reading *εἰτι* (*εἰτε*), I shall pursue no farther.

<sup>3</sup> Those commentators who understand the *χαρίσματα κρείττονα* (*μείζονα*) as the higher gifts amongst those treated of in chap. xii., must take *καὶ ἔτι* . . . *δεικνύω* adversatively; but then it would at least have to be *ἔτι δέ*. Thus the contrast to the gifts does not begin only in verse 31b, but already in verse 31a. The exegetes have allowed themselves to be led astray by the explanation of verse 31a in xiv. 1 (*ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ πνευματικά, μᾶλλον δὲ ὡς προφητεύετε*), as if by these words the exhortation: *ζηλοῦτε τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ μείζονα* were simply resumed. But these words are preceded by the exhortation: *διώκετε τὴν ἀγάπην*. In this the contents of chap. xiii. and also of xii. 31 are comprehended.

<sup>4</sup> It is striking that *οὐδὲν* has no article (all manuscripts agree in this). Probably Bengel is right: the Apostle wishes to stimulate the attention of the Corinthians. Yet examples of the omission of the article through

As to the reference of καθ' ὑπερβολήν I cannot come to any quite definite opinion. This Pauline phrase is in Romans vii. 13 connected with the adjective (κ. ὑ. ἀμαρτωλός), but in 2 Corinthians i. 8, iv. 17, Galatians i. 13, with the verb. Without doubt the latter reference is, from the point of view of style, the more natural,<sup>1</sup> especially as the want of the article with ὁδός is doubly felt if καθ' ὑπερβολήν belongs to this word. In respect of meaning, though not of style, the connexion ὁδὸν καθ' ὑπερβολήν makes very good sense ("a way, high above all," "a sublime way"). But if we refer καθ' ὑπερβολήν to the verb, then more than one translation seems possible.

(1) We can connect the expression closely with ἔτι, so that it is simply to be understood pleonastically, "in superabundance,"<sup>2</sup> but this "superabundance" beside ἔτι appears really superabundant"; moreover, this translation can scarcely be supported by parallel cases.

(2) We can, with Billroth, paraphrase "in a way that is excellent because sure to be successful"; but if we do this the emphasis would be transferred from the way to the recommendation of the way, which the Apostle can scarcely have wished.

(3) Finally, we can assume that Paul with this expression heralds the enchanting hymnic form of his description of the way. The last interpretation, which assumes, it is true, an unnecessary anticipatory reflection on the part of the Apostle, must in my opinion be adopted, if one does not refer καθ' ὑπερβολήν to the substantive: "covet rather the

carelessness are not lacking. We can see a certain incorrectness in the fact that Paul, in making the exhortation ζηλοῦτε τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ κρείττονα, had probably also love in mind, but now designates it as the way in which to win these better gifts. But of love in the sense of the Apostle it may be said both that it is "the greatest" of all and that it is the way to all the others.

<sup>1</sup> But the arrangement of the words is less favourable to it.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Ewald and also Grotius.



better gifts, and yet I show <sup>1</sup> you a way in lofty speech."

Since none of these interpretations is quite satisfactory, it appears to me that the connexion with "way" is after all the most probable, especially as the oldest commentator of our chapter, Clemens Alexandrinus, <sup>2</sup> has τὴν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὁδόν.

## II. THE TEXT OF THE HYMN.

Now follows the hymn of love. It is not my intention to add a new interpretation to the many complete ones already in existence.<sup>3</sup> But both with regard to the critical examination of the text and with regard to the subject matter there still remain many uncertainties. It is with these that I shall deal. The 13th chapter of 1st Corinthians is rightly regarded as the highest, because the most impressive literary performance of the Apostle in form and matter. It is therefore here, if anywhere, the duty of the exegete to bring text and understanding to the most complete certainty. The task of grasping the religious-historical significance of the hymn has hardly been approached. The final remarks will be devoted to that task.

ζηλοῦτε τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ κρείττονα καὶ ἔτι καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν ὑμῖν δείκνυμι.<sup>4</sup>

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>1. If I speak with the tongues<br/>of men and of angels,</p> | <p>1. Ἐὰν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων<br/>λαλῶ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων,</p> |
|---|--|

<sup>1</sup> Notice the lively anticipation expressed by the present tense.

<sup>2</sup> *Quis dives salv.* 38.

<sup>3</sup> The most complete and the best which I know, is that of Joh. Weisz (*Kommentar z. 1 Korintherbrief*, 1910); but his proposal to change the place of our chapter and connect it with chapter viii. seems to be insufficiently justified, and has also the beginning of the hymn (speaking with tongues) against it. That Paul had already finished the hymn when he wrote his letter, might be inferred from the loose or, as it may rather be called, difficult connexion in which it stands to chaps. xi. and xii; but the delicate pedagogical references to the addresses in the beginning and the middle of the hymn make this supposition improbable.

<sup>4</sup> [This stands without a German translation, apparently to mark that it is not part of the Hymn, but only the transition to it.]

But have not love,<sup>1</sup>

I am become <sup>2</sup> a booming  
brass or a clanging cymbal.

2. And if I have power of prophecy<sup>3</sup> and know all secrets and all knowledge,<sup>4</sup>

and if I have all faith, so  
that I move mountains,  
but have not love,  
I am nothing.

3. And if I give away piece-meal all that I have,  
and if I sacrifice my body,  
so that I may glory [on  
good grounds]

but have not love,  
I profit nothing.

4. Love is long-suffering, full of  
kindness is love, love  
envieth not,  
makes no display, is not  
puffed up, 5. does not  
masquerade,

seeketh not her own, is not  
easily provoked, does not  
bear malice,

6. rejoiceth not in injustice, but  
rejoiceth in truth.

7. covereth all things, believeth  
all things, hopeth all  
things, endureth all  
things.

ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω,  
γέγονα χαλκὸς ἢ χῶν ἢ κύμ-  
βαλον ἀλαλάζον.

2. καὶ ἐὰν ἔχω προφητεῖαν καὶ  
εἰδῶ τὰ μυστήρια πάντα καὶ  
πᾶσαν τὴν γνῶσιν,

κἂν ἔχω πᾶσαν τὴν πίστιν  
ὥστε ὄρη μεθιστάναι,

ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω,  
οὐθέν εἰμι,

3. κἂν ψωμίσω πάντα τὰ ὑπάρ-  
χοντά μου,  
καὶ ἐὰν παραδῶ τὸ σῶμά μου,  
ἵνα καυχήσωμαι,

ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω,  
οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι

4. ἡ ἀγάπη μακροθυμεῖ, χρησ-  
τεῖται ἡ ἀγάπη, οὐ ζηλοῖ  
ἡ ἀγάπη,

οὐ περπερεύεται, οὐ φυσιοῦται,  
5. οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ,

οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῆς,<sup>5</sup> οὐ παροξ-  
ύνεται, οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακόν,

6. οὐ χαίρει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, συν-  
χαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.

7. πάντα στέγει, πάντα πιστεύει,  
πάντα ἐλπίζει, πάντα ὑπομένει.

<sup>1</sup> [The translation attempts to reproduce Dr. Harnack's German version very closely, and does not pretend to be a direct rendering of the original Greek text.]

<sup>2</sup> [The word "become" is here added, though not given in Dr. Harnack's translation. The omission is probably due to a slip, for he speaks later of *γέγονα* as *treffend gewählt* in place of *εἰμι*.]

<sup>3</sup> [Literally "have prophesying," which gives a clear meaning in German, *weissagung habe*, but not in English.]

<sup>4</sup> [In the commentary Dr. Harnack prefers to understand *ἔχω* rather than *εἰδῶ* before *πᾶσαν τὴν γνῶσιν*.]

<sup>5</sup> τὸ μὴ ἑαυτῆς.

<sup>6</sup> [The meaning of *στέγει* remains uncertain: see commentary.]

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>8. Charity never ceaseth—<br/>whether there be prophecies,<br/>they shall be done away,<br/>whether there be tongues,<br/>they shall cease,<br/>whether there shall be know-<br/>ledge,<sup>1</sup> it shall be done<br/>away ;</p> <p>9. For piece-work is our know-<br/>ing, and piece-work is our<br/>prophesying ;</p> <p>10. But when the perfect comes,<br/>the piece-work will be<br/>done away ;</p> <p>11. When I was a child, I spoke<br/>as a child, pondered as a<br/>child, thought as a child,<br/>when I became a man, I put<br/>aside what is of the child.</p> <p>12. For now we see by means of a<br/>glass, in a riddle,<br/>but then from face to face ;</p> <p>Now I know piecemeal,<br/>but then I shall perceive <sup>2</sup><br/>as I also am perceived.</p> <p>13. Now remaineth faith, hope,<br/>love—these three,<br/>but the greatest among<br/>them is love.</p> | <p>8. ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτει—<br/>εἴτε δὲ προφητεῖαι, καταρ-<br/>γηθήσονται,<br/>εἴτε γλῶσσαι, παύσονται,<br/><br/>εἴτε γνώσεις, καταργηθήσονται·</p> <p>9. ἐκ μέρους γὰρ γινώσκομεν καὶ<br/>ἐκ μέρους προφητεύομεν·</p> <p>10. ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον, τὸ ἐκ<br/>μέρους καταργηθήσεται·</p> <p>11. ὅτε ἤμην νήπιος, ἐλάλουν ὡς<br/>νήπιος, ἐφρόνουν ὡς νήπιος,<br/>ἐλογιζόμην ὡς νήπιος·<br/>ὅτε γέγονα ἀνὴρ, κατήργηκα τὰ<br/>τοῦ νηπίου.</p> <p>12. βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπ-<br/>τρον ἐν αἰνίγματι,<br/>τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσ-<br/>ωπον·<br/>ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους.<br/>τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ<br/>ἐπεγνώσθην·</p> <p>13. νυνὶ δὲ μένει πίστις, ἐλπίς,<br/>ἀγάπη, τὰ τρία ταῦτα·<br/>μείζων δὲ τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη·</p> |
|--|---|

### III. THE FIRST PART OF THE HYMN, 1—3.

That love, at least in the two first parts of the hymn, is the love for one's neighbour, there can be no doubt. It is a question whether the conception of it is not widened in the third part.<sup>3</sup>

V. 1. "Supposing the case that I be one who speaks with tongues," etc.—ἐάν is to be so understood in the two following

<sup>1</sup> [In the German the plural is used : perhaps "sciences," or "ways of knowing."]

<sup>2</sup> [*Erkenne*, I recognise, apprehend, take cognisance of.]

<sup>3</sup> Compare Joh. Weisz, *ibid.* p. 312.

verses also <sup>1</sup>; whether this case can really be is of no consequence. The Apostle begins with the *glossolalia* because the Corinthians attached so much importance to that power. The "tongues of angels" may be taken as an abstract idea (Heinrici) which is probably used not entirely without irony; but it is more probable that Paul believed just as seriously in an angelic language as the Jews, or as the Pagans did in a language of the gods. The comparisons which depict the sounds of *glossolalia* show how we are to represent to ourselves the form which it took, not as a low-voiced stammering but as shouting, sometimes dully resounding, sometimes piercing and shrill. Unsurpassable is the contrast between the solemn commencement and the conclusion of the verse: on the one hand the tongues of men and of angels, on the other hand booming brass and clanging cymbal!

V. 2 is an intensification of verse 1. The verse contains in its protasis two clauses <sup>2</sup> and the stress is laid on the *πάντα*. "Supposing that I had the gift of prophecy and knew all secrets and (had <sup>3</sup>) all knowledge, and supposing I had all faith," etc. But, although the sentence is formed of two clauses, it does not therefore follow that the Apostle places prophecy in the same category as the knowledge of mysteries (i.e. the knowledge of the secrets of salvation) and the Gnosis, or that he derives the two latter from the former: it is only as opposed to faith that they belong to-

<sup>1</sup> The differences of the manuscripts with regard to *καὶ ἐάν, καὶ ἂν* and *κἂν* I pass over as unimportant, s. B. Weisz, *Texte u. Unters.*, xiv. 3, s. 62 f. Some manuscripts have found it necessary to replace the tellingly-chosen perfect tense *γέγονα* by *εἰμι*, an old copyist's error, then changed it to *ἐν εἰμι*, and that has become "*unum*" or "*in unum*." Likewise *ἥ (velut)* has been inserted before *χαλκός*.

<sup>2</sup> *ἐάν* appears twice, not thrice.

<sup>3</sup> It is not absolutely necessary to refer *εἰδῶ* to *πάσαν τὴν γνῶσιν* also; *ἔχω* can keep its importance, and influence *γινώσκω*, especially as it is immediately repeated.

gether. It is worthy of notice that the Apostle differentiates between the *gnosis* and the knowledge of secrets or mysteries. The cause of this can only be that *gnosis* is more comprehensive. The knowledge of mysteries comprehends the understanding of certain problems, namely, the problems of salvation, but the *gnosis* comprehends the entire field of knowledge in the three realms of being *sub specie dei*. The highest faith is proved by being able to accomplish not merely miracles but the greatest miracles. The one which the Apostle names is the ensample of the greatest miracles ; it is drawn from the very source from which Matthew xvii. 20, xxi. 21, and Mark xi. 23 drew it, namely the evangelical tradition.<sup>1</sup> Unsurpassable is again the contrast with the last sentence—"I am nothing." It could not be "I have nothing" ; for such a man has the most extraordinary possessions ; but in the midst of this wealth of knowledge he himself is nothing, thus poorer than poor.<sup>2</sup>

V. 3. The last intensification : even the highest works of love, done without love, are profitless for him who does them. The apodosis (οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι) puts it beyond doubt that here deeds must be meant, by which it was hoped to attain salvation ; for only thus can "profit" be understood. The first clause of the protasis forthwith proves this ; for it is in accordance with the popular (late Jewish) view, which Paul shares,<sup>3</sup> that alms, especially when one sacrifices the whole property, serve to win salvation.

<sup>1</sup> Ὁρῇ μεθιστάνειν (not μεθιστάναι) is read by Westcott and Hort with ACKL and perhaps rightly ; B. Weisz, *ibid.* p. 33, prefers to keep to the regular form.

<sup>2</sup> Besides οὐθέν, οὐδέν is to be found in the MSS. That ὠφελοῦμαι instead of εἶμι is found in A would not be worth noticing, if it were not given also by Ambrosius and others. But in any case it must be regarded as due to influence from the following verse.

<sup>3</sup> Instead of the perfectly attested ψωμίσω, Clemens Alex. has once *Pädag.* II. i. 5) διαδῶ. This has arisen from the passage in Matt. xix. 21 : ἔπαγε πώλησόν σου τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ δός πτωχοῖς (Luc. : διάδος), which must be compared generally.



But what is the second clause : ἐὰν παραδῶ τὸ σῶμά μου ἵνα καθήσονται or ἵνα καυχῶμαι ? All the German exegetes have decided for the first reading, indeed many of them scarcely notice the second reading, they are so sure of the matter ; and nearly all the text-critics (with B. Weisz and v. Soden) are on their side ; but besides Westcott-Hort, Lachmann is for καυχῶμαι.<sup>1</sup> The question cannot be decided by textual criticism alone. The tradition gives the following picture :

Καυθήσονται DEFG—but these four Codd. present in the letters one text—L and a large number of minuscule MSS., Aphra., Method., Basil, Euthal., Cyrill., Maxim., further Tertull., Cyprian, Pseudocyp. *de rebapt.*, Ambrosiaster, Greek and Latin Codd. which Hieronymus knew,<sup>2</sup> Augustine, the Latin Codd. d e f g m vulg., further syr. utr., Copt. MSS. [?], armen., aethiop. MSS. [?], goth.

Καυθήσονται CK and many others, Ephraem [?], Chrysost., Cyrill. Theodoret. The versions can of course be quoted for this reading as much as for the preceding.

Καυχῶμαι SAB, Greek Codd., which Hieronymus knew, 17, Copt. MSS., Aethiop. MS., Goth. marg., Ephraem.

Westcott-Hort call the reading καθήσονται “Western and Syrian,” but establish the fact that it appears elsewhere too. Soden writes to me on the basis of his rich material : “Καυθήσονται is certainly κοινή (Antiochian) and most prob-

<sup>1</sup> Lachmann's decision here, however, does not mean much, for he did not wish to restore the original text, but the oldest reading of the Greek MSS. Besides he only gives καυχῶμαι in brackets.

<sup>2</sup> Hieronymus writes (in Gal. T. vii. 517 Vall.) : “ Si tradidero corpus meum ut glorier,” and also : “ scio in Latinis codicibus, in eo testimonio quod supra posuimus : Si tradidero corpus meum ut glorier, ‘ardeam’ habere pro ‘glorier’ ; sed ob similitudinem verbi, qua apud Graecos ‘ardeam’ et ‘glorier,’ i.e. καθήσονται et καυχῶμαι, una litterae parte distinguitur, apud nostros error inolevit, sed et apud ipsos Graecos exemplaria sunt diversa.” Comp. Hieron. in Esai. T. iv. 688 : “Apostolus si etiam corpus suum tradat martyrio ut ardeat sive gloriatur, utrumque enim fertur in exemplaribus.”

ably Palestinian-Eusebian. Among the Egyptian texts four (or five) as against three (which however are younger) read *καυχῆσθωμαι*. *Καυχῆσθωμαι* appears also in nine Palestinian-Eusebian Codices, several times corrected to *καυθ*. It is to be found also in several *κοινή*-Codd. which have never been influenced by the Egyptian text.<sup>1</sup>

This state of the facts does not, in my opinion, admit of a sure decision, even though *καυθήσθωμαι* (*καυθήσωμαι*) is more widespread and according to this series of testimonies earlier attested than *καυχῆσθωμαι*, which appears first in the fourth century and for which there is on the whole almost none but Egyptian testimony. Although, however, the scales, from the point of view of textual criticism, lean towards *καυθήσθωμαι*, they regain their balance, nay even lean to the other side, as soon as three witnesses are called in who have not yet been heard.

(1) It is more than probable that Hieronymus in his statement, as usual, simply repeats Origen, whom he transcribes. It is therefore Origen who already remarks the difference of the tradition, but presupposes the correctness of *καυχῆσθωμαι* as a matter of course. How could Hieronymus—not to speak of his carelessness—have found the courage to differ from the common Latin tradition, if he had not possessed powerful authority? But now Westcott-Hort have really found the reading *καυχῆσθωμαι* in Origen. Cramer's edition indeed has (*Cat. S.* 252) *καυθήσθωμαι*, but

<sup>1</sup> v. Soden continues: "Thus the inclination of the writers to the word *καυχῆσθωμαι*, to which they are accustomed in Paul, is clear. The writers of the Palestinian-Eusebian Codd. may have been influenced by the reminiscence, if they did not take it over from the Egyptian. Since the Latin Codd. advocate *καυθήσθωμαι*, *καυχῆσθωμαι*, even if it were the Egyptian reading, based perhaps on Origines (?), cannot come into consideration for the original text, even from the point of view of text criticism. The indicative -σθωμαι after *ἵνα* is very frequent later, but cannot compete with -σθωμαι for the Recensions (families): at best it might be *κοινή*."

that is an error ; for the Scholion of Origen which follows presupposes *καυχῆσθαι* : ὡς δυνατοῦ ὄντος ψωμίσαι τινὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα οὐ διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν κενοδοξίαν, καὶ ὡς δυνατοῦ ὄντος καὶ μαρτυρῆσαί τινα ἔνεκεν καυχήσεως. The reading *καυχῆσθαι* therefore was certainly followed by Origen.

(2) Clemens Alex. too attests the reading *καυχῆσθαι* ; for both in *Strom.* iv. 18, 111, 4, and in *Strom.* vii. 10, 59, 4, he quotes our verse so that he takes *παραδιδόναι* absolutely (he says for it *ἐπιδιδόναι*), and leaves out the final sentence altogether. Such a quotation could only be made by one who read not *ἵνα καυθήσθαι* but *ἵνα καυχῆσθαι*. But we must still further agree with Westcott-Hort that in Clemens *καυχῆσθαι* can be proved directly, although the only MS. in the only place where Clemens quotes our verse verbally, has *καυθήσεται*. It runs (*Strom.* iv. 18, 111 f.) : *Αὐτίκα ὁ ἀπόστολος Παῦλος* 'Ἐὰν το σῶμά μου ἐπιδῶ,<sup>1</sup> φησίν, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, χαλκός εἰμι ἡχῶν καὶ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον<sup>2</sup> ἦν μὴ ἐκ διαθέσεως ἐκλεκτῆς, δι' ἀγάπης γνωστικῆς μαρτυρήσω, λέγει, φόβῳ δὲ· εἴπερ οὖν καὶ μισθῷ προσδοκωμένῳ ἐπικροτῶν τὰ χεῖλη εἰς μαρτυρίαν κυρίου ὁμολογήσω κύριον, κοινός εἰμι ἄνθρωπος, ἡχῶν τὸν κύριον, οὐ γινώσκων. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ὁ λαὸς ὁ τοῖς χεῖλεσιν ἀγαπῶν, ἔστι καὶ ἄλλος παραδιδούς τὸ σῶμα, ἵνα καυθήσεται. The reading of the MS. (*καυθήσεται*) is unbearable ; for the two last sentences cannot be adversative, but must be parallel. If they are adversative—which is already almost forbidden by the context—then *καυθήσεται*, alone would not suffice ; it would be necessary that the good motive for which the martyr lets himself be burned should be mentioned. The MS. should therefore be corrected in this place.

(3) Clemens Romanus, too, most probably did not read

<sup>1</sup> See the remark already made above.

<sup>2</sup> Contamination of verses 3 and 1.

*καυθήσομαι*. In his letter from C. 47 onwards he is very dependent on our letter ; and in C. 55 he says : " But, to bring forward examples of Gentiles also, many kings and rulers . . . have delivered themselves over to death, that they might rescue their fellow-citizens through their own blood . . . We know that many among ourselves have delivered themselves to bondage, that they might ransom others. Many have sold themselves to slavery, and receiving the price paid for themselves have fed others " (Lightfoot).<sup>1</sup>

We can assuredly not ignore the fact that Clemens is thinking of our passage, but he read nothing in it about death by fire. With *παραδιδόναι* he connects *εἰς θάνατον*, *εἰς δεσμά*, *εἰς δουλείαν* ; but he passes over the death by fire because he has not been led to it by 1 Corinthians xiii. 3. He cannot have left it out intentionally, therefore he did not read it in the text.

Thus the reading *καυχῆσθωμαι* is to be traced beyond Origen to Clemens Alex., and in all probability to Clemens Romanus. It is immensely strengthened by this. But even this series of witnesses is not decisive ; for Clemens Romanus is not quite a certain witness, and Clemens Alex. and Origen only testify to us that in Egypt *καυχῆσθωμαι* was read, not merely in the fourth century, but as early as the end of the second century. Let us examine the internal arguments.

For *καυθήσομαι* and against *καυχῆσθωμαι* the following argument is adduced : the voluntary death by fire, or the suffering of torment by fire, for the sake of others is

<sup>1</sup> 47, 1 : ἀνάλαβετε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τοῦ μακαρίου Παύλου τοῦ ἀποστόλου, namely our letter. In C. 49 in his hymn of love he has made use of 1 Corinthians xiii. Now in C. 55 he writes : " Ἴνα δὲ καὶ ὑποδείγματα ἐθνῶν ἐνέγκωμεν· πολλοὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ ἡγούμενοι . . . παρέδωκαν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς θάνατον, ἵνα ῥύσωνται διὰ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν αἵματος τοὺς πολίτας . . . ἐπιστάμεθα πολλοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν παραδεδωκότας ἑαυτοὺς εἰς δεσμά, ὅπως ἐτέρους λυτρώσονται· πολλοὶ ἑαυτοὺς παρέδωκαν εἰς δουλείαν καὶ λαβόντες τὰς τιμὰς αὐτῶν ἐτέρους ἐψώμισαν.



particularly suitable as the strongest example of sacrifice ; further, the example is chosen through recollection of Daniel iii. 28 (95) : καὶ παρέδωκαν τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν εἰς ἔμπυρισμόν : the reading is much too difficult to have been introduced by the emendators. On the other hand, *καυχῆσθωμαι* as an emendation may be easily explained, because the word is usual with Paul ; but as regards the sense it is intolerable, because it introduces a point of view entirely foreign to the context, and even spoils the sense of the verse ; for inasmuch as it has already been conceded in the protasis that the motive for giving up life is ambition (*κενοδοξία*), no assurance is required that such sacrifice is worthless, and the words : ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, become superfluous. “ If ever a reading is to be rejected without more ado, that is the case here ” (Godet). Heinrici more carefully speaks only of the greater strength which the thought gains through reading *καυθήσομαι*, whereas *καυχῆσθωμαι*, according to him, is weak.

The arguments here adduced do not, in my opinion, hold good ; moreover the following considerations are opposed to them :

(1) The reading *καυθήσομαι* is not only “ difficult ” (B. Weisz), but also very suspicious ; for it is with reason that the commentators are in doubt as to how far the voluntary death by fire may be regarded as a sacrifice for the good of others. Godet and others are thinking of martyrdom by fire, but that is not a sacrifice for others, and besides it had not yet come within the Apostle’s range of vision.<sup>1</sup> Now it may be assumed that the Apostle had no particular case in mind, but had chosen as heroic an example as possible, and

<sup>1</sup> In the case of *καυθήσομαι* Weisz thinks of torture by which confessions detrimental to others may be extorted. Very improbable ! Mr. Holl tells me that he understands the passage as referring to the mark which was branded on slaves. That calls for more attention, but this meaning cannot so readily be understood from the words. Who thinks immediately on reading *καυθήσομαι* of the brand of a slave ?



had left to the reader the question of sacrifice for the sake of others, but why he then specialises at all is not very clear : " If I give all my possessions piece by piece, and if I give even my body " <sup>1</sup> is certainly stronger and more terse.

(2) The place in Daniel, which is adduced in support of the reading *καυθήσομαι*, can also be used against it ; it was very well known and could easily have induced a correction on the part of an old copyist.

(3) After the church had entered on the epoch of martyrdom, in which death by fire was not rare, it is easier to understand how the variant *καυθήσομαι* for *καυχῆσωμαι* could force its way into the text, than the opposite case. On the other hand the substitution of *καυχῆσωμαι* for *καυθήσομαι* could not possibly be regarded as a chance error in writing which had propagated itself in copies ; and, since a thoughtlessly introduced *καυχῆσωμαι* cannot be assumed, the introduction of this word must be regarded as intentional. It is an unsatisfactory explanation that *καυχῆσωμαι* was brought in because it is usual with Paul. *Καυθήσομαι* gave positively no cause to expunge it ; *καυχῆσωμαι*, on the other hand, was probably expunged for the very reason which still makes it appear unacceptable to many as is shown below.

(4) *Παραδῶ τὸ σῶμά μου ἵνα καυθήσομαι* is certainly tolerable in itself, but remarkably cumbersome. (" I give up my body, in order that I may be burnt "—the Greek language does not require such periphrases) : besides this, the change to the first person is rather surprising ; more natural is *καυθῇ* (which is read in Basilus). But in the case of *καυχῆσωμαι* this difficulty disappears.

<sup>1</sup> That *παραδιδόναι* used absolutely is to be so understood can be proved by numerous examples. "Ὅς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν," writes Paul, Rom. iv. 25, and Westcott-Hort point to Plut., *Demet.* 49 f. (p. 913 f.) : *τολμήσαντος δὲ τινος ἐλπεῖν τι, ὡς Σελεύκῳ χρὴ τὸ σῶμα παραδοῦναι Δημήτριον, ὥρμησε μὲν τὸ ἔλπιος σπασάμενος ἀνελεῖν ἐαυτὸν κ.τ.λ. . . . εἰ καὶ πρότερον ἐδόκει τὴν παράδοσιν τοῦ σώματος ἀσχαρὰν πεποιθήσθαι.*

(5) “*Καυθήσωμαι*,” remarks von Soden (s. above)—“not *καυθήσομαι*—is to be recognised as the traditional form in the families of MSS. which do not give *καυχήσωμαι*.” Now it is true that the deformity of a Conj. Fut. appears in Byzantine times, but to saddle Paul with it is serious: on the other hand, too, *ἵνα* with the Indic. Fut. cannot be proved in Paul! The assumption is therefore almost imperative that the deformity *καυθήσωμαι* arose from *καυχήσωμαι* through the substitution at first of one single letter for another.

(6) But all these reasons would seem to give way before the chief argument against the reading *καυχήσωμαι*, namely that it spoils the sense of the verse. If this were the case, it would of course be necessary after all to reject it. It must be conceded that the sense of the verse is almost spoilt, that it at least loses its force, if *καυχᾶσθαι*, here as elsewhere, has only and always the meaning of “idle boasting.” But that is not at all the case.

*Καυχᾶσθαι* (καύχημα, καύχησης, ἐγκαυχᾶσθαι=בָּהִלָּה is found in Paul not less than fifty-five times,<sup>1</sup> is therefore a particularly usual word with him, and must therefore be evaluated in accordance with the psychological characterisation of Paul, a task which has not yet been done sufficiently. Paul feels it as a *vox media*. If the thing boasted of is right, then the Christian, and especially the Apostle, may and should take pride in it; he may and must take pride in it, because the time will come when before the judgment-seat of God everyone will receive according as his deeds have been. He must then have something (a treasure) to show before God—how this is brought about may be left undecided here—and he may already pride himself on that which he will show there; such pride is no *κενοδοξία*. That is the

<sup>1</sup> In Rom. 8 times, in 1 Cor. 9 times, in 2 Cor. 29 times, in Gal. 3 times, in Eph. once, in Phil. 3 times, in 1 Thess. once, in 2 Thess. once.

opinion of the Apostle ; we cannot retrench anything from it, whether we like it or not.<sup>1</sup> The second epistle to the Corinthians shows particularly how Paul (as Apostle) feels himself justified in boasting, compare also 2 Thessalonians i. 4 ; 1 Thessalonians ii. 19 ; Philippians ii. 16 : *εἰς καύχημα ἐμοὶ εἰς ἡμέραν Χριστοῦ*.

This *καύχημα* is therefore something which, when it is the right *καύχημα*, “ brings profit ” (*συμφέρει*). Paul says this bluntly in 2 Corinthians xii. 1, even if he does deny it for the special case : “ I must needs glory, though it is not profitable ; but I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord.”<sup>2</sup> This very juxtaposition of “ glory ” and “ profit ” is to be found in our passage, and that is decisive. It removes all difficulties and establishes firmly the reading *καυχῆσθαι*. The sentence *ἵνα καυχῆσθαι* refers of course to the two foregoing sentences, and the whole verse may therefore be thus translated or paraphrased :

“ And if I should give all my goods, piece by piece, and even if I were to offer my body, that I might glory—that is that I might have a *καύχημα εἰς ἡμέραν θεοῦ*<sup>3</sup>—but had not love, it would profit me nothing.”<sup>4</sup>

Thus the reason for glorying founded on the sacrifice becomes profitless purely through the want of love ; for in

<sup>1</sup> Because his opinion is such, he writes, 1 Cor. ix. 15 f. : *καλὸν μοι μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖν ἢ τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει*. ἐὰν γὰρ εὐαγγελίζωμαι, οὐκ ἔστιν μοι καύχημα (Rom. v. 2 f.) : *καυχώμεθα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσιν*—so why not too : *καυχώμεθα ἐν τῇ παραδόσει τοῦ σώματος*—(1 Cor. v. 6) : *οὐ καλὸν τὸ καύχημα ὑμῶν*.

<sup>2</sup> *Καυχᾶσθαι δεῖ, οὐ συμφέρον μὲν, ἐλεύσομαι γὰρ εἰς ὅπτασις*.

<sup>3</sup> “ If thou sellest that thou hast and givest to the poor, thou shalt have treasure in heaven,” so runs the parallel passage cited above, in Matt. xix. 21. One may glory in a treasure in heaven. 2 Cor. viii. 24 Paul says that the Corinthians' readiness to sacrifice themselves is a subject of glorying for him, how much more for themselves ; comp. ix. 2 f. and ix. 9 with reference to the almsgiver : *ἐσκόρπισεν, ἔδωκεν τοῖς πένησιν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτοῦ μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*.

<sup>4</sup> *Οὐδὲν* is here (as against *οὐθέν*) incontestably proved, see B. Weisz, *ibid.* p. 32.

itself the distribution of possessions and the sacrifice of life are a true reason for glorying (καύχημα), and it is allowable to strive after it. Therefore the assertion made in the words ἵνα καυχῶσθαι appears neither debilitated nor weak: it rather becomes now more weighty: even what may be a ground for glorying in the presence of God becomes nothing when love is wanting!

The Pauline use of καυχᾶσθαι was, however, not the ordinary one, and the objection which modern readers make to it was made already by the Hellenic antiquity. Read Ignatius and Hermas—they, as citizens of the age of Greek vain self-glorification, recognise καυχᾶσθαι only as something bad.<sup>1</sup> But Paul knows it as something justifiable, because from youth upward he had lived in the Pharisaic outlook on life, which not only did not object to claims, titles of right and titles of glory before God, but even demanded them.

The nature of this way of thinking was radically amended by the Apostle to the extent of entirely removing it; but, as so often happens, he kept the form and with it a remnant of the idea itself. Later in Augustine the case is the same: “God crowns our merits” (*Deus coronat nostra merita*), says the very man who will recognise no merits except the “gifts of God” (*munera Dei*).

The rejection of the true reading καυχῶσθαι is thus explained: The word was objectionable and by “correction” was easily eliminated. Nothing more was necessary than to change one letter, and this brought the welcome support of the passage in Daniel and of the records of martyrdom. As early as the second century, certainly before Tertullian, the substitution took place in authorita-

<sup>1</sup> An exception is Clemens Rom., who however shows in his language as a whole much dependence on Paul, c. 34, 5: τὸ καύχημα ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ παρρησία ἔστω ἐν τῷ θεῷ. Comp. also 2 Cor. vii. 4: πολλή μοι παρρησία πρὸς ὑμᾶς, πολλή μοι καύχησις ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν.



tive MSS. How natural it was can be estimated from the fact that even those early fathers who read *καυχῆσθαι*, interpret *παράδοῦναι τὸ σῶμα* here of the martyrs; whereas Paul had not thought of them, but of such cases as are quoted by Clemens Rom. c. 55 (as above mentioned).

Finally, it must be pointed out that we have another passage in the New Testament which exactly reproduces the thought that was here in Paul's mind. In 1 John iv. 17<sup>1</sup> it is said: "Herein is love made perfect among us, that we may have boldness in the day of judgment." It is only necessary here to substitute *καύχημα* for *παρρησία*<sup>2</sup> and the Pauline idea is exactly reproduced: only love makes a *καύχημα* possible at the judgment day;<sup>3</sup> thus without love all reason for glorying, even the greatest, is profitless (*οὐ συμφέρει τὸ καύχημα*).

#### IV. THE SECOND PART OF THE HYMN, 4 -7.

In verse 4 the third repetition of *ἡ ἀγάπη* is wanting in many of the authorities (B, 17, 73, 74, etc., etc., f, Vulg., Copt., Armen., Clemens Alex. and many Fathers), but the number of authorities which give the word preponderates. It was expunged because the copyists did not understand the effective chiasmic arrangement: *ἡ ἀγάπη μακροθυμεῖ, χρηστεύεται ἡ ἀγαπή* (thus Lachmann, Heinrichi, B. Weisz: see the distribution of the kola in Cod. D), and therefore connected the second *ἀγάπη* with the following *οὐ ζηλοῖ*.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ἐν τούτῳ τετελείωται ἡ ἀγάπη μεθ' ἡμῶν, ἵνα παρρησίαν ἔχωμεν ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς κρίσεως. Compare also 1 John ii. 28.

<sup>2</sup> With regard to the homogeneousness of the two words, see the two notes immediately preceding.

<sup>3</sup> See Phil. ii. 16, quoted above.

<sup>4</sup> It is not impossible that the Apostle intended *ἡ ἀγάπη μακροθυμεῖ, χρηστεύεται ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ ζηλοῖ ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ περπερεύεται, οὐ φυσιοῦται*; but the sentence is not made stronger and finer thereby.



Verse 5, Clemens Alex. and Cod. B have, instead of τὰ ἐαυτῆς rather τὸ μὴ ἐαυτῆς, and Westcott-Hort have put this reading in the margin as alternative. B. Weisz (*ibid.*, p. 17, 103) calls it arbitrary, thoughtless and impossible ; but (1) because the other reading is quite usual with Paul,<sup>1</sup> it might readily be inserted. (2) τὸ μὴ ἐαυτῆς also is not unknown to Paul (see 2 Cor. xii. 14 : οὐ ζητῶ τὰ ὑμῶν). (3) The reading is not at all "impossible," neither is it as weak as it appears at the first glance : it even fits in better with the context than τὰ ἐαυτῆς, because the other words beside which it is all express an attitude of love towards the external or to others. What prevents me, nevertheless, from deciding with certainty on it, is purely the weak attestation,<sup>2</sup> and the observation that Clemens Romanus, before he begins his hymn on love (which is based on 1 Cor. xiii.) writes in c. xlix. 6 : ὁφείλει ζητεῖν τὸ κοινωφελὲς πᾶσιν καὶ μὴ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ.

Verse 7. A branch of the old Western translations<sup>3</sup> has for πάντα στέγει "*omnia diligit*," and therefore probably read wrongly στέργει ; it may be, however, that the wish to retain the triad, "*agape omnia diligit, credit, sperat*," was influential here. The reading is worthless.

Verses 4-7 contain two rare words, and a word whose explanation must remain uncertain. Gataker and Heinrici

<sup>1</sup> Phil. ii. 21 : τὰ ἐαυτῶν ζητοῦσιν, 1 Cor. x. 24 : μηδεὶς τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ζητεῖτω, x. 33 : μὴ ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ.

<sup>2</sup> Clemens comments in *Paedag.* iii. 1, 2. on several verses from 1 Cor. xiii. In this connexion he writes : τὸ δ' ἐπίπλαστον ἀλλότριον, ὅπερ ἐξηγείται σαφῶς "οὐ ζητεῖ" "φῆσας" "τὸ μὴ ἐαυτῆς" τὸ γὰρ ἰδιον ἢ ἀλήθεια τὸ οἰκεῖον καλεῖ, τὸ δ' ἀλλότριον ἢ φιλοκοσμία ζητεῖ, ἐκτὸς οὔσα . . . τῆς ἀγάπης. It is certain that Clemens had here before him a MS. with the reading τὸ μὴ ἐαυτῆς (that there is no error of memory B. testifies), but it is just as certain in *Quis dives salu.*, 38, that he had seen a MS. which read, τὰ ἐαυτῆς ; for he writes, in p. 956 (not 947, as Tischendorf gives) : σὺ δὲ μάθε "τὴν <καθ'> ὑπερβολὴν ὁδόν," ἣν δέικνυσι Παῦλος ἐπὶ σωτηρίαν : "ἡ ἀγάπη τὰ ἐαυτῆς οὐ ζητεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐκκέχυται"

<sup>3</sup> See Soden jun., *das lat. Neue Testament in Africa zur Zeit Cyprians (Texte und Untersuchungen, xxxiii.)*, p. 598.

have contributed excellent commentaries to *περπερεύεται*.<sup>1</sup> We must understand that the meaning is "to display" or "to make a show."<sup>2</sup>

*Χρηστεύεσθαι*, as far as I know, is to be found first in Greek literature in the Gospel or collection of sayings which Clemens Romanus made use of. He cites, chapter xiii. : *μάλιστα μεμνημένοι τῶν λόγων τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ, οὓς ἐλάλησεν διδάσκων ἐπιείκειαν καὶ μακροθυμίαν. οὕτως γὰρ εἶπεν·* "Ἐλεᾶτε ἵνα ἐλεηθῆτε, ἀφίετε ἵνα ἀφεθῇ ὑμῖν· ὡς ποιεῖτε, οὕτω ποιηθήσεται ὑμῖν . . . ὡς χρηστεύεσθε, οὕτως χρηστευθήσεται ὑμῖν· ᾧ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε, ἐν αὐτῷ μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν." In accordance with this he writes himself in the following chapter : *χρηστευσώμεθα ἑαυτοῖς κατὰ τὴν εὐσπλαγχνίαν καὶ γλυκύτητα τοῦ ποιήσαντος ὑμᾶς*. Did not Paul borrow the verb (which, wherever it appears in the Fathers, may be traced to him) from that Evangel, which was probably a recension of Q ?

What meaning for *στέγειν* the Apostle had in mind, it is difficult to decide. The meaning, "endure," cannot very well come into consideration (contrary to Weisz) ; for in the immediate sequel we read : *πάντα ὑπομένει*. But we may well translate "cover, hide," or "protect," or "keep quietly to oneself."<sup>3</sup> The word is further found in the New Testament only in 1 Corinthians ix. 12, and 1

<sup>1</sup> Latt. strangely : "*perperam agit*," but Tertullian "*non protervum sapit*." *Μακροθυμεῖ* is translated in the Old African bible (see also Tertull., *de pat.*, 12) *!by magnanimitas est !* Here we have two fine examples of the slavish fashion of the *Vetus Latina*.

<sup>2</sup> "Display" or "parade" is better than the closely related idea "swagger" ; Clemens Alex. writes (*Paedag.* iii. 1, 3) : *περπερεία ὁ καλλωπισμὸς περιττότητος καὶ ἀχρεϊότητος ἔχων ἔμφασιν. διὸ καὶ ἐπιφέρει [ὁ ἀπόστολος].* "*οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ*" : *ἀσχημον γὰρ τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν σχῆμα*. So our "undisguised" comes nearest to the meaning of *οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ*, but "unseemly behaviour" is not to be understood. In Tertullian, strange to say, *οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ* is rendered by "*non proterit*," which certainly gives a good sense, but is hardly correct. The opposite idea to *οὐ παροξύνεται* here occurs in Heb. x. 24, *εἰς παροξυσμὸν ἀγάπης*.

Hesychius says *στέγειν· κρύπτειν, συνέχειν, βαστάζειν, ὑπομένειν*.

Thessalonians iii. 1, 5 (in the LXX, too, it is very rare). In the first instance it signifies—here, too, it is *πάντα στέγομεν*—quite clearly: “we restrain ourselves in everything (lest we should hinder the gospel).” In the two other instances it is best to translate it by “bear,” “endure.” The translation, “love restrains itself in everything” (Heinrici) does not however appear to me sufficiently strong and significant beside the words which follow, and the *πάντα* also then no longer corresponds exactly to the three following *πάντα*. The fundamental meaning appears to me to be most appropriate: “love hides (palliates?) all things,” comp. 1 Peter iv. 8 (James v. 20): *ἀγάπη καλύπτει πλήθος ἁμαρτιῶν*.<sup>1</sup>

If Paul in Colossians iii. 14 calls love “the bond of perfectness,” our verses 4–7, and especially the last, are like a comment upon them. Although, as worked out in details, they were certainly not written without regard for the loveless conditions in the Corinthian community, yet they rise above this narrower reference to a general description which is stripped of everything particular. What deep experience is the cause that the analysis of love begins with “suffereth long” (*μακροθυμεῖ*) and ends with “endureth” (*ὑπομένει*), that the absolute *πάντα* stands out so powerfully at the end of the description, and that within that description the culminating point is the sentence that love rejoiceth in the truth.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> These very words are given by Clemens Rom. in his hymn, which is dependent on our chapter, before *πάντα ἀνέχεται, πάντα μακροθυμεῖ* (c. 49), and we may perhaps conclude from this that he understood *στέγει* in the sense of “tegit.” But this is uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> The words: *συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* are to be thus understood. *Σύν* only strengthens and is introduced for the sake of rhythm. The other explanation (“rejoices with the truth”) brings in an alien element. Truth is here, as elsewhere with the Apostle, considered as something ethical, which comes very near to the idea of right and good; comp. v. 8: *μὴ κακίας καὶ πονηρίας, ἀλλ’ εὐκρινείας καὶ ἀληθείας*, Rom. ii. 8: *ἀπειθοῦσι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, πειθομένοις δὲ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ*, also 2 Thess. ii. 12: *μὴ πιστεύσαντες τῇ*

As regards the disposition of the fifteen sayings, the nine first verbs arrange themselves easily into three verses. The first verse describes the principal qualities of love, the second the simplicity and truth of its appearance, the third the selflessness and unalterable kindness of its inmost nature. This eulogistic description closes with the pithy balanced sentence, "It rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth." This leads over to the  $2 \times 2$  great positive sayings.

A. HARNACK.

*Helena Ramsay, transl.*

### THE ARK OF THE COVENANT.

THE subject of the ark was much discussed some years ago by German scholars. The opinion of Wellhausen, that the ark was an old sanctuary belonging to the clan of Joseph and that it was afterwards adopted as the chief sacred symbol of Jahve, held the field among critical scholars. It was promulgated by Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* (3rd edition, p. 47) and accepted by such scholars as B. Stade (*G.V.I.*, i. 458), W. Nowack (*Hebr. Arch.* ii. 6), T. K. Cheyne (*Enc. Bibl.*, i. 307), K. Marti (*Geschichte der Isr. Religion*, 68), Holzinger (*Exodus*, p. 123) and others. A new solution, however, was offered by Reichel (*Ueber die vorhebräischen Götterkulte*, Wien, 1897), and J. Meinhold (*Die Lade Jahves*), who supposed the ark to be a throne. M. Dibelius (*Die Lade Jahves*, Göttingen, 1906) shared this opinion and sup-

ἀληθείᾳ ἀλλὰ εὐδοκῆσαντες τῇ ἀδικίᾳ. This meaning for ἀληθείᾳ was at that time current among both Jews and pagans; two parallel developments took place here. Hundreds of Jews and Greeks at that time might have written the sentence of Clemens Rom. (xxxv. 5): ἀκολουθήσωμεν τῇ ὁδῷ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπορρίψαντες ἀφ' ἐαυτῶν πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν καὶ πονηρίαν. Clemens Alex. writes (*Quis dives*, 38): οὐκ ἐπιχαίρει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, σύγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. For love and truth, comp. also 2 Thess. ii. 10, and Eph. iv. 15.



posed that the temple of Shiloh existed already in the pre-Mosaic period. This temple and its holy throne, the ark, was adopted by the Israelites as a temple of Jahve. The theory that the ark originally had no association with Jahve was also defended by H. Winckler (*Geschichte Isr.*, i: 77) and R. Kraetzschmar (*Die Bundesvorstellung*, 1896, p. 213).

The majority of Old Testament scholars seems inclined to assume that the ark, whatever its original nature may have been, was of non-Jahvistic origin. The tradition that it was made at Mount Sinai is supposed to be untrustworthy. The narrative of its construction is assigned by the school of Wellhausen to the Priestly Code, and therefore is regarded as unimportant for our knowledge of the real nature of this sanctuary.

The chief argument for this theory is that it is not possible to assume that Jahve dwelt at various places at the same time. There can be no doubt about the fact that Mount Sinai was the abode of Jahve. Moses went up into this mount in order to receive the laws and ordinances of Jahve, and he is said to have remained forty days and forty nights in the presence of Jahve. That Mount Sinai is also in later times the fixed abode of Jahve follows from the song of Deborah (Judges v., Psalm lxxviii. 9), where Jahve is called "the Lord of the Sinai." (The Hebrew יְהוָה here is the equivalent of Arabic Dhu, "Lord.") In 1 Kings xix. Elijah went unto the mount of God, Horeb, and God spoke to him on this mount.

At the same time, however, Jahve is believed to have dwelt in the temple of Jerusalem, in which the ark was placed, as is apparent from 1 Kings viii. The ark is the symbol of His presence. Wherever the ark is, Jahve Himself is present (1 Sam. iv. 3 ff.; v. 1 ff.; 2 Sam. vi. 1 ff.; xi. 10 f.; Num. x. 35 f.). This is explained by B. Stade



and others, by the theory that the ark contained some object that was worshipped as a fetish, otherwise it could not have been regarded as the dwelling-place of a god. This conception of the ark, however, is considered by Stade to be inconsistent with the theory that Jahve is the Lord of Mount Sinai (*Geschichte d. V. Isr.* i. 458; Kraetzschmar. *Bundesvorstellung*, p. 213).

We easily understand that this theory was contradicted by J. Meinhold, L. Couard (*Z.A.T.W.*, 1892, p. 79 f.) and others. Meinhold tried to show that the ark was a portable throne and held the view that the Israelites carried this throne with them in order to make themselves sure of the presence of Jahve, when they were moving from Mount Sinai. Every religion teaches us that no god ever was regarded as confined to a fixed abode. The Babylonian goddess Ishtar, e.g., is worshipped in various temples in Babylonia, at the same time, however, she is with her image, that was carried by one of the Babylonian princesses to Egypt, and in one of the Amarna-letters the Babylonian king asks the Pharaoh of Egypt not to neglect her. The spiritual nature of the gods implies the possibility of their presence at various places. The ancient conception still survives in the Roman Catholic ideas of the present time. The saints and their images are worshipped in all lands, and there is no doubt about the possibility of their presence in any of those lands. They even possess different qualities in various places and are believed to heal certain diseases in some place which they do not heal in other places. But a saint is never identified with his image. The image always is only the symbol of his presence. So the image of a god was never fully identified with the god himself. The god may dwell in heaven, at the same time, however, he may be present at any place where an image or some other object that is believed to be his symbol, stands.

Therefore, the problem is to explain in which way the ark was a symbol of Jahve. If this can be made clear there is no further ground for the theory that the ark is of non-Jahvistic origin.

The various ways in which scholars have tried to explain how the ark was the abode of Jahve seem to be insufficient.

Reference has been made to the portable sanctuaries of the Egyptians and Assyrians. The ark was supposed to be an imitation of the Egyptian sacred boats. The holy barges of the Egyptian gods, however, were carried about in processions by the priests of the god. A small chapel containing an image of the god was placed in the barge. The Babylonian gods also had their means of conveyance. On the great feast of Zakmuk, the New Year's feast, the gods of Borsippa were brought to Babel for the great meeting of the gods on New Year's Day. There seems to be some resemblance between these sanctuaries and the ark, but closer investigation shows that there is still greater difference. The Egyptian shrines or chapels are small houses with doors and windows. Inside the chapel is the image of the god. The ark, however, is a square wooden chest without any resemblance to a shrine. There is not the least indication that it was ever believed to contain an image. We only know that it sometimes was carried with the army (2 Sam. xi 10 ff.), but there is not a single instance of its being carried about in holy processions. It stood in the temple since the days of Solomon. It was quite an exception when it was taken from the temple at Silo into the encampment of the Israelites. (1 Sam. iv. 3-7, "The Philistines said: God is come into the camp; and they said, Woe unto us, for there has not been such a thing heretofore.")

Even if the statement of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, i, 307, "Within the best-known historical periods it was in simple arks or coffers that the images of the gods were borne

in procession at the Babylonian (and Assyrian) festivals " were correct these coffers would differ from the ark, as the ark did not contain an image. The arks to which the *Encycl. Bibl.* refers are, however, not wooden coffers, but small houses, as may be seen from the boundary stones, on which several gods are represented looking out of their shrines as a dog looks out of his kennel (III. *Rawl.* 45 ; IV. *Rawl.* 43).

Reichel (*Ueber die vorhellenische Götterkulte*, Wien, 1897) referred to the empty throne that accompanied the army of Xerxes (Herodotus vii. 40) and to other empty thrones. He supposes these thrones to be of Asiatic origin and holds the view that the terrace-towers of the Babylonian temples are artificial thrones. J. Meinhold has taken up this view and supposes the ark to be a portable throne of Jahve, that was to represent His real throne, Mount Sinai. He assumed that the Israelites believed that Jahve sat on the ark. This view was criticised by K. Budde (*Theol. Stud. und Krit.*, 1906, p. 489 ff. ; *War die Lade Jahves ein leerer Thron?*). Budde's criticism is perfectly justified. He argues that the Hebrew word Aron (ark) always means box or chest, that there is not a single trace of the supposed belief that Jahve sat on the ark. On the contrary, the common view is that Jahve rides on the Kherubim and under the wings of those Kherubim the ark was placed in the temple of Solomon. This implies that Jahve would have dwelt under the Kherubim instead of to ride upon them. Furthermore, the Holy of Holies was lower than the temple, it was a cube of 20 cubits on each side. The height of the temple was 30 cubits. We cannot assume that a lower ceiling would have been made in this place if Jahve was believed to sit upon the ark. We may add to this argument that the ark, a square wooden box, can hardly be supposed to be the imitation of the throne of solid rock, Mount Sinai.

We therefore understand, that E. Kautzsch (*Bibl. Theol. des A.T.*, Tübingen, 1911, p. 53) says that a sufficient explanation of the holy nature of the ark has not yet been offered, and that S. A. Cook in the *Encycl. Britannica* (s.v. Ark) refers to the various theories that were brought forward without deciding in favour of one of them.

The solution of the problem is at hand if we only trust in the historical value of Exodus xxxii. There we are told that Moses delayed to come down from Mount Sinai. Then the people gathered themselves together unto Aaron and said to him, "Up, make us a god, which shall go before us ; for as for Moses, the man that brought us up out of the land of Egypt, we know not what is become of him." Thereupon Aaron made the golden calf, the image of Jahve, and the Israelites brought offerings to it. The people that is to move from Mount Sinai evidently wishes to be guided by their god. The calf was the image of Jahve worshipped in the temples of Bethel and Dan. This popular conception of Jahve fully agrees with the fact that there is a close connexion between Jahve and thunderstorm and rain. The thunderstorm is the natural phenomenon, in which Jahve reveals Himself unto mankind (Exod. xix., 1 Kings xix., Psalm xviii. etc.). The bullock was the animal that was held to be a symbol of the thunder-god, Hadad or Ramman. So we perfectly understand that Aaron made a bullock, as the people demanded from him a god, that might go before them.

From Exod. xxxii. 1 it follows that the god that might go before them would not have been desired by the people if Moses had come back. Moses himself was but a mere man ; in the eyes of the people he cannot have ranked with a god. Consequently, he must have been expected to bring the god, whom the people wanted, with him. As he did not return the people supposed that he had met with an accident and desired Aaron to procure them the necessary holy symbol



that might assure them of the presence of Jahve, when they were moving from Mount Sinai.

Now Exodus xxxii. tells us that Moses came down with the two tables of the law in his hand. As soon as he saw the bullock "his anger waxed hot" and he demolished the image. The tables of the law, therefore, seem to have the significance ascribed by the Israelites to the bullock. There is one instance in the Old Testament which proves that they might really have this significance in the belief of the old Israelitic tribes, viz., 2 Kings v. 17. Naaman desires to worship Jahve, but, living in Damascus, he is unable to do so, as Jahve is the God of Israel. In order to be sure of the presence of Jahve at Damascus he carries two mules' burden of earth from Samaria to Damascus, "for he will henceforth offer neither burnt-offering nor sacrifice unto other gods, but unto Jahve." The earth of Israel, taken to Damascus makes Naaman feel sure that Jahve will be where this part of His soil is. In the same way may the stone tablets, taken from Mount Sinai, make Moses feel sure that Jahve, the Lord of Mount Sinai, will be wherever this part of His abode is transported. According to Exodus xxiv. 12 Jahve Himself has taken those tables and has written upon them the laws and the commandments. Exodus xxxii. 16 says, "The tables were the work of God and the writing was the writing of God." We are perfectly in harmony with ancient religious ideas if we assume that those tablets must have been holy in a double sense. Firstly, because they were taken from Mount Sinai, the sacred abode of Jahve, and secondly, because the writing on it was the writing of God. So we fully understand that a wooden chest that was made for the transport of these tablets was regarded in the same way as the Egyptian shrines on barges, etc. These were holy because the image of a god stood in them; the ark was holy, for the tablets were brought down from Jahve's abode.



Perhaps the objection may be made that Exodus xxxii. is of late origin. The school of Wellhausen assigns it to E, at least the main part of it. It would be of no use to discuss here the construction of Exodus xxxii. I refer for this to *Alttest. Stud.*, p. 72, where I tried to show that this chapter cannot be divided into a Jahvistic and an Elohist narrative. For our present purpose this question is of little importance. We have, however, to deal with another theory of the same school regarding this chapter. Exodus xxxii. is supposed to combat the worship of Jahve in the temples of Dan and Bethel (see, e.g., Bāntsch, *Exodus*, p. 269). This explanation is part of the theory that the narratives are reflections from a later period. I criticised this theory in the *EXPOSITOR* for October, 1908, p. 358 ff. In Exodus xxxii. is not the slightest hint about a later worship of Jahve in the form of a bullock. Hosea viii. 5, 6, x. 5 speaks about the "calf of Samaria" and the calf of Bethaven without any reference to this chapter. Amos prophesies in the temple of Bethel, but he does not even allude to the image in that temple. If Exodus xxxii. combats the cult of North-Israel we should certainly expect that the cult of Jerusalem at the same time would be glorified. This is not the case. The tablets, the contents of the holy sanctuary at Jerusalem, are broken by Moses and must be replaced by duplicates. According to the priests of Jerusalem the cult of Bethel was an innovation of Jeroboam I. It is very improbable that a narrative intended to expose the cult of a competing temple would make the ancestor of its own priesthood responsible for the origin of this cult. Therefore, we cannot agree with those scholars who suppose that Exodus xxxii. is a reflection from the ninth or eighth century B.C. But in this case it is reasonable to assume that it is part of the old tradition about the Exodus. The chapter is in perfect harmony with the historical circumstances. If the Israelitic tribes worshipped

Jahve at Mount Sinai, because they assigned their deliverance from the oppression of the Egyptians to His divine power it is to be expected that they will try to make sure themselves of His protection when moving on to Canaan. If there is no reason to deny that the narrative of the events at Mount Sinai must have some historical background, we also must admit that the events of Exodus xxxii. perfectly suit the circumstances.

It is a common view that the contents of the ark cannot have consisted of the tables of the law. We should never expect to find the tables of the law hidden in a chest in the Holy of Holies. We are told in 2 Sam. vi. 6 f. that Uzza was killed as he touched the ark. It seems perfectly incredible that the law of Jahve would have been placed in an ark that was never to be opened. Therefore it seems advisable to assume that the contents originally consisted of pieces of stone, that were taken from Mount Sinai with the same purpose that induced Naaman to take two mules' burden of earth to Damascus. But then it remains to explain in what way the rough-hewn stones were transformed into the tables of the law.

It is generally accepted by those who assume that the ark was an old Josephitic sanctuary adopted by Jahvism, that this transformation took place when the ark was accepted by the priests of Jahve as the symbol of His divine presence. But if we cannot admit that the ark is of pre-Jahvistic origin we do not see why the present form of the tradition should have taken the place of an older form, as the religious feeling of the pre-exilic period (cf. 2 Kings v. 17) obviously had no serious objection against the conception of Jahve found in that supposed old form of the narrative of the events at Mount Sinai. Moreover it cannot be said that the Jahvistic theory about the contents of the ark would have been a probable one, especially not if we remember that Exodus tells us

that the laws written upon these tablets were of considerable length (Exod. xxiv. 12 ; xxxii. 15 f.), and if we therefore are compelled to assume that the view of Deuteronomy (that the Decalogue was written upon the tablets) is to be rejected. I tried to show in my article on the Book of the Covenant and the Decalogue (see EXPOSITOR for August, 1909, p. 158) that it is reasonable to assume that the Book of the Covenant represents the old Mosaic legislation, that was inscribed upon the tables, as Exodus xxiv. 12, "I will give thee . . . the law and the commandment, that thou mayest teach them," cannot refer to the Decalogue. I pointed out (l.c., p. 165) that the term, "Tables of Eduth" may be an old one. If this is right we should have to assume that the Israelitic priests had invented the theory that the legislation of the Book of the Covenant, that was to be applied in every day life, was hidden in a sacred chest that was never to be touched. We can hardly make them responsible for so improbable a suggestion.

So the only way I see is that the study of the problems of the contents of the tables and of the origin of the ark leads to the conclusion that the narrative of Exodus about the contents of the ark after all is to be accepted in its present form. We are used to suppose that the ark was never to be opened and that it should not even be touched. But in reality no sufficient proofs of this could be given. It is true that "Uzzah is killed" (2 Sam. vi. 4), but it is not justifiable to derive from the fact that a man was killed in transporting the ark the conclusion that it was not to be touched. The ark was set upon a new cart. This cannot have been done without touching it. After the death of Uzzah David would not take the ark into Jerusalem. We do not know in what way Uzzah was killed, but the religious feeling of those days could only explain this accident as a deed of Jahve. If David had known that it was not allowed to touch the ark he would

not have refused to bring the ark to Jerusalem and he would have understood that Uzzah died by his own fault.

In 1 Samuel vi. 18 several of the people of Beth Shemesh are killed because they looked into the ark. The consequence is that they do not wish to have the ark any longer with them. This does not prove that nobody was allowed to open the holy chest. It is obvious that only sacred men are entitled to approach the sanctuary. Therefore, Abinadab sanctified his son Eleazar (1 Sam. vii. 1) to keep the ark. If common people are punished for approaching the ark or for looking in it we are not justified to conclude that the priests also had no right of opening it.

Furthermore, the existence of laws written on tables of stone demands a receptacle in which they might be conveyed. We know very little of the history of the ark. It is not probable that it was opened at certain times when it once was placed in the Holy of Holies of the Jerusalem temple. There were of course sufficient copies of the laws of Jahve at hand for the priests (Hos. viii. 12). When manuscripts may be consulted there is no need for the more difficult handling of stone tablets. So we perfectly understand that the ark practically became the holy sanctuary that remained in the untroubled silence of the Holy of Holies.

The name of the ark remains to be discussed. The name Ark of the Covenant of Jahve is quoted as proof for the late origin of the conception of the ark as the receptacle of the tablets of the law. In some places the Hebrew word Covenant, ברית, means "law" (Deut. iv. 13, "He declared to you His covenant which He commanded you to perform," and 1 Kings viii. 21, Solomon "set a place for the ark wherein is the covenant of the Lord"). Now it is supposed that the name Ark of the Covenant depends upon this meaning of "Berith"; and as the word in this sense is used in Deuteronomy it is supposed that this name arose in the seventh



century B.C. under the influence of the religious ideas of the prophets.

An inquiry into the curious names of the ark seems to prove that the name Ark of the Covenant is late. The old name was Ark of Jahve. Wellhausen (*Text d. Bücher Samuelis*, p. 55; cf. Driver, *Notes on the Hebr. Text of the Books of Samuel*, p. 36) observed that the name Ark of the Covenant of Jahve is used in 1 Samuel iv. only in verses 3, 4 and 5. In other verses of the same chapter it is called Ark of Jahve or Ark of God. The text of the LXX omits the word covenant in these verses. A Redactor is supposed to have corrected the Hebrew text, but to have stopped his emendations after verse 4 as they became too numerous. It is possible that this is the right explanation. LXX reads also Ark of the Covenant of Jahve, 1 Samuel v. 4, 2 Samuel vi. 10 (where the Hebrew text omits Berith). So there is room for doubt. In Joshua iii., however, it is obvious that the word Berith is of later origin in the verses 11, 14, 17, where the Hebrew construction is an impossible one. The fact that the word Berith was inserted in some verses of 1 Samuel iv. and Joshua iii. is no sufficient proof for the late origin of the title "Ark of the Covenant of Jahve." It only proves that in later times there was a predilection for this name, but it does not show that it originated in a later period.

In Num. x. 33, xiv. 44, the ark is called Ark of the Covenant of Jahve. These parts of Numbers are assigned by Wellhausen to the Elohist. Many scholars assume that the word covenant is a later insertion. But this admits of no proof. It is only assumed in order to be in harmony with the common theory. We do not see why the ark could not have been called the Ark of the Covenant of Jahve if the historical events show that this name may have a perfectly good sense in the Israelitic tradition.

There is no reason to doubt that the various tribes of Israel



made a covenant at Mount Sinai. It also is beyond reasonable doubt that the Lord of Mount Sinai was invoked as the God protecting this covenant. The tribes promised to obey His laws and commandments. But in this case there is no sufficient ground for denying that the holy chest, which contained the sacred laws of this God, might not have been called the Ark of the Covenant of Jahve.

The fact that centuries afterwards this old name was understood in another way and therefore was beloved by the Soferim, does not prove that the name itself is a title of later invention. If we penetrate into the religious thought of old Israel we do not find any feature in the conception of the nature of the ark that cannot be explained by the historical situation and the religious ideas of that period.

Thus we need not accept the view that the ark was a sanctuary to be used in the holy war, nor that it was an old Josephitic fetish; we have only to interpret the text of Exodus in the light of the history of religion.

B. D. EERDMANS.

## *ST. PAUL AND THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.*

### II.

#### JEWISH AFFINITIES WITH THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS.

It is a custom almost universal among writers on the religion of the New Testament to speak of the "Mysticism" or "Faith-Mysticism" of St. Paul. Now "Mysticism" is one of the most elastic terms in the religious vocabulary. Hence, when it is used to designate an important element in the complex of Paul's religious experience, its precise significance in this connexion must be as clearly defined as possible. It is not our purpose at the present stage to

attempt such a definition. It is enough to indicate the features in the Apostle's experience which are commonly grouped under this name. Prominent among them are those which he himself describes as "crucified with Christ," "baptized into his death," "risen with Christ," "joined to the Lord," "putting on Christ," being "in Christ," having "Christ living in" him. To a somewhat different side of the same general category belong the "visions" and "revelations" which he occasionally claims to have: the pneumatic endowments of a unique kind which he shares with other Spirit-possessed Christians: and the remarkable ecstatic experience which he recalls in 2 Corinthians xii. 1 ff. Some recent investigators have been disposed to associate these spiritual phenomena with the influence of the Mystery-Religions, and, in future articles, we must, in the light of their researches, make a careful comparison of the terminology of these religions with the religious vocabulary of Paul. On a surface view of the facts, however, it seems relevant, meanwhile, to suggest that in the Pauline phrases quoted above, we have examples of a spiritual experience which comes to light wherever religion exercises an intense and sovereign control over the personality. The soul for which God is all in all craves for and continually attains a relationship to the Divine which can only be expressed in terms of absorbing personal intimacy. For Paul access to God is only and altogether through Christ. Hence, speaking generally, the language he employs is true to his whole Christian standpoint. On the other hand, the peculiar experience described in 2 Corinthians xii. 1 ff., the visions and revelations, and perhaps the unique spiritual endowments, while traceable over a very wide area of religious history both in ancient and modern times, are nevertheless more local in their character, and belong more essentially to a definite environment. If we are to do justice to that

environment in Paul's case, we must attempt to examine those elements in Judaism, his ancestral faith, which may broadly be grouped under the comprehensive term "Mysticism." For there may certainly be a germ of truth in Reitzenstein's statement: "Paul was a mystic before his conversion: this is attested by his allegorical exegesis of Scripture."<sup>1</sup>

We should expect to find phenomena of the kind called "mystic" in experiences which reveal religious feeling at its highest pitch of intensity. These, in the history of Israel, are associated with the *prophetic* function.

The earliest descriptions of the *Nebi'im* (e.g. 1 Sam. x. 5, 10; xix. 20, 24) are extraordinarily significant. Here they appear in bands, swayed by a common religious excitement, accompanied by stirring music. Their frenzy is contagious. Saul is swept away by it, strips himself of his clothing, and falls exhausted to the ground. Even at a later date, according to 2 Kings iii. 15, Elisha calls for music, and while the minstrel plays the prophetic inspiration comes upon him and he declares the word of the Lord. In the Samuel-passages these phenomena are attributed to the *Ruah Elohim*. The *Ruah*-conception, in the most primitive phases of the popular religion, had probably stood for anything "demonic" that had to be accounted for, but in the oldest documents of the Old Testament has already been incorporated with the person of Jahweh.<sup>2</sup> In the case of Elisha, the phrase used is "the hand of Jahweh." This phrase occurs again and again in the book of Ezekiel, where it is apparently connected with trance or ecstatic conditions. It is almost needless to recall the parallels to these primitive ideas both in Semitic and Hellenic religions. The ecstatic influence of Apollo over the

<sup>1</sup> *Hellenistische Mysterien-Religionen*, p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> See Volz, *Der Geist Gottes im A.T.*, p. 62 et al.

Pythia is typical.<sup>1</sup> It is worth while noting that in Egypt certain classes of priests who are regarded as being in immediate contact with the supernatural world are designated *προφῆται*.

The development of Hebrew religion has nowhere left more impressive traces than in the sphere of the prophetic activity. A feature characteristic of the great pre-exilic prophets is their lack of emphasis on the conception of the *Ruah Jahweh* in connexion with their own prophetic equipment. Perhaps this is due to the fact, as Volz suggests,<sup>2</sup> that they still felt in it something of the primitive idea, which, as not necessarily ethical, was alien to them. But their usage is no indication that they were less conscious of the Divine Presence. It was the very reverse. They feel themselves to be in direct touch with Jahweh. "The Lord God hath spoken," says Amos (iii. 8), "who can but prophesy?" "Thou shalt be as my mouth," says the Lord to Jeremiah (Jer. xv. 19). And Isaiah's solemn vision represents the same type of experience. At certain crises they were peculiarly sensitive to the Divine compulsion. Isaiah, e.g., tells how the Lord spake to him "with strong pressure of the hand" (viii. 11). Jeremiah in an appeal to God exclaims: "I sat alone because of thy hand" (xv. 17).

While visions are rare in the experience of the greatest prophets, their conception of intimate fellowship with Jahweh is central for their religion. It is often described as "knowing God," or the "knowledge" of Him. This is something more profound than any activity of the intellect. It is essentially experimental. Very significant for its meaning are the words of Hosea: "I will even betroth

<sup>1</sup> See Rohde, *Psyche*,<sup>3</sup> ii. pp. 60, 61. A conspectus of most striking passages from Greek authors in De Jong, *Das antike Mysterienwesen*, pp. 163-165.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 67.



thee unto me in faithfulness, and thou shalt know the Lord " (ii. 20). The "knowledge" is a revelation of God in the inner being. "The word is very nigh unto thee in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it" (Deut. xxx. 14). Here we have, as Klein says,<sup>1</sup> "the quintessence of the prophetic preaching." God gives Himself to men in experience. And the experience is essentially moral. This point of view is peculiarly characteristic of Jeremiah. For him all ethical activity has as its foundation a personal communion with the living God.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the climax of this aspect of Old Testament religion appears in some of the later Psalms: e.g., Psalm li. 11: "Cast me not away from thy presence: and take not thy holy spirit from me." In Psalm lxxiii. 23-26 the "mystical" element is still more prominent: "Nevertheless I am continually with thee . . . Whom have I in heaven but thee, and there is none on earth that I desire beside thee."

It is obvious that there are intimate relations between the prophetic idea of the "knowledge of God" which we have just emphasised, and Paul's conception of *γνώσις*, which must be examined at a later stage. Meanwhile, if, following the development, we inquire into the standpoint of Ezekiel, we are confronted by experiences which remind us forcibly of the earlier popular beliefs. Ezekiel, like his great predecessors, sets high moral truths in the forefront of his message. But his is plainly a nature sensitive to ecstatic conditions, and these occupy a prominent place in his own descriptions of his prophetic work. In his first overpowering vision of the glory of God he narrates how he fell upon his face, and then heard a voice which commanded him to stand up that he might receive the Divine

<sup>1</sup> *Der älteste Christliche Katechismus, etc.*, p. 2. Cf. Kohler, *Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums*, pp. 25, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Duhm, *Theologie der Propheten*, p. 243.



commission. "And spirit entered into me when he spake unto me, and set me upon my feet, that I heard him that spake unto me" (ii. 2). In chapter viii. 3 he describes spirit as lifting him up between earth and heaven, and bringing him in the visions of God to Jerusalem. This takes place after "the hand of the Lord God" has fallen upon him. No doubt the experience belongs to a trance-condition. It is futile to explain such descriptions as merely literary artifice. They belong to the very framework of his prophetic activity. The fact that he narrates them so vividly attests the importance which they had for him. Of interest in this connexion is the eating of the book which was given him (ii. 9 ff.). It is quite possible that this was not a mere symbol, but rather an indication that "Ezekiel received the Divine message in an ecstatic condition, associated with intense bodily sensations."<sup>1</sup> It is not without importance for our subject that the later Apocalyptic, with its emphasis on esoteric lore, may be traced back to the influence of Ezekiel. In view of the phenomena with which we have been dealing, Dean Inge's remark requires some modification: "The Jewish mind . . . was alien to Mysticism."<sup>2</sup>

Ezekiel, in contrast to the pre-exilic prophets, makes fairly frequent mention of the Spirit of Jahweh in connexion with his inspired utterances. And in the post-exilic period as a whole, the *Ruah J'* comes gradually to be regarded as the special charism of the prophet. The conception has become highly ethicised, as, e.g., in Deutero-Isaiah. Here we have, as Volz points out,<sup>3</sup> the monotheistic transformation of the *Ruah* which had possessed the earlier *Nebi'im*. One cannot help comparing the

<sup>1</sup> Volz, *op. cit.* p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Christian Mysticism*, p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 96.

process with that by which Paul ethicised the ecstatic conception of the *πνεῦμα*, current in early Christianity. The parallel has a vital bearing on the meaning of the Apostle's "mysticism."

When we pass into the Judaistic period we are confronted by a variety of phenomena which may be called "pneumatic." This is the era of apocalyptic literature, and the descriptions given by the seers in the Apocalypses of their visions and of the conditions and circumstances in which these were granted to them afford rich material for study. Now it is true that the writers of the apocalypses associate the revelations embodied in their books with famous names of the past. And the experiences related are constantly embellished and elaborated in a more or less formal fashion. But throughout there is abundance of unconscious evidence that the writers themselves had personal and intimate knowledge of ecstatic conditions. These conditions are again and again ascribed to the influence of the Spirit. A noteworthy instance occurs in IV. Ezra xiv. 38 ff.: "On the following day there cried to me a voice, Ezra, open thy mouth, and drink that which I give thee. Then I opened my mouth, and behold, a full cup was handed to me. It was filled as if with water, but the colour of the water was like fire. This I took and drank, and when I had drunk, understanding streamed from my heart, my breast swelled with wisdom, my soul preserved its memory. Then my mouth was opened, and was not again closed." In his illuminating notes (ed. Kautzsch), Gunkel points out that the flame-coloured liquid represented the Spirit: when the seer had drunk, he was inspired. An interesting feature of the description is the reference to the remembrance of the experience. Persons in ecstasy often lost consciousness, and after the condition had passed away, were unable to recall that which had been given them "in the Spirit."

Here consciousness and memory have suffered no interruption. The whole passage is evidence that the writer was not dealing merely with phenomena external to himself. These mystical experiences are prepared for by ascetic practices. For example, the command comes to Baruch (Apoc. of Baruch, ed. Charles, chap. xx. 5-6) : "Go therefore and sanctify thyself seven days, and eat no bread, nor drink water, nor speak to any one. And afterwards come to that place, and I will reveal myself to thee . . . and I will give thee commandment regarding the method of the times." The same type of instruction is found in IV. Ezra ix. 23 f. Here, again, there is something more than secondhand tradition.

We do not forget that in the Judaistic epoch the opinion prevailed that the Divine Spirit was no longer operative in the nation. And this view could be justified by comparing the existing age with that of the great prophets. But, as Gunkel aptly remarks, "such phenomena are in reality not the possession of any single epoch, but they occur at all times and in all places."<sup>1</sup> Frank recognition of this truism would save much irrelevant discussion on the subject of the "Mysticism" of Paul.

The visions and revelations of the Jewish Apocalypses, which are all to a greater or less degree related to eschatological happenings, are in many instances connected with the ascent of the soul to heaven. Some scholars believe that this conception must have entered Judaism from outside, and are inclined to find its origin in Hellenic-Egyptian culture.<sup>2</sup> This is quite possible. For, as we shall notice immediately, Judaism came into very intimate contact

<sup>1</sup> *Apokryphen u. Pseudepigraphen d. A.T.* (ed. Kautzsch), Bd. II., p. 341.

<sup>2</sup> So, e.g., Volz, *op. cit.*, p. 124. Bousset favours the hypothesis of Persian influence, *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft*, IV., p. 145 ff.

with the various phases of Hellenistic syncretism. And ever since the time of Plato, the notion of the ascent of the soul into the higher world seems to have formed an important element in the profounder strains of Greek religion.<sup>1</sup> The experience is described more than once in the Ethiopic Enoch: e.g., xxxix. 3 f. (ed. Charles): "In those days a cloud and a whirlwind carried me off from the earth, and set me down at the end of the heavens. And here I saw another vision, the mansions of the holy and the resting-places of the righteous." In the Slavonic Enoch, the seer is carried up through the various heavens until, in the seventh, he is set "before the face of the Lord" (chap. xxi. 5). There his earthly robe is taken off him and he is clothed with the raiment of the Divine glory (xxii. 8). This, no doubt, refers to the purification of the soul, if it is to look upon the face of God. It is scarcely possible to separate the conception from the Hellenistic idea of the ascent of the soul through the various spheres, a process in which it is gradually purified. It is obvious that in the Enoch-literature there is a large mass of imported material, mystic lore accumulated from manifold sources. But here again we have no doubt to reckon with an ecstatic "mysticism," current in certain circles of Judaism, and lying behind the delineations given in apocalypses of religious heroes of the olden time.<sup>2</sup>

Many modern Jewish scholars are inclined to believe that the chief elements in the famous mystic system of the Cabala have descended in a continuous tradition from the apocalyptic literature of the second and first centuries B.C. Whether, as Josephus holds, these writings were carefully preserved in the circle of the Essenes, who are regarded by some (e.g., Jellinek and Gaster) as the originators of the

<sup>1</sup> See Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*,<sup>2</sup> p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bousset, *Religion des Judentums*,<sup>2</sup> p. 342.



Cabala, there is little evidence to determine. The description we have quoted from the Slavonic Enoch of the seer's ascent to heaven vividly reminds us of Paul's account of his mystic experience in 2 Corinthians xii. 1 ff. And we know that at many points the Apostle has links of connexion with apocalyptic ideas. But whether these belong to the centre or the circumference of his religious outlook is a question which must be discussed at a later stage in our inquiry.<sup>1</sup>

It is probably an error to draw a sharp line of demarcation between Apocalyptic and Rabbinic thought. These provinces must certainly have overlapped. The religious phenomena of the one are clearly manifest in the other. There is truth, no doubt, in Schlatter's remark that the Palestinian Synagogue had no room for "pneumatics."<sup>2</sup> In Rabbinic piety ecstatic experiences seem to have been held in check. The problems of mystical lore had to be approached with much caution. The advice of the Son of Sirach is significant: "The things which have been commanded thee, ponder; for thou hast no need of secret things" (iii. 22). This shrinking from mystic raptures became more marked in the authoritative Rabbinic schools of the second century A.D. It was said of Simon ben Azzai that he died after he had cast a glance into the mysteries of the "garden."<sup>3</sup> To the famous Rabbi Akiba († 135 A.D.) is referred the warning found in the Mishna against discoursing on the creation of the world (Gen. i.) and the first chapter of Ezekiel, except before carefully selected indi-

<sup>1</sup> Gunkel (*op. cit.*, pp. 342, 349), indicates many parallels, e.g., between IV. Ezra and Paul, which suggest that they belonged to the same circle of Judaism. But he clearly recognises that the contrasts are greater than the resemblances (p. 343).

<sup>2</sup> *Jochanan ben Zakkai*, p. 74, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> Interpreted by some as the realm of theosophical speculations, by others as Paradise. See Bacher, *Die Agada der Tannaiten*, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 408.



viduals.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless the existence in Rabbinic circles of "pneumatic" phenomena, parallel to those with which we have been dealing, is fully authenticated.

It is interesting to note that the "wise" man is regarded as possessing a special Divine endowment. "Who hath known thy counsel unless thou hast given him wisdom and sent thy holy spirit from on high?" (Wisd. of Sol. ix. 17). With this may be compared a passage from the celebrated description of wisdom: "From generation to generation passing into holy souls, she (i.e. Wisdom) maketh them friends of God and prophets" (*ib.* vii. 27). Probably under the same category may be placed the remarkable experience of Eliphaz narrated in Job iv. 12 ff.: "In thoughts from the visions of the night when deep sleep falleth on men, fear came upon me, and trembling, which made all my bones to shake. Then a spirit passed before my face; the hair of my flesh stood up: it stood still, but I could not discern the form thereof: an image was before mine eyes, I heard a still voice." Notable Rabbis like Hillel were looked upon as inspired by the Holy Spirit.<sup>2</sup> Indeed saintliness (*Chasiduth*), which is virtually imitation of God, has as its consummation communion with the Holy Spirit. Schechter, commenting on this conception, quotes from a Midrash: "Holiness means nothing else than prophecy."<sup>3</sup> On the whole, no doubt, the catastrophic aspect of the Spirit has fallen into the background. Characteristic of this situation is the idea of the Spirit as especially manifested in the Holy Scriptures, which has become a widespread belief in Rabbinic theology.<sup>4</sup>

At the same time, there is another group of phenomena

<sup>1</sup> Bacher, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

<sup>2</sup> See Volz., *op. cit.*, pp. 115, 165.

<sup>3</sup> *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, p. 217.

<sup>4</sup> See Volz., *op. cit.*, pp. 167, 168.

which are closely linked to those ecstatic experiences which we discussed in the field of Apocalyptic literature. As in the case of the apocalyptists, they are associated with esoteric lore, arising out of theosophical and cosmogonic speculations. Judaism had been in touch with Babylonian-Persian ideas, as Blau points out,<sup>1</sup> for at least 500 years before the Christian era. The conception of Gnosis had permeated many phases of its thought. So we need not be surprised to find in it remarkable affinities with the doctrines which we meet both in Hellenistic and in Christian Gnosticism. One name stands out prominently in Rabbinic tradition as identified with mystical speculations, that of Jochanan ben Zakkai (fl. c. 70 A.D.). Our knowledge of his Haggadic explanations of Scripture, which was the form given to esoteric doctrines of this kind, is so meagre that much caution has to be used in estimating his standpoint.<sup>2</sup> But we know that the material which supplied a basis for them came from the opening section of Genesis and the opening section of Ezekiel. The one passage was the starting-point for mystic speculations on the Creation (*Ma'aseh Bereschith*), the other for esoteric theories as to the being and abode of God (*Ma'aseh Merkabah*), Merkabah, chariot, being a concise description of Ezekiel's mysterious vision. The latter doctrine must have been elaborately developed. Traces of it, in various phases, are found throughout the Rabbinic tradition. Later, the term "Merkabah-travellers" came to be used of those who ventured on this mystic quest. Some interesting traditions survive as to Rabbis who were absorbed in such theosophical endeavours. An interview is recorded between R. Joshua b. Chananja and Ben Zoma. In answer to a greeting by Joshua, Ben Zoma gave forth a mystic utterance, and Joshua said to the scholars who

<sup>1</sup> Art. *Gnosticism* in *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, V., p. 681.

<sup>2</sup> See Bacher, *op. cit.*, p. 39 f.

accompanied him, "Ben Zoma is gone." Bacher thinks that the saying is to be explained in the light of a tradition that Ben Zoma became mentally affected in consequence of mystical speculations.<sup>1</sup> But Blau's explanation, illustrated by parallel passages, which finds in the words a reference to ecstasy, seems more relevant to the whole context.<sup>2</sup> Ben Zoma is one of a group of Rabbis who, according to a famous tradition, had, during their lifetime, "entered Paradise." Ben Azzai had his vision and died (*ut supr.*). Ben Zoma saw and lost his reason. Acher became a heretic. Akiba alone suffered no harm.<sup>3</sup> Bousset is probably justified in connecting this tradition with visionary experiences of the Rabbis in question, reached in conditions of ecstasy. But such experiences are never conceived in the realistic fashion current, for example, in the contemporary Mystery-religions. We are not confronted in Judaistic thought with the notion of absorption in the Deity. Nor does there ever, apparently, occur the conception of the deification of mortals through mystic communion with God. These facts will be found of high significance when we come to investigate the mystical ideas of Paul.

As we have already seen, the mystic phenomena of the Apocalypses are usually associated with the feverish strain of eschatological expectation which prevailed in the Judaistic period. Of course, in such books as Ethiopic Enoch, Slavonic Enoch, and IV. Ezra, much of the esoteric tradition may well fall under the category of Gnosis. But the clue to the standpoint of the writers is eschatology. On the other hand, the mysticism of Rabbinic Judaism seems to have an intimate connexion with allegorical exegesis of

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 424.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 684.

<sup>3</sup> *Chagiga*, 14b-15b. Cf. Bousset, *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft*, iv. p. 145 ff., a most comprehensive treatment of the conception of the ascent of the soul.

the Old Testament. Examples have been mentioned in the case of Jochanan ben Zakkai. Significant for the whole trend of thought we are considering is the statement of Akiba: "The whole world is not worth so much as the day on which the Song of Songs was given to Israel."<sup>1</sup> The full import of the saying becomes plain when we remember that for Akiba the book was an allegory of the unique relationship between God and Israel. An interpretation, starting with this presupposition, involved mystical conceptions at every turn. Thus, the *Rabba* on the Song of Songs "compares the 'tent of the congregation,' which was full of the 'N' (splendour) of the Shechinah, to a cave by the sea-shore. The sea rushes in and fills the cave; but the sea suffers no diminution of its waters. . . . Just so the 'tent of the congregation': the Divine Presence filled it, but it filled the world just the same."<sup>2</sup> The Haggada of Simon ben Jochai, renowned as a mystic, are said to be noteworthy for the exuberance of their language as to the relation between God and Israel.<sup>3</sup>

Some light has been shed by recent research on this obscure field. We are able to discern dimly a group of ancient Haggadists, designated *Doresche Reschumoth*, i.e. "interpreters of hints." The name, which is given them in Rabbinic tradition, would at once suggest allegorical exegetes. But this seems to be placed beyond doubt by the investigations of Lauterbach.<sup>4</sup> He shows that their characteristic was the estimating of Old Testament passages as symbols, whose figurative sense was far more important than the literal. While in many respects they reveal marked resemblances to Philo and the Alexandrian type

<sup>1</sup> Bacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 310, 311.

<sup>2</sup> Qu. by Rev. J. Abelson, *Hibbert Journal*, Jan., 1912, p. 435.

<sup>3</sup> Bacher, *op. cit.*, II., p. 79.

<sup>4</sup> *Jewish Quarterly Review*, Jan., 1911, esp. p. 301.



of Judaism, they were apparently Palestinian theologians, independent, so far as the evidence goes, of external influences.<sup>1</sup> Indeed Lauterbach believes that Philo was to some extent influenced by them. It is important to observe that the chief interest of these interpreters was practical. "If thou desirest to know Him by whose word the universe came into being, study the Haggada, for from it shalt thou know the Holy One, praised be He, and cleave to His ways" (*Sifre Ekeb.* p. 49).<sup>2</sup> Klein points out that in the essentials of their piety they stand in the direct succession of the prophets.<sup>3</sup> Their outlook, apparently, was far wider than that of ordinary Rabbinism. And some of their utterances suggest a more or less direct affinity with the Essenes and the Therapeutae.<sup>4</sup> Their mystical tendencies seem to have brought them under suspicion. For their interpretations have left very few traces in Rabbinic literature. They were felt to imperil the sacred Torah. And it is quite possible that a saying of Abtaljon's (*Pirque Aboth* i. 11) is a direct polemic against them.<sup>5</sup> Klein believes that a chief aim of their practice was to win the heathen for ethical monotheism. If this be so, it is all the more significant to find that Paul appears to follow their method closely in such passages as 1 Corinthians x. 1 f.<sup>6</sup>

The tragic history of R. Chanina b. Teradjon was connected in a later tradition with the fact that he had pronounced the Divine Name as it was written. "This probably implied that he had busied himself with mystic doctrine."<sup>7</sup> The history of the hidden Divine Name (*Schem hammephorasch*) is a complicated subject, on which we must simply touch, as belonging to the essence of Rab-

<sup>1</sup> Lauterbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 305, 328.

<sup>2</sup> See Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>4</sup> Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

<sup>5</sup> Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

<sup>6</sup> See Lauterbach, *loc. cit.*, p. 330, note 33.

<sup>7</sup> Bacher, *op. cit.*, I<sup>2</sup>. p. 597.



binic mysticism. In Ethiopic Enoch (lxix. 14), one of the evil angels asks Michael "to show him the hidden name." Various explanations have been given, but Klein has collected a number of passages from Rabbinic tradition which furnish a strong argument for his position that the mystical name of God is *Ani we-hu*, "I and he," a combination signifying the most intimate relation conceivable between God and His people. The hidden name "conceals the profoundest mystery of religion, the *unio mystica*, the demand for unity with God."<sup>1</sup> It is a point of extraordinary interest that direct parallels occur in Hellenistic literature. Thus, in a prayer to Hermes (in a Papyrus of the British Museum) the words occur : *σὺ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἐγὼ σὺ*. The same formula is found in a Leiden Papyrus.<sup>2</sup> And in the well-known Gnostic Egyptian *Pistis Sophia*, Jesus is represented as saying : "not only will you reign with me, but all men who shall receive the mystery of the Ineffable will be kings with me in my kingdom, and I am they and they are me."<sup>3</sup> In the magical Papyri mystic Divine names are used as incantations, and many of these are derived from the vocabulary of Judaism. The same usage is, of course, to be found in Jewish magic. But we have no clear data for tracing the connexion which may exist between the mystic doctrine of the hidden Divine Name and those phenomena of Hellenistic religion to which reference has been made. How widely the significance of the "name" has been diffused is apparent from Ephesians i. 21 : "Far above all authority and rule and power and lordship, and every name which is named not only in this age but also in the coming one."

Philo, in a remarkable passage,<sup>4</sup> declares as the aim of

<sup>1</sup> Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> See Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*<sup>2</sup>, p. 97.

<sup>3</sup> Schmidt, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, I. p. 148.

<sup>4</sup> *De Humanitate*, 119 (ed. Cohn-Wendland).

Moses in all his legislation the establishing of "harmony, fellowship, unity of mind, blending of manners, by means of which houses and cities, nations and countries and the whole human race should advance to the highest well-being." This ideal is to some extent the reflection of actually existing tendencies. We have already alluded to phenomena in Judaism which suggest foreign influence. We must examine this contact more closely. The problem is of importance for our discussion, as we have to contemplate the possibility that Hellenistic (including Oriental) conceptions influenced Paul through this medium.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps the most impressive example of the assimilation of Judaism and Paganism is to be found in those mixed religious communities, chiefly in Asia Minor, which recent research has been drawing out of their obscurity. Sir W. M. Ramsay has most suggestively contrasted the attitude of the Jews to Greeks and Phrygians respectively. In the first case there was an inherent racial antipathy. In the other the Jews were brought into touch with a people of fundamentally Oriental type.<sup>2</sup> This affinity had remarkable consequences. Antiochus the Great had founded Jewish colonies in Asia Minor about 200 B.C. It seems to have been due to their influence that the worship of the Phrygian deity, the κύριος Σαβάζιος, was blended with that of the Old Testament Jahweh, often designated in the LXX as κύριος Σαβαώθ.<sup>3</sup> This cult possessed mysteries closely akin to those of Attis.

But the influence of ethnic ideas upon Judaism is discern-

<sup>1</sup> See Wendland, *Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*, p. 178.

<sup>2</sup> *Historical Commentary on Galatians*, pp. 193-196.

<sup>3</sup> See Cumont, *Religions Orientales*, pp. 97, 98; Eisele, *Neue Jahrb. f. klass. Alt.*, xxiii., p. 631. There is abundant evidence also for votaries of θεός ὑψιστος, the typical title of the God of Israel in Asia Minor, who had not been Jews, and yet were organised in associations apparently only semi-Pagan. See Schürer, *Sitzungsb. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1897, pp. 200-225.

ible over a wide area. Gruppe emphasises the contact of Jewish thought with Oriental mysticism at an early date in Samaria, where Chaldaean astrology seems to have been practised.<sup>1</sup> This is highly probable. But we cannot by any means limit the spheres in which Judaism came into touch with Oriental syncretism. If we had any clear data regarding religious life in the regions immediately east of Palestine in the Hellenistic period, we might be able to trace the origin of that elusive sect, the Essenes, in which, alongside typically Jewish features, appear marked traces of alien beliefs and practices, as, e.g., their daily prayer to the Sun. But their beginnings are wrapt in obscurity. And the same may be said of the Therapeutae, whose existence and characteristics are known to us only from Philo's treatise *περὶ βίου θεωρητικοῦ*.<sup>2</sup> His description reveals many indications of syncretism. But except for the resemblance to be found between them and ethnic associations or guilds, it is impossible to form definite conclusions. Hence it seems hazardous to regard the Essene "colonies" as the main channels through which Persian, Greek, and Egyptian ideas had penetrated Judaism.<sup>3</sup> Essenism may have been an important link of connexion. But there are gaps in the evidence.

Unassailable testimony to the pressure of Babylonian and Persian thought upon Judaism is presented by the apocalyptic literature. In this instance, of course, the Exile supplies the starting-point. The cosmological speculations which abound in such documents as the Ethiopic and Slavonic Enoch are plainly traceable to the astronomical theology of Babylon, which extended its sway in all direc-

<sup>1</sup> *Griechische Mythologie*, II., p. 1608 f.

<sup>2</sup> Conybeare, in his masterly edition (Oxford, 1896), has adduced very convincing arguments in favour of its genuineness: see especially his excursus, pp. 258-358.

<sup>3</sup> So, e.g., Kohler, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, April, 1893, p. 406.

tions. In all likelihood it is here that we must look for the ultimate origin of that worship of the elements or elemental spirits (*στοιχεῖα*) which had crept into Judaism. As in the case of similar Oriental influences, the religion of Persia may have been the direct medium, for in it the elements play an exceedingly important part.<sup>1</sup> But since it is difficult, in this phase of religion, to make sharp distinctions between the spirits of the elements and those of the planets, Babylonian theology seems to lie in the background. Abundance of evidence as to these elemental spirits occurs, e.g., in Ethiopic Enoch, lx. 11–23, Jubilees, ii., Ascension of Isaiah, iv. 18, and the Christian Apocalypse, xiv. 18, xvi. 5. Particularly important for our discussion is Paul's use of *στοιχεῖα* in Galatians iv. 3, 9, and Colossians ii. 8, 20. And the whole subject is illumined by a passage in the second-century *Κήρυγμα Πέτροῦ* (Preuschen, *Antilegomena*, p. 52) : *μηδὲ κατὰ Ἰουδαίους σέβεσθε· Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι μόνοι οἰόμενοι τὸν θεὸν γινώσκειν οὐκ ἐπίστανται λατρεύοντες ἀγγέλοις καὶ ἀρχαγγέλοις, Μηνὶ καὶ Σελήνῃ.*<sup>2</sup> The manifold possibilities of contact between Judaism and Babylonian doctrine are thrown into relief by such facts as the penetration of Babylonian ideas into Syria, and the presence in Palmyra, where Babylonian astrology was popular, of a large Jewish colony which seems to have compromised with Paganism.<sup>3</sup> The influence of Persian beliefs on the Jews has at times been exaggerated.<sup>4</sup> Yet it would be futile to deny it in such spheres as angelology and demonology, and possibly in such apocalyptic conceptions as that of the end of the world. And there is, at least, some

<sup>1</sup> See Bousset, *Hauptprobleme d. Gnosis*, p. 223 f.

<sup>2</sup> See Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, p. 73 f., who finds an intimate relation between this Jewish mysticism and Hermetic doctrine.

<sup>3</sup> See Cumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 181 f., 367.

<sup>4</sup> E.g., in our judgment, by Bousset, *Religion des Judentums*<sup>2</sup>, p. 582, *et al.*



affinity between Persian dualism and the corresponding strain in Jewish apocalyptic.<sup>1</sup>

We have already suggested that the Jewish idea of the all-powerful "Name" must have links of connexion with Pagan magical ideas. As a matter of fact, Jacob has brought forward strong arguments for the Egyptian origin of this belief.<sup>2</sup> It is needless to say that our knowledge of Egyptian magic has been largely augmented by the magical Papyri which have recently come to light. They reveal a fundamentally Egyptian ground-work. This might be expected, as, from ancient times, magic formed a most important feature in Egyptian religion.<sup>3</sup> But these texts have incorporated many Jewish elements, more especially forms of the Divine Name, such as *Ἰάω*, *Ἀβρίω*, *Ἀδωνάι*, and famous Jewish names like Abraham, Jacob, Moses, etc. Typical examples will be found in the *Μονὰς ἡ Ὀγδόη Μωϋσέως*, edited by Dieterich.<sup>4</sup> The translation of the Old Testament into Greek has, as Hubert observes, contributed a new magical mythology to Egyptian religion.<sup>5</sup> But the notable fact is the action and reaction between Egyptian and Jewish ideas. For there seem to be here and there distinctly Jewish insertions in the texts, which are, no doubt, modelled on Egyptian tradition. We have here basal elements of that Jewish magical literature which reached its zenith in the Middle Ages.<sup>6</sup> This interchange is highly characteristic of Hellenistic syncretism. It leaves open the possibility of Jewish and even of Christian influence in the case of conceptions which are often treated as wholly independent in their origin, and supposed to have had a

<sup>1</sup> See Bousset, *op. cit.*, p. 585 f.      <sup>2</sup> *Im Namen Gottes*, Berlin, 1903.

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Erman, *Ägyptische Religion*<sup>2</sup>, p. 167 ff.

<sup>4</sup> In *Abraxas*, see esp., p. 201 ff.

<sup>5</sup> See his exhaustive article *Magia* in Daremberg et Saglio, *Dictionnaire des Antiquités*, vol. 3, part 2, pp. 1494-1521, and esp. p. 1505.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, pp. 14, 186, 189 note 1.



share in moulding, e.g., the thought of St. Paul. Gnostic communities must as frequently have been the channels for diffusing Christian ideas as for the propagation of Hellenic or Oriental doctrines.

When we speak of the accessibility of Judaism to contemporary religious syncretism the remarkable figure of Philo inevitably stands out before us. For, in the light of our present discussion, it is scarcely legitimate to regard him, with some scholars,<sup>1</sup> as an isolated phenomenon. It is true that Alexandrian Judaism had no transforming effect on the Jews of the Diaspora. But Philo is a crucial example of a Jewish religious thinker, in whom diverse strains of thought and feeling, both inherited and acquired, are curiously amalgamated. The most common estimate of him is that of an extravagant allegoriser of the Old Testament, concerned above all else to make the Divine revelation given through Moses square completely with Greek philosophy. But the atmosphere of his allegorical activity is often ignored. Allegory, he describes as dear to *ὁρατικοῖς ἀνδράσιν*, "men of vision."<sup>2</sup> Reitzenstein gives good reasons for believing that the term *ὁρατικοί*, in Philo, is virtually equivalent to *πνευματικοί* or *γνωστικοί*, those who attain to the real vision of God.<sup>3</sup> And here we come at once into the circle of mysticism. Indeed Philo addresses those who reach the highest kind of knowledge as *μύσται κεκαθαρμένοι τὰ ὄψα*, and he beseeches them to receive it as *ἱερὰ μυστήρια*.<sup>4</sup> That these are not merely artificial terms taken over from the language of the mysteries is evident from his appeal to the soul. "If a yearning come upon thee to have share in Divine blessedness . . . escape

<sup>1</sup> E.g., Bousset, *op. cit.*, p. 501.

<sup>2</sup> *De Plantatione*, 36 (ed. C.W.).

<sup>3</sup> *Die Hellenistischen Mysterien-Religionen*, pp. 144-146.

<sup>4</sup> *De Cherubim*, 48 (ed. C.W.).

from thyself and go out of thyself (ἐκστηθὶ σεαυτῆς) in a Bacchic frenzy and divinely inspired like those who are possessed and filled with Corybantic delirium.”<sup>1</sup> Here is genuine ἔκστασις. And there can be no doubt that Philo speaks from personal experience. “At times, coming to my work empty, I have become suddenly full, ideas being sown upon me in showers from above, so that by divine possession I am in a condition of frenzy (κορυβατιᾶν) and ignorant of everything, the place, the company, myself, what was spoken, what was written. For I received a flow of interpretation [so Markland], an enjoyment of light, a vision of piercing clearness.”<sup>2</sup> Unquestionably Platonic and Stoic influences are discernible in Philo’s ecstatic mysticism. But there are elements closely akin to the prophetic ecstasy of the Old Testament. And side by side with these strains may be traced the influence of mystery-religions.

We have restricted this brief discussion of Philo to the single feature of his mystic ecstasy, partly because it suggests a parallelism with certain phenomena in the religion of Paul, and partly because it discloses as its core and kernel a genuine personal experience, which may, of course, be expressed in terms belonging to the religious syncretism of his age, but which cannot be completely explained either from the Platonic-Stoic influence of Posidonius or from the mystery-doctrines of Hellenised Egyptian theology.

H. A. A. KENNEDY.

<sup>1</sup> *Quis Rer. Div. Heres*, 69 (ed. C.W.). See Bousset, *op. cit.*, p. 517 note 2, for an interesting list of terms in Philo associated with ecstatic experiences.

<sup>2</sup> *De Migratione Abrahæ*, 35 (ed. C.W.). Additional striking references in Bréhier, *Les Idées Philosophiques et Religieuses de Philon*, who gives a luminous account of Philo’s conception of ecstasy and prophetic inspiration, pp. 188–200, but lays stress far too exclusively on the Platonic character of his mysticism.

*THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE  
PRESENT DAY.*

XV. SIN AS A FORCE AND POWER OVER MAN.

As regards the relation between God and man we are always encountered by the difficulty both of expressing and of understanding its nature. This relation is, obviously and necessarily, a unique thing in the universe of our knowledge. There is not, and there cannot be, any other relation similar to it; we cannot aid understanding by comparing it with anything else; and all metaphors fail to fit the conditions fully. Like everything else that concerns God, this relation of man to Him has to be perceived by direct intuition, or, as Paul would put it, through the power of faith, which is for us "a conviction of things not seen." <sup>1</sup> Just as we recognise and know through faith that God is and that God is good, without being able to demonstrate by logical argument that either axiom is true, so we recognise and know that, as was pointed out in the previous Section, mere increase in the distance that separates man from God, or (to use our other form of expression) increasing unlikeness of man to God, does not remain a mere abstract proposition but becomes a force or power acting on the will in such a way as to weaken the sympathy of the human for the Divine nature, to lessen in man the power of recognising the Divine character and purpose, and to enfeeble the desire of man for reunion with God.

If we are challenged to prove this assertion that increase of distance from God becomes a power of evil, we cannot demonstrate it. It is involved in the nature of our relation to God. We feel it and we know it. It is an ultimate or

<sup>1</sup> Hebrews xi. 1.

primary fact from which we have to start. In Pauline language, we live by faith alone.

This truth, however, is simply another form of the axiom that God is good: He is good because He draws man to Him naturally. Like seeks to like through a sort of attractive power which the one exerts on the other; and the lesser, i.e. man, moves towards the greater, i.e. God. Such is the natural fact, or the purpose of God, which acts and is so long as man has not lost his simple and natural character. Yet even this metaphorical expression that "like draws to like" is utterly inadequate as a statement of the relation: it is only a figurative description which in some degree helps comprehension, but it is both incomplete and positively inaccurate in some important respects.

The term, "attractive force," then, is merely another metaphor by which we attempt to express the relation between the Creator and the created. The righteous action is the actualising of this force; and the performance of such an action makes the power stronger, so that we feel righteousness as a force in us, in which the force of faith is merged. The two become indistinguishable in fact, though distinguishable in language. Such is the nature of this force and the law of its action.

It is only another side of the same law and nature, which rules and constitutes righteousness, that the failure to perform the righteous act—which is tantamount to the performance of the unrighteous act in the supposed situation—not merely weakens the force attracting the individual to God, but actually brings into existence a counter-force, the power of evil, which tends to draw the individual away from God, to intensify his unlikeness towards God, to increase continuously his distance from God.

These various ways in which we have attempted to state



the nature of sin are merely metaphors drawn from human experience to aid comprehension, and not philosophical definitions. Sin, therefore, is a force and a power, not simply a fact. When we speak of sin widening the distance from God, that metaphor is insufficient to suggest that sin thereby strengthens itself and establishes its hold on the man's will. Such, however, is the law according to which this failure to do righteously works: it is not a mere negation, it is more than simple non-righteousness. It is, or it becomes, the power of evil ruling the will of man.

Yet for this we have no more proof than there was for the previously stated axioms, or rather forms of the same axiom. Such we know: such we perceive: the experience of the world in past history and in contemporary life is inexplicable otherwise.

Hence arose the intensity of Paul's hatred for sin. This hatred is his heritage from his Hebrew ancestry, from the past history of his people, from the dealings of God with the forefathers. It was a flame burning more intensely in him than in other Jews, because his native power was stronger; but it was a purely Jewish force, and utterly unlike anything Hellenic.

The Jews in Paul's time began life on a higher moral platform than the Gentiles. The Law had been a stern and salutary master (*paidagogos*), forcing them onwards in some degree, but unable to force them beyond a certain point: they could not obey it completely: it was a yoke imposed as an external thing: it was not able to produce real righteousness, but only the semblance of righteousness, because the acts which it enforced did not spring from the free will of the individual, i.e. from the Divine element in him seeking of its own initiative towards the Divine end. Hence the act, which was outwardly



right, did not result in sufficiently vitalising and strengthening within the man that force which is righteousness.

Yet this action according to the Law, although it could not make the individual man righteous, did produce an effect on the nation, and so ultimately on the individual through the nation. It produced a national righteousness, in other words a national standard of judgment according to the knowledge of moral principle, which was embodied in the law. It developed conscience and the consciousness of sin through the fact that the prohibition of sin stood always placarded before the nation in the law.<sup>1</sup> It is a true fact of psychology that such a national standard of judgment about sin, and such a national conscience, may be developed by generations of contemplation of a moral law; and the modern phrase "the Nonconformist conscience" attests the result as a historical fact in a living instance.

This national conscience, and this national standard of righteousness, produces a powerful effect on the individual member of the nation. He commonly has the national righteousness, being pushed forward to it by the compulsion of social requirements. This national or racial righteousness in a person, for which social compulsion and not the will and character of that person is responsible, may be described metaphorically as static, not dynamic righteousness. It does not remake the individual. It does not recreate and reinvigorate his nature. He is not born again. Commonly, its effect is to make him more self-satisfied, more complacent, less conscious of the Divine.<sup>2</sup> Only

<sup>1</sup> "I had not known sin except through the law," Romans vii. 7. "Through the law cometh the knowledge of sin," Romans iii. 20. Compare Romans vii. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Romans x. 3, "Being ignorant of God's righteousness, and seeking to establish their own, they (i.e. the Jews living according to the law and the national righteousness) did not subject themselves to the righteousness of God."

dynamic righteousness, which springs from the individual striving towards reunion with God, can make him a new man; and such righteousness cannot come except through the force of faith, which is a possession of the individual soul.

The national righteousness, of which we have been speaking, has many advantages. When the individual falls short of it, he is conscious that he is untrue to the national character. This consciousness that one is falling below the national standard continues so long as the law remains a living force in the race or in the individual. If the law comes to be felt only as a dead prescription of works, it ceases to be a master that forces the nation on towards its standard; and yet even then it has not lost all its power and usefulness.

Paul always felt that the Jews, even though they were not gaining true righteousness through the law, were starting on a higher standard of judgment and knowledge than the ordinary Gentiles. "I bear them witness that they have a zeal for God, but not according to a right intuition."<sup>1</sup> It is much to have this zeal for God; but the zeal requires to be guided by a right perception of His nature and of man's relation to Him through Christ. Without that perception the Jews, in the issue, set up their own instead of the righteousness of God.<sup>2</sup>

Accordingly, Paul, like other Jews of his time, started with the immense advantage of this strong hatred for sin and zeal for God. Sin kept him from God. He regarded the force and power of sin almost as a personal enemy: it was to him Satan.

Sin, even more than righteousness, can be national and racial. As we have just seen, that national righteousness,

<sup>1</sup> Romans x. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Romans x. 3, quoted in the last note but one.

though in itself a good thing, never attained to be the true dynamic righteousness in the highest sense of the term ; but sin that is national and inculcated through the national standard of judgment can be just as harmful, as dangerous, and as hostile to right, as when it proceeds from the individual initiative. Satan, the power of evil, can rule in a nation and set up his throne in its capital, and be all the more powerful and terrible in consequence. Then, in Paul's estimation, the political and social conditions, whether Imperial or municipal, which impeded his work of spreading the Gospel, were hindrances put in his way by Satan, the enemy.

Whether, or how far, Paul considered Satan as literally and strictly a personal being, must remain uncertain. He had not entirely freed himself from a lingering belief in "principalities and powers" intermediate between God and man ; and thus, on the one hand, it was easy for him to believe in such a purely evil power, subordinate to God, while on the other hand through the stimulus of his intense hatred for sin it was also easy for him to fall into the use of metaphorical or half metaphorical language, picturing the power of sin as a personal being whom he could abominate, and against whom he could more easily rouse in his pagan correspondents the same intense hatred that he himself cherished. Strong emphasis is in Paul often due rather to emotion than to intellect, even in cases where the subject and the purpose seem to be properly intellectual. The emphasis is not so much intended to enforce attention on the part of his readers, as forced out of him by the intense passion of his own convictions, which were not matter of cool intellectual assent, but ruled his whole emotions and the depths of his nature. Thus, however his language about Satan may suggest in some cases a personal enemy, I would not venture to assert that this implies an

intellectual belief in the existence of such a personal power.

After all, Paul was before everything a preacher and a missionary. To him the first and supreme duty was to make his converts hate sin and love righteousness ; and it was far more important to make them dread and detest a personal Satan than to lead them into philosophical speculation about the purpose of God in permitting sin and about the whole problem of evil. If they began to theorise about the purpose of God in a creation of which evil forms a part, and about the necessity which imposed itself on the Creator, as a condition of creative action, to leave open the possibility of evil, i.e. separation from God, such vague and profitless theorising, and the logomachies which would arise out of them, could only distract them from the first business of their life, viz. to be good ; and that danger was already apparent to Paul, incipient in the Corinthians, more advanced in the Colossians, and fully developed in the Asian churches when he wrote to Timothy.

#### XVI. THE FIRST ADAM AND THE SECOND ADAM.

How largely the idea of racial sin bulked in the mind of Paul appears in his treatment of the man Adam, and the primal sin which Adam committed and whose effects "the second Adam" obliterates. "Through one man"—viz. Adam, whose perfectly historical character as the first-created man Paul unquestioningly assumes—"sin entered into the world, and death through sin ; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned." <sup>1</sup> The way to salvation was closed by Adam, and reopened by Jesus as "the second Adam."

The first man was the first sinner ; and thus death, which is the wages or consequence of sin, began, and has ever since continued to reign in the world. As Dr. Denney says,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Romans v. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Commentary on Romans v 12.



“ Paul uses ‘ death ’ to convey different shades of meaning in different places, but he does not explicitly distinguish different senses of the word ; and it is probably misleading rather than helpful to say that in one sentence (here, for example) ‘ physical ’ death is meant, and in another (vii. 24 e.g.) ‘ spiritual ’ death. The analysis is foreign to his mode of thinking. All that ‘ death ’ conveys to the mind entered into the world through sin.” He adds that in the second part of verse v. 12 Paul explains “ the universality of death ” : it rests upon the universality of sin.

For us, however, who are attempting to rethink in modern terms the thought of Paul, it is absolutely necessary to attempt to distinguish in the process of our thought what side of the idea “ death ” should be determining and dominant in our mind, when we re-form or re-express a Pauline principle. Paul, as Dr. Denney says, never consciously defined to himself, or thought of defining, the different senses in which he seems to use the word : he had the whole idea “ death ” in his mind, when he used the word. Yet, when he speaks of “ death ” as the wages of sin and as the lot of the wicked, he must have been conscious that this death is something different from its appearance as a stage in the path of righteousness, or even as the earthly end of that path.<sup>1</sup> “ For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain ” : this “ death ” is not the lot of the wicked : it is simply a process in the transformation of his body into the spiritual body like that of Christ. So when he says, “ I through the law died unto the law that I might live unto God,” he regards the death through which he passed as the end of the older stage in his experience and the entrance on the new life : through death he enters on life.

<sup>1</sup> John's phrase “ the second death ” may perhaps indicate a certain consciousness, common in the early Church, that the word has more than one meaning, Rev. ii. 11, xx 6, 14, xxi. 8.



In this passage, Romans v. 12, he seems to regard "death" as the removal from God, the final exclusion from God, the definite separation from God, which is consummated at the physical death, but has been going on throughout the career of sin. This is the "second death" of which John speaks.

His words in Romans v. 12, however, have been interpreted as an assertion that all men sinned in Adam and fell with Adam. What does this mean? Why should we now be punished in respect of anything that Adam has done, or rewarded in virtue of anything that Jesus has done? That is a question which rises first in any human mind; but the question is wrongly put, and the point of view implied in it is false. Paul does not say that all men are punished because Adam sinned, or because they were made guilty in Adam's guilt, but that all men, in proportion as (or because) all have during their own life sinned,<sup>1</sup> are punished through the death which began with Adam.

The sin of Adam inflicted incalculable injury on the human race, not by implicating all men in itself, but by involving them in its consequences. Such is the fact of the world: such is the experience of life: such is the law of nature. Every day it is exemplified. The innocent suffer from the sins in which they have no share. The nation as a whole may be ruined by the folly or the crime of one man. This is the fact to which we must accommodate our life, and from which we must start in our philosophy. Paul saw in it the opening for the grace and kindness of God to show itself. If we suffer through the sin of the first Adam, it is in order that the second Adam may have scope for the

<sup>1</sup> "On the ground that," or "in the proportion that," seems to be the strict sense of ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον. "On condition that" is the most typical sense of ἐφ' ᾧ, and the use here naturally arises out of that, and is nearly identical in force with it. Death got power over them on condition that they sinned.

infinite power and mercy by which He rescues all men, and justifies the Divine plan.

In the first place, Adam is the typical man, i.e. a fair and typical specimen of the genus man : not less, but if anything more favourably situated than the ordinary man. With every advantage, with no inherited taint, he failed, and with him all men fail, because it is impossible that they should succeed where he could not succeed. Subsequent generations of men have in themselves less chance of success than he, because they are born and nurtured amid surroundings already corrupted. Paul holds fast by the old Hebrew doctrine that the children suffer in the sin of their parents for generations. Sin affects society, brings disease, physical and moral, into the nation, causes a racial deterioration through which the descendants of Adam have all suffered. History is the record of the stages through which the initial disobedience to law has worked out its consequences. Social and medical science trace the laws according to which those consequences are worked out. Adam is the test case : such is Paul's view. If he failed, none of his descendants can succeed through their own effort and initiative.

In the second place, if it be objected that this was an insufficient test, and therefore unfair, that objection misses Paul's meaning. Paul does not rest his argument simply on the one test case of Adam. He appeals to all history and experience. Throughout the whole passage, i. 18-iii. 20, he has laboured to prove that all have sinned, and failed to attain righteousness ; and in v. 12 he briefly sums up that proof in the phrase " for that all have sinned."

His purpose in v. 12 is not to argue that all are guilty of sin in virtue of Adam's primal sin, but that, as death came over all men through Adam's sin, so life becomes the portion open to all men through Christ's triumph in death over death.

Reference to Paul's words elsewhere makes this quite plain. Compare 1 Corinthians i. 21 : "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." In this chapter of Romans the same statement is repeated in the immediate sequel : v. 15, "By the trespass of the one the many died" ; v. 17, "By the trespass of the one death reigned through the one." Men all die with Adam, because all sin : i.e. men all fail to attain righteousness, and need a Saviour.

Since the typical and representative man failed, and human nature is thus shown to be in its own power incapable of resisting sin, the only cure lies in another representative man, who triumphs over sin. This second typical man is Jesus : He must be in the fullest sense man, otherwise His case will not prove anything for other men or help them in any way : He stripped Himself of His high position and became the representative man ; and He proved what men can attain to in virtue of the Divine nature which is in them. That is an essential part of Paul's teaching, that there is this Divine element in man, which can grow until it dominates his whole nature. What man needs is some force to start him on the course of growth towards the truth. As we have already seen, Paul finds this force simply in Faith, in the belief that it can be done because Christ has shown that it can. For that growth towards the truth it is necessary that the man should, as Paul expresses it, die to sin : i.e., he must cease to move on in the way towards sin, and begin to move in the opposite direction towards righteousness. The beginning to do this is already accepted as salvation : the seed that is planted contains in it already the mature tree. The man who has believed in the possibility has got the driving force which will impel him on in the course, hard as it is ; and this force is the fact that Jesus died for each individual man,

separate and single, and by dying to the world of transience and mutation resumed His Divine personality.

The appearance of Jesus as a figure in human history does not bring the Divine nature nearer to man. It only brought the Divine nature within the cognizance of human faculties and perceptive powers ; thus this event seemed to bring God closer to man, because it made the cognizance of God by man easier.

So far as I can understand the thought of Paul, he assumes this as fundamental truth. Jesus becomes real to us, a real power for us, only in so far as the belief in the power of His death enters into us and becomes part of our living self with the force that a great idea and an intense enthusiasm exert on the nature and action of the man who feels them. Ultimately He becomes, through the progress of our spiritual life, the whole of our living self : " it is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me." The human self and the human nature is identified with the Divine nature, and yet the human personality and self-identity remain. This is eternal life in Paul's doctrine. This is salvation.

#### XVII. THE OPENING OF FIRST CORINTHIANS XIII.

I may be pardoned at this point for digressing from the proper order of treatment.

His Excellency Dr. Harnack's study of the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, the Hymn of Heavenly Love,<sup>1</sup> of which the first part appears, in an authorised translation from the Berlin *Sitzungsberichte*, in this number of the EXPOSITOR, is a work of the highest interest. Beginning after the thoroughgoing and methodical German fashion

<sup>1</sup> This name is applied to the chapter in the writer's *Pictures of the Apostolic Church*, 1910, p. 232 (published 1909 in the *Sunday School Times*). I took it from Spenser's "*Hymn of Heavenly Love*."



from a minute study of text and words, it moves onward to a broad and lofty survey of religious thought ; and in the discussion of the words used by the Apostle it sometimes throws a brilliant light on his thought and on his outlook over the world and man and God. One hardly ventures to praise a writer who stands so high as Dr. Harnack. We learn from him, and are thankful to him ; but he stands as a classic, above the level of mere laudation. One learns method and nobility of thought from studying him, even when differing from some detail in his interpretation ; and the result is to strengthen our conviction that Paul is, in one way, the greatest among those who interpreted to men the religion of Jesus, and that we never understand the Apostle rightly until we take him on the highest moral plane to which human nature is capable of rising.<sup>1</sup>

The title Hymn is naturally applied by every reader to this chapter, *das hohe Lied von der Liebe*. It is not written in plain prose. It has the measured stately movement and rhythm of a Hymn. We notice that when Paul's religious emotion rises to the highest pitch, it has a certain note of enthusiasm—in the literal sense of the Greek word, possession by the Divine power—which tends to impart to the verbal expression a rhythmic flow. This Dr. Harnack brings out by printing the Greek text and his own German rendering in shorter verses and in three longer measures. It is especially when he speaks of the unspeakable and illimitable kindness of God or His love to men that Paul's expression casts itself in a lyric form. Hence the renewed study of 1 Corinthians xiii. only deepens our conviction that the lyrical tone of 1 Timothy iii. 16 springs out of the heart of the writer, and is not due to the verse being

<sup>1</sup> *Pauline and Other Studies*, p. 38.



quoted from a contemporary hymn.<sup>1</sup> Amid marked diversity on the surface the deep-lying psychological resemblance in nature between the Epistles to Timothy and the earlier letters of Paul is the most powerful argument that they are all the work of one mind and heart.<sup>2</sup>

The Hymn, as Dr. Harnack says, stands in close relation to the needs and defects of the Corinthian character; and yet rises far above any individual and personal reference to a perfectly universal expression of the nature of God and His relation to men. The quality of which the Hymn sings "embraces the most comprehensive and the strongest kind of good-will to all men, a deep and burning desire to seek after the progress of the race and the benefit of every individual with whom we are brought into relations; it develops the side of our nature in which we can approximate nearest to the Divine nature, because it is the human counterpart of the feeling that God entertains to man."<sup>3</sup>

That is the invariable character of Paul's letters. He never applied superficial remedies to mere external symptoms. He treated the failing or evil in a congregation as the outward effect of a deep-seated want or misapprehension to which all human nature is exposed; and he tried to raise the Church to a higher view of life by purifying and elevating their conception of the Divine nature. The only way in which a merely individual and external treatment comes into play is when penalty and punishment must be applied: this is apportioned according to the individual circumstances. Otherwise he treats all errors by moral and religious principles, which are absolutely universal in their application.

<sup>1</sup> If there was such a hymn, it is more likely to have been founded on Paul than quoted by him.

<sup>2</sup> EXPOSITOR, April, 1912, p. 359.

<sup>3</sup> *Pictures of the Apostolic Church*, p. 230.

I may be permitted, in gratitude for what I have learnt from Dr. Harnack's study of this *Hohe Lied*, to add some remarks on three points. In the first I am obliged to differ from him, not I think in a contrary direction, but rather through proceeding further in the same direction and thus appreciating more highly the beauty of Paul's tone. In the other matter, where he compels perfect assent, my aim is to proceed to certain arguments about the authorship of the Pastoral Epistles. Amid the differences which divide those Epistles from the earlier letters of Paul, there reigns a psychological unity and a real identity of originating heart, which prove the authorship; and Dr. Harnack's exposition of the Hymn recalls to my mind analogous phenomena in the Pastorals.

I. Dr. Harnack is fully justified in laying much stress on the transition by which Paul passes from the general exposition to this lyric and emotional Hymn, and in studying closely the manner in which the passage is effected in the last verse of chapter xii. This throws a strong light on Paul's character, and on the tact and delicacy of his dealing with the Corinthians. As to one point, however, of xii. 31 in Dr. Harnack's interpretation I regret to be unconvinced by his arguments: a view diverse from his seems to place Paul's thought and tone and method on a higher level. Westcott and Hort here differ from him in placing the paragraph division in the middle of xii. 31, and incorporating the second clause of that verse in the Hymn, ch. xiii.; whereas he (like most scholars) connects closely the two clauses of xii. 31 (in which he seems to me to be right).

According to the interpretation of xii. 31, for which Dr. Harnack contends, Paul places his own "super-excellent way" in marked contrast with the Corinthian way. The Corinthians admire spiritual "gifts," and eagerly desire

them as the crown of the Christian career; but Paul, on the contrary, advises these young converts rather to admire and strive after the Christian virtues, and indicates this to them as a more excellent way than theirs of leading the Christian life.

Such a pointed and strong contrast between the Corinthian and the Pauline way seems, however, not to be in harmony with Paul's tone in this part of his letter. He here studiously suppresses his own individuality, makes light of his own merits, and avoids anything that could seem like pressing his way on the Corinthians or depreciating their way. Anything of that kind is out of keeping with the tone of chap. xiii. The delicate and gracious courtesy which lights up this part of the letter is quite remarkable. By a skilful use of the first and the third person he avoids suggesting either that the Corinthians are lacking in love (though their want of it prompts the praise of its excellence and necessity) or that he himself possesses love. "All hint of fault is put in the first person singular": if I have every merit and good action, but have not love, I am valueless. On the other hand, where he in positive terms praises the quality of love, he avoids the first person singular, lest this should seem like a claim to the possession.<sup>1</sup> There is no trace of the irony, subtle and polished and gentle as it is, that rules in chaps. i.-iv. The time for that has passed, or perhaps one should rather say the Apostle's mood has changed.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Pictures of the Apostolic Church*, p. 232 f.

<sup>2</sup> That the longer Epistles of Paul were written, not at a single effort, but in parts with some interval between each, seems to me to be the explanation of many of the phenomena in both First and Second Corinthians. A dictated Epistle, which treats of such varied topics in a tone so lofty and legislative and philosophic, was thought out in sections. This was stated in my *Historical Commentary on Corinthians*, §§ xxxix.-xliv. (Expositor, March, 1901, pp. 220 ff.). This might be illustrated from Spen-

Paul sees what is lacking in the Corinthians' spirit and conduct; but he does not, as yet, criticise or find fault with their way. He merely praises what is good in their way, but gradually leads them up to a higher level of judging and acting.

There is in xii. 31 no comparison, no direct contrast between Paul's way and theirs. The adverbial expression, *καθ' ὑπερβολήν*, which at first sight appears rather awkward as attached to a noun, is carefully chosen to avoid any suggestion of contrast. The connexion is made by "and," not by "but"; only the *ἔτι* imparts to the "and" a touch of hesitation and pondering: "and still, along with the excellence of your conduct in desiring eagerly the gifts, you should always remember that there is a way, a super-excellent way," viz. the way of love, which is then described in the Hymn.

Like the introduction of the Hymn, so is the conclusion, xiv. 1, with which Paul resumes his didactic exposition in plain prose. "Pursue love; hunt it as a hunter seeks his prey, determined to get it; but strive after the spiritual gifts, and especially the gift of prophecy." Here, again, the two ways are mentioned side by side: both are worthy of eager desire: neither is recommended exclusively or even preferentially (unless *διώκειν* can be interpreted as a markedly stronger term<sup>1</sup> than *ζηλοῦν*). The parallel between xii. 31 and xiv. 1 is perfect, though the order must of course be reversed: in the introduction the way of

ser's first letter to Gabriel Harvey; Gregory Smith in his edition recognises that the end of the latter is written a week earlier than the beginning; but my friend Mr. J. C. Smith points out to me that the end of the letter was written and sent as a separate letter, and lost on the way, so that Spenser repeats it at the end of his new letter, after explaining the circumstances. The dates are 16 and 5 Oct. 1579.

<sup>1</sup> This suggestion can hardly be justified; both are strong and emphatic terms.



love has to be mentioned last, in the conclusion it is necessarily placed first.

Hence Paul does not use the comparative degree of an adjective ; he does not say " I will show you a more excellent way," for that would suggest a comparison of his own way with the Corinthian way. He does not even employ the definite article, for that form would suggest that he is showing "*the way*," the one true and supreme way. So perfectly chosen is the language here, that even the addition of " the " would spoil it. Dr. Harnack's interpretation misses this ; hence he is a little surprised at the omission of " the," and feels the want of the article to be rather awkward, and even points out that occasionally in Paul the article is omitted carelessly. On the contrary, the language here is so perfectly chosen that the smallest change would weaken the delicate effect.

We might attempt to express in rough modern words the run of the expression thus : " all the gifts of the spirit are good and desirable, each in its own way ; they are, however, diverse, and they vary in dignity, and men cannot possess them all : all cannot be prophets, or teach, or speak with tongues. But strive ye after the gifts in proportion to their worth. They are good. They are excellent. Be eager to attain them. And yet—and still—there is a super-excellent way, and this I show you in the Hymn.

The term " gifts " must therefore be understood in the same sense throughout chaps. xii.-xiv. It would be an obscurity very unlike Paul's style to pass in the middle suddenly to a different sense for the word, and then return to the former sense. The difficulty of his style arises from other causes : his reasoning moves with rapid and long steps which are not easily followed ; often he sees intuitively rather than reasons, giving an argument that seems to us arbitrary or far-fetched to justify his intuition ; but he



does not commonly operate with terms whose meaning he consciously changes completely back and forwards in the chain of his expression.

Still, if the supposition of such rapid change gave a better flow to the passage, we should have to accept it. We find, however, that it misinterprets the spirit and harmony of Paul's thought.

Against the uniformity for which we contend in the meaning of the term "gifts" throughout this passage, Dr. Harnack brings the objection that the Apostle, who has recently described the "gifts" as imparted by God according to His free will and choice, could hardly advise the Corinthians to "strive after" those same gifts. There is, however, no real inconsistency, it is only an apparent difference that is felt when one contemplates the situation with too narrowly logical a view. It is truly and perfectly consistent with the Pauline and the Christian philosophy to strive earnestly after the gifts of God: they are the free gift of God, imparted at His own will, and yet men may and should eagerly desire them and strive after them. Such is the nature of the Divine gifts and graces: such is the true relation of the Christian man to his God.

The common interpretation of xii. 31, which Dr. Harnack mentions, is rightly rejected by him: it is indefensible from every point of view, and fails to catch the gracious and lovely current of Paul's thought. As he says (and I assume that he is right in this: I have not read carefully their exegesis), almost all the commentators understand that, in the first clause of xii. 31, Paul advises the Corinthians to strive by preference after those spiritual gifts which serve best for edification, i.e. to prefer prophecy or teaching to *glossolalia*.

This is to be rejected for two reasons. In the first place it disregards the order and natural connexion of words:

ζηλοῦτε τὰ χαρίσματα suggests forthwith, "strive after the gifts"; then the addition of τὰ μείζονα (κρείττονα) gives an almost predicative sense, "according to their degree of excellence." The force is not to be regarded as if the words were equivalent to τὰ μείζονα χαρίσματα or τὰ μείζονα τῶν χαρισμάτων.

In the second place it is not the Apostle's purpose here to draw hard and fast distinctions, or to insist that the Corinthians should make *glossolalia* a secondary matter: what he means is that all gifts are good, and should be sought after in proportion to their goodness. By his form of expression he leaves open for the moment the possibility that some may be better than others; that topic will come later. Yet even when in xiv. 1-4 he gives the preference to prophecy over speaking with tongues, he immediately adds in xiv. 5, "I wish you all to speak with tongues, but still more that you should prophesy." This is just a re-emphasising of xii. 31a, and xiv. 1; but now, after the distinction has been drawn in xiv. 2-4, the statement of the thought becomes more definite and precise: "All gifts, however, are good: *glossolalia* is good: my wish is that you should all have that gift, but still more that you should have the power of prophecy as a higher and greater gift."

This gradual movement towards definiteness about these gifts is evident, when xii. 31a is correctly interpreted. The movement continues through xiv. 12 "since ye are eager strivers after spiritual gifts, seek that you may be rich unto the edifying of the church," to xiv. 39 "strive after the power of prophecy, and forbid not to speak with tongues." Here prophecy alone is prescribed as an object to strive after; and *glossolalia* is "not forbidden." This is the climax.

The whole passage xii.-xiv. is concerned with the gifts of the spirit; with infinite courtesy and tenderness Paul

tries to raise the Corinthians' minds to a higher outlook and a nobler aspiration. In the middle of this passage it is not allowable to interpret "the gifts" once in a totally different sense as the fundamental Christian virtues.

All that I have said regarding the delicacy of Paul's attitude towards the Corinthians' way would be falsified, if Weiss's view were correct that already in xii. 29 f. Paul "has reproved and found fault with the Corinthians' habit of ambitiously striving after the higher gifts."<sup>1</sup> This meaning I cannot gather from Paul's words. Weiss introduces into xii. the depreciation of one gift (not of all gifts), which is expressed in xiv.; and he expresses this gentle, delicate depreciation in harsh and strong language, which has no resemblance to, and no justification in, the kindly, yet emotional, words of the letter. It would be quite justifiable if Weiss expressed his own opinion about the Corinthians in the language that best suited the strength of his feeling; but he is here giving a *résumé* of Paul's words. One feels obliged to say that the exegesis of Paul which expresses in such strong, sledgehammer style the courteous and gracious language of the Apostle is dooming itself beforehand to misunderstand Paul's attitude.

II. Dr. Harnack's defence (which, in the present writer's opinion, is perfectly successful and conclusive) of the reading *καυχῆσθαι* in verse 3, is one of the most delightful and illuminative things that I have ever read about the character of Paul. It shows us the great Apostle in his relation to the Pharisaic and Judaic view of life; it illustrates the influence which the strictly Pharisaic way of thinking exercised on his mind, and his invariable custom of taking that thought on the highest level of which it is capable; and,

<sup>1</sup> Nachdem er soeben das ehrgeizige Streben nach höheren Gaben zurückgewiesen und gemahnt hat . . . (v. 29 f.).

finally, it lets us trace his triumphant emergence from the Pharisaic view to a still higher level.

This gradual victory over Pharisaism—in other words, the whole life of Paul in his relation to the Pharisaic mode of thinking—might be illustrated at greater length; the path which Dr. Harnack has here indicated might be followed throughout a wide range of ideas; but I here refer to it only in order to draw an inference from it. Without intending it, Dr. Harnack's exposition makes it easy to see why an idea like this, which is in Paul's letters so frequently expressed by the verbs *καυχάομαι*, *ἐγκανυχάομαι*, and the nouns *καύχῃσις*, *καύχημα*, never occurs in the Pastoral Epistles.

Those Epistles differ as regards vocabulary from the other letters, not merely in using many words not found in the letters, but also to some extent in making little employment of certain ideas and words which are much more frequently used in the earlier letters. None of those four Greek words, which occur fifty-five times in Paul's earliest eight letters, are found in the three Pastorals.

Now, to quote Dr. Harnack's own words, "the Pharisaic fashion of thinking was fundamentally amended by Paul, until he at last did away with it entirely." It is true that this group of words is absent from the Pastorals; but also it is the case that none of them occur in Colossians, and there is only a single occurrence in Ephesians.

The Apostle was naturally most prone to use this form of expression where he was most on the defensive, and where he was recommending and fortifying against attack his own conception of the Gospel: therefore the words are most frequent in Second Corinthians. The same way of contemplating his own life was exemplified in the opening words of his *Apologia* before the Sanhedrin—an *Apologia* which was never completed—see Acts xxiii. 1, where



there is the expression of a strong and self-confident, almost thoroughly Pharisaic *καύχημα*, though the word itself is not used. If his action were attacked he would defend it, and with good reason glory in the purity of his motives and conduct. Yet, as he grew older, he rose above this way of defence, and used it and the words which express it less and less.

These words are almost wholly confined to Paul in the New Testament. Besides him James thrice uses them, once in the Pharisaic good sense (i. 9), and twice in the bad sense (iv. 6) : James too had something of the markedly Judaic character. In Hebrews also the noun *καύχημα* is once used ; but only as a synonym and completion of *παρρησία*, which precedes, limits and defends it.<sup>1</sup>

This word *παρρησία*, denoting freedom in expression and thought, is the Christian term and idea, which is characteristic of the later books in the New Testament. It originates as a Christian term with Paul, being used by him both in the noun and the derived verb *παρρησιάζομαι*. In First Thessalonians ii. 2 the verb is employed in a somewhat hesitating way, conjoined with *λαλεῖν*, "we used freedom . . . to speak to you the Gospel." In Ephesians vi. 20 the verb is used more freely "to speak boldly (as I ought to speak)"; and Luke in the Acts uses the verb frequently<sup>2</sup> in this sense, catching it from the lips of Paul. The verb is Pauline and Lukan. The noun occurs regularly in the later Pauline letters, Second Corinthians twice, Ephesians twice, Philippians, Philemon, First Timothy. It is also a characteristic word in Luke<sup>1</sup> and still more in John (both in the Gospel nine times and in the first Epistle four times).

<sup>1</sup> Hebrews xxx. 6, ἐὰν τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ τὸ καύχημα τῆς ἐλπίδος μέχρι τέλους βεβαίαν κατέσχωμεν.

<sup>2</sup> Only in Acts, not in the Gospel, where he was under the influence of the earlier tradition : the noun occurs once in Mark viii. 32.



The mere statement of the facts shows how, in harmony with Paul, the language that expressed to the Church the Christian ethics lifted itself above the Pharisaic standpoint. The word *παρρησία* is entirely free from the unpleasing connotation of *καύχησις*. The latter carries with it the suspicion of self-confidence: Paul himself feels this, and apologises for the word and the idea of *καύχησις* in Second Corinthians xii. 1 and 5. It commonly has degenerated in Greek speech and acquired a thoroughly bad sense: in Second Corinthians x. 13 and Ephesians ii. 9 there is the suggestion that such degeneration is possible, while in First Corinthians v. 6 the degeneration is actually exemplified. Regularly, however, the word has in Paul the better sense vindicated for it by Dr. Harnack in the Hymn, verse 3. In James iv. 16 the bad sense of *καύχησις* is complete. The word thus comes to connote much the same as *ἀλαζονία* or *κενοδοξία*: the latter is purely Pauline <sup>1</sup> (found twice, Phil. and Gal.), the former is found in James, in Romans, in First John, and in Second Timothy (each once). The development therefore is from the use in a good sense of a term that is readily capable and even suggestive of a bad sense to the full and proper distinction between the good and the bad sense by two contrasted terms, and the disuse of the doubtful word or the condemnation of it to the bad sense alone.

The language of the Pastorals stands in this matter on the level of the developed Christian usage. The question is whether there is reason to think that this level was attained in the lifetime of Paul, or not. If not, there would result a probability in favour of the opinion that the Pastorals cannot be the work of Paul; but, on the other hand, if it is probable that Paul himself gradually attained to this level, those Epistles would, so far as this matter is con-

<sup>1</sup> The noun and the adjective are lumped in the statistics.

cerned, retain the place which, in our opinion, properly belongs to them as the latest stage in the expression of his thought.

The statistics already quoted seem to place the answer beyond question. The middle Epistles approximate to this level, whereas the earlier are remote from it. Dr. Harnack's argument that Paul was gradually emancipating himself from the Pharisaic point of view, until he triumphed over it completely, is perfectly correct. The group of Epistles of the Captivity approximate to this level. Indeed, if we except Philippians, the three closely connected Asian Epistles come very near it, as there is only one occurrence in them of these words; but even in them the thought still lingers that *καύχσις* before the judgment of God is justifiable. This process is completed in the Pastorals; but the steps are clearly marked in the preceding Epistles and nearly completed in the latest of them. In this as in so many other matters we need the Pastorals to justify Paul, and to consummate our picture of him.<sup>1</sup>

III. In the Hymn we find that verses 4-7 are a good example of Paul's way of heaping together a long series of characteristics and modes of action in order to express the real nature of the topic which he is discussing. In doing so he employs a rich vocabulary, and exhibits great carefulness in regard to delicate shades of significance. Any one of these enumerations of a series of words shows the mind of the philosophically educated man. Only a person who has been accustomed to think much and to philosophise can practise such refinement in language. In such a list Paul's

<sup>1</sup> It should not be omitted that the argument of the great German scholar regarding this reading is a complete vindication of the skill and judgment applied by Westcott & Hort in the formation of their text. Alone among modern scholars (with the partial exception of Lachmann) they preferred *καυχῆσθαι* and placed it in the text, relegating *καυθήσθαι* to the Appendix as "Western and Syrian."

tendency also was to employ strange and rare words, or even to invent new words. It is a Pauline characteristic to be an innovator in language.

*χρηστεύομαι* is found only here in the New Testament, and in later Christian writers is probably taken from Paul. Dr. Harnack suggests that Paul derived it from a recension of Q, which was used and quoted by Clemens Alexandrinus.

*περπερεύομαι* is found only here in the New Testament : it is rare in Greek, as is the noun *περπερέα*.

*φυσιόω* is never used in the New Testament except by Paul, who has it six times in 1 Corinthians, and once in Colossians.

*ἀσχημονεῖν* is never used in the New Testament except twice in 1 Corinthians. In this place Dr. Harnack follows Clement of Alexandria, and rejects the sense "behave unseemly," which suits better the other occurrence of the word (vii. 36).

*παροξύνομαι* occurs only twice in the New Testament. The other instance is in Acts xvii. 16, where Luke uses it about Paul's indignation at the idolatry practised in Athens, probably catching it from the Apostle's own lips. The word was therefore probably a characteristic Pauline word, but it is only once found in his writings. Occasion to use it positively would be rare. Here alone there is a need to use it negatively.

*στέγειν*, used four times by Paul (twice in 1 Cor.) and not elsewhere in the New Testament, has its sense doubtful here : yet it is evidently a characteristic Pauline word like the three preceding.

In such a list Paul tends to refinement in language, he seeks out rare words, some of which remain peculiar to himself in the New Testament ; and of these some were characteristic of him at one stage of his life and in one letter,

Now, if one turns to the Pastorals one finds many such lists of qualities and characteristics. The subject lends itself to them. There also many of the words are rare, and found only once in the New Testament, or found only in one Epistle, or confined to that stage of Paul's life when he was writing the Pastorals. It was a Pauline characteristic to be an innovator and experimenter in a certain class of philosophic moral terms. This philosophy he was expounding to the world in terms that would be generally intelligible. The fact that the author of the Pastorals is an innovator and experimenter in language is no proof that he was not Paul, but rather affords psychologically a presumption that he was Paul, because he shares with Paul a certain deep-seated character.

W. M. RAMSAY.

## *PERSONALITY AND GRACE.*

### *V. A GRACIOUS RELATIONSHIP.*

GRACE, as we have interpreted it, is not a name for direct forces acting upon us impersonally and in no way requiring our personal consent any more than it requires our personal co-operation. It is on the contrary the personal relation of life to us whereby we can have a right personal relation to it, and of which the possibility of maintaining this right personal relation is the supreme evidence.

Direct forces may pass through the personality as through all created things. Yet, in so far as they are merely direct forces, they are not personal but only the material for personality. Therefore, in the strict sense, they are neither moral nor religious, but only experiences to which we ought to have a religious and moral relation. They are simply talents given to us, not really different from natural endow-

ments at the beginning of life because they are mystical endowments in the middle.

Conversion may be sudden and transforming and yet be exclusively moral and religious. Man's development is so irregular and incalculable because insight may bring him face to face with transforming realities which illumine for him his whole nature, and because there are many evils in it which can live only in the dark. The Divine righteousness and love are mighty in themselves and what seems to be weakness of moral fibre and slavery to habit may often be simply a refusal to suffer them to speak. We may not, therefore, limit either the extent or the suddenness of the change due to the hearing ear and the understanding heart, nor should we ascribe what is due to living in a new world to an unknown mystical change of nature.

But in so far as the change is purely mystical, it is not in itself either moral or religious. It is a new gift of disposition for morality and religion to use. No gift, however given, may be overlooked, and least of all those rapid regenerative experiences by which some lives are transformed. By looking at them more closely, we may find them rather the destruction of barriers which sin has placed round the true character, than any new creation. We may compare them with those cases of double consciousness in which psychology is interested, and which are doubtless explained by the one true consciousness ridding itself, as it were, of its mask. We may also find that the work of destruction, though sudden in its final effect, was the accumulated result of much moral struggle and spiritual aspiration. Yet the fact that it is an overpowering, transforming experience, not our work, but breaking in upon it, would not be altered. And it is difficult to believe that no more is involved. The miraculous seems to operate in the soul as nowhere else, and there are persons in whom a



mystical, overpowering, impersonal influence seems to be as much a new beginning as if they had been born with a different disposition.

The personality, like all created things, must work simply with what is given. The material of it must be forces independent of us and, so far as we are concerned, impersonal. Whether they operate only at the beginning, or are also active through life, does not alter the moral or religious meaning of these gifts.

The moral aspect is plainest. Such gifts form disposition, whereas only the use of them forms character. Wherefore, not with the gifts but with the disposing of them moral questions arise. If the disposition is largely and happily endowed, so that its possessor is naturally disposed to good, that is simply a large responsibility. No more than for a natural endowment of bodily strength, should there be moral approval for a purely mystical endowment of spiritual strength. As an object for moral complacency, it is merely a temptation, being just a talent which may be lodged with us useless or even for moral disaster. Until by personal use of it, it is built into character, it does not become part of our moral selves, and perhaps there is no clearer reminder that the moral self is a moral attainment and not merely a creation of power.

Morality is the pilot, not the stream, however favourable. Only a blind morality would deny that the moral life can be carried forward on such a stream, but only a rudderless morality would abandon itself to the most favourable current.

Religion, even more willingly than morals, admits the existence of direct, creative, and so far as we are concerned, purely mystical and impersonal forces. Like morality, it may also wish to find in them some relation to our past experience, for, while God is able of the stones to raise up

children to Abraham, what He does is to yearn after Abraham's actual seed. Yet religion cannot doubt that, in the last issue, our whole life, physical, mental, spiritual, rests on direct gifts of God. Gladly the religious soul ascribes all it is to God, and says with the Psalmist, "He has made us, and we are His."

Nevertheless, such gifts are not in themselves any more religious than they are moral. They only become religious as they help to make a spiritual relation to God possible. But a spiritual relation is to a Father, not a force. Only as we receive a gracious influence as part of a gracious relationship are we forwarded towards that end. As something which we trust to in itself, it might even be irreligious. To make the abundance of the grace given us the basis of our trust is no more good religion than to make it the basis of our character is good morals.

Wherefore, the theologian, no more than the moralist, should concern himself with the mysterious sources of life which he may not know, but should realise that his task is with the life itself as it is given. His business is not with the influx of grace—ecstatic, sacramental or evangelical, but with the Spirit of God's Son in the heart crying, Abba Father, and with the service of sons which makes that a reality.

Religion has not to do with a relation of grace at all, but with a gracious relationship. Its concern is not the unknown, impersonal basis of the spiritual personality, but the relation of that personality with all its possessions to God, the only perfect personality, their object as well as their source.

It will, then, appear that the question is not between a greater or less measure of grace, or between different kinds of grace, as if any of it were wholly common or any were wholly efficacious, but between a right and a wrong relation

to God. In the right relationship nothing is common, everything is efficacious, because, by consent of the heart, everything has become effective for our spiritual good ; and in the wrong relation everything is common, nothing is effective for good, even the most overwhelming mystical experience being capable of turning into spiritual pride and uncharitableness.

In that case the idea of assigning so much to man and so much to God cannot arise. It is manifestly all of God and none of it of man, but it is all the more of God that it is through ourselves. Every religious soul rejoices to know that all his succour is of God not man, of grace not works. But every religious soul also rejoices to know that God succours us by a personal relation, the essence of which is that it works by love not force, in which case its supreme benefit is the succour of the beloved. From lack of a better word, we may speak of gratitude to God as the fitting response, but it is only as a son is grateful to a father whose perfect parental relation to him has turned dependence on him from being an encroachment upon his own self-reliance and self-respect into the source of all his independence and mastery.

While, therefore, the theological doctrine of election expresses the supreme religious truth that all our confidence must be in God and none of it in ourselves, we can see that it fails to express the true religious faith, because it places our dependence upon God on the wrong issue. It does not concern itself with a gracious relation of God to us, but only with a relation of grace as a gift merely given. The grace it works with is irresistible precisely because it is impersonal. The God which is behind it is abstract omnipotence. But the essence of a gracious relation is that it is personal, which may in the end be equally irresistible, but only by first winning our response.

Grace as an irresistible gift of God is a straight line passing direct through the personality, whereas grace as a relationship is a curve which encircles and embraces it. That is only a figure, but it derives meaning from every personal relationship in which no gift which does not take the trouble to be first a human relationship is accounted a benefit. It must not only bestow its gift. It must also take the trouble to pass the gift through a personal relationship.

Like every curve, it has a concave and a convex side, seemingly contradictory, really complementary. It takes possession of us, yet sets us free ; makes us absolutely dependent, yet gives us independence of all things ; enables us to lose ourselves, yet truly and for the first time to find ourselves. In all its action it is a thing of seeming opposites. What the philosophers call an antinomy is at the heart of all its ways. And that is so of necessity, precisely because it must enable us to find ourselves in the real world by delivering us from ourselves in our own unreal world.

Nowhere does this more clearly appear than in the first response it asks from us. Though grace is just another name for the dealings of God's love, it does not begin by asking from us love but faith. That we may call its first antinomy. A doctrine of grace, indeed, should not operate directly with love at all.

To understand that method is to set out on the right road ; to misunderstand it is to set out on the wrong. To begin with love is to expect that grace will be an impersonal influx, not a gracious personal relationship. With Augustine we are made to regard love as a mysterious, almost a mechanical transformation of our hearts, what he calls a change in the substance of the soul, a simple influx of God into it. Religion ceases forthwith to be a sense of personal victory and becomes a trust in mysterious alien forces from which a new life may spring, but in a manner completely



detached from our present life, and with no moral relation to it.

Religion at once becomes a perilous mixture of an impersonal mysticism and a morality of law and merit. In practice that generally means a combination of a material sacramentarianism and a material asceticism. The reason is not difficult to find. Everything that works on us we must realise through some medium, if it is to take any place in our conscious life. If a mysterious mutation of our nature is our religious trust, then by some means we must consciously realise the fact. Grace, so conceived, having no necessary moral relationship to us, cannot be manifested simply in increased liberty and moral victory in our present lives. Being a direct, impersonal force, only a material medium can quite satisfy the mind, that being the natural channel of all direct forces. Hence the satisfying nature of a material sacramentarianism. But then some test of grace must be sought, some proof that it has really entered by this channel. That requires the idea of merit, which, to be of value as a test must be legally estimated, and, if possible, through visible acts of discipline and self-denial, displayed.

The end is a hesitating, but not humble, trust in our own goodness, a trust in the merit of our love to God which is not less harassing because we must wait till God chooses to implant it, of which fact we can never in the last issue be quite sure. The nightmare of legal merit rides the spirit still, which could not be if our trust were in the graciousness of God's love to us and not in the security of our love to God. The result is a wrong combination of religion and morality which is neither religious nor moral.

Know thyself might be good advice, if one could ever know his own spiritual state by self-contemplation. But of all the impossible things for us to know by introspection,



our love to God is the most elusive. For that there are two reasons. First, the thing we are looking for could not be love for the simple and sublime reason that love is precisely the thing which does not regard itself. Second, to begin by thinking of our gracious relation to life is to obscure from us life's gracious relation to us. To be sure that we are transformed into love would only make us more resentful of life's rude attack upon us who have already a right relation to it. What we need for our deliverance is the assurance that, in spite of our very ungracious relation to life, it has, underneath the frowning face it often wears, a gracious relation to us. Once we are persuaded of that, our own gracious relation to it ought to follow, whereas, without that, the emotion we call love, but which is not a response to anything we know, whether we regard it as our own work or God's, will only be a sentiment, which, when the rude assaults of life come upon it, will be no kind of succour, but, by turning our mind to our own perfect relation to life, make us even more troubled at life's imperfect relation to us.

JOHN OMAN.

### *THE POSITION OF THE TENT OF MEETING.*

It is well known that the passages relating to the position of the tent of meeting present great difficulties, and a theory has been formed to account for them. It is supposed that in one document (E) the tent of meeting stood outside the camp, and that the Ephraimite Joshua resided in it as a permanent priest, while in another (P) the tent was situated in the middle of the camp and was served by the Levitical priesthood. There is supposed to be a third document (J), but this does not mention the tent of meeting at all. It regards the ark as preceding the people on the march (at any rate sometimes), but it agrees with "P" as to the position of the ark in camp (Num. xiv. 44). Either therefore "E's" tent of meeting is not the abode of the ark or else "E" must differ from "J" and "P" as to the position of the ark. After prolonged study of the question I have found that various facts displace this theory, and also that the data point to another view as being correct.

1. A very important passage in "E," the document that (on the theory) locates the tent outside the camp, has been overlooked. This is Exodus xviii. That chapter by universal consent describes an episode that belongs to the end of the period spent at Horeb. It therefore refers to a later incident than Exodus xxxiii. 7-11, which is the first mention of the tent in "E." From verses 13-16 it appears that Moses sat as a judge with all the people standing about him because they came to him "to inquire of God." The presence of the people shows that the scene is laid in the middle of the camp. Yet this inquiry of God is the very business that was transacted in the tent outside the camp at the period to which Exodus xxxiii. refers, and at that time Moses was not surrounded by the people. On the

other hand, it will be noticed that Exodus xviii. is in entire agreement with "P," which also represents Moses as sitting at the door of its tent of meeting in the centre of the camp for the purpose of transacting judicial business. This passage seems to be fatal to the theory. In August, 1908, I asked an eminent continental adherent of the theory how he explained the fact that at the later date Moses was found transacting judicial business in "E" in the centre of the camp, surrounded by the people, contrary to the representation of "E" in Exodus xxxiii., and he could give me no answer. He promised to let me hear from him some day in reply, but no reply has reached me. I believe the point to be quite unanswerable by those who adopt the current critical hypothesis.

2. The R.V. rendering of Exodus xxxiii. 7 is incorrect. It should run: "And Moses used to take *a* (or the) tent and pitch it *for himself* without the camp, etc.," the Hebrew article being often used where English idiom requires the indefinite article. Now this proves decisively that we are not dealing with the abode of the ark, and also that Joshua was not its minister. It is inconceivable that Moses should have taken the shelter of the ark and removed it to a distance from the camp for his private use, leaving the ark itself bared and unguarded. If he had done so, Joshua could not have been in charge of the ark, seeing that he was in this tent, while the ark (*ex hypothesi*) remained alone in the camp. In point of fact the ark had not been constructed yet, and this passage of Exodus in no wise refers to it.

3. That Joshua was not a priest in "E" may be proved with certainty by the following facts: (a) In the book of Joshua the passages assigned to "E" show us "priests" who were quite distinct from Joshua himself and had charge of the ark. (b) In another passage of "E" Joshua, as Van Hoonacker has acutely pointed out, is not resident in

the Tent of Meeting, but has to be summoned thither with Moses (Deut. xxxi. 14). (c) "E" recognises the priesthood of Aaron and Eleazar (Deut. x. 6, cp. Joshua xxiv. 33). (d) It is not recorded that Joshua performed any priestly function whatever. The idea that he was a priest rests merely on inference from Exodus xxxiii. That passage only tells us that in the capacity of minister of Moses he used to remain in a tent pitched by Moses for himself on occasions when Moses left it, just as a modern private secretary might stay in his employer's study. There is no hint of his giving *torah* or burning incense or doing any other priestly work of any kind.

4. The only other passage which represents Joshua as present at the tent of meeting is Numbers xi. 28. The true meaning of the verse is doubtful; if he is there described as "one of his chosen men" that would make him one of the seventy elders, and in any case he would naturally be in attendance on his master Moses.

5. Numbers xi. 24-30, xii. distinguish between tent and camp, but in language which may just as well refer to the tent as being the centre of a hollow square formed by the encampments. These passages therefore are not decisive.<sup>1</sup>

For these reasons the theory must be rejected. What clues have we to guide us to a more satisfactory view?

1. Exodus xxxiii. 7-11 is manifestly out of place in its present context. It is therefore natural to try a transposition. It cannot stand at any later point because of the testimony of Exodus xviii. Therefore we must see if it can stand earlier.

2. In verse 11 the words "his minister Joshua the son of Nun, a young man" come strangely after the previous mentions of Joshua (Exod. xvii. 8-14, xxiv. 13, xxxii. 17).

<sup>1</sup> For detailed proof of this see *Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism*, pp. 100-102.

They would form a better introduction for his first appearance than any one of these passages. On the strength of his it has been suggested that Exodus xvii. 8-16 should stand later than it does at present, but to this there are several answers : (a) No such transposition could remove the difficulties created by the fact that xxiv. 13, xxxii. 17 at present precede xxxiii. 11 ; (b) Deuteronomy xxv. 17 f. shows that the Amalek episode should stand in its present early position ; (c) so does the mention of Rephidim in Exodus xvii. 8 ; (d) the words " then came Amalek " in the same verse suggest that the Amalekites were not very near their own territory, but had marched some distance to attack Israel. Consequently it would seem that it is Exodus xxxiii. 7-11 which must be transposed, not Exodus xvii. 8-16.

3. With Exodus xviii. removed to a later position the arrangement for the interim transaction of judicial business in xxiv. 14 seems strange. It would be natural that we should be told of the ordinary judicial arrangement first before learning of the exceptional procedure in a special emergency, but nothing has yet been said as to this. If, however, Exodus xxxiii. 7 ff. originally preceded this passage the strangeness disappears. *A priori* one would expect that some arrangements would have been made immediately on leaving Egypt. Exodus xxxiii. 7 f., xxiv. 14, xviii. in the order named give an intelligible and connected account of the original arrangements and their subsequent modifications to meet varying circumstances : in any other order they leave the mind in bewilderment as to the actual course of events and the causes for the successive changes. Let the experiment of reading them in this order be tried, and the natural sequence will be easily apparent.

4. There is only one earlier place where Exodus xxxiii. 7-11 can stand, but there it fits into the context marvellously



and removes another group of difficulties, viz., those relating to the cloud. The place in question is after Exodus xiii. 22, for the statements as to the pillar in xxxiii. 9 f. attach naturally to those in xiii. 21 f.<sup>1</sup>

5. The story of the tent of meeting is then as follows : Immediately after the departure from Egypt, Moses instituted the practice of trying cases in a tent outside the camp. Here the cloud used to descend and he received revelations. This lasted till after the arrival at Sinai, where Moses was instructed to make the tent which should shelter the ark. "And there I will meet with thee, and I will commune with thee" (Exod. xxv. 22). From the time of the erection of the abode of the ark the earlier tent ceased to be the tent of meeting and the court which formerly sat there transferred its seat to the door of the new Tent of Meeting in the centre of the camps. Thus a simple transposition enables us to remove one of the most inveterate perplexities in the Pentateuchal narrative and to restore an intelligible and harmonious history.

HAROLD M. WIENER.

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed examination of the difficulties relating to the cloud see *op. cit.* pp. 82-90, 102.

# THE APOSTLE PAUL'S HYMN OF LOVE (1 COR. XIII.) AND ITS RELIGIOUS-HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

## PART V. THE THIRD PART OF THE HYMN, 8-12, AND THE CONCLUSION, 13.<sup>1</sup>

THE third part of the hymn (vers. 8-13) returning to the comparison with the gifts, treats of the eternal nature of love.<sup>2</sup> Because love is something perfect and absolute (ver. 7: four times *πάντα*), it never ceases,<sup>3</sup> whilst the gifts partly are done away with—as is the case with prophecies and knowledge—and partly cease of themselves (so Glossolalia).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [Some notes, enclosed in square brackets, have been added in process of translation to attain clearness.]

<sup>2</sup> In ver. 8 it is probable that the better-attested and more difficult *ἐκπίπτει* (not *πίπτει*) should be read (in *ἐκπίπτει* the passives which follow are heralded): further we must prefer *προφητεῖαι* (only B has the sing.) and also the unusual *γνώσεις* (with AD<sup>b</sup> F<sup>8</sup> G 17. 47 Tertull. [but not Itala], Gregor. Nyss.) because it is in fact necessary. In ver. 11 the evidence is evenly balanced in respect of the position of the thrice-repeated *ὡς νήπιος* (before or after the verb). The fact that *γάρ* before *ἄρτι* is lost in old MSS. is easily explained, likewise the very old addition of *ὡς* before *δι' ἐσόπτρου*, which is found already in Clem. Alex., Tertull., Origen (*ὡς ἐν ἀνύγματι* also occurs). It would be necessary to retain *ὡς* if the addition could not be easily explained, whereas the loss would be almost incomprehensible. Clem. Alex. scarcely ever gives *ἐν ἀνύγματι* (except Exc. ex Theodoto 15), s. Paedag. I. 6, 36; Strom. I. 19, 94; V. 1, 7; V. 11, 74; but still it is assured.

<sup>3</sup> The indicative [present] *ἐκπίπτει* is here purposely chosen instead of the future. [The translator inserts "present," omitted apparently by a slip in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> The Apostle lacked the finer feeling for the Greek language in a high degree, otherwise he could never have written in ver. 8 *καταργηθήσονται . . . παύσονται . . . καταργηθήσονται* (also the repetition of *καταργ.* in vers. 10 and 11). The thought prescribed the change in the second, and the repetition in the third place, and that sufficed for him. Clem. Alex. (*Quis*

From this point of his exposition onwards the problem of knowledge arises before the Apostle, and does not release him until the end. First it is still prophecy, knowledge, and speaking with tongues (ver. 8), then knowledge and prophecy (ver. 9), then (vers. 11 and 12) knowledge alone—a clear proof that at last this alone is in question. We feel from his words how deeply painful to him is the recognition that our knowledge is imperfect and therefore incapable of duration. The mood which dominates him is not that of Socrates with regard to ignorance, but rather something like that of Faust, only entirely directed towards the knowledge of God ; but as a foil it has the triumphant cry, “ Love never faileth,” and this contrast gives to the final words of the Apostle their incomparable charm, and then, and only then, brings the hymn to its climax. Ways of knowing<sup>1</sup> and ways of prophesying cease, because we possess them but partially, and because it is a law that what is partial comes to an end with the advent of what is perfect. To the mind of the Apostle, which is bent upon the entire and absolute, partial and perfect knowledge do not stand in the relation of parts and whole. The image which he uses for their relation shows rather that he judges the former as something childishly inauthoritative, which therefore is not to be taken seriously, and which has to give way not to entire knowledge but to an entirely different kind of knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

Very finely chosen are the three words *λαλεῖν*, *φρονεῖν*

*dives*, 38) writes as a correction : *προφητεῖαι καταργοῦνται, γλῶσσαι παύονται, ἰδέσεις ἐπὶ γῆς καταλείπονται*. [This note seems out of keeping with Part VI. Here the repetition of the verb is treated as a literary fault ; but in Part VI. Dr. Harnack points out that the effect of the Hymn largely depends on the repetition of certain dominant words to express dominant ideas.]

<sup>1</sup> The *ἐκ μέρους γινώσκωμεν* (ver. 9) makes it necessary to read *γνώσεις* in ver. 8 (see above). Of *γνώσις* the Apostle would not have said that it ceases. (See the following.)

<sup>2</sup> The fact that the Apostle has opposed to “*ἐκ μέρους*” not “*τὸ πᾶν*”

and λογίζεσθαι, as the degrees of a climax.<sup>1</sup> Our φρονεῖν also, nay even our λογίζεσθαι in the present, are, judged in the light of what is to come, childish, and have no eternal significance. Godet, however, goes too far in his explanation when he refers λαλεῖν to the speaking with tongues, φρονεῖν to prophecy and λογίζεσθαι to knowledge; for the reference to prophecy cannot, except in an artificial way, be introduced into the term φρονεῖν.

It is also remarkable that the Apostle does not say: "When I became a man what was childish ceased," but "when I became a man, I put away childish things." They had become hollow and unreal to him. Such, therefore, is the attitude of the Apostle towards knowledge and the other gifts which he possesses in the present—he would like to put them aside as quite insufficient if only that which is perfect were already come! This attitude is already, as Godet rightly recognises, expressed in ch. i. 7: "So that you may not feel yourselves lacking in any gift, while you await the revelation of the Lord" (ὥστε ὑμᾶς μὴ ὑστερεῖσθαι ἐν μηδενὶ χαρίσματι, ἀπεκδεχομένους τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τοῦ κυρίου). That was indeed in reality not the attitude of the Corinthians, but Paul, in the opening part of several of his letters, pictures the communities as being what they ought to be.

Very pessimistic is the Apostle's view of what we can know of God and profane things. The reason for this appears in ver. 12: because in this earthly life (ἄρτι) we see only "by means of a mirror, in a riddle." We should transport the Apostle into the modern or the Hellenic world of thought, if

but "τὸ τέλειον" shows his opinion of the relation of the knowledge of the present to the knowledge of the future, which indeed only becomes quite clear in ver. 11 ff.

<sup>1</sup> [This paragraph and the next are one long footnote in the original German.]

we were to think here of general world-knowledge or of a theory of knowledge which confesses that we know things only in images or actually within the limits of specific sensuous perception. The sorrowful lament of the Apostle does not refer to things but only to God and His ways;<sup>1</sup> that is made quite clear by the words: "but then from face to face." They would have to run very differently if it were a question of knowledge of the external world. But when we have ascertained this, we may be allowed to add that there is here an identity of attitude, however different be the ways in which Paul and the Hellenic philosophy would face the problems of thought; and further, that the Hellenic philosophy, too, had in that age become more and more a philosophy of religion and a longing after God, so that it did not so much strive after the knowledge of the reality of things, but, like the Apostle, after the knowledge of the divine "from face to face."

What knowledge it is to which the Apostle aspires, and which he contrasts with the knowledge δι' ἐσόπτρου<sup>2</sup> ἐν

<sup>1</sup> Still it is surely intentional that βλέπομεν has no object, and every one feels the reason for it.

<sup>2</sup> It is an old dispute whether these words are to be translated "by means of a mirror" or "through a (dim) glass"; but this dispute should not have arisen. To deviate (with Tertullian) from the certain meaning ἐσόπτρου=mirror, is inadvisable, and besides, Clem Alex. remarks on this passage (*Strom.* I. 19, 94): δι' ἐσόπτρου=κατ' ἀνάκλασιν, through reflection which makes the image obscure. Only in ourselves and our brothers do we, according to Clemens (thus only indirectly), become aware of God. Clemens cites in this connexion the Apocryphal saying: "Thou hast seen thy brother, thou hast seen thy God," (εἶδες τὸν ἀδελφόν σου, εἶδες τὸν θεόν σου). However, we need not confine the mirror to ourselves and our brothers. Paul is surely thinking also of the reflexion of God in nature and history.—The image of the mirror which the Apostle uses has nothing to do with Sap. Salom. vii. 26: "For wisdom is the reflection of eternal light and the mirror of the activity of God" (ἀπαύγασμα γὰρ ἐστὶν [Wisdom] φωτὸς αἰδίου καὶ ἑσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας), and absolutely nothing with Ode Salom. 13 ("our mirror is the Lord; open the eyes and look upon it in him") and the alleged logion of the Lord in an alleged epistle of John (de mont. Sina et Sion 13: "For we also who believe in Him see Christ in ourselves as in a mirror. As



*ἀντίματι*,<sup>1</sup> he has expressed not only by the words "from face to face," but still more clearly by the words: "But then I shall know as I also am known."<sup>2</sup> What an intimate part he takes in this sentence is shown already by the change from the 1st person plural to the 1st singular, even though we may call the "I" typical. In verse 11 already he had (after ver. 9: we) spoken in the 1st singular; but in verse 12a he had gone back to the plural. Now (ver. 12b) he again speaks in the singular. The speech becomes a confession and the expression of the most personal and certain hope which rules him. For this he finds *γνώσομαι* not strong enough. Our language unfortunately cannot well render the contrast. ἄρτι γινώσκω . . . τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώ-

God Himself instructs us and warns us in a letter of John His disciple to the people: See Me in yourselves in the same way in which any one of you sees himself by looking into water or into a mirror" - ("Nam et nos qui illi credimus Christum in nobis tamquam in speculo videmus, ipso nos instruente et monente in epistula Johannis discipuli sui ad populum: Ita me in vobis videte quomodo quis vestrum se videt in aquam aut in speculum"). James i. 24 is also quite different. On the other hand Theophil. ad Autol. I. 2 may be quoted, although the ground of the comparison is of a different sort: "When there is rust in the mirror the face of the man cannot be seen in the mirror. So also when there is sin in the man, such a man cannot contemplate God." (Ἐπὰν ἡ λὸς ἐν τῷ ἐσόπτρῳ, οὐ δύναται δρᾶσθαι τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῷ ἐσόπτρῳ. οὕτως καὶ ὅταν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐ δύναται ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνθρώπος θεωρεῖν τὸν θεόν).

<sup>1</sup> The object as such cannot be described as a riddle, still less can ἐν ἀντίματι be in any way understood locally; on the contrary it indicates as much as δι' ἐσόπτρου the manner of contemplation: we perceive, as a glossator says, "in problems and images and similitudes (ἐν ζητήμασι καὶ εἰκόσι καὶ ὁμοιώμασι), which indeed give suggestions but admit of no certain interpretation. The old African Latin (see also Tertull.) has preserved "in aenigmate." Irenaeus (IV. 9, 2) writes: "Through a mirror and riddles" (per speculum et per aenigmata). Tertullian explains (adv. Prax. 14) "in aenigmate" = "in imagine." The Apostle's expression is decided by Num. xii. 8: "I will speak to him mouth to mouth" (στόμα κατὰ στόμα λαλήσω αὐτῷ, ἐν εἶδει καὶ οὐ δι' ἀνιγμάτων).

<sup>2</sup> Godet's explanation that βλέπειν δι' ἐσόπτρου refers to prophecy and only ver. 12b to knowledge is untenable; for obviously ver. 12b says the same without metaphor which is metaphorically expressed in ver. 12a. If the meaning were different, that must clearly appear. For the rest Godet's explanation is only a further deduction from his false explanation of ver. 11 (see above). This verse, too, has only to do with knowledge. At best we may regard prophecy as included.

σομαι.<sup>1</sup> Το ἐκ μέρους is opposed not only as in verse 10 τέλειον, which leads beyond πᾶν, but the Apostle reaches out still higher : " I shall know even as I am known," that is, as God knows me,<sup>2</sup> so I shall know Him (and His ways). Such is, therefore, the aim after which the marrow of his soul sighs, but which at the same time he holds as the surest hope. No hope can aspire more boldly. The knowledge from face to face is the knowledge after the fashion in which God knows. How much Paul lives in the problem that is presented by the relation of our knowledge of God to God's knowledge of us, is shown by several places in his letters.<sup>3</sup> But in this passage there is no reference to love ; rather do knowledge and love appear as two entirely separate things, just as in the description of love in verses 6-7 nothing was named which had to do with love. It is different with John (on this point see below).

Τότε πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον . . . τότε ἐπιγνώσομαι—when this τότε shall come to pass was stated with unmistakable clearness in v. 10 : when the parousia of the Lord will put an end to this earth and with it to all that is imperfect (ὅταν ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον),<sup>4</sup> not before. In accordance with this the statement νυνὶ δὲ μένει ἀγάπη finds its explanation. The sense is : in this temporal life, in which we have only partial

<sup>1</sup> With regard to γινώσκειν and ἐπιγινώσκειν compare Moulton, *loc. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>2</sup> Some have thought that the aorist is remarkable and have been led by it to the assumption that Paul wished to say : " As I was known, namely, at the time of my conversion." But it is difficult to see why the Apostle should have been thinking of this special, although fundamental, event. The aorist is far rather descriptive, and used without reference to time. (s. Moulton, pp. 134, 135 f.)

<sup>3</sup> See Gal. iv. 8 : νῦν δὲ γνόντες θεόν, μάλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. 1 Cor. viii. 2 f. : εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἐγνωκέναι τι, οὐπω ἔγνω καθὼς δεῖ γινῶναι (our verses form a gloss to these words) : εἰ δέ τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, οὗτος ἔγνωσται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (this thought is foreign to our passage). Heinrici contributes a remarkable parallel from Philo Cherub. to the first half of the Apostle's thought : When we live we are known rather than know (ὅτε ζῶμεν . . . γνωρίζομεθα μάλλον ἢ γνωρίζομεν. I. S. 197 ed. Cohn).

<sup>4</sup> Compare Dr. Lepsius's article on the Apokatastasis or Restitution of all things, in a recent number of the *EXPOSITOR*.

and uncertain knowledge, which some time will be done away, we nevertheless possess something unchangeable, therefore of absolute value, namely love.

Only because this thought hovered before the Apostle's mind could he here associate faith and hope with love. But even thus they come unexpectedly ; for their introduction is not prepared in any way.<sup>1</sup> The reason that they are mentioned can therefore only be that the Apostle wished to express the thought : " Of all our present possessions, love is the most valuable." The emphasis rests, therefore, on ver. 13b : " Love is the greatest of them."

But another difficulty arises here. How can the Apostle say that at this time only faith, hope and love remain—surely the gifts, too, remain ? Here there is, in fact, a contradiction which cannot logically be quite cleared away, but which is psychologically quite comprehensible. A possession like the gifts which, as the Apostle has regretfully confessed, makes only a partial, childish knowledge possible, is in reality no real possession.<sup>2</sup>

But in contrast to them remains something which is not partial and childish, on which, therefore, we can rely, namely faith, hope and love. This does not mean that to the two first, as to love, the saying *οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτουσιν* may be applied—for *ἐλπὶς βλεπομένη οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλπίς* (Rom. viii. 26), and the same applies to faith—but that their case is different from that of the gifts ; for the change from faith and hope to the perfect is fulfilment, but the change from the gift-

<sup>1</sup> At this point, then, we may find fault with the hymn from the standpoint of strict compactness. In such cases exegetical logicians are in the habit of simply expunging the verse, or else suppose that something has been lost. Here, so far as I know, no such proposal has been made. [The statement in the text, also, is reconsidered and to some extent modified in Part VI.].

<sup>2</sup> Irenæus paraphrases very finely (IV. 12, 2) : " Omnibus ceteris evacuatīs manere fidem, etc. " ; compare II. 28, 3 : " Reliquis partibus destructis hæc tunc perseverare, quæ sunt fides, spes et caritas."

knowledge to perfect knowledge is a break ; for the former is done away, and the new comes to take its place. In this sense, the Apostle, condensing his thoughts and leaving out a middle term in the speech, speaks of the remaining of faith, hope and love, in order then to come to the conclusion which he wished, namely, that among these also love was the greatest. It is the greatest—that, too, we must supplement—because it is perfect and permanent not only through anticipation like faith and hope, but it passes over unchanged into eternity : “ Love never ceaseth.”<sup>1</sup>

Finally it should be noted that the Apostle has embraced the three ideas, faith, hope and love, by an emphatic τὰ τρία ταῦτα.” The assumption that he is contrasting them with the triad, glossolalia, prophecy and knowledge, is petty, especially as he does not further concern himself with faith and hope. But the association of the three is certainly intended to express the exclusive value of these three virtues : nothing in this earthly life can be placed beside them. The Apostle has also said elsewhere that Christianity is comprehended in them.<sup>2</sup> Who brought forward this great device of the Christian religion ? Paul himself ? We do not know. John and Ignatius have not repeated it—they connect faith and love, but hope plays no part with them<sup>3</sup>—but Polycarp (ep. 3) and “ Barnabas ” (c. 1) have reproduced it, and from the end of the second century onwards it became through the reading of the Pauline epistles a Church formula, until Ambrosius combined the three Christian virtues with the four antique ones in his ethics and thus created catholic syncretism around this principal point.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Thess. i. 3, 5, 8 ; Col. i, 4 f.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Clemens Alex., *Quis dives*, 38 : Μένει δὲ τὰ τρία ταῦτα, πίστις, ἐλπίς, ἀγάπη· μείζων δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἀγάπη ; καὶ δικαίως· πίστις μὲν γὰρ ἀπέρχεται, ὅταν αὐτοψία πεισθῶμεν, ἰδόντες θεόν, καὶ μάλλον αἰξεται τῶν τελείων παραδοθέντων.

<sup>3</sup> Clemens Rom. (c. 58) places faith and hope together like a formula.

<sup>4</sup> The statement—“ But now remaineth faith, hope, love ”—sounds as if the



PART VI. THE LITERARY QUALITY OF THE HYMN.<sup>1</sup>

We should not be so bold as to attempt to exhaust the religious and moral content of this hymn. It must be felt. We may try to investigate the charm of the form and of the style, and to discover their secret.

Amongst all the writings of Paul, this hymn ranks highest in respect of its form.<sup>2</sup> It offers the most sublime and strongest aesthetic charms, and it is worth while to reflect upon the means by which Paul has obtained such effects. Poetry, in the strict sense, the hymn, indeed, is not, but "speech": therefore the designation "hymn" is not quite correct. Like the eighth chapter of Romans it gushes forth freely, which, however, does not exclude the use of simple artistic means. Rhythm and poetic form flowed from enthusiasm—an obvious proof that the deepest contemplation and sensibility became, by inner necessity, poetic in their expression. Lastly, it is the subject matter which in its powerful expression gives the effect of perfect poetry.

In the first place the mere plan is unsurpassable. The hymn is divided into three parts, and a final verse: the indispensableness of love (vers. 1-3), the nature and effect of love (vers. 4-7), the eternalness of love (vers. 8-12). Each part has its particular scheme; but in all the parts the highest effects are obtained by the excellent choice of words, by the powerful simplicity of the syntax and the combined means of antithesis and repetition. Here we are not taking into

Apostle were using a well-known expression; in that case it would be easier to explain why the connexion in the passage with which we are dealing is, as has been already stated, not irreproachable. But the assumption is not absolutely necessary. Resch's attempt (*Agroph*<sup>2</sup> in the *Texts and Researches*, vol. 30, p. 153 ff.) to prove the saying to be a logion of the Lord has not been successful. J. Weisz (p. 320) thinks it necessary, from the assurance with which Paul has advanced the statement, to infer an authoritative saying.

<sup>1</sup> [This Section is a single footnote in the German original.]

<sup>2</sup> s. Joh. Weisz, p. 311 f.



consideration the use of delineating and descriptive adjectives, except in the first verse.<sup>1</sup> The whole effect rests on the verb (in German that cannot unfortunately always be reproduced) and thus the hymn receives the most lively inner movement as well as certain statuesque dignity. This paradoxical interlacing lends the piece its mysterious aesthetic charm. What poet has here equalled the Apostle? The arrangement of the words, too, supports the effect in pre-eminent fashion; it could not be improved in any of the verses.

The three parts are quite differently handled. The first, which is introductory, begins most solemnly, and its three subdivisions are strictly parallel and symmetrically worked out, yet, nevertheless, in such a way that by their subject matter they form a climax: (1) Glossolalia (ecstasy); (2) all prophecy, all knowledge and the highest power of faith; (3) self-sacrificing action. The thrice-repeated sentence: "*ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω*" appears each time as an antithetic secondary clause, and thus the inference is drawn. The first time with ironic sharpness, which goes through marrow and bone: "Tongues of men and angels—a booming brass and a clanging cymbal!" What a contrast! Instead of heavenly voices, the raving sounds of a hollow instrument! The two other times, however, after a broad exposition in the protasis, the highest effect is attained in the apodosis by brevity: *οὐδὲν εἶμι—οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι.* Like blows with a club, these words strike down all possessions and all titles to fame, which claim to be accepted without love. At the same time the "I" which dominates all this part enhances the credibility of the sayings, so that no contradiction is possible. He who speaks thus has experienced it.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [See above in Part III. p. 393.]

<sup>2</sup> [A further motive causing the variation in the hymn between the use of first and third person singular, is stated by Sir W. M. Ramsay, *Pictures of the Apostolic Church*, p. 232.]

The second part, again, begins solemnly : ἡ ἀγάπη is repeated thrice in the first sentence when the three fundamental qualities of love—long-suffering, kindness and freedom from envy—are introduced. But then the poet restrains himself no longer ; when the heart is full the mouth overfloweth ! Out of the fullness of his idea of love he pours forth words in deepest excitement to express the being and nature of love—first only in negations, but these already have the effect of great maxims, and they close with the sublime thought that love stands beside the highest thing that exists, namely truth. But even with this the poet has not exhausted himself. A four times repeated “ πάντα ” is contrasted with the eightfold “ οὐκ ” and gives the most complete expression, in a powerful sequence, to the absoluteness of love. The language becomes more and more entrancing, the thoughts seem to stumble over each other ; but they only seem to do so—every word stands firmly in its proper place. The ecstasy is ecstasy of intellectual apprehension, ἐν νοί.

The poet alters the tone as he prepares to utter the final saying. With three impressive words he places the principal thought as theme at the beginning : “ ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτει.” But immediately the tone of enthusiasm becomes apparent, and this is reflected in the double change of the plural and singular (vers. 9 and 12a plural, vers. 11 and 12b singular). Certainly the “ I ” is not individual but typical ; but still the change has a great effect. In three sentences following each other asyndetically, the Apostle contrasts the ephemeral nature of prophecies, tongues and knowledge with the eternal nature of love : it is not with love as it is with the gifts ! Καταργηθήσονται dominates his verse and continues in verses 10 and 11. But in verse 9 ἐκ μέρους becomes the catch-word and reaches over into verses 10 and 12. The 11th verse is decided by the five times re-

peated *νήπιος*, and the 12th finally by the very effectively repeated contrast of “*ἄρτι*” and “*τότε*,” and also by the antithesis: “*δι’ ἐσόπτρου . . . πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον*,” and *γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους . . . ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπιγνώσθην*.” [Note the effective use of the three tenses, which crown the preceding antitheses: “*τὸ ἐκ μέρους . . . τὸ τέλειον*” and “*νήπιος . . . ἀνήρ*.”]

The final verse, by a diversion full of genius brings yet another climax. Inasmuch as the word *μένει* resumes again from the positive side the words *οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτει*,” faith and hope appear here on earth instead of knowledge, which cannot hold its place beside love. They can hold their place, but greater than them is love. The Apostle could not have ended more effectively.

#### PART VII. THE POSITION OF THE HYMN IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION.

It is important and instructive to attain clearness with regard to the position of this sublime poem in the history of religion. It is not a psalm like those of the Old Testament or like the lately discovered Odes of Solomon; Paul has not gone there for his model. Rather does the hymn stand entirely apart by itself; for there is, so far as I know, nothing like it in profane literature either. But has it any religious-historical significance? “Modern” scholars will try to find one in “the tongues of angels” and “the clanging symbol”; gladly do we leave them to their investigations. The really important thing is what the Apostle says about love and knowledge, and what relation it bears to Hellenism, as for example to Plato.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Agape and Eros had originally nothing in common with one another; but as early as the first century agape grows beyond the idea of *caritas* and takes on fundamental characteristics of eros. In the second century the problem of “agape” and “gnosis” is common.

I. We must begin with the most certain fact—love and knowledge have nothing to do with one another in this hymn. Neither does love lead to knowledge nor knowledge to love.<sup>1</sup> That results forthwith from the fact that love here is “*caritas*” and nothing else. That is obvious not only for the first two parts of the hymn, but also for the last part. Just because of this Paul places love in the closing verse not with knowledge, of which he has just been speaking, but with faith and hope, thus with religious-moral virtues; and just because of this, in the description of love in the second part, there is no mention of knowledge.

II. Present knowledge and future knowledge the Apostle feels simply as contrasts. It may seem not to be so when he calls the former partial knowledge; but according to him it is not the entire which is opposed to the partial, but the perfect, which is something quite different from the sum of parts. Present knowledge, according to him, is a childish thing, which is not improved by completing it, but which has to be done away altogether; for it sees only reflected pictures, the understanding and explanation of which remain a riddle. Therefore: no bridge leads from the partial to the whole; neither does the Apostle feel any impulse to increase this partial knowledge. Because he regards it as a worthless possession he would rather strip it off, just as, when he became a man, he put away childish things.

III. Valuable knowledge, namely, the knowledge from face to face, the full knowledge—as God knows—is not to be expected till that which is perfect has come, that is, when (through the second appearance of Christ) this temporal life suddenly comes to an end.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In c. viii. 1, Paul confronts the two (love and knowledge in the present), and comes to the bitter conclusion that whereas love edifies, knowledge puffs up. With regard to another relation between the two which immediately after comes under discussion, see below.

<sup>2</sup> [See the paper of Dr. Lepsius on the Apokatastasis in *EXPOSITOR* 1911.]



With these thoughts Plato and the Greek idealistic philosophy of religion (we do not speak here of later developments of Neo-Platonism) have simply nothing to do ; they are opposed to them. Not a single word more is required to prove that. Paul appears here not as the disciple, but as the opposite pole to Plato and the Greeks. They place love and knowledge in one category as *amor intellectualis* ; Paul separates them. They recognise indeed a knowledge which increases step by step, but all knowledge is qualitatively identical ; Paul denies that. According to them, present knowledge, in spite of its incompleteness, is the best thing in the world ; Paul is far removed from this belief. Finally, they know nothing of a future event by which that which is perfect will suddenly appear, but of a gradual emergence of the spirit from the bonds of the sensuous to a higher being. There can be no doubt Paul is a Jew and will have nothing to do with the knowledge of the Hellenes.

But still all is not yet said, rather there remains yet another point of the highest importance, and it brings Paul and Plato together. The contemptuous judgment of the value of knowledge applies only to the present, partial knowledge. As soon as the Apostle thinks of perfect knowledge he judges quite otherwise. In trembling emotion and in ardent impulse he contemplates it : the best thing in the world, the best in this temporal life, is love, but the absolutely best, for which his soul longs, is perfect knowledge, the knowledge from face to face, the knowledge in which " I know as I also am known." This knowledge, as has already been said, has nothing to do with love ; but yet it is a point of some importance that he is led to it when he is thinking about love, and in another passage of the same letter (viii. 3) he goes yet a step further : " If any man love God, he is known of Him." Here, also, he does not indeed say " he knoweth God," but still it is the preparatory step to that combination.



The knowledge from face to face is the highest goal—is it not Plato whom we are listening to? Further, if knowledge at its highest point has for its object simply the last, namely the divine nature, is not that too Plato? Finally, when the Apostle in this connexion designates present knowledge as knowledge in a mirror, is that not a confirmation of the Platonic origin of the guiding thought?

But caution is imperative. The apologist Theophilus says in one place, repeating the learning of the schools, that the word “*θεός*” is derived as much from “*τεθεικέναι*” as from “*θέειν*.” We smile at this double etymology; but in the history of religion of the Hellenic age, there is often question of double origins, nay, we may say that only those ideas and institutions which had a double root survived and finally conquered (namely in catholic Christianity, which is the conclusion of the universal development); all others lost vitality.

Catholic Christianity is a formation out of two converging and finally concurrent lines, of which one, starting from the prophets, runs its course by way of the later psalms in the later Jewish development (comprehending the earliest Christian), the other in the development of the Greek philosophy of religion (comprehending the nature of the mysteries). But the two lines are not only convergent and finally in the third and fourth centuries concurrent; but already also during their course side-lines diverged from the principal lines, and these became intertwined with one another.

If we apply this insight to the problem that lies before us, there can be no doubt that the recognition of perfect knowledge as the highest thing was developed in the Jewish line too, and likewise the conviction that the highest knowledge and everything that is highest is nothing else than the knowledge of God.<sup>1</sup> Therefore it is possible that Paul did

<sup>1</sup> See Matt. xi. 27.

not first borrow this view from Platonism. Even the unusual tone in which the longing after knowledge is expressed by him is not necessarily Hellenic. His *πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον*, οὐκ ἐν αἰνίγματι (see above) has quite sufficient basis in the saying in Numbers xii. 8. And from this source even the *δι' ἐσόπτρου*, which at first gives quite a Platonic impression, can be sufficiently explained.

Compare

Numbers xii. 8.

στόμα κατὰ στόμα λαλήσω  
αὐτῷ, ἐν εἶδει καὶ οὐ δι'  
αἰνιγμάτων.<sup>1</sup>

1 Cor. xiii. 12.

βλέπομεν ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν  
αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον  
πρὸς πρόσωπον.

The different expressions *στόμα κατὰ στόμα* and *πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον* are explained by Paul's having read the Hebrew text (פֶּה אֶל פֶּה) and having begun the sentence with *βλέπομεν*. The Hebrew word הִנֵּה both he and the LXX in agreement and correctly have rendered by *αἰνίγμα*. Thus, the Pauline *δι' ἐσόπτρου* corresponds to the phrase *ἐν εἶδει*. The Hebrew text has the word מַרְאֶה; at one stroke this word explains both the *βλέπομεν* and the *δι' ἐσόπτρου* of Paul; for מַרְאֶה means not merely "sight" and "what is seen" (thence "countenance," "form"), but also "appearance" as distinguished from reality, and finally "mirror" (Exod. xxxviii. 8). Thus Paul retained the word which he read in the Bible verse that he had in his mind. This fully explains the origin of the image—Paul longs to see God in the same way as it was once promised to Moses, and every recourse to Greek sources becomes unnecessary.<sup>2</sup> But be-

<sup>1</sup> This is preceded by καὶ εἶπεν [ὁ θεὸς] πρὸς Ἀαρὼν καὶ Μαριάμ· Ἀκούσατε τῶν λόγων μου· ἔὰν γένηται προφήτης ὑμῶν κυρίῳ, ἐν ὁράματι αὐτῷ γινωσθήσομαι καὶ ἐν ὕπνῳ λαλήσω αὐτῷ· οὐχ οὕτως ὁ θεράπων μου Μωυσῆς· ἐν ὄλῳ τῷ ὄλῳ μου πιστός ἐστιν· στόμα κατὰ στόμα κ.τ.λ.

<sup>2</sup> The Hebrew text of Num. xii. 8 is certainly not in order. If it is said in xii. 6 that the prophets will (only) see אֶת־יְהוָה God, but Moses from mouth to mouth אֶת־פִּי־יְהוָה, then מַרְאֶה cannot be right, since the word cannot

cause of this we need not deny that a Greek philosopher too could have chosen the word ; <sup>1</sup> Plato would certainly have acclaimed it as a sublime testimony of his own special philosophy. Two lines of world-history converge here.

But would Plato have understood the ἐπιγνώσκομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην too ? He would probably have understood it, but differently from the Apostle. For Paul it is not only the expression of completest knowledge, but at the same time the confession of being sheltered in the all-knowing God. This ἐπεγνώσθην gathers its meaning from c. viii. 3 : εἰ τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, οὗτος ἔγνωσται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. But Plato would have understood much better the saying that love rejoiceth not in injustice but in [the truth. "Truth" is for Paul "the designation of the new religious and metaphysical view of the world taken by the Gospel, but also the principle, at once religious and ethical, which it is necessary to bow to and to obey, so that injustice is irreconcilable with truth" (J. Weisz). But just this is also Plato's conviction.

Here there is, in spite of the greatness of the difference, the deepest point of unity. It is not to be sought [in the saying about the mirror, but in the fact that that thought is common to both, and in the fact that the Apostle, in reflecting upon love and recognising it as something imperishable, is led at all to the question of knowledge. Love and perfect knowledge, according to him, have nothing to do with each

be used differently in two succeeding sentences (probably no importance should be attached to the difference in punctuation). Therefore, the reading מְרִאָה which only removes the difficulty in ! does not help much. Probably we should read with Paterson לא במראה ; if Paul read thus his dependence on the passage in Num. is perfectly clear. But however we may correct the text, it is obvious that the δι' ἐσόπτρου of Paul was originated by מראה, just as ἐν ἀνύγματι was originated by בהירָת ; parallels from Philo, etc., are therefore superfluous.

<sup>1</sup> We may ask also if Paul would have been able to bring the old saying, by means of an alteration apparently so slight, to an expression so much more sublime, if he had not breathed Greek air.

other, but yet they have for the Apostle one thing in common—the Eternal.

The direction which the Apostle takes here and also in the connecting of faith and hope with love, proves, however, still further that his idea of love is specifically different from the Stoic one. The Stoic idea rests upon rational considerations about the equality of men and appears as the rational activity of the reasonable knowledge about the condition and end of man. To the Apostle, too, such considerations are not unknown<sup>1</sup> but his idea of love has not sprung from this. For Paul love, even as love for one's neighbour, is inseparable from the love of God; from it and with it, love, although entirely *caritas*, receives being and kind; but the converse, too, holds good; in and with the love for one's neighbour the love of God and religion itself are given.

The final verse proves this; Paul could not, while speaking all through the hymn about love for one's neighbour, have brought in faith and hope at the end, if love had not been for him inseparably bound up with the love of God, and an indissoluble unity with it. This view, prepared in the Old Testament, can be traced back to Jesus Himself.

Thus the Stoic love of humanity and the love which Paul means are very different things; but here it is again the same as in the case of the valuation of perfect knowledge—in that age there were, with regard to the idea of love, two converging lines, the humanitarian-stoic line and the theistic-Jewish line. During their development a certain interchange took place. Even in Hellenism there enters into the humanitarianism a strong religious element; in illustration we might quote Epictetus. But Paul, in the hymn, moves solely on the latter-named line; it was only later that the two lines ran together.

<sup>1</sup> See Rom. i. 19 ff., ii. 14 ff.; Acts xvii. 22 ff. Here the Apostle has learnt from the Stoa.



John has gone a step beyond Paul in the direction of Plato ; <sup>1</sup> he has brought love and knowledge nearer to one another on Christian ground. But before following this up we must note that in the principal question John remained a faithful disciple of Jesus and Paul's companion in faith. What is common to both of them is the fundamental idea of love, as John also understands it. According to him, too, love of God and of one's neighbour are so related, or rather are such a complete unity, that they are interchangeable. "We know that we have passed out of death into life because we love the brethren" (1 John iii. 14). "He that saith he is in the light and hateth his brother, is in the

<sup>1</sup> Clemens Romanus, inspired by 1 Cor. xiii., composed about the year 95 a hymn to love, which, however, especially as it plagiarises in several passages, cannot be compared to Paul's hymn. It lacks depth and real feeling ; it seems like a confused mosaic without higher value. It is remarkable that Clem. Alex. (*Strom.* IV. 18, 111 f.) comments on both hymns together, and betrays nothing of the fact that that of Clemens Romanus is a very clumsy affair beside that of Paul. The hymn runs as follows :

"Let him that hath love in Christ fulfil the commandments of Christ.

Who can declare the bond of the love of God ? Who is sufficient to tell the majesty of its beauty ? The height whereunto love exalteth is unspeakable.

Love joineth us unto God ; love covereth a multitude of sins ; love endureth all things, is longsuffering in all things. There is nothing coarse, nothing arrogant in love. Love hath no divisions, love maketh no seditions, love doeth all things in concord. In love were all the elect of God made perfect ; without love is nothing well-pleasing to God :

In love the Master took unto us Himself ; for the love which He had towards us, Jesus Christ our Lord hath given His Blood for us by the will of God, and His flesh for our flesh and His life for our lives (Lightfoot)."

Ὁ ἔχων ἀγάπην ἐν Χριστῷ ποιησάτω τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παραγγέλματα.

τὸν δεσμὸν τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ θεοῦ τίς δύναται ἐξηγήσασθαι ; τὸ μεγαλεῖον τῆς καλλονῆς αὐτοῦ τίς ἀρκετὸς ἐξειπεῖν ; τὸ ὕψος εἰς δὲ ἀνάγει ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνεκδιήγητόν ἐστιν.

Ἀγάπη κολλᾷ ἡμᾶς τῷ θεῷ, ἀγάπη καλύπτει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν, ἀγάπη πάντα ἀνέχεται, πάντα μακροθυμεῖ· οὐδὲν βάνυσον ἐν ἀγάπῃ, οὐδὲν ὑπερήφανον· ἀγάπη σχίσμα οὐκ ἔχει, ἀγάπη οὐ στασιάζει, ἀγάπη πάντα ποιεῖ ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ· ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ ἐτελειώθησαν πάντες οἱ ἐκλεκτοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ· δίχα ἀγάπης οὐδὲν εὐάρεστόν ἐστιν τῷ θεῷ.

ἐν ἀγάπῃ προσελάβετο ἡμᾶς ὁ δεσπότης· διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην ἦν ἔσχεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἕδωκεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν ἐν θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σάρκα ὑπὲρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν.



darkness even until now ; whoso loveth his brother abideth in the light " (I. ii. 9). " Hereby know we love, because He laid down His life for us : and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren " (I. iii. 16). " Whoso shutteth up his compassion from his brother in need, how doth the love of God abide in him ? " (I. iii. 17). " If we love one another, God abideth in us, and His love is perfected in us " (I. iv. 12). " He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen, and this commandment have we from Him, that he who loveth God love his brother also " (I. iv. 20). " By this shall all men know that ye are My disciples, if ye have love one to another " (John xiii. 35).

That is the love which Paul, too, means in his hymn ; even when John places *μῆναι* and *ἀγάπη* together we are reminded of him. But, again, it is the same knowledge which Paul means when John says in I. iii. 2, " We know that we shall be like Him ; for we shall see Him even as He is." But John goes far beyond Paul when he writes (I. iv. 7 f.) : " Let us love one another, for love is of God ; and every one that loveth is begotten of God and knoweth God ; he that loveth not knoweth not God ; for God is love." There the idea that love is a metaphysical and " gnostic " principle is announced ; it has its root in the birth from God who is love, and its fruit is the knowledge of God. Further, however, according to John, love fills up the gap caused by the fact that in the present we are unable to see God : " No man hath beheld God ; if we love one another God abideth in us " (I. vi. 12) ; nay in iii. 12 it is said : " He that doeth good (i.e. loves) is of God ; he that doeth evil hath not seen God." If, according to John, God is love, and the whole state of Christianity appears to be comprehended in the saying " Abide ye in my love, even as I abide in the love of the Father " (xv. 10), then love is here " the almighty

love, which cares for and bears all things " and which includes also the knowledge of God.

But although John's line converges more strongly to Plato than does that of Paul, there is still a great deal lacking to a real approach between them ; for the formula that knowledge develops itself step by step from the lower knowledge and passes over into love, is still quite unknown to John. It is to be found first in Valentinus and Clemens Alexandrinus. John stands essentially on the Jewish-theistic line, and his idea of love has nothing to do with the Hellenic Eros, the Amor intellectualis. But he has prepared the way for the latter to penetrate into the sphere of Christian thought, because he has united " to love God " and " to know God," nay, has said that they are one.

#### PART VIII. CONCLUSION.

From John we return to our hymn. Wherein its religious-historical significance rests, may now be said in a few words. In the midst of a culture which in its highest aims was intellectually inclined, and at the same time was occupied with mysteries and sacraments, Paul has given expression, in an entrancing manner and in a language which all could understand, to the fundamental idea of Jesus about love of one's neighbour. Love, namely the love of one's neighbour, is the best thing in the world because it is permanent and eternal ; it stands above all gifts and knowledge that we may attain to, and it has its place beside, nay above the religious virtues, faith and hope. Simple, uncoloured morality is thus revealed as the being of religion itself. Religion is, as with Jesus Himself, brought down from heaven into what is human and necessitous, without losing its divine nature. Fundamental sayings of Jesus have here received a programmatic form born of the deepest experience

of life.<sup>1</sup> Caritas is placed in the centre as the essence of the new religion.

Dilectio summum fidei sacramentum, Christiani nominis thesaurus, quam Apostolus totis viribus Sancti Spiritus commendat : such are the words in which Tertullian, *de pat.* 12, has rightly written of Paul's hymn. The development of the essence of the Christian religion has indeed struck out other paths ; some have determined not to do without metaphysics, and the Christian philosophy of religion has mixed up amor intellectualis with caritas. But, if it has never been forgotten in the Church that caritas—and only that—is the Sacramentum fidei, then, beside the sayings of Jesus, it is Paul's hymn which has chiefly been the cause of this. Through it and with it caritas has victoriously held its place as the principle of religion.

And Paul—as he was not naturally a Hellene, so he never became one ! Who can wonder at the fact, long since remarked, that amongst the numerous ideas which he made trial of—his speculative theology and psychology reduces itself to that—there were some which had sprung from Hellenic ground and were descended from the mysteries ? But these ideas also the Apostle would not have received, if they had not been connected with knowledge that he already possessed by virtue of his Jewish-religious education. He never left this sphere, which indeed was transformed by his Christian experience, but was never given up, and he could never acquire anything Hellenic which did not already possess points of contact in the religious and theological tradition with which he was familiar. The Apostle of the Gentiles always remained, so far as he was not a Christian, a

<sup>1</sup> Jesus, too, speaks of those who prophesy and of those to whom spirits are subject and to whom that is of no use. The sum of the commandments is for him the love of God and one's neighbour, and beside the active manifestation of the latter, the former has very little place.

Jew. That he did remain a Jew, although he so energetically began the process of transferring the new religion into the Greek world, was the source of his strength, and secured him his permanent place in history. His own personal career was wrecked by this attitude ;<sup>1</sup> but that his ideas remained effective far beyond the age of Hellenism, is owing first of all, not to the Hellenic element which is sparingly enough mingled with them, but to the strength with which the Apostle was able to announce afresh the old God of the Jews as the Father of Jesus Christ and to place love in the centre.

A. HARNACK.

<sup>1</sup> See my *Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, Heft IV. (1911), pp. 28-62.

*THE THEOLOGICAL USE OF THE NEW  
TESTAMENT.*

AN INAUGURAL LECTURE.

IT is my first duty—and the duty is a pleasure—to acknowledge the catholicity of spirit which has prompted the authorities of this college to entrust a Scotchman and a Presbyterian with the work of the Yates chair of New Testament Greek and Exegesis. At the opening of the College Dr. Fairbairn claimed that “though created by the Independent or Congregational churches, it has been created in no sectional spirit.” My appointment is a fresh proof that this principle continues to determine the policy of those who are responsible for the organisation of Mansfield ; I am sensible of their generosity, and I feel bound at the outset to explain that although I come to you from different academic and ecclesiastical traditions, I shall endeavour to serve the college and the churches loyally in those interests of scholarship and religion which are dear and common to us all.

“New Testament Greek ” is a convenient rather than an accurate term for the scope of this chair. Our newer knowledge of the *κοινή* has dispelled the notion that the New Testament writers used a special dialect and vocabulary of their own, instead of the Hellenistic vernacular. Besides, the exegesis of these writers takes us back into an age when there was no New Testament. The collective religious authority of the New Testament flows from the rise of the canon, which belongs to the later history of the church and of dogma. Historical exegesis, with its obligation to avoid dogmatic presuppositions or practical considerations in handling the texts, has to discuss the New Testament docu-



ments as part of the literature thrown up by early Christianity. At the same time, even this scientific treatment brings out the features and qualities of the New Testament writings which led to their selection for the purposes of the canon. It also justifies—I would almost go the length of saying that it demands—what may be called the theological use of the New Testament as a collection of early Christian writings which for the most part embody a religious unity.

The very title suggests this. When we speak of the “New Testament” (ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη), the use of διαθήκη is different from that, for example, in the title of the “Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.” The New Testament is not the dying counsel of Jesus. In the fifth century “Testamentum Domini nostri Christi,” the instructions and regulations for church-life are supposed to have been issued by the risen Christ, but even this does not correspond to the sense of “Testament” in the title of the Christian canon; the New Testament contains more than the *ipsissima verba* of the historical Jesus or of the Lord speaking in the Spirit to the prophetic souls of the primitive community. The primary significance of the title is to be found in the fact that the Christian canon was a sequel. It is uncertain when the term “Old Testament” began to be applied by the early Christians to the records which attested the validity of the covenant with Israel and guaranteed its promises. Paul speaks incidentally of “the reading of the Old Testament” (τῇ ἀναγνώσει τῆς παλαιᾶς διαθήκης),<sup>1</sup> but his words do not necessarily imply that this was a contemporary title of the Jewish scriptures. Eventually the usage did come into force, and it paved the way for a similar title, as soon as the authoritative collection of Christian writings required a designation. But the title was more than a verbal inference,

<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. iii. 14.

adopted for the sake of convenience. It served undoubtedly to bring out the contrast or the sequence between the old and the new periods in revelation. Irenaeus, for example, quotes the saying of Jesus about the householder who brought out of his treasure things new and old, and explains that the householder is the Lord, while the things old and new unquestionably mean the Law and the Gospel. But it is essential to recollect that the term *διαθήκη*, as applied either to the Christian religion or to its canonical records, had a larger import. Upon the one hand, like its Hebrew equivalent *bērîth*, in the later stages of the Hebrew literature, it could denote primarily the promise of God by which He binds Himself to His people at any specific epoch in their religious history. "The term *bērîth* had a charm and power, and was clung to, partly because it expressed the most solemn and unalterable assurance on God's part that He would be the people's salvation, and partly, perhaps, because it suggested that He acted with men after the manner of men, graciously engaging Himself to them, and entering into their life."<sup>1</sup> The emphasis, therefore, falls not on mutual obligations so much as on the gracious disposition which determines the attitude of God to men at any historical crisis of religion. Our popular use of "covenant" corresponds to *συνθήκη* rather than to the fundamental notion of *διαθήκη* as a term for the Christian religion, where the notion of compact or agreement is subordinate to that of the divine resolve. Thus Paul prefers to bring out the element of promise and grace in the divine *διαθήκη*, an element which is obscured in an English equivalent of "covenant," and in so doing he conserves what is vital in the conception. But *διαθήκη* was as flexible a term as our modern "will" or "disposition." Associations of will or testament hovered round it in other

Professor A. B. Davidson in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. i., p. 514.

quarters, and these, for all their suggestions of formality, helped to deepen the element of decisiveness—an element which, like that of promise, expressed the personal initiative of God in the history of revelation. The Latin equivalent, *testamentum*, at once acquired a vogue in this connexion within the western church, and the connotation of “New Testament” thus arose. Melito of Sardes is the earliest writer who is known to have used the Greek form. We may infer, therefore, that it was coming slowly into circulation, but long after the middle of the second century. By the time of Tertullian, the <sup>2</sup>Latin form was apparently current, though not yet absolute.

Primarily, then, the title was due to the name already assigned to the Jewish canon which had been the Bible of the early church. The “New” Testament suggests at once a religious contrast and a continuity with the “Old.” Christians, it was felt, inherited by a secure title the promises of God which had formed the hope of religion in the past; the death of Jesus was for them a pledge of God’s irrevocable good-will, a proof of His character as the God of love acting freely within history, such as the Old Testament had not been able to furnish.

The title, therefore, had more than the significance of an antithesis. It indicated and vindicated a positive estimate of Christianity as the religion whose *διαθήκη* is embodied in the New Testament writings, and embodied as a divine act of revelation through the person of Jesus Christ. In our popular vocabulary “the Testament” means the Christian scriptures. The trend of religious feeling which has led to this abbreviation was felt almost as soon as the canon arose. In this one way the early Christians concentrated the interests of faith upon the New Testament as *the* Testament, and interpreted the Old Testament by Messianic and allegorical methods as a prediction of the later covenant, when the

divine will became effective through Jesus. The inheritance of religious privilege to which they believed they had fallen heirs was summed up in the new order of sonship which Jesus had inaugurated. It was His person and spirit which were fundamental. Philo, anticipated by at least one writer in the Old Testament,<sup>1</sup> had already interpreted *διαθήκη* as a symbol or rather an embodiment of the sheer grace of God. "There are all sorts of covenants, apportioning graces and gifts to the deserving," he remarks, "but the highest kind of covenant is " God himself."<sup>2</sup> This tendency to heighten the personal, divine element in *διαθήκη* naturally appealed to the early Christians. Justin, for example, more than once identifies Christ with the new covenant. "What is the covenant of God? Is it not Christ?" "An eternal and perfect law and a faithful covenant is given to us, even Christ."<sup>3</sup> This is to read the notion of "covenant" in the light of Christ, not to read Christ in the light of older conceptions of *διαθήκη*, and the New Testament literature, in its deepest reaches, moves under the same impulse. The Christianity it embodies has no guarantee outside what Jesus was and did. It attests a religion which is bound up with the significance of the impression made by His teaching and personality. It implies that the binding force of our religion as a tie to God depends upon His character as expressed by Jesus. And this is what I mean by a theological use of the New Testament—not an identification of the significance of Jesus with the precise doctrinal forms which that assumed in apostolic or post-apostolic thought, not a pious play of fancy upon the title of the New Testament collection, but an approach to the documents, along the avenues of historical and literary criticism, which brings us face to face with the

<sup>1</sup> The author of Isa. xlii. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *De mutatione nominum*, 6, 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Dial.* 122, 10.



decisive place of Jesus for them and for ourselves. We get behind the conception of a New Testament canon. But what we do not get behind is the impression that the New Testament, in spirit as well as in name, is a collection of documents which witness directly to a new and final order of sonship inaugurated by Jesus Christ for men. That witness is conveyed in the record of interaction between experience and reflection. The experience is spontaneous, and so is the reflection, more or less, in its own way. Both lie open to our criticism, but it must be criticism with a sense of perspective and proportion, which does not lose sight of the fact that these documents claim to be the classical texts of a new religion, and of a new religion dominated by the spirit of Christ. This is what furnishes the ultimate criterion for their appreciation, and so enables them to furnish us with the standard and the elements of a theology which is definitely Christian.

Such a theological use of the New Testament is organic to its purpose and structure. The historical method has shown that it is a theological abuse of the New Testament to manipulate proof-texts in support of some later creed or to construct a speculative religious philosophy and then sprinkle it with New Testament phrases. But its work has been constructive as well as critical. By distinguishing the Christian message from the dialect in which it had to be made intelligible for the first Christian century, it has enabled us to recognise afresh that while we are bound to criticise the New Testament writings as theological no less than as literary products, they verify a religion which lives to criticise our later theories as well as our practice of it. This is one of its properties as a reality in the sphere of historical religion. For here as elsewhere reality is not simply what resists the efforts of our clever fingers to treat it as if it were a lump of wax. Reality thrusts itself upon our conventional and



traditional interpretations. It will neither be modernised nor treated as antiquarian. It refuses to be stereotyped. It startles us repeatedly with an unsuspected vitality and range of appeal. The New Testament claims to certify such a reality in the history of religion, and a theological use of the New Testament is successful, not as it is satisfied to discover some adequate formula, ancient or modern, for this divine power of life in the person and spirit of Jesus, but as it enables us by the processes of linguistic research and historical imagination alike to feel intelligently the authentic rush and thrill with which that redeeming reality broke upon the first Christian century and prompted men to think out its supreme significance.

In a word, the very title of the New Testament contains a theology in itself. I do not mean, of course, that research into the religious ideas of the New Testament would justify us in making anything like the later federal theology a norm for the Christian religion. As a matter of fact, the conception of a covenant occurs only once in the extant words of Jesus. It was the conception of the divine kingdom which appealed more to Him, possibly because it had fewer legal associations, possibly because it lay more in line with the eschatological interests of the gospel. But both conceptions were social and redemptive, and ultimately both ran up into the same belief in a new relation between men and God the Father. Consequently, when Jesus spoke of His death at the last Supper as the inauguration of the new covenant, it is probable that this isolated saying means that he was viewing the establishment of the kingdom for once in the light of the older category. Even the presence of the term "new" in the Supper-saying is not beyond the range of controversy, though it is the less likely to be a Pauline addition since the notion of a new covenant cannot be said to have been one of Paul's cardinal religious categories

even in his anti-Judaistic reading of the Old Testament history. It is in Hebrews that the new covenant idea is worked out most explicitly, with an infusion of the testamentary element in connexion with the death of Christ, but it is curious that no allusion is made by the writer to the famous Supper-saying. Irenæus, the last and indeed (with the exception of Clement) almost the only one of the early fathers to employ the covenant-idea in the philosophy of religious history, develops his view quite independently of Hebrews. So far as I recollect, he never mentions that epistle in this connexion. It was not from the phraseology of the New Testament writings, therefore, that the early church applied the title of "New Testament" to its canon of Christian scriptures. The mere idea of the covenant was not important enough, theologically, to suggest a cognate name for the collection. The latter was due to the larger complex of ideas which found partial expression for the supreme significance of Jesus in the traditional conception of religion as a covenant or a succession of covenants. When we interpret *διαθήκη* in the sense already outlined, we are in a position to recognise that it did express legitimately the significance of what the author of the epistle to Diognetus calls "this new development or interest <sup>1</sup> which has entered life now and not formerly." The absorbing interest of the New Testament is this entrance of the divine will into human life and history through Jesus Christ. The new development is exhibited in a variety of aspects, but essentially as a good will of forgiveness and fellowship which is valid and permanent because Jesus has realised the conditions necessary to the revelation of God's true character and to the fulfilment of His aims for men.

"Trennen und zahlen lag nicht in meiner Natur" ought

<sup>1</sup> Lightfoot's rendering of *καινον τουτο γένος ἡ ἐπιτήδευμα*.

to be a cry of penitence, and not a paean, on the lips of a New Testament critic. He must analyse ideas as well as documents. Nevertheless, however we may criticise the forms which the valuation of Jesus as Lord assumed within the early church—and even the Pauline form abides our question—these represent the outcome of a vital experience due to the spirit of Christ. A theological use of the New Testament, in the modern sense of the term, reveals diverse conceptions of the Christian faith within the rapid development of early Christian speculation. We find serious antinomies and lacunae. Particularly in the investigation of the synoptic gospels and of Paulinism, where the problems of New Testament theology meet us in their sharpest form, we are confronted with approaches to the person of Jesus which appear at first sight to be almost contradictory. It is not easy to speak briefly on this intricate subject without appearing to be summary and hasty, but it would be disingenuous to say nothing. I can only confess that I do not find evidence for believing that somewhere within the thirties and forties of the first century Christianity suffered a sudden or gradual *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* and that Paulinism or the enthusiasm of the apostles was wholly responsible for the intrusion into the synoptic record of those strata which imply that the new faith was something more than a spiritual form of theism *plus* brotherly love promulgated by a singularly devout Jew. The object of New Testament theology is not the consciousness of Jesus but the faith of the Christian religion, its origin under the creative influence of Jesus, its effects in the individual and in the community, and its implicates for a Christian view of the world. Faith implies revelation, and the God of Jesus is the fundamental source of revelation for our theology. But historically and exegetically, I think, it can be shown that the faith of Jesus contains the germs of what may be called a Christology. The genetic relation of that Christo-

logy to Paulinism and to the conceptions of the Fourth gospel is another matter. But in view of the eschatological interest and the Messianic self-consciousness of Jesus, I fail to see how the impulse which created the latter theologies, with their faith in Jesus, can be described as absolutely irrelevant to the faith of Jesus Himself. The theology of the New Testament runs up repeatedly into Christology, and the problem of problems is to determine how far the essential elements of the synoptic Christology or of the more speculative reconstructions in Paulinism and the Fourth gospel are organic to the person of Jesus. This is neither the time nor the place even to outline that issue. I would merely point out in passing that the central doctrine of the Spirit in Paul, for example, may be viewed, in one aspect, as an attempt to express, in terms of contemporary psychology, the religious conviction that Jesus Christ has placed men in a relationship to God which furnishes them not simply with new moral and spiritual ideals, but with a new nature for the realisation of these ideals. Along lines like these the study of the New Testament justifies the instinct, although it may not always corroborate the arguments, which led the early church to entitle its collection "the New Testament." In a word, it is more than the canonical title or authority of the "New Testament," it is its contents, especially the gospels and Paul, which put us into the proper focus for seeing not only that they are susceptible of a theological use but what is characteristic in that use. "Things," as Hooker used to say, "are always ancients than their names." This religious aspect of the New Testament writings is formulated in their canonical title. But it is older than its formulation. It is as old, we may claim, as the first line of that early Christian literature.

I should be sorry in one way, and relieved in another, if all this seemed to you like underlining the obvious. But



what has been before my mind in taking up the duties of this chair has been the danger of the new scholasticism, which is apt to leave us engrossed with almost anything in or around the New Testament except the meaning of its religion. The scholastic theology of the middle ages had at least the merit of being alive to the interests of the faith. It was an attempt to restate the significance of the Christian doctrine in terms of Aristotelianism, and although the scholastic theologians, as Döllinger puts it, "without the elements of Biblical criticism and dogmatic history, possessed only one of the eyes of theology," they managed with their one eye to render some singular service to their religion. Our new scholasticism has Biblical criticism enough, but in poring over linguistic and textual details it may lose the vision of what really counts in the New Testament literature. This tendency is due in part to reasons with which one has genuine sympathy—to the increasing need of specialisation in research, to an impatience with the desire of pressing the texts into the service of piety or dogma, to a conscience for historical perspective in exegesis, and to an exhilarating sense that New Testament criticism has at last succeeded in vindicating its right to the academic privilege and principle that knowledge, however technical or remote, is its own end and reward. So it is. But it is part of knowledge to know what is most worth knowing, in any department. The most real thing in the New Testament is its religion, and the more severe our philological and literary methods, the more essential it is that these should be handled in such a way as to converge upon the theory or theology of that religion. Otherwise, we may know about the New Testament, but we do not know it; at any rate, we do not know it in the sound sense of knowing the spirit through the letter.

It would be small gain to escape from the bondage of theories about the verbal inspiration of the New Testament



only to fall into an uninspiring preoccupation with words and texts. The *religionsgeschichtliche Methode* has at least helped to avert that danger, although it also has been too prone occasionally to concentrate attention upon what is odd and incidental, to undervalue the power of great personalities over current ideas in its emphasis upon the law of historical relativity, and above all to forget that the main point with regard to such Oriental conceptions or semi-mythical religious forms as we encounter in the primitive Christian theology is not where they rose or what was their original shape, but what Christian thinkers took them to mean and made out of them for the specific purposes of a creative faith. Such a method, however, is able to correct its own extravagances. So is the psychological method, which is its correlative in historical New Testament research. It is along these and other lines that we can protect ourselves against the new scholasticism, not by relaxing in the slightest degree the technical discipline of the lower criticism nor by ruling out any literary or archaeological investigation which contributes to the scientific knowledge of the New Testament's origin and environment. All such contributions have their place and value in a theological school. We believe here that the most practical equipment for life is sound knowledge. Only, knowledge must be of the relevant. New Testament Greek and exegesis have a circumference which is to-day more fascinating and varied than ever, but they have a centre. And I would feel tempted to consider the work of this chair a comparative failure if men did not leave<sup>1</sup> their New Testament class with the conviction that although we have to ask many questions about the gospels, some of which cannot yet be answered with any degree of certainty, the supreme question which the gospels put to us is *What think ye of Christ?*—and that they present us with sufficient materials for answering this question as it ought to

be answered by those who find within the New Testament the elements of a religion which is religion and of an adequate theology because they have learned to recognise in outline, however darkly, what is Christ's estimate of Himself in relation to God and to the world of men.

JAMES MOFFATT.

*FURTHER STUDIES IN THE EPISTLE OF ST. JAMES, CHIEFLY SUGGESTED BY DR. HORT'S POSTHUMOUS EDITION.*

I. 19, ἵστε ἀδελφοί μου. Hort's note on this is, "St. James has the form οἶδατε in indicative (iv. 4) οὐκ οἶδατε ὅτι ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου κ.τ.λ., and probably used this shorter and sharper form to mark the imperative. The N.T. writers commonly use οἶδατε, but ἵστε occurs in two other places, Ephesians v. 3-5, Hebrews xii.14-17, both of which gain by being taken imperatively." In the former Dr. Armitage Robinson follows the A.V. and R.V. "Let fornication be not even named among you. . . . For *this ye know* of a surety that no fornicator . . . hath any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ." I cannot help thinking that, if the Ephesians were capable of appreciating the rule laid down, "Let it not be even named among you," they could hardly need to be taught that a fornicator hath no inheritance in Christ's kingdom. This latter truth they know already; it is the foundation upon which St. Paul builds his special precept in ver. 3. That precept requires the imperative, while the indicative alone is suited to the principle on which the precept rests. In the second passage the R.V. has, "Follow after sanctification, lest there be any fornicator or unclean person, as Esau, who for one mess of meat sold his birthright. *For ye know* that, even when he desired to inherit the blessing, he was rejected." Here the imperative would be just as unsuitable as in the former case. Jews did not need to be taught the story of Esau, but simply to be reminded of what they already knew. Similarly in St. James I understand ἵστε as indicative, "All this ye know; act upon your knowledge." Since it is through the word we are begotten from above, let us receive it with

meekness. H. argues that as the form οἶδατε is used for the indicative in ver. 4, the form ἴστε could not have been used in the same sense by the same writer ; but we find the two forms ἔστω and ἦτω both used by St. James as imperatives of εἰμὶ (i. 19, v. 12), and ὁράτε, which is always imperative in the other books of the N.T., is found only in the indicative in St. James. The imperative form ἴστε seems never to be found in biblical Greek, its place being usually taken by γινώτε. On the other hand, ἴστε is indicative in 3 Macc. iii. 14 (Ptolemy's letter).

II. 1, μὴ ἐν προσωποληψίαις ἔχετε τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν τῆς δόξης. I am glad to find that H. follows Bengel in taking τῆς δόξης in apposition with τοῦ Κυρίου. I think, however, that he is mistaken in regarding μὴ ἔχετε as interrogative, and in his explanation of τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Κυρίου. The former he translates "Can you really think in your acts of partiality that you are holding the faith? I prefer to render it, "Do not have your faith in personal respects," i.e. "Do not you who call yourselves believers in Christ disgrace your faith by exhibitions of partiality." H. thinks "this gives rather a tame sense, and gives no exact sense to the phrase ἐν πρ. ἔχετε." On the other hand, my objection to Hort's rendering is that it is simpler to take ἔχετε as an imperative, especially as it begins a new section of the Epistle, and it is the manner of the writer to introduce each new topic with a clear heading, usually in the form of a precept,<sup>1</sup> and then to enforce it in a variety of ways. It certainly cannot be said that, taken interrogatively, the sentence gives an unmistakable meaning. On first reading, it suggests that those addressed are not guilty of respect of persons. And the following γὰρ, which, if we take ἔχετε as imperative, gives a warning against respect of persons, as involving worldly-mindedness and unrighteous judg-

<sup>1</sup> See my *Introduction*, pp. cxxx., cclviii.

ments, is hard to explain, if we take ἔχετε as a question, "Can it be that you are guilty of partiality?"

Hort's note on the following words τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Κυρίου is "The two most obvious senses of the genitive here are the subjective, the faith which our Lord Himself had, and the objective, the faith in Him. . . . The latter is not supported by any clear parallels and gives a not relevant turn to the sentence." "Even Mark xi. 22 is not so much 'have faith *in God*' as 'have faith *from God*.'" I cannot myself feel this, and I think besides that the following passages favour the objective force of the genitive, Acts iii. 16 τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ἐστερέωσεν τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, Rom. iii. 22 δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, Apoc. ii. 13 οὐκ ἡρνήσω τὴν πίστιν μου. It seems to me that this view is confirmed by the frequent use of the prepositions εἰς, ἐν, ἐπί, in place of the genitive, and by the array of texts which speak of faith as belonging to man, such as "Great is thy faith," "Thy faith hath made thee whole," "O ye of little faith," "All things are possible to him that believeth," "If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed."

II. 5, ὁ Θεὸς ἐξελέξατο τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ πλουσίους ἐν πίστει. Hort's note is, "The meaning is not 'abounding in faith,' which would weaken the force of πλουσίους in this connexion, but 'rich in virtue of faith.'" The nearest approach to this phrase in the N.T. occurs in Ephesians ii. 4 ὁ Θεὸς πλούσιος ὢν ἐν ἐλέει διὰ τὴν πολλὴν ἀγάπην αὐτοῦ . . . καὶ ὄντας ἡμᾶς νεκροὺς τοῖς παραπτώμασιν συνεζωοποίησεν τῷ Χριστῷ, to which no reference is made by H. It is evident that "rich or abounding in mercy" is the true sense here, just as in 1 Timothy vi. 17, 18 the true sense is "Charge the rich not to put their trust in uncertain riches, but in God, who has enabled us to be rich (abounding) in good works." It is the dative of the sphere, not of the



cause. Compare *Hermas, Sim. ii. 4* ὁ πένης πλούσιος ἐν τῇ ἐντεύξει, καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχει ἢ ἐντευξίς αὐτοῦ παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ.

II. 6, ἔλκουσιν ὑμᾶς εἰς κριτήρια. Hort's note is "the word κριτήρια may mean 'suits,' but better, as sometimes, 'courts of justice,' though we should have expected ἐπί rather than εἰς." For examples of κριτήρια in this sense compare Plato, *Legg. vi. 767 B* δίο δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔστω κριτήρια (the one for private, the other for public actions), where Stallbaum quotes Polyb. ix. 33 κοινὸν ἐκ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καθίσας κριτήριον. For εἰς see Plato, *Phaedo 273 B* εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγεσθαι, *Gorg. 521 C*, etc.

II. 8 εἰ μέντοι νόμον τελεῖτε βασιλικὸν . . . καλῶς ποιεῖτε. H. allows that μέντοι generally keeps its ordinary meaning "however" in the N.T., but thinks that, here and in Jude 8, it may mean "indeed." The words of St. Jude are ὁμοίως μέντοι καὶ οὗτοι σάρκα μιαίνουσιν, where οὗτοι refers to the heretics who follow the example of the men of Sodom and the fallen angels, though they know full well how these were punished. "However" seems to give the required sense both here and in St. James, where the context is "You ill-treat the poor whom God has chosen to be inheritors of his kingdom, and you pay court to the rich who oppress you and drag you before the tribunals." This respect for the rich may, however, proceed from a good motive. If you are filled with the spirit of love, ready to forgive injuries, and win your persecutors over to a better mind, it is well; but if you act thus from no better motive than respect of persons, it is sin. H. criticises this explanation in the following terms: "An intelligible adversativeness is obtained by supposing St. James to be replying to an imagined plea of the Jewish Christians that they were showing their love to their neighbours by their civility to the man with gold rings. It is hardly credible, however, that

so absurd a plea, of which there is not the least hint in the text, should be contemplated by St. James." At any rate forgiveness of injuries was not only contemplated, but commanded, by our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 44), and such a conflict of laws might well raise doubts in the minds of Jewish converts, which St. James may have felt it incumbent upon him to clear up.

II. 18, ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις Σὺ πιστὶν ἔχεις καὶ γὰρ ἔργα ἔχω· δεῖξόν μοι τὴν πίστιν σου χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων, καὶ γὰρ σοὶ δείξω ἐκ τῶν ἔργων μου τὴν πίστιν. Hort may well call this an extremely difficult verse. The preceding verses had shown that the same principle held good in a profession of faith as in a profession of philanthropy: without corresponding actions, a mere profession is worthless. Even supposing there could be real faith apart from its works, how is it to prove its reality if it is not attended by works? Whereas one who has good works thereby shows that he has faith also. Again, what is it you believe? and what is the effect of that belief? You believe that there is one God. The devils believe the same, and the effect of their belief is simply to produce terror. On the other hand (here I understand James himself to intervene), take the case of Abraham as a type of the faith which justifies. You will always find it co-operating with his works.

I have said nothing as to the phrase ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις, which is commonly used to introduce an interruption by an objector, as in 1 Corinthians xv. 35 ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις, πῶς ἐγείρονται οἱ νεκροί; in my note I have endeavoured to show that the same phrase might be used to introduce an interruption by a supporter, such as "Nay! a man shall say (may go so far as to say)." I have, however, not yet succeeded in finding an exact parallel for such a use of the phrase. H., who understands the words ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις to be spoken by an objector to St. James' doctrine of works,

gives the following paraphrase, "Thou, James, hast thou faith, that thing which thou slightest in me? I for my part, as well as thou, have works; I do not allow that I have no works, I have works of the law in addition to my faith: can you conversely say that you have faith in addition to your works?" St. James then "begins his reply with the words *δειξόν μοι*, attacking the notion that faith and works are two separate things." My objection to this way of taking the passage is that the Greek is too much cut up into snippets (*Σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις; καὶ γὰρ ἔργα ἔχω. δειξόν μοι τὴν πίστιν σου χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων κ.τ.λ.*), that it is very harsh to take *σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις* as a question, and that too much is understood in the English. The first two clauses, as read by H., make two distinct and opposed sentences. As I read them they make only one sentence, preparing the way for the imperative which follows. I do not think that *καὶ γὰρ* can mean more than "and I." To express "I for my part" we should require *ἐγὼ δὲ* in answer to *σὺ μέν*. I understand *δείξον* to be spoken by the *τις* of ver. 18, whereas H. thinks that James here breaks in.

III. 3 *ὅλον τὸ σῶμα αὐτῶν μετὰγομεν*. "*μετάγω*, as commonly used, means 'to transfer.' Apparently here simply in the sense of leading (?) not from one place to another, but from one direction to another, though it is not satisfactory to have no clear authority for it." H. Compare Luc., *Dial. Deor.* xx. 8 *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν τις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτέρας θεᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐτέραν μεταγάγοι τὴν ὄψιν*, Stob. *Floril.* p. 280 (ascribed to Aristippus) *κρατεῖ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ὁ ἀπεχόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ χρώμενος μὲν, μὴ προεκφερόμενος δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ νεῶς καὶ ἵππου οὐχ ὁ μὴ χρώμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ μετὰγων ὅποι βούλεται*.

*Uses of αἰτεῖν and αἰτεῖσθαι.*

IV. 2, 3. *οὐκ ἔχετε διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς; αἰτεῖτε καὶ οὐ λαμβάνετε διότι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθε, ἵνα ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὑμῶν δαπανήσητε*. "It is remarkable that the middle is used

here and in the next line, but the active between (them). *αἰτέω* is properly to ask a person ; what is asked for being often added in a second accusative : it is, as it were, 'to petition.' *αἰτοῦμαι* is properly to ask for a thing ; the person asked is sometimes also inserted, but rarely." H.

It is to be noted (1) that in this passage the verb, in both voices, is used absolutely, so as to preclude the application of the test, that the meaning is determined by the nature of the following object ; (2) that the rule is contradicted by the statement, which follows shortly afterwards, that the accusative of the thing, not of the person, is to be supplied after the middle, as well as after the active, as shown in the translation "Ye have not (what things ye desire) because ye ask not (for them) : ye ask (for them) amiss that ye may spend them, etc." ; (3) that (according to H.) it is impossible to explain the contradiction between *μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι* and *αἰτεῖτε* in vers. 2 and 3, by difference of active and middle. "St. James could never mean to say that they did *αἰτεῖν*, though they did not *αἰτεῖσθαι*" : and yet we are told just before that the words have different meanings, that *αἰτεῖν* means properly to ask a person, and *αἰτεῖσθαι* properly to ask for a thing.

It seems to me that the distinction here laid down is not in accordance either with the usage of the N.T., as shown in Luke i. 63 *αἰτήσας πινακίδιον*, Acts iii. 2 *αἰτεῖν ἐλεημοσύνην*, xvi. 29 *αἰτήσας φῶτα*, or of profane Greek : *μισθόν*, *λόγον*, *χάριν* follow *αἰτεῖν* in Plato. It is contrary to the teaching of the Greek grammarians quoted in Stephanus and in Sturz, *Lex. Xen. s.v.* where Favorinus is cited for the dictum *αἰτοῦμαι τὸ μετὰ παρακλήσεως αἰτῶ καὶ ἰκετεύω*, as well as the scholiast on Aristoph., *Plutus* l. 156 (*αἰτοῦσιν οὐκ ἀργύριον οἱ χρηστοί*) to the same effect : *αἰτοῦμαι τὸ αὐτὸ <τῷ αἰτῶ> ὥσπερ ποιῶ καὶ ποιῶμαι, πλὴν ὅτι τὸ μὲν αἰτῶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ζητῶ, τὸ δὲ αἰτοῦμαι τὸ μεθ' ἰκεσίας*. Besides



these, Sturz quotes Ammonius and Thomas Magister for another distinction (asking for a loan, as opposed to asking for a gift) which, though not applicable to our present purpose, is yet borne witness to by the practice of the best authors, τὸ μὲν αἰτῶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅπαξ τι λαβεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀποδοῦναι· τὸ δ' αἰτοῦμαι ἐπὶ τοῦ χρήσασθαι εἰς ἀπόδοσιν. Cf. Thuc. vi. 46 τά τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέστης ἑκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ ξυλλέξαντες, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγύς πολέων αἰτησάμενοι, and Lysias 154, 24. This meaning is of narrow scope as compared with the others, but is often found in business documents, as in the Greek papyri.<sup>1</sup> Sturz gives a long list of passages in which αἰτοῦμαι is used in prayers to the gods or in earnest entreaty to men. And this distinction is not a mere matter of usage, but flows naturally from the subjective and intensive or dynamic force of the middle, as seen in αἰρῶ and αἰροῦμαι, φράζω and φράζομαι, ποιεῖν and ποιεῖσθαι, ἰδεῖν and ἰδέσθαι (cf. the grammars of Winer, p. 319 foll.; Krueger, § 52, 8, 10; Donaldson, pp. 432-453; and Viteau's Essay, *Sur la Syntax des Voix*, in the *Rev. de Philologie* for Jan. 1894, pp. 1-41). This special

<sup>1</sup> Blass, who admits this comparatively unimportant distinction, gives a very unsatisfactory account of the wider distinctions noticed in Stephanus and Sturz, and even says (*Gr. of N.T.*, p. 186) that a son's request from his father or a man's petition from God is usually expressed by αἰτῶ. I quote one or two examples from Aristophanes on the other side, *Ranae*, 1126, 7 Ἐρμὴ χθόνιε πατρῷ ἐποπτεύων κράτη, σωτὴρ γενοῦ μοι σύμμαχος τ' αἰτοῦμένῳ; *Vesp.*, 555. 6 ἱκετεύουσιν θ' ὑποκύπτοντες, τὴν [φωνὴν] οἰκτροχοοῦντες· οἰκτειρὸν μ' ὦ πατέρ, αἰτοῦμαι σ', εἰ καὶ τὸς πάποθ' ὑφείλου. Of course exceptions may be found. The special middle sense is a refinement upon the old active, in which it was originally included, as μεταπέμπω, "to send after," is often used by Thuc. in the sense of μεταπέμπομαι, "to send for." In the verse of St. James, which we are considering, as well as in i. 5, 6, we find αἰτεῖν, as well as αἰτεῖσθαι, used of prayer to God, and in Matthew vii. 11 we have πρόσφ μᾶλλον ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς δώσει ἀγαθὰ τοῖς αἰτοῦσιν αὐτόν; The shorter and simpler form is used, where there is no danger of mistake. Another strange perversity of Blass is that, while allowing "the N. T. writers to be perfectly capable of preserving the distinction between the active and middle," he still considers that these distinctions are arbitrarily set aside by St. James in iv. 2, 3. Compare Moulton in his *Prolegomena to N.T. Greek*, p. 190.



force of the middle *αἰτοῦμαι* is excellently shown in the pathetic appeal of the Plataeans to the Spartans (Thuc. iii. 59. 2 foll.) *ἡμεῖς, ὡς πρέπον ἡμῖν καὶ ὡς ἡ χρεία προάγει, αἰτούμεθα ὑμᾶς, θεοὺς τοὺς ὁμοβωμίους καὶ κοινούς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπιβοώμενοι, . . . καὶ ἐπικαλούμεθα τοὺς κεκμηῶτας μὴ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Θηβαίοις, μηδὲ τοῖς ἐχθίστοις φίλτατοι ὄντες παραδοθῆναι . . . ἐπισκῆπτομέν τε μὴ Πλαταιῆς ὄντες . . . ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων χειρῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας πίστεως, ἰκέται ὄντες, ᾧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, παραδοθῆναι* : and again in the like appeal of the Spartan envoys to Athens, when they were in similar straits after the disaster of Sphacteria (Thuc. iv. 18) *γινώτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας νῦν συμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες οὔτινες ἀξίωμα μέγιστον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔχοντες ἤκομεν παρ' ὑμᾶς, πρότερον αὐτοὶ κυριώτεροι νομίζοντες εἶναι δοῦναι ἐφ' ᾧ νῦν ἀφιγμένοι ὑμᾶς αἰτούμεθα*.<sup>1</sup> Contrast this use of the middle with that of the active in i. 27 *αἰτεῖν Θηβαίους χρήματα*, viii. 44, 85, *αἰτεῖν δίκας* i. 140, *αἰτεῖν ἀναίρεσιν τῶν νεκρῶν* vii. 72.

We now proceed to consider how this characteristic force of the middle voice tends to explain the contrast between *αἰτοῦμαι* and *αἰτῶ* in James iv. and similar passages. As opposed to the middle, the active suggests outward action as opposed to inward feeling. Thus *αἰτῶ* means prayer of the lips, as contrasted with prayer of the heart. The meaning, then, of the sentence will be "You have not, because you do not pray with the heart. You pray with the lips, and receive no answer, because your heart's prayer (however correct your words may be) is not prayer for what

<sup>1</sup> So far as there is any truth in the view that the middle *αἰτοῦμαι* goes with the accusative of the object, this is to be explained by the fact that earnest entreaty is aroused rather by the thought of the object desired than of the person from whom it is sought ; but, as we see from the appeal of the Plataeans, the feeling for or against persons may greatly intensify the longing for the object.

God wills, but for worldly and carnal objects which He has forbidden."

Other passages in which *αἰτῶ* and *αἰτοῦμαι* are contrasted are Mark vi. 22-25, where Herod's thoughtless promise to the daughter of Herodias is expressed in the words *αἴτησόν με ὃ ἐὰν θέλῃς*, and again with an oath *ὃ ἐὰν με αἰτήσῃς δώσω σοι ἕως ἡμῖνους τῆς βασιλείας μου*. The determination of Salome to make the most of the opportunity is shown by her going out at once to consult her mother (ver. 24, *τι αἰτήσωμαι*), and returning with her mind fully made up to demand John's head in a charger (ver. 25, *καὶ εἰσελθοῦσα εὐθὺς μετὰ σπουδῆς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ᾗτήσατο*). In Matthew's shorter account there is no contrast, the word for ask (*αἰτήσεται*) only occurring once. Similarly the ignorant request of the other Salome for her sons (in Matt. xx. 20-22), is introduced by the words *προσκύνουσα καὶ αἰτοῦσά τι παρ' αὐτοῦ*, while the true meaning of her request is introduced by the words *οὐκ οἶδατε τί αἰτεῖσθε*, and there is the same change in Mark x. 35 foll., where the verbal request is marked by *αἰτεῖτε*, and our Lord's interpretation (ver. 38) by *αἰτεῖσθαι*. So in John xvi. we have the contrast between the prayers of the disciples before the outpouring of the Spirit, ver. 24 *ᾗτήσατε οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου*, and the prayers which should follow the outpouring, ver. 26 *ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου αἰτήσεσθε*. Compare also 1 John v. 14 foll. *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ παρρησία ἣν ἔχομεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐὰν τι αἰτώμεθα κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ, ἀκούει ἡμῶν, καὶ ἐὰν οἶδαμεν ὅτι ἀκούει ἡμῶν ὃ ἐὰν αἰτώμεθα, οἶδαμεν ὅτι ἔχομεν τὰ αἰτήματα ἃ ᾗτήκαμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*, where the general sense seems to be "if we pray in spirit and in truth according to His will, we know that we have the objects of our petitions."

This distinction between the active and middle of *αἰτέω* is confirmed by glancing at Redpath's Concordance of the

O.T. The word does not occur at all in Genesis. In Exodus the active is found four times, always in reference to the Israelites asking for jewels from their Egyptian neighbours. In Deuteronomy the middle alone occurs, once of prayer to God (xviii. 16), once of God's demands upon Israel (x. 12) *τί Κύριος αἰτεῖται παρά σου, ἀλλ' ἡ φοβείσθαι Κύριον*. In Joshua the middle is used several times of requests for land, water, etc. : the active never. In Judges we find the active in similar petitions, except in the case of Gideon, who begged the people to give him gold earrings out of their spoils, to devote to God (viii. 24). In 1 Samuel the middle is always used of the prayers of Hannah, but the prayer for a king is sometimes referred to in the active, sometimes in the middle. In 2 Samuel xii. 10 the active is used of David calling for bread ; in 1 Kings ii. 10, 20, 22 the middle is used of the petitions of Adonijah and Bathsheba to Solomon. In 1 Kings iii. 5, 10, 11, 13 the middle is used regularly of Solomon's prayer for wisdom ; in x. 23 of the Queen of Sheba. In Job vi. 22 we have Job's scornful answer to Eliphaz, *μήτι ὑμᾶς ᾔτησα* ; " did I make a request to you," and immediately afterwards the middle is used, *οὐ παρ' ὑμῶν ἰσχύειν αἰτοῦμαι*, " it is not from you that I look for help." A similar contrast appears in Isaiah vii. 11, 12 *αἰτήσαι σεαυτῷ σημεῖον παρὰ Κυρίου . . . καὶ εἶπεν Ἀχαζ, οὐ μὴ αἰτήσω οὐδὲ μὴ πειράσω Κύριον*, " Pray for a sign from the Lord " . . . " I will not make any request, or tempt the Lord."

JOSEPH B. MAYOR.

*PERSONALITY AND GRACE.*

## VI. FAITH.

THE question now is, where are we to find a beginning? If grace is just another name for the dealings of God's love, yet if, as has been maintained, a doctrine of grace should not operate with love at all, with what material must we start to build? The answer that grace works by faith may easily seem more orthodox than obvious. Why should faith have that pre-eminence among the graces? If grace is just the working of love, why, in spite of all that has been said, should not the response it requires also be the working of love? Or if, owing to deficiency in ourselves, that is impossible, is it not by hope that we should advance to a more perfect state?

The answer, to some extent, has been already given. The reason is simply that as God would stand to our souls, not merely in a relationship of grace, but in a gracious relationship, we ought to commence with the recognition of that fact. To begin with love might only mean the recognition of an impersonal influx of God into the soul, whereas to begin with faith is to recognise that God's whole relation to us is one of personal love.

Faith works by love and for that matter also by hope. It is trust in a love of God not yet realised or even perfectly manifested. But without passing through faith, without going through our personality, as it were, in that indirect curve, love would neither be ethical nor spiritual. It would only be an emotional affection of the mind always in danger of degenerating into sentiment. Unless it come through a personal relation of trust, it never can be a personal regard, reverencing God for Himself and man for what he has of God's image. Faith in short is the right

beginning precisely because it means beginning with God, not ourselves.

It is possible, however, to begin wrongly with faith as well as with love. We may expect it also as an influx and cherish it as the merit whereby God saves. It then ceases to be faith, just as love, as an influx and a merit, ceases to be love in any ethical and spiritual sense. In the one case as in the other the eyes are turned away from God and directed to ourselves. Faith then becomes a state of feeling which has to be cherished and cultivated; and that task constantly leads to a mixture of excited emotions, stimulated confessions and suppressed intellectual convictions. The result is moral insincerity and religious unreality.

There is only one right way of beginning with faith. That is to begin with an object which constrains belief. Unless, when we consider the object, belief itself arises, unless, when we consider the object, we have no need to constrain belief but cannot help believing, faith has no reality. We have, in short, no right to believe in anything except in so far as it impresses us as true. To try to impress ourselves contrary to the impression of the object itself, is to forget that truth is the basis of all moral motive and reality, of all religious victory. The sacrifice of sincerity and of the sense of reality can, therefore, never be the way to true faith. A true faith, in the last issue, is simply faith in the truth because it convinces us that it is true.

Unbelief may be a perilous moral state, but that is not because we have failed to suppress criticism or contrary convictions. To attempt any such thing is also a perilous moral state. In the strict sense unbelief is not even wrong because we have not tried to believe. We have no right to believe anything we can avoid believing in, if we give it due freedom to convince us. Unbelief is never wrong



except on the one condition that by some kind of hypocrisy we ward off the impact of truth upon our spirits.

The question, therefore, is, what object of faith exists belief in which can only be averted by some kind of juggling with our own response to it? We fail to see that relation of the object of faith to our belief because we speak of the object of faith abstractly as the love of God and look for its operation not here and now but in a life with other conditions than ours. We do not, however, really believe that God is love till we believe that love is God, till, in whatever weakness we meet it, we can say here is omnipotence. To see that by our own insight is to have faith.

Jesus brings faith to a practical issue by making the object of faith the blessedness of the Kingdom of God. That is the touchstone of all His teaching, the proof that men have known and believed.

By adopting the forms into which we have analysed personality, we might speak of the object of faith as, first, the blessedness of a right self-consciousness. The note of it is being poor in spirit. With that goes grieving and meekness—a heart responsive to man and submissive to God. To be poor in spirit is not to be weak or succumb to life, but to be strong and victorious over life through the assurance that all our life comes from God. In that way we are masters of our whole self-conscious world, because all that comes into it comes from God, from love.

Second, it is the blessedness of the right self-legislation. The note of it is hungering and thirsting after righteousness. Not a stern, hard conscience, but only unsatisfied reaching after the infinite righteousness can direct us aright. This also has a human side. It has learned to pity not condemn. That is the true, the vital note which no merely moral doctrine of conscience can strike. Also it has a divine side. The pure in heart see God, not surely for self-satisfaction, but

in order that all our moral ideals should lose their boundaries and look out upon the infinite.

Finally, there is the blessedness of the right self-determination. Blessed are, not those who are at peace, but those who make peace. That also has a human side. It involves being persecuted for righteousness' sake and having all manner of evil said against us falsely. We shall know that our will is on the side of the right kind of peace when we meet its foes, and we shall know that it is master of all our fears when we can face them and be at peace. It has also a Divine side. As it is a prophet's victory, it will have a prophet's reward. Nowhere will that reward be found save in the heavens, nowhere, that is to say, except in the very order of love in the might of which we are called to stand.

The ground of that blessedness is simply the discovery that the final order of the world is of love not violence. That discovery is faith, and the man who has it is blessed, because he knows that all the reality he is conscious of is in his own power, because he sees the ideals by which he can direct himself in the midst of it, and because he has conquered the fears by which he might be hindered from determining it.

If any man really have such a faith, it can only be on one ground. He can receive it because he has in some way seen that his true blessedness is in actual reality of that nature. Love somehow must have made its own appeal and have been its own evidence. The question is not how are we to force ourselves to believe, but how, being face to face with the facts, we escape the necessity of believing. How, if love is in reality the final order and the highest security, can we go on believing that the final order can be of force and the final security in wealth and battleships? How can we fall so far from

truth, as to put our faith at times in the manifest fruits of injustice? How can we even be envious at the wicked and contemptuous of the righteous?

The answer is not, as we imagine, intellectual independence. On the contrary, independence of mind is essential to right faith. No man can ever receive it from another. Except he see it for himself, he does not believe it at all. Still less can the hindrance be moral independence. We shall never believe so long as we accept our standard of life from others and refuse to stand on our own feet and let God speak to us.

Not perplexity of any kind but insincerity is our real hindrance. Only the force of God's own appeal as it speaks in life to our own hearts can enable us to believe in that way in God's love. But that appeal hypocrisy alone can ward off. Hypocrisy is just the refusal to allow the deep realities of life to touch us, whereas faith comes through utter openness to reality, for we only truly believe in that about which we are not afraid to ask any question or await any issue. Wherefore, in the Gospels hypocrisy is the only deadly sin, just because it is the one sure way of averting the impact of God upon our souls.

As there could be no joy in sinning without some element of pleasant self-delusion, a measure of hypocrisy exists in all sins, even the most open and flagrant. A libertine may boast of his conquest, but he never allows himself to face the straight issue of what it means. He does not say to himself that he has bought a nobler personality than his own for money which he was not even man enough to earn for himself, nor does he ever look straight at the shadows of degradation and death behind. Indeed gross, open vices are simply nests of self-delusions. Who, for example, ever knew a drunkard, and did not know one who lied to himself? Yet the danger of hypocrisy increases with the respectability

of the sin. Nay there is no need to have any conscious transgression at all, for the most blinding of all hypocrisies is just the amazing spiritual illusion that privilege is merit and not responsibility. In that sense, as Professor A. B. Davidson put it, "perhaps mankind is one large Pharisee."

For that reason, and that reason alone, unbelief is the most universal and most deep-seated corruption in the heart of man. Yet, as faith is not a direct moral act which we should purpose and carry through, unbelief is not directly culpable. Faith is not of ourselves, it is the gift of God, and unless it is the gift of God, it is not faith. Nevertheless, it is not the gift of God in the sense that God implants it in the spirit by a mere arbitrary act of omnipotence. That also would not be faith, for faith is simply our own conviction that a thing is true, and that has no right to be derived from anything but the impression of the object itself. It is the gift of God in the far higher sense that God presents Himself through all His dealings with us as worthy of trust. His manifestation is a gospel, good news which is its own evidence. Yet, if we can only disbelieve it because we have shut our hearts against its appeal, because through wilful self-delusion we have averted its impact upon our spirits, unbelief may be the gravest of all moral situations, for it would mean that we love darkness rather than light.

In the strict sense we have no right to exhort people to believe, and most exhortations of that kind simply leave earnest people painfully and fruitlessly endeavouring to lift themselves by their own waistbands. Then, as their attention is directed to themselves and not to God, they are apt to regard faith as merely a self-maintained state of nervous tension.

But did not Jesus require belief as a condition of His working, and did not Paul say to the Philippian jailer,



“ Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved,” and are not men exhorted to “ Repent and believe the gospel ” ? But Jesus was there, and only asked to be allowed to make His due impression ; repentance is precisely the way in which we put away the hypocrisies which prevent the gospel from being its own evidence to us ; and, finally, the words in Acts cannot possibly, in the circumstances, be more than a summary of Paul’s presentation of the object of belief. Paul’s method at least is not in doubt. He reasoned of righteousness and judgment to come. He reasoned from men’s experience of God’s goodness in life and from their groping after Him. He made reasoned presentation of the significance of Jesus Christ for faith, and he always set that presentation in an atmosphere of humble and sincere dealing with one’s own soul in which alone men can see the things in which they ought to believe.

There is only one right way of asking men to believe : to present to them what they ought to believe because it is true. And there is only one right way of persuading : to present what is true in such a way that nothing will prevent them from seeing it except the desire to abide in darkness. And there is only one further way of helping them : to point out what they are cherishing that is opposed to faith. When all that has been done it is still necessary to recognise that faith is God’s gift not ours, His manifestation of the truth by life, not ours by argument, and that even He is willing to fail till He can have the only success love could value—personal acceptance of the truth simply because it is true.

JOHN OMAN.



*THE FINAL DESTINY OF THE EVIL AND OF  
THE GOOD.*

THE subject of Eternal Punishment has of late fallen somewhat into the background, and other questions have pressed for solution. Echoes of the great controversy of a past generation alone remain to remind us of the stern and eager discussion that arose in the revolt against the generally accepted doctrines of the older Evangelicals concerning the future state of the impenitent. Some of the greatest leaders of thought were engaged in the conflict, including Tennyson and Whittier, poets of the Larger Hope, George Macdonald amongst the novelists, Farrar and Samuel Cox amongst the theologians, all of whom were more or less sympathetic towards, if they were not thorough-going exponents of, the doctrine of Universalism. There were many, however, on the other hand, who whilst their hearts went out towards this movement could not wholly commit themselves to a full acceptance of the doctrine. Even so liberal a teacher as F. D. Maurice experienced the difficulty occasioned by "the boundless power of resistance" in ourselves to the holy love of God, and could see nothing but the darkness that enveloped the whole subject. There were difficulties on both sides, but practically all agreed that as the voice of Scripture was not sufficiently conclusive one way or the other, and that philosophy could yield nothing more than a faint hope and trust, the question must be left as undetermined. They could but fall back upon the assurance that the Judge of all the earth would do right and that somehow good would be the final goal of ill.

Now it seems to us that to have taken one step further would have provided what promises to be a solution, tentative and provisional, at least. And it is this solution that we

are attempting to suggest in outline, somewhat, it must be owned, in abstract form, as it is only in this way that we can deal with ultimate problems. But in order that we may present the destiny of the wicked in the strongest light it will first be desirable to indicate some aspects of the state of blessedness promised to true believers in Christ and those who accept the Gospel message.

Without attempting to collect the numerous passages in the New Testament which refer to the fullness of life which those will enjoy hereafter, who are in Christ, we may very well state that in all cases it is the survival of the individual consciousness and the entire personality that is clearly implied. Not only so, but there will be a "body" provided in order that the personality may not be depleted or impoverished or found "naked." The redeemed ones shall see their Saviour's face, they shall know as they are known, they shall be with Him to behold His glory and share in His triumph. There is no indication whatever of anything approaching to absorption in the Infinite or the loss of personal qualities or personal identity. On the contrary it is life at its fullest and best and the intensifying and the quickening of all the spiritual and personal powers and functions. The blessed ones shall be like their Lord, transformed into His likeness, manifested with Him in glory, with His name written in their foreheads.

This enlargement and realisation of the soul's fullest powers as personal in the ideal must be regarded as necessary from a philosophical point of view. The return of the many into the one is not a loss of the particular differentiations in the universal, but an enrichment by the attainment of a higher synthesis of unity. The individuals will not thus be separated from the totality of being, but they are distinctive and unique, and by the medium of love are brought into fuller reciprocal relations with the Divine. Love in its com-

plete form involves reciprocity between individuals, all of whom are in turn subject and object ; but if the individuals should come to be completely merged into the ocean of being, love would fail for want of subject and object.

This conception of love, with its tendencies and purpose, is, we think, the best corrective to that form of mysticism which leans towards Pantheism. Love defeats itself when it tends to destroy personal freedom. Whatever identity of aim and purpose, endeavour and interest there may be in mutual love there can be no blending of the respective centres of consciousness, else the possibility of reciprocal relations is lost. To become one with Christ and with the Father is to strengthen and deepen those relationships which constitute the unity, and surely every power of the spiritual life and every function of the soul will be developed, matured and enriched in the exercise of a sacred and holy love. So far from the will being lost, merged or superseded, it is in harmony with the law of freedom that what makes for life at its fullest and best leads to perfect the freedom of the will. The will is only fully free when it tends to the development of the highest functions of our spiritual life, or rather freedom is maintained and developed only when its determinations are in the direction of the development of the personality as a whole. Hence the familiar paradox holds good that the will is only perfectly free when it is fully surrendered to the Divine Will.

We hold, therefore, that the future for those who belong to Christ is not a submergence but a true and blessed fulfilment and realisation of the personal self in the life beyond. And, moreover, as Dr. Denney has conclusively shown in his Drew lecture on Immortality, it has to be won. (EXPOSITOR, viii Series. pp. 1 ff., 118 ff.) "To him that overcometh, to him will I give to eat of the tree of life which is in the Paradise of God." The faith that overcomes the world secures

the kingdom. We are to lay hold upon eternal life. In our patience (or our persistence) we come to possess our souls. It is quite clear that faith which determines and involves the surrender of the will to Christ is that which brings out, develops and perfects the essential activity of the soul. Life is won not by quiescence, by passive contemplation nor by ecstatic raptures alone, but by entering upon and by claiming through faith the life which is life indeed.

Let us now turn to the other category, the destiny of the wicked and finally impenitent. Inasmuch as punishment is an ambiguous term we will avoid it for the present and consider the element of suffering in its relation to spiritual conditions. Suffering is related to death in so far as it heralds its approach, and it may prove to be a deterrent and prophylactic. Nevertheless suffering is contradictory to death, inasmuch as there cannot be suffering when death ensues, for suffering involves a certain degree and measure of conscious life. Suffering ceases at death, and we are told that the wages of sin is death.

In a universe ruled by love, even a perfectly holy love, suffering is never an end in itself. It is remedial when vicariously borne, but it is always intended to subserve the ends of health and life. As a deterrent, a prophylactic or a warning its purpose is beneficial, and life is not only maintained and developed, but it is strengthened and enriched through the instrumentality of struggle and suffering. Prolonged suffering may seem to cause death, but it is always open to argue that the disease or injury which causes death produces the suffering as well, and that it would be a far worse condition of affairs if this were not the case.

All analogy seems to suggest that so long as a soul is suffering on account of sin it is not in a finally hopeless state. So long as the conscience is aware of the wrong that is done and is sensible to the loss of God's favour and love, so long



as the soul is miserable on account of irreparable evil wrought in this earthly life, the life of that soul is not really extinct. "Weeping and gnashing of teeth" or even remorse would be impossible, unless there were present the consciousness of shame and guilt, and where this consciousness exists the state of that soul cannot be wholly abandoned. The fear, on the other hand, is that this wholesome state of suffering should finally cease and that the evil come to be felt not as evil but for that soul become its good.

The hope of final restoration and restitution of all lost souls is perhaps fainter than appears to a superficial philosophy. It can hardly be supported with confidence from Scripture, and the philosophical grounds will hardly bear close analysis. It may be that the probational element of this present life is fairer as a test of character and choice than we are disposed to imagine. Whilst we cannot suppose a definite credal test to be submitted to souls in view of the future state, neither can a fixed objective standard of morals be applied. But that there is in every man the consciousness of a distinction between the higher and the lower and an ideal which may be embraced or rejected, and that there is a sense of shame, guilt or dissatisfaction when the higher is refused and the actual falls short of the ideal, can hardly be disputed. The distinction may be relative and vague, but it is there present to the consciousness, and some power of moral choice is possible wherever man as man is found. Christ comes to every man in that ideal in every age and place. The will may be determined in favour of the higher and better self, and it may be sufficient for the present that the impression should be made to give the soul its bent for eternity.

Machinery just meant  
To give thy soul its bent,  
Try thee and turn thee forth, sufficiently impressed.



We do not of course assert that Christ is nothing more than the soul's ideal, still less that there is no need of a revelation of the redemptive work of the Saviour and its due presentation, but that where there is no light but that of the moral ideal, however faint and dim, the Christ does come with His saving grace in the form of that ideal. In ante-Christian days, or in the darkness of heathendom, this moral appeal is presented even though the full truth can only be found in the presentation of the Gospel.

Without that moral choice—the choice of the highest and the best—we know that the soul is bound to deteriorate, and the direction towards evil will tend to be confirmed unless the soul is renewed and sent back upon its choice. Possibly with many the choice of direction is all that can be achieved in this life, but it is sufficient if it is sincere and final, and doubtless the alternatives are more clearly presented than we know, and possibly this power of determination is given to all.

The ground that we have for hope in eternity for those who have lost their chance in this life is very uncertain indeed, especially if we are to be judged not by our actual attainments nor by any absolute standard, but by the direction given to our lives by the choice of the higher, in which we are all helped by God's Good Spirit and the saving grace of Christ, even though we may not fully know the source of the power placed at our disposal.

The penalty of wrong determination is ultimately death. It is the natural result of the final rejection of Christ. If the mercy of God in Christ is unable to change the will, so long as its freedom is maintained nothing in the nature of suffering as such can do this, unless indeed the suffering occasions the sense of need and the consciousness of the loss of God's favour and presence. But even then the choice must be made in the surrender of faith through the power of the

Holy Spirit. But the crucial question comes in, may not the will confirmed and reinforced by habitual resistance hold out through all eternity? Sin is not a mere isolated act, it is a disposition, a direction and determination of the will, and in consequence that of the whole being. And although the perverted will may be in a state of unstable equilibrium, yet we must contemplate the possibility of final resistance. We cannot suppose that if the will of man continues to be obstinately opposed to God that that will can ever be forced without the loss of freedom and of the will itself. What then is to happen in such cases?

Now we know that the repeated and continuous assertion of the will in the direction of evil will ultimately result in the loss of moral freedom. The will is only free to do right in the sense that a right choice alone secures and maintains freedom. A life of successive acts of righteous judgments and decisions is that which tends to develop, perfect and realise the personality as a whole and in consequence to strengthen and mature the freedom of the will. On the other hand, to do wrong is to lose personal power and efficiency and in consequence the freedom of choice. Our personal liberty may be used to curtail and destroy itself, and a man who does wrong often and long enough will come to have no will at all.

What then if in the case of hardened sinners personal freedom is lost in the very nature of things, and in consequence all that constitutes the essential self-hood? The personality that is distinctively an end in itself is lost in the Universal Consciousness, and God's glory which was to have been realised through the personal consciousness finds other ends for its fulfilment. The last state of that man is worse than the first, for he began as a free agent, he finishes by losing his centre of conscious determination. It were better for that man that he had never been born, for the end for which he was born is realised otherwise than by his conscious 'existence.

The forfeiture of one's personal being in the loss of the free will is, we take it, the eternal sin, eternal punishment. The spiritual "stuff" out of which we are created does not pass out of existence necessarily, but it is merged in the totality of being, and is absorbed in the eternal fount of existence. Personal identity, the unity of the distinctive and unique experience is recalled and blended in the universal consciousness.

This is indeed the greatest of all punishments, greater even than eternal suffering, for "who would lose, though full of pain, this intellectual being?" It does not follow, however, that this very punishment may not be a loving, as it is a just, dispensation of the Divine Government. It may be that the lost soul, in wandering through the solitudes of a self-determined isolation from God, is sought and found by the Infinite Love. Whilst the will cannot be persuaded it may be vanquished and compelled to return, but by the compulsion it would lose its distinctive self-hood and be encompassed and overwhelmed by the love which knows no defeat.

This conception of the matter seems to fit into the symbolism of the New Testament. "The worm that dieth not" can hardly mean eternal remorse—it may mean something even worse, eternal loss—the loss and eternal destruction of that divine gift which has become a decaying and destructive element in the world of spirit, the perverted will; thus the worm is for ever destroying that which destroys. The eternal fire, the fire unquenchable, is surely the fire of God's infinite holiness and purity, which shall consume all destructive and disintegrating elements, and in which all impenitent souls shall be absorbed. The fire prepared for the devil and his angels must surely devour in its purifying flame all those forms of being and of force which have opposed the Divine will.

There is no idea of torture here, it is rather the triumph of a holy love in spite of the opposition of human wills and all inimical forces and agencies. God shall be all and in all and the consuming fire shall embrace all being, and even the unwilling elements shall be mastered by its fervent heat. Good will be the final goal of ill, but the will-power which is finally allied to ill must be recalled and overwhelmed in the triumph of good.

This hypothesis may seem to divest the future state of the terrors which it would have for evil-doers, and for the hardened and impenitent. It might seem to be a consoling thought to the careless that it does not signify how we live in this life, as we shall be made good without any trouble in the next. But at what cost? The loss of that which most properly constitutes one's own true and distinctive self. To be made good against our will is the loss of that choice which is the crowning glory of our manhood. To be made good in spite of oneself through the refusal to exercise the power of choice is an unspeakable and an eternal loss. Whether it be felt to be so or not it is in reality an incalculable, an irreparable loss.

This doctrine is not identical with that known as Conditional Immortality. We can all accept the view that eternal life is conditioned by faith in Christ, but that there should be a limited period and varying degrees of suffering for the wicked to be followed by annihilation or extinction seems to be somewhat aimless and purposeless. The doctrine here advocated is not that the impenitent are annihilated, but that their freedom, constantly abused, is recalled and forfeited in the inevitable course of things. Suffering, we think, is never retributive alone, it either leads a soul to turn from that which causes the suffering or it renders the soul indifferent and hardened to the penalty.

Nor are we advocating the doctrine of the Nirvana of Bud-



dhism, still less the Niflheim of the ancient Norsemen. It is neither unconscious existence on the one hand nor nothingness on the other. It is an absorption into the flame of life in which good is determined for us and we become no longer ends in ourselves. Spiritual entities cannot pass out of existence, but they may lose themselves in a higher unity. If there are those of a mystical turn of mind or Pantheists whose dreams seem to resolve themselves into an extinction of personality such as we have described, surely it must be because they have not taken into full account what in their rapture the loss of a distinctive consciousness and personal freedom involves. It would be as we have indicated, the loss of the power to reciprocate the love of God and the heart to appreciate and return that love in full.

In conclusion, it is only necessary to bring the two conceptions of the fate of the wicked and the destiny of the good into contrast. In the one case the divine purpose is accomplished in spite of our wrong determination, in the other we are graciously permitted to share in bringing about that purpose and are included within the divine plan and voluntarily lend ourselves to the working out of God's will. In the one case the end in view in the creation of the living soul is forfeited and frustrated, in the other, each believing soul becomes an end in itself. In the one case the essential nature of the human soul as an originating activity is suspended, in the other, God's glory is consummated in the perfection and fulfilment of our being, and His glory is the triumph of all we have aimed at and hoped and worked for. God has formed us for Himself, and His glory consists in the good, the ultimate good, of those upon whom His love is set.

J. G. JAMES.



*DR. GRAY'S NEW BOOK ON ISAIAH.*

THERE is no more beautiful English word than interpretation, and hard as it is to be an adequate interpreter, whether of races, or of churches, or of literatures, or of classes of society, the pleasure far exceeds the pain. That there are specially great difficulties in interpreting the ancient Scriptures, need not be said. Our latest commentators on the Book of Isaiah are confronting these, and I have no doubt that Dr. Peake (the editor of the main part of vol. ii.) will maintain the high standard set by Dr. Gray in vol. i. It would be impossible to consider here the work of the latter scholar in all its aspects. In tone it is perhaps a little too restrained, but that may well be the result of having to condense so much under different heads. On the whole, the achievement is very satisfactory. I must indeed make one exception, but the implied criticism will undoubtedly be rejected by the great majority of moderate scholars. If, therefore, I express my opinions with decision, it will do my friend Dr. Gray no harm, and criticisms which are rejected now will perhaps bear good fruit after many days.

It was a favourite remark of an adopted son of Oxford, though by birth and education a Jew, that if David and Isaiah were to rise from their graves, they would be highly astonished at the Hebrew writing ascribed to them. This humorous remark meant two things, (1) that an immense amount of corruption has penetrated into the traditional text, and (2) that most of the conjectural emendations of modern scholars have only led us further away from the true text. Now that I am near the end of my active career I can realise the truth of these positions, thanks to the labour consequent on two largely planned works, the Isaiah in the *Sacred Books of the Old Testament*, and a series

of critical articles in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. May I venture to say that Dr. Buchanan Gray thinks very much as I do? At least he speaks in a noteworthy passage of his Preface (p. ix.) of "the numerous uncertainties which appear to (him) at present to beset the text," adding that "few emendations are certain, though many enable us to approximate more closely to the original thought of the writer than do the prevalent conjectural translations of the existing Hebrew text." His view appears to be that, however corrupt many parts of the traditional text may be, there are passages enough where the meaning is sufficiently clear to justify us in determining what the original writer may, to be consistent with himself, have said. Of course, the roots of the proposed emendation must be still visible in the corrupt text. When this is not the case, it is better, with Dr. Buchanan Gray, to leave the true reading undetermined.

While claiming our latest commentator on Isaiah as an ally on the general question of the state of the text, I am far from asserting that we agree as to all aspects of the special question, how to deal with the largely corrupt text. The problem is complicated for those who believe, with Duhm, that simplicity of style affords no universal criterion of correctness. One might have thought it safe to collect the seemingly simple passages of a paragraph or section, and derive from them some hints for the healing of corrupt places. But experience shows that simplicity may be an artificial product. One might also have thought it sufficient much oftener than it is to turn the LXX text into Hebrew to arrive at a nearly correct text, whereas only too often the Hebrew text which really underlies the Greek is not less distant from the true text than the Massoretic. In fact, the study of the LXX as a textual aid is still in its infancy. Even more necessary is it than in the case of the Massoretic text to supplement old methods with new.

We must, therefore, in my opinion, give much more attention to the study of the mistakes of the scribes, and in order to guard ourselves against personal caprice and subjectivity we must perforce adopt some form of the North Arabian theory. It is on these two points that I feel that Dr. Gray and I are most likely to differ, and these points therefore most need discussion. At the same time, I am very thankful for the wide range of our agreement. We are both liable to the same charge—that of destroying the basis of the history of the Old Testament religion, to the discouragement of those who hold to the organic connexion of the Old Testament and the New.

In reply to this charge it is enough to say that the chief motive for studying the Old Testament should be the intrinsic interest of that many-sided book. Whether we solve its literary and historical problems or not, is comparatively unimportant, but whether through our study we become wiser and better men, imports us much. That is the whole matter. There is no better introduction to the problems of the science of religion than is afforded by the historical and psychological study of the Old Testament writings. To have worked at these problems makes a man truly wise, truly competent to express himself on the religious problems of our own day—problems which are history in the making. We may or may not attain to a permanently satisfactory scientific solution, but the eye of our mind will have been cleared, and the moral discipline of putting truth above all other considerations will be of priceless value for our higher culture. May we not say that, while mere critical theories “have their day” and perish, the love of truth is eternal?

We need not, then, be upset at finding that there is great uncertainty about the Hebrew text of the Old Testament. The next question is, How does Dr. Gray deal with the most testing cases in Isaiah i.-xxvii.? One such case is certainly

offered by a passage in Isaiah's earliest prophecy (ii. 6), where the traditional Hebrew text has—

For thou hast forsaken thy people,  
The house of Jacob,  
For they are full from the East,  
And are diviners like the Philistines,  
And with the children of foreigners they. . . .

Every line of this suggests a controversy. The passage was already corrupt in the time of the LXX, but Dr Gray ventures to adopt one of that version's characteristic readings, "for his land is full," instead of "for they are full." His own special contribution is, the substitution of כנענים "Canaanites," i.e., "traders," for עננים "diviners." He states the case thus:—

"If we look at the wider context, another question arises, viz., Is any reference to soothsaying or the like probable? By a conjecture discussed (elsewhere) this is obtained. Judah (or Israel) has become a busy commercial people, thronged with foreign traders; hence flows wealth, which is expended on munitions of war, and the manufacture of handiwork to which, instead of Yahweh, the people pay worship." He has strong doubts as to the legitimacy of the combination of the Philistines and divination. This is ingenious, but would have been more cogent if it had been possible to show that there was a similar reference to commerce in the parallel line. Dr. Gray himself, however, admits that this cannot be done. I wish that he had also seen how clearly יִשְׁפִּיקוּ, "practise sorcery," underlies יִשְׁפִּיקוּ. Nothing is more common than the confusion of כ and ק, and a transposition of letters such as is here presupposed. I venture to add a translation of my own text which has in essentials been before the world for about five years.

For Yah has forsaken his people,  
. . . the house of Jacob,  
For they are diviners like the Ethbalites,  
And practise sorcery in Yerahme'el.



It will be noticed here that **מלאו מקדם** and **נכרים** are unrepresented in the above. The former combination of words is probably a gloss on the words that underlie the obscure **יְלִדֵי נְכָרִים**, viz., Yerahme'el Rakmanim; the latter word is itself probably a gloss, while **יְלִדֵי** for **יְרַחמֶאֱל** is justified by a whole group of passages in which **יְלִיד** or **יְלִידִי** must be a corruption of the regional **יְרַחמֶאֱל**.<sup>1</sup> As for **מלאו מקדם**, I grant the improbability of such a phrase; "his land is full of . . ." is what we should have expected. We ought also by this time to know that **מלא** is often a fragment of some popular form of "Yerahme'el,"<sup>2</sup> such as "Armal" (cf. the ethnic miswritten le'ummim in Isaiah xli. 1). **מקדם** is undoubtedly a corruption of **רקמים** or **רקמנים**, just as **נכרים** is.

Dr. Gray, too, does not scruple to omit superfluous words; **מקדם** and **כַּפְלִשְׁתִּים** are both unrepresented in his corrected text. But he does not (so far as I can see) attempt to account for them. On the other hand, that revised form of the text which is suggested by the present writer's North Arabian theory does account for them, and effects this without yielding to the temptation of calling any single word superfluous. The whole verse means that Yahweh has given up Israel because Israel has given up Yahweh. Of this apostasy of Israel the grand proof is the prevalence in Israel of divination, which is due to the addiction of the Israelites to the religious practices of the Ethbalites—apparently the nearest branch of the Yerahme'elite or N. Arabian race. There is no doubt a lacuna in the expression of the poet-prophet's meaning. For the prophet certainly considers that by adopting N. Arabian religion the Israelites will soon vie with their N. Arabian neighbours in worldly power. How can this be? Isaiah does not explain it. But the problem is not very obscure. The gods of the N.

<sup>1</sup> See *Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel* (1905), pp. 247 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. "Micaiah the son of Imla."



Arabians must have been regarded as patrons of civilisation and its luxuries, and of such luxuries Isaiah and his disciples were the sworn opponents. Another difficulty found by Dr. Gray has been already mentioned—it is the connexion of divination with the Philistines. But if, as I think that I have shown, there has been a great confusion between the Pelethites—or rather, the Ethbalites—and the Pelishtim, this objection falls to the ground, for the Ethbalites (i.e., the Ishmaelites) and the Yerahme'elites were the same race, and the Yerahme'elites were certainly great in all abstruse religious lore.

All this is not of merely scholastic or technical interest. It requires to be made widely known that there were two religions among the Israelites; the most popular of these was, in all essentials, identical with the N. Arabian. One part of the popular religion was probably the belief in a supernatural divine-human Being who was to deliver Israel from its foes, and rule over the people of Yahweh in restored Paradise. This becomes very plausible, if "soured milk and honey shall he eat" (Isa. vii. 15) can be equivalent to "he shall begin his career as an inhabitant of the divine garden," and if the *'almah*, whose child this great Being is, can be regarded as, in the original form of the myth, a virgin-goddess.<sup>1</sup> If only one might re-write the whole of the supposed Messiah-passage so as to fit in with a popular Messiah-myth, one might turn out a much more satisfactory piece of exegesis. All that we can do is to indicate the various possibilities suggested by phrases of the traditional text, and if one feels free to do so, to reconstruct a more plausible text.

Isaiah vii. 14–16 is, therefore, a highly testing passage, and not least from the point of view of textual criticism. There is, as it seems to me, no theory which enables us to do

<sup>1</sup> See my *Bible Problems* (1905), pp. 71–91.

justice to every statement of the passage, and we are, therefore, compelled to apply the more approved critical methods, new and old, to this possibly much corrupted text. Dr. Gray certainly does his best to be just to competing possibilities, but, owing to his prejudice against new text-critical methods, he offers no contribution to the recovery of the original text. This is what he says on the text-critical question.

“The ambiguities and awkwardnesses of the passage are so numerous as to give little hope of reaching an interpretation that will command general assent; and under these circumstances even the dogmatic or traditional Christian interpretation will doubtless continue to find defenders, while others may infer that the text has been deeply corrupted and must be reconstructed by bold and extensive conjectures (see Cheyne, most recently, in the *Two Religions*, 309 ff.).”

I think the critical section of the notes on vii. 14-16 would have been even more thorough than it is, if some idea had been given to the reader of the conclusions which I have reached, and of their grounds, and I take the liberty of referring the reader to pp. 314-316 of the book called *The Two Religions of Israel*, and of adding one more correction here. It relates to the troublesome word *‘almah*, “a girl of marriageable age.” As I have mentioned, I regard the prophecy in Isaiah vii. 16 as an announcement of the birth of a son to Isaiah. The parallelism of the prophecy in viii. 3b cannot be ignored, and if so, we may, without rashness, attempt by critical methods to bring העלמה, and נְבִיאָה nearer together. Now, we know of several names for the population of N. Arabia, and among these are אמלים (Amalites) and צִבְעֹנִים (Zib'onites). There is nothing inconceivable in Isaiah's being married to a N. Arabian woman; not all Yerahme'elites were forsakers of Yahweh. The prophet in vii. 14 and the narrator in viii. 3 both mention that Isaiah's

wife was a N. Arabian, the one calling her העלמה (or perhaps העלמיה) "the Amalite," and the other צבאוניה, "the Zib'onite."

Dr. Gray does not hold the Immanuel prophecy to be Messianic. He agrees with Robertson Smith, and most of those recent scholars (including myself) who approach the subject from a philological point of view, that the children—not the child—spoken of are normally born human beings, who will be, each of them, a sign, inasmuch as they will receive, and deserve to receive, the memorial name Immanuel, "God (is) with us." I for my part still hold that, if Isaiah vii. 14 *has to be* translated, Prof. Robertson Smith's version must be the right one. If, however, besides grammatical accuracy, complete naturalness is always essential in translation, then the version referred to is certainly wrong. But I have only time to add one more remark, viz., that the religion of Isaiah and of the prophets of his school was diametrically opposed to the notion of a Messiah.

If this be the case, a still more trying consequence (to many people) is that a fine passage, Isaiah ix. 1-7, which is certainly Messianic, must be denied to Isaiah, and given up to some unknown exilic or post-exilic writer. I do not assert that this is the only argument for a late date of this passage, but it is certainly the argument which, for me, carries most weight. Dr. Gray too inclines to a late date. He does not, however, contribute much to the correction of the text, and there is, therefore, perhaps less cogency about his argument than might be desirable. To me, five out of the eight quatrains of the poem appear to contain North Arabian regionals and ethnics. For instance, the very doubtful words, סאון, רעש, and שכמו, and ער may most satisfactorily be thus explained. To confine myself to the Messiah's name, I venture to think that Dr. Gray might have had better results if he had applied the N. Arabian key. The leading ideas are

surely that the Messiah will conquer N. Arabia, and rule righteously over the united dominions of Judah and N. Arabia. Dr. Gray's version of ix. 4 differs in no important respect from the well-known Authorized Version. I venture to submit a version of my own revised text. Verse 4 (5) falls, as Dr. Gray also thinks, into two quatrains.

For a child has been born to us,  
A son has been given to us,  
And dominion is over Kashram,<sup>1</sup>  
And his name is called [over Ashmar].<sup>2</sup>

The mighty hero  
Hath swallowed up Šib'on,<sup>3</sup>  
The potentate of Arabia,  
The prince of Shalem.<sup>4</sup>

There are a number of points here which invite a more lengthy consideration than can be given in footnotes. I think it would have made the commentary more stimulating if some hint of these problems had been given, but I admit that in point of quantity Dr. Gray is not open to criticism, and that to have given space to a record of heretical views might have depressed some readers. I must confess, however, that I hope that the author makes a wrong estimate of his public.

I find no difficulty myself in saying that even where I most differ from Dr. Gray, I can recognise and appreciate the combination of learning and common sense, which is perhaps one of this esteemed scholar's most striking characteristics.

<sup>1</sup> Kashram (often miswritten Kasdim) is a popular substitute for Ashhur-Aram. See references in the index of *The Two Religions of Israel* and *The Mines of Israel*.

<sup>2</sup> יִשְׁמָן in the original text was probably followed by עַל-יִשְׁמָן, "over Ishman" (=Ishmael).

<sup>3</sup> Šib'on, a derivative of Ishmael, is a name for N. Arabia.

<sup>4</sup> The traditional text has *shalom*. The confusion of *shalom* with *shalem* is also visible in Judges vi. 24, Mic. v. 4 ("that is, Ishmael"). *Shalem* comes from Ishmael.



The present volume closes with chaps. xxiv.-xxvii., which Dr. Gray describes as "an Apocalypse of Judgment on the World, and of Yahweh's reign and glory." Later on, however, the title, "Apocalypse" is reserved for xxiv., xxv. 6-8, xxvi. 20 f., xxvii. 1, 12 f. All the parts of the singular compound which we have in chaps. xxiv.-xxvii. are, Dr. Gray thinks, post-exilic, even xxvii. 13, in which a captivity in the lands of Asshur and Mišraim is spoken of. Of course, the passage might conceivably be an Isaianic fragment, though Isaiah was not usually a prophet of consolation. But Dr. Gray holds that here, as in Ezra vi. 22, "Asshur" is a term for the Persian empire. He adds a reference to Isaiah xi. 11; Hos. xi. 14, Mic. vii. 12, Zech. x. 10 might also be parallel. I am very sorry, but surely this is far too arbitrary, nor can I think that language was given us to conceal thoughts. If I understand right, Asshur or Ashhur was one of the names in the Old Testament for N. Arabia, either in its totality or in its more distant parts. In *The Decline and Fall of the Kingdom of Judah* I have sought to indicate some passages in which this view of Asshur is inevitable; among such passages must, as I venture to think, certainly be included Isaiah xxvii. 13. I have said nothing yet about verse 12, and will here only note that, as in Judges xii. 6, *shibboleth* (which Dr. Gray here doubtfully renders 'current,' should probably be *shōbal* (i.e., Ishmael). Both verse 12 and verse 13 are clear upon the N. Arabian theory and upon no other; there was a N. Arabian as well as a Babylonian captivity, as I have sought to show at length in *Mines of Isaiah Re-explored*.

While gladly recognising the fullness and accuracy of the commentary on Isaiah xxiv.-xxvii., I think that honourable mention might have been conceded by the editor to this no longer new theory. For let us consider how much it explains. In xxiv. 14 there is one very strange statement,



"For Yahweh's majesty they cry aloud from the sea";  
and another in the next verse,

"Wherefore in the lights glorify ye Yahweh."

All that Dr. Gray can find to say is that *from the sea* "may mean *from the west*," though this limitation of jubilation would be curious and that though "it is very doubtful whether *the lights* means *the East* as the region of light," yet "some term for East in antithetic parallelism with *the isles of the sea* (ver. 15*b*), i.e., the West, may very well have stood here." From the later point of view, however, it is certain that here, as in xxvii. 1, *yam* is a short form of *yaman* (= *yāwān*), and possible that both *urim* and its corruption *'iyyim*<sup>1</sup> are shortened forms of *asshurim*. Of course, these readings imply that there was a N. Arabian captivity; but why should we not frankly confess that the N. Arabian theory may be right? I will only add that Isaiah lxvi. throws much light on this passage. The jubilant ones in ver. 14 are the Jewish exiles in the more distant parts of N. Arabia who (in ver. 15) call upon those N. Arabians who have survived the great judgment to glorify the God who "only doeth wondrous things." I am bound to add that, though in general Dr. Gray keeps his eyes wide open for Babylonian and Assyrian illustrations, he says nothing about the great eschatological myth borrowed from Babylon, directly or indirectly, by Israel.<sup>2</sup> It is a myth of the destruction of the world issuing in a fresh creation, and therefore Dr. Gray is quite justified in rendering *'eres* "earth." The earth, however, for these Hebrew writers is virtually confined to the peoples most nearly related to the Judaïtes, i.e., those of N. Arabia, and the city which is to be "broken" is the capital of the leading people of that region. It is a question, however, whether *'eres* might not more correctly be rendered

<sup>1</sup> The phrase "*'iyyê hayyām*" presumably comes from *'Yr-Yaman*.

<sup>2</sup> See Zimmern (*KAT*, part ii.), and cp. Cheyne, *Mines of Isaiah* (1902).

“land,” by which would be meant the united countries of the Abrahamic peoples, which had still a keen consciousness of this affinity (cp. Isa. xix. 26 f.). And further, it is a question whether תבל has not come from אֶתְבַּל, i.e. Ethbal = Ishmael. “It was not Yahweh’s will that any of those kindred peoples should altogether perish. Sifted they would have to be, but not broken. A general dissatisfaction with their unprogressive cultus would have to arise, and would, for N. Arabia, be only wholesome.” For have they not “transgressed laws, overstepped statutes, broken the eternal covenant” (xxiv. 5)? From the beginning God has communicated with these favoured peoples, and they have rejected the revelation of His will.

There were some Israelites, then, who could not believe that there was a hopeful future for the N. Arabian races, and, again, there were others who held with equal firmness that those dangerous nationalities would be extinguished. One of the latter is, I think, the writer of those grim words in xxv. 8a, “He hath annihilated Ishmael for ever” (מֵוֹת from אֶתְמוּל = Ishmael). Ishmael is the author of the sorrow of all the subject peoples. Dr. Gray would, in my opinion, have done well to have mentioned this possibility. But how can I wonder that he has regarded primarily the public of teachers, and avoided so-called eccentricities? Nobly has he acquitted himself of his task.

T. K. CHEYNE.

## THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.

### XVIII. THE SAINT AS KING.

IN the view of Paul the world lay round man like a sea of storm and vicissitude, in which each human being lived his life staggering onward from one danger to another, no sooner free from one trouble than involved in another. Everything was fleeting, changeable, constantly varying. Yet, in the words which have already been quoted,<sup>1</sup> Paul "sighed as scarcely any other has done beneath the curse of the transiency of all that is earthly." It was true, yet not the whole truth, to say that for the saint the world around was just as evanescent, incalculable, and unintelligible, as it was for the sinner. The salvation which he had already gained did not lie in this human life. Although he was remade, recreated, re-constituted, in Johannine phrase born again, yet human life continued to be as much as ever for him a stormy sea—"afflicted on every side, fightings around, fears in the mind"—apart from all external discomforts, was the more wearing anxiety for his converts and the sympathy with and participation in the troubles of every individual and of every congregation.<sup>2</sup>

The Stoic ideal of the truly wise man, the true *philosopher*, who was wholly superior to fate and to his surroundings, calm and unruffled amid whatever tempests howled around him, absolutely untroubled by the troubles which overwhelmed others—an ideal which in different expressions was characteristic of later Greek philosophy generally,—Paul did not approve. His heart was only more open to suffer

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Section IX. from Steffen, *Zft. f. d. N. T. Wissensch.* 1901, ii. p. 124, after Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Cor. vii. ; compare xi. 28.

with others, and more intensely sympathetic with their trials, "Who is weak, and I am not weak ? who is caused to stumble, and I burn not ? " The philosophic ideal of passionlessness and *Ataraxia* was infinitely remote from his mind. The relief for which he sighed did not lie in that direction.

There was, however, a peace attainable in another direction. "The fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control." <sup>1</sup> The peace which is thus gained lies at the opposite pole from *Ataraxia*. Through infinite sympathy with suffering comes freedom from suffering. One is thus brought face to face with another of the Pauline apparent self-contradictions: by going infinitely far in one direction you find yourself at the opposite pole. Yet this is a truth of nature and of physical law. A poet who believed himself to be absolutely anti-Christian, although his attitude towards the world and the emotions of his heart were made possible only through centuries of Christian teaching, expresses in a striking antithetic form a truth that is similar and illuminative. Good, the more it is divided, is just the more multiplied, so that each subdivision is larger than the original whole. Evil, the more it is divided and participated in by others, becomes less, until it may thus be entirely eliminated from the world. That, says the poet, is the hope of the future, which alone makes life possible for those who comprehend the horror and the deterioration and ruin of the world around us. The thought is not that of Paul; but it is the expression from a wholly different standpoint of a similar moral principle and an "eternal law." Its antithetic expression aids in the understanding of Paul's expression, yet its carefully balanced antitheses are the very opposite of Paul's style. In Paul the antitheses are not balanced against one another: they are the outcome of different moods and frames of mind, stated

<sup>1</sup> Gal. v. 22.

at different times, and rarely brought intentionally into juxtaposition.

Mind from its object differs most in this :  
Evil from good ; misery from happiness ;  
The baser from the nobler ; the impure  
And frail from what is clear and must endure.

If you divide suffering or dross, you may  
Diminish till it is consumed away ;  
If you divide pleasure and love and thought,  
Each part exceeds the whole ; and we know not  
How much, while any yet remains unshared,  
Of pleasure may be gained, of sorrow spared.

SHELLEY, "Epipsychidion."

Thus, after all, the Stoic ideal of the wise man is realised through Paulinism, but in a different direction by voyaging over the sea of life to an opposite side. That the Stoic paradox, "the wise man is the king," was not very far distant from Paul's mind is probable. "If by the trespass of one *man* death was king through the one, much more shall they that receive the abundant gift of grace and of righteousness be kings in life through the one Jesus Christ."<sup>1</sup> We have preferred to translate "be king" rather than "reign," as this comes nearer the root idea of the Greek verb, and also because it shows a certain lingering of the Greek philosophic saying in Paul's mind. Paul's thought is Hebrew, essentially and fundamentally, right through from beginning to end ; and yet it has risen through Judaism to a higher level and a nobler stage, so that Hellenism was capable of being ennobled to harmonise with it. Paul's essentially Hebraic religion was expressed by him in forms and language which might be comprehended by the Greek mind ; and he was able to express it in such forms and words, because he had been brought up amid the surroundings of a Hellenised Tarsus and had shared in the society and the education of a Graeco-Roman life.

<sup>1</sup> Romans\_v. 17.



This is the perfection of missionary teaching, to make intelligible an alien religion to a foreign people, not by diluting it or by transforming it, not by watering it down or by assimilating it to the thought habitual to the foreign mind, but by stating it in the most complete and uncompromising form, yet in such a way that it is possible for the foreign hearer to rise towards it in his habitual line of thinking.

There is a plane to which all perfectly natural and honest thought can be raised. On that plane Pauline teaching is expressed. No truth is inconsistent with such teaching. Paul emphatically states and maintains that in the Gentile thought there was truth, even the highest, indeed the sole kind of truth, viz., truth about the character of God and man's relation to Him : " Gentiles, having not law, are law unto themselves ; in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness in accordance, and their reasonings in inmost meditation accusing or else defending,"<sup>1</sup> as they weigh their own action in silent thinking about right and wrong. In such a passage as this Paul had in mind the teaching, and possibly the actual lectures, of Athenodorus of Tarsus and similar philosophic teachers. A philosophy which could teach the little that is quoted from Athenodorus was fundamentally true, and could be developed into hearty sympathy with Paulinism, if only it developed freely and naturally.

I should not hesitate to see in 2 Timothy ii. 12, " If we suffer with Him, we shall also be kings along with Him," a later influence of the thought in Romans as it had remained

<sup>1</sup> Romans ii. 14 f. The above translation appears to give the true sense. The American Revision properly disconnects this from ii. 16 (which Westcott and Hort closely connect). There is no reference to the judgment day (as the punctuation of the two great English editors would imply), but to meditation by thinking pagans over their conduct. II. 13 is continued by ii. 16, while ii. 14, and 15 are parenthetical. The true connexion is disguised both in the Authorised and in the Revised Version.

always in Paul's heart. The expression in that passage is an echo of Romans vi. 8, "But if we died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Him"; but the thought is modified by the idea of kingship which was in Paul's mind a few verses earlier, verses 14 and 17. The form which Paul chooses was intelligible to the Greeks, because they had always before them the philosophic principle that the truly good man "is a King." Paul raises this principle to a higher level, but keeps the phrase. The passage in Timothy is not a quotation made by some later Paulinist from a church hymn which had been taken phrase by phrase out of Paul; it is a fresh expression of Paul's own favourite thoughts in slightly varying phraseology.<sup>1</sup>

The influence of Greek thought on Paul, though real, is all purely external. Hellenism never touches the life and essence of Paulinism, which is fundamentally and absolutely Hebrew; but it does strongly affect the expression of Paul's teaching. Further, it lends to Paulinism the grace and the moderation, the sense of where to stop and how to avoid overstating, which is natural to Paul. It gives to him also that strong sense of the joy of the Divine life, which he expresses most emphatically to the Philippians, "Rejoice always," and to the Galatians,<sup>2</sup> but which is characteristic of him everywhere, even amid his equally strong sense that the Divine life is an unceasing strain and a struggle against trial after trial, which taxed his powers daily to the utmost.

Paulinism is essentially Hebrew; but it is Hebraism exalted to a new level. What is added to it is what specially fitted it to reach the European and the Greek world specially; but this addition was not Greek, or derived in any way from

<sup>1</sup> Although neither the English nor the American Revision favours the view, yet in 11, "Faithful is the saying" is an emphatic adjunct to the impassioned statement of verse 10.

<sup>2</sup> See Gal. v. 12, quoted on p. 558. Philippians iii. 1, iv. 4, ii. 18.

Greek philosophy, though it answers the questions of that philosophy. It was the true and proper development of Hebrew religion to its highest standard, and not a syncretism of Hebraic and Greek elements. Yet it was attained in the process of answering the great questions which had been raised by the contact of Judaism with the Graeco-Roman world.

### XIX. FAITH AS A POWER.

The consciousness of power, energy, strength, is one of the most characteristic features of the Christian experience and life, as they are described by Paul. "According to the power that worketh in us" is the range of our achievement, "above all that we ask or think" (Ephesians iii. 20). So he declares in Philippians iv. 13 "I can do all things in Him that strengtheneth me." The energy is the Divine element in the man, present from the beginning, making man originally in the image of God, but weakened, obscured, apparently almost extirpated by sin and misunderstanding of the nature of God (yet never wholly and finally extirpated), and needing to be reinvigorated by the process that begins with the apprehension of the work and meaning and power of Jesus.

The Gospel which Paul preaches is not in word but in power. Hence he hated mere empty talk and vain discussion about even the highest subjects: they distract the attention of men from the real work of life: they tend to degenerate into quibbles of words, and empty logomachy. What he urges and desires and prays for in his converts is that they may be "strengthened with all power, according to the might of His glory . . . bearing fruit unto every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God" (Colossians i. 10 and 11).

This power, therefore, is co-extensive with "the know-

ledge of God." The power and the knowledge grow together stage by stage : the one cannot increase without the other increasing. What is from one side knowledge of God is from another side action like that of God. Such knowledge is not abstract theory or mere passive thought. It is not gained by a process of acquisition, like the growing knowledge of mathematics or languages. It is gained instantaneously through the power of God seizing and holding fast the nature of the man. It is in a sense perfect and complete from the first, because the man instantaneously sees God once and for all time, because he grasps instantaneously the nature of God and of his relation to God. Yet in another sense it can grow continuously and indefinitely, not by becoming more complete and rounded in whole than it was at the first, but by expanding on all sides, and filling up more effectively the activities of the man, and enabling him to carry his activity into a wider range of relations with the world around, and thus, as it were, making him realise with growing completeness the relation of the Divine nature to the whole universe, and the way in which the Divine nature fills and interpenetrates and constitutes men and history and everything that is.

This knowledge begins from completeness and culminates in completeness : the growth lies in the increase of energy and mastery, because its nature is energy. It begins in the recreation of a human mind and character : "ye have put off the old man with his doings and have put on the new man, that is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of Him that created him" (Colossians iii. 9-10). New creation is everything. Nothing else, neither ritual nor want of ritual, is of the smallest consequence in this rebirth of the human energy, "but new creation" (Galatians vi. 15).

This aspect of the knowledge of God is, of course, rightly stated and emphasised by many writers. We would, how-



ever, not regard this as a sort of corollary or additional chapter to an account of Paulinism. This constitutes and is Paulinism : this is the essence of the teaching and Gospel of Paul. If we speak of adoption, and justification, and the imputing to man of the righteousness of Christ, all these are merely attempts to explain the nature of the inexplicable and the Divine : they are metaphors, and some have become poor metaphors to us, though they were rich and instructive metaphors to a former age. They have in large degree lost their meaning to us ; and the study of Pauline teaching frequently degenerates into a study of past methods and old attempts at an explanation of Paulinism. Paul had to drive home into his hearers some conception of what he was aiming at ; and in the attempt he had to use their ways of looking at the world, and to work on their habits of thought. No one knew so well as he knew that this was unsatisfactory and imperfect. Hence he always turned from the theoretical side of teaching to the practical : he exhibited to them the knowledge of God in the process of exerting itself actively : “ he placarded before them the crucifying of Jesus ” (Galatians iii. 1) ; “ he preached Christ crucified ” (1 Corinthians i. 23).

There are two instructive variations of the fundamental truth in the letter to the Galatians :

## V. 6.

For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision ; but faith working through love.

## VI. 15.

For neither is circumcision anything, nor uncircumcision ; but new creation.

The second explains the first definition, and the first explains the second. The whole Epistle was written in one mood of feeling, at one time, and in the same white and fervent heat of passionate enthusiasm ; and the two phrases



which conclude the two definitions are reiterations of what Paul felt so deeply. In vi. 15, writing with his own hand, he is briefly recapitulating the gist of the whole letter ; and just as was customary in placarding laws and ordinances and public documents,<sup>1</sup> he puts in large letters the most important points. So with this point. "Faith working through love" is equivalent to "a new creation."

This energy of the Christian is the Spirit of God working in him. What is sometimes called by Paul faith working in him is at other times expressed as the Spirit of God. These are equivalent terms and ways of making clear the one fundamental power. I do not call it the one fundamental *fact* ; because it is urgently important to remember that there are no facts, no hard stationary situations : there are only acts, processes, force, energy. There is the power of evil, "the flesh," "the devil," sweeping away the nature of man from God ; and there is the power of faith, i.e. the Spirit, seizing him, renewing his mind (Romans xii. 2), reinvigorating the Divine element that had been almost killed within him, bringing him towards God, setting him free from the power of sin which ends in death and turning his attention to the things of the Spirit (Romans viii. 2, 5), making him a temple of God in which dwells the Spirit of God (1 Corinthians iii. 16).

In that last metaphor of the temple, the idea of force and growth is lost : it is a very external figure, and has no grip of the inner nature of the process. It was, however, suitable after a fashion to the Corinthians, who were new converts from paganism, and continued from old habit to regard the power of God as something that dwelt in a temple. Paul

<sup>1</sup> The very word *προγράφειν*, to set forth openly, to placard in public, refers (as Lightfoot rightly remarks) to the custom of publishing documents of this class by a public copy before the eyes of all citizens in a conspicuous place.

had to raise their old way of thinking to a higher level, so that when they searched this level they could see more clearly the real nature of the whole, and the true nature of the relation between God and man ; and through this metaphor he does lead up the mind of the Corinthians to the higher, in fact to the highest possible and supreme level : “ since you are the temple of God, the Spirit of God dwelleth in you.” Beyond that there is nothing greater : there is nothing more completely and finally true than that : “ the kingdom of God is within you,” for “ the Spirit of God dwelleth in you.”

The result of this indwelling Spirit of God is to quicken and strengthen the capability of the man to love. In love the human nature approaches most closely to God, for the love that God entertains towards man is the initial and the final law of the world. “ Faith working through love ” (Galatians v. 6) is another expression for this result : “ the Spirit working through love ” is an equivalent statement of the law of Christian life.

The apparently supernatural powers which were seen occasionally in specially striking manifestations were the spiritual gifts <sup>1</sup> of which the early writers often speak, and which the Corinthians so eagerly desired and aimed at. They are great and impressive expressions of the one permanent power dwelling in the Christian man ; but, being exceptional in their appearance and not absolutely continuous, they are really less true and lofty and lasting, though they appear more striking to the external observer. It is the permanent, and not the occasional, that is the really and fundamentally Divine. As Professor W. P. Paterson <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> χαρίσματα τὰ πνευματικά.

<sup>2</sup> *The Apostles' Teaching*, i. p. 82. To Dr. Paterson's conversations, when we were colleagues in Aberdeen, I owe more than can be adequately expressed.

expresses it, "The Christian life consists, not in occasional spiritual exaltation, but in a walk in the Spirit" (Galatians v. 25). Hence Paul, while respecting such powers and occasional manifestations, warns the Corinthians that these are not the greatest things. Even though miracles seem to fail, yet miracles are not the most important expressions of the Spirit and power of God. The continuous expression of that Spirit and power in love is the greatest, the truest, the most lasting (1 Corinthians xiii. 13).

This Spirit of God co-operates with the innate sympathy of man for God, and strengthens the natural perception of man in the belief that he is the child of God : this is natural to all men, so long as they give free play to their own nature.<sup>1</sup> "The Spirit Himself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are children of God."<sup>2</sup>

Further, the Spirit of God produces in man the power of insight into the nature of God ; it is a continuous and growing revelation of God to him ; it advances and widens his knowledge of God : "a spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Him, keeping the eyes of your heart enlightened that ye may know" (Ephesians i. 17, 18) : "we received the Spirit which is from God . . . the Spirit which searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God . . . that we might know" (1 Corinthians ii. 12, 10, 12).

It also gives us the power of expressing these "deep things of God." On this power Paul's experience induced him to lay special stress in writing to these Corinthians (1 Cor. ii. 13), who rather prided themselves on their ability to conceive and express philosophically the truth of God. Paul tells them that only through the power of the Spirit can they

<sup>1</sup> So Paul said to the Athenians Acts xvii. 27-29, quoting the words of more than one among the Greek poets.

<sup>2</sup> To "bear witness" here means to confirm and strengthen the perception that is naturally existent in man.

express the things of the Spirit. Poetic phraseology, the technical terms of philosophy, metaphors drawn by man from the experience of life, all were inadequate and ineffective. Doubtless, Paul would have included in this list of inadequate expressions some of his own metaphors in so far as they were human and external: only in virtue of the enthusiasm and the passionate feeling that surged through them did they become true: in themselves, as mere philosophical terms, they were incomplete and lifeless. "Which things also we speak, not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Spirit teacheth; marrying spiritual ideas to spiritual words." Philosophical terms are valueless, dead, uncreative. Paul wants spiritual terms to convey his meaning; and the intensity of his emotion gives life to them.

That the idea of force or power is dominative in Paul appears in Tim. ii. 15, which has always been misunderstood through failure to perceive that the writer is describing the motive power of an immensely strong instinct in the human mind: this was pointed out by the writer in the *EXPOSITOR* 1910. In 1 Cor. i. 23 Paul "preaches Christ crucified . . . , the power and the wisdom of God": the scandal of the crucifixion is called not a fact but a force, the expression of God's ruling providence. This power and wisdom of God is not merely a power outside of man: it is also in man, expressing itself through the right action of man.

W. M. RAMSAY.

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